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From the Dust Jacket: McNarmara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969, volume VI in the newly-named Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the brief, but significant, tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative. During these years, Vietnam touched every aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, determining budget priorities, provoking domestic unrest, souring relations with NATO, and complicating negotiations with the Soviet Union. McNamara's early miscalculations about Vietnam became the source of deep disappointments. Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never good, frayed almost to the breaking point as McNamara repeatedly rejected military advice in favor of his civilian experts. McNamara's carefully crafted plans failed, his frustrations grew, and he became estranged from the President. His private attempts to check the war's momentum contradicted his public statements supporting the military effort and tarred McNamara as a hypocrite. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, arrived with a reputation as a hawk, but focused most of his effort on extricating the United States from Vietnam. McNamara and Clifford presided over the Department of Defense during momentous and dangerous times. Vietnam was one of a series of wars, emergencies, and interventions involving U.S. interests. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, declining U.S. prestige and power in Europe and NATO, war in the Middle East, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, arms control talks with the Soviet Union, and violent protests at home competed for attention. Overseeing the Vietnam War and contending with these complex policy issues taxed even McNamara's enormous energy and brilliant intellect as he struggled to manage DoD programs. His long-cherished cost-cutting programs fell by the wayside; his favored weapons systems were swept aside; his committed efforts to limit strategic arms faltered; and his reputation was permanently tarnished. McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam highlights the interaction of McNamara and Clifford with the White House, Congress, the JCS, the Department of State, and other federal agencies involved in policy formulation. The two secretaries increasingly found that the cost of winning the war became a morally prohibitive as the price of losing. ; Volumes 1-5 have series title: History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 654-671) and index. ; Arms Control : An Elusive Goal. Multilateral force ; Test ban and nonproliferation ; Threshold test ban treaty debate ; Comprehensive test ban treaty ; Nuclear nonproliferation treaty ; Arms control-through 1967 ; Arms control 1968 -- ABM: Centerpiece Of Strategic Defense. Strategic forces, 1965 ; Civil defense ; Soviet buildup ; Old bombers, new bombers, advanced bombers ; ABM debate ; To Glassboro ; Announcing the deployment of the ABM ; Clifford's approach to strategic arms -- NATO Readjustment. France secedes ; Nuclear planning group ; Flexible response ; NATO and Vietnam -- NATO: Burden-Sharing And U.S. Troop Reduction. Framing the issue ; Force structures ; Reduction of U.S. forces in Europe ; Assessing Germany's share of the load ; OSD, the JCS, and troop reductions in Germany ; Tripartite talks ; Clark Clifford and NATO ; Aftermath of Czechoslovakia -- Crisis In The Middle East. Genesis of the crisis ; Onset of an emergency ; Personal diplomacy ; To the breaking point ; Six-day war ; Arab reaction ; Attack on the Liberty and the U S -Soviet crisis ; Aftermath ; Rearming Israel -- Battle Over Military Assistance. FY 1966 MAP request ; Vietnam assistance and FY 1966 MAP ; FY 1967 MAP ; More is needed ; Export-import bank credit controversy ; FY 1969 MAP ; Final MAP proposal -- Year Of Crises. Losing H-bombs ; Pueblo and the Blue House ; Prague spring: Moscow summer ; REDCOSTE and the Czech effect -- Strategy And Cost-Effectiveness. Cost-efficient war? ; Strategic forces ; Procurement contracting impact ; Cost reduction ; Global drawdown ; Conclusion. ; Movers and Shakers. DoD's senior leadership ; Civilian-military divide ; Commander in chief ; National security policymaking apparatus ; Mastering the Pentagon -- Vietnam : Escalation Without Mobilization. Pondering escalation ; Hidden escalation ; More troops, more money ; Enemy dictates the course of action ; McNamara's 180-degree turn ; Conflicting assessments ; President's decision -- Air War Against North Vietnam, 1965-1966. Targeting North Vietnam ; Rolling thunder ; Working toward an extended bombing pause ; Resuming rolling thunder ; POL debate ; Rolling thunder: indecision, discord, and escalation -- Paying For A War: Budgets, Supplements, And Estimates, 1965-1967. FY 1966 defense budget ; 1965 supplemental ; August supplemental amendment to the 1966 budget ; FY 1966 supplemental ; FY 1967 defense budget ; Vietnam spending and the economy -- Vietnam: Escalating A Ground War, July 1965-July 1967. Planning a ground war ; Hard choices ; Cost-effective deployments ; Barrier concept ; More troops, more questions ; Search for a winning formula -- More Than Expected: Supplementals And Budgets, 1966-1968. Enacting the FY 1966 supplemental ; FY 1967 defense budget ; Need for a FY 1967 supplemental budget ; Price of escalation ; Enacting the FY 1967 supplemental ; FY 1968 budget request ; Defending the FY 1968 budget -- Vietnam: An Endless War, 1967-1968. Accelerating troop deployments ; Shaping public opinion ; Manning the barrier ; Khe Sanh ; Tet offensive ; New secretary ; Ground war grinds on ; Settling in or getting out ; Fighting while negotiating -- Air War Against North Vietnam: Escalation To Cessation, 1967-1968. State of the air war at the outset of 1967 ; Targeting debate ; Rift widens ; Pennsylvania initiative ; After tet -- Bills Come Due: Budgets And Supplementals, 1968-1970. Final FY 1968 defense budget ; How big a tax increase? ; Proposed FY 1969 budget submission ; Juggling the numbers ; Passage of the FY 1968 SEA supplemental ; Enactment of the FY 1969 budget ; FY 1970 defense budget -- Home Front. Conscripts and volunteers: lower standards, greater inequality ; Project 100,000 ; Race and casualties ; Burning cities: rising protest ; March on the Pentagon ; 1968 riots -- Another Cuba?. Intervention in the Dominican Republic ; Justifying intervention ; Operational plans and planning operations ; Perils of peacekeeping ; Withdrawal ; From the Dust Jacket: McNarmara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969, volume VI in the newly-named Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the brief, but significant, tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative. During these years, Vietnam touched every aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, determining budget priorities, provoking domestic unrest, souring relations with NATO, and complicating negotiations with the Soviet Union. McNamara's early miscalculations about Vietnam became the source of deep disappointments. Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never good, frayed almost to the breaking point as McNamara repeatedly rejected military advice in favor of his civilian experts. McNamara's carefully crafted plans failed, his frustrations grew, and he became estranged from the President. His private attempts to check the war's momentum contradicted his public statements supporting the military effort and tarred McNamara as a hypocrite. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, arrived with a reputation as a hawk, but focused most of his effort on extricating the United States from Vietnam. McNamara and Clifford presided over the Department of Defense during momentous and dangerous times. Vietnam was one of a series of wars, emergencies, and interventions involving U.S. interests. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, declining U.S. prestige and power in Europe and NATO, war in the Middle East, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, arms control talks with the Soviet Union, and violent protests at home competed for attention. Overseeing the Vietnam War and contending with these complex policy issues taxed even McNamara's enormous energy and brilliant intellect as he struggled to manage DoD programs. His long-cherished cost-cutting programs fell by the wayside; his favored weapons systems were swept aside; his committed efforts to limit strategic arms faltered; and his reputation was permanently tarnished. McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam highlights the interaction of McNamara and Clifford with the White House, Congress, the JCS, the Department of State, and other federal agencies involved in policy formulation. The two secretaries increasingly found that the cost of winning the war became a morally prohibitive as the price of losing. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Après le déclenchement des révoltes arabes en 2010, la Tunisie est le seul pays arabe à s'être démocratisé avec succès, dans une région où un repli autoritaire est en train de sévir. Les chercheurs ont étudié la transition démocratique tunisienne en se concentrant principalement sur ses facteurs internes, alors qu'ils ont accordé peu d'attention à l'impact des facteurs internationaux et des influences externes sur le processus de transition. S'appuyant sur une analyse qualitative, cette étude examine la dimension internationale de la transition de la Tunisie vers la démocratie et soutient que les facteurs et influences internationaux ont joué un rôle important dans le processus de démocratisation. Cette recherche se concentre sur l'impact que l'agence des promoteurs internationaux de la démocratie a eu sur la structure nationale tunisienne. Il met en évidence la façon dont l'interaction entre les acteurs internationaux et les groupes nationaux tunisiens a contribué au processus de démocratisation, sans soutenir que les facteurs externes ont imposé les choix et des acteurs politiques et sociaux tunisiens. L'étude expose trois résultats théoriques qui contribuent au débat sur la dimension internationale de la démocratisation. Premièrement, cette recherche suggère que lorsque les promoteurs internationaux de la démocratie soutiennent les oppositions nationales à développer une confiance mutuelle à renforcer leurs liens, et de combler les divisions, il favorise l'émergence des nouveaux 'centres de pouvoir'. Les données empiriques fournies par cette étude démontrent que les programmes d'aide à la démocratie et les influences libérales internationales ont favorisé la création d'une coalition tunisienne pro-démocratie d'opposition au régime de Ben Ali. Deuxièmement, cette étude avance que le faible niveau de la bataille étrangère pour l'influence en Tunisie a facilité le processus de négociation entre les élites de transition pendant le processus de démocratisation. Troisièmement, cette étude soutient que lors de la transition tunisienne vers la démocratie, les promoteurs internationaux de la démocratie ont aidé les partis politiques tunisiens à passer d'un consensus initial sur la mise en place d'un système politique démocratique à une concurrence au sein du système démocratique mis en place. Bien que cette étude se concentre uniquement sur le cas de la Tunisie, tous les chapitres fournissent des preuves comparatives avec d'autres contextes régionaux. ; Following the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, Tunisia is the only Arab country that has democratized successfully in a region where authoritarian retrenchment prevails. Scholars have studied the Tunisian transition to democracy focusing mainly on domestic factors, devoting little attention to the role international factors and external influences played in the transitional process. Relying on qualitative analysis, this study investigates the international dimension of Tunisia's transition to democracy and argues that international factors and influences played a relevant role in the democratization process. This research focuses on the impact the agency of international democracy promoters had on Tunisian national structure during the transition to democracy, without downplaying the agency of Tunisian political and social actors. It highlights how the interplay between international actors and Tunisia domestic groups contributed to the making of the democratization process. The study lays out three theoretical findings that contribute to the debates on the international dimension of democratization and democracy promotion. First, it suggests that when international democracy promoters support domestic oppositions in developing mutual trust, strengthening ties and bridging divisions, they enhance the emergence of new alternative 'centres of power' to the regime. Second, this study argues that the low level of foreign squabbling for influence in Tunisia facilitated the bargaining process among transitional elites during the democratization process. Third, this study suggests that during the Tunisian transition to democracy, international democracy promoters helped Tunisian transition elites to move from the initial consensus over democracy to competition within the democracy. While this study focuses only on the Tunisia's case, all the chapters provide comparative evidence with other countries in the Middle East and North Africa to back up the empirical findings and the theoretical reflections.

Abstrak -- Kedaulatan negara di wilayah udara berdasarkan Konvensi Chicago 1944 tentang International Civil Aviation adalah bersifat "Complete" dan "Exclusive". Namun ada fenomena yang muncul dalam pelaksanaan konsep kedaulatan di wilayah udara Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, dimana ada sebagian wilayah udara Indonesia yaitu diatas kepulauan Riau dan Natuna yang ruang udaranya dalam pengaturan pelayanan navigasi penerbangan Flight Information Region (FIR) Singapura, yang tentunya berpengaruh terhadap kedaulatan negara Indonesia yang penuh dan eksklusif atas ruang udara tersebut. Sehiungga perlu dilakukan penelitian tentang realignment flight information region Singapura dalam rangka penegakan kedaulatan negara di wilayah udara nasional, untuk menganalisis penyebab keberadaan Flight Information Region Singapura di wilayah udara kepulauan Riau dan natuna, dampak pengaturan FIR Singapura terhadap kedaulatan wilayah udara Indonesia, dan upaya pemerintah Indonesia dalam rangka realignment FIR Singapura tersebut di wilayah udara tersebut. Penelitian ini menggunakan Metode pendekatan kualitatif eksplanatory, data penelitian diperoleh melalui wawancara mendalam terhadap para informan dengan menggunakan teknik expert sampling, observasi, dan penelaahan dokumen/studi literatur. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa : (1) Keberadaan FIR Singapura di wilayah udara kepulauan Riau dan Natuna dilatarbelakangi sejarah pembentukan FIR oleh ICAO yang kemudian diwariskan Inggris kepada Singapura dan pendelegasian oleh Indonesia kepada Singapura melalui perjanjian bilateral, (2) Dampak pengaturan FIR Singapura terhadap kedaulatan Indonesia meliputi aspek pertahanan dan keamanan, sosial-ekonomi, dan kepentingan pemberdayaan lingkungan udara, (3) Upaya-upaya yang dilakukan Pemerintah Indonesia untuk realignment FIR Singapura meliputi bidang diplomatik, regulasi dan teknis. Hal ini membuktikan bahwa pelayanan navigasi penerbangan dalam suatu wilayah udara (FIR) tidak semata-mata untuk tujuan keselamatan penerbangan, akan tetapi memiliki kaitan yang erat dengan kedaulatan negara di wilayah udara nasional.Kata kunci: kedaulatan negara di wilayah udara, realignment, flight information region Abstract -- The sovereignty of the state in airspace based on the Chicago Convention of 1944 concerning International Civil Aviation is "Complete" and "Exclusive". But there is a phenomenon that appears in the implementation of the concept of sovereignty in the airspace of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, where there is a portion of Indonesian airspace, namely the Riau and Natuna islands whose air space is in Singapore Flight Information Region (FIR) navigation service arrangements, which certainly affects sovereignty Indonesia is full and exclusive of the airspace. So it is necessary to do research on Singapore's realignment flight information region in order to enforce state sovereignty in national airspace, to analyze the causes of Singapore's Flight Information Region in the Riau and Natuna airspace, the impact of Singapore's FIR regulation on the sovereignty of Indonesian airspace, and the Indonesian government's efforts in the framework of the Singapore FIR realignment in the airspace. This study uses an explanatory qualitative approach method, research data obtained through in-depth interviews with informants using expert sampling, observation, and document review / literature studies. The results showed that: (1) The existence of the Singapore FIR in the Riau and Natuna archipelago airspace was based on the history of the formation of the FIR by ICAO which was later inherited from Britain to Singapore and Indonesia's delegation to Singapore through bilateral agreements, (2) Impact of Singapore FIR arrangements on Indonesian sovereignty covering aspects of defense and security, socio-economic, and the interests of empowering the air environment, (3) Efforts made by the Indonesian Government for FIR Singapore's realignment include diplomatic, regulatory and technical fields. This proves that flight navigation services in an airspace (FIR) are not solely for the purpose of aviation safety, but have a close relationship with the sovereignty of the country in national airspace.Keywords: state sovereignty in airspace, realignment, flight information region

To settle the Russo-Ukraine war diplomatically, a number of analysts have suggested that the apparent military stalemate be accepted in a ceasefire agreement in which Ukraine would be partitioned along the current battle lines.One possibility would be to include in such an agreement a formal legal acceptance of Russia's annexation of Crimea and of the areas it now controls in southeast Ukraine. Another, more plausible possibility would be to leave the issue of formal acceptance open to further negotiation after armed hostilities have ended. That was the path accepted for the division of Korea after the war there ended in 1953. (Seventy years later, a formal settlement of the war has yet to be worked out.) And a third alternative would be to formally accept Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea while leaving the territorial acquisitions in its 2022 invasion up for later negotiation.All three ceasefire proposals assume that Ukraine would give up about 18 percent of its pre-2014 territory at least for the time being.Beyond halting the ongoing mayhem and destruction, Ukraine would gain two advantages from these ceasefire possibilities.First, Ukraine is, economically speaking, better off without the areas captured by the Russians. Crimea and the Donbas area were a drain on Kyiv before the Russian incursions, and the situation in Crimea is probably even worse now as it no longer has appeal to well-heeled tourists from Europe. And much of the rest of the captured territory, from which over half the population has fled, is something of a rubble heap which the Russians would have to pay to reconstruct. Indeed, estimates are that they already are shelling out some $11 billion per year in the occupied territories. Even after ceasefire and partition, they would likely have to police their occupation against insurgents.Second, a lasting ceasefire would give the bulk of Ukraine a chance (and a spur) to quietly work on its problems of corruption and economic stagnation that currently hamper its efforts to join the West. Dealing with these pathologies is likely as well to be helpful and perhaps necessary to persuade many of those who have fled their homeland to return.There's a lot to do. Ukraine enjoys many advantages: a rich history, a well-educated workforce, and abundant natural resources, including some of the best farmland on the planet. Nevertheless, among the 25 post-Communist countries, it came dead last in economic growth over the last three decades. In 1991, its GDP per capita was about the same as that of Poland, but, by 2015, it was only a quarter or a third of Poland's. By 2019 (before COVID-19 and before the Russian invasion), Ukraine had managed to become the poorest country in Europe.Maybe northwest Ukraine, with the debilitating war halted, could eventually figure out how to emulate South Korea which was in much worse shape when partition and ceasefire were declared on its peninsula in 1953. And if there are decades of peace, it seems possible that Ukraine and Russia, even as they continue, however uneasily, to negotiate the partition issue, could gradually establish a comfortable co-existence resembling the ones embraced by the U.S. and Canada or by Germany and Austria — examples Russia's leader, Vladimir Putin, put forward as models a few months before the war.Although Putin has often expressed of late a willingness to negotiate, there is considerable and understandable concern that he cannot be trusted to abide by a ceasefire in part because he may actually harbor broader goals, perhaps including plans to attack the rest of Ukraine or other countries in the neighborhood, such as Poland.Any agreement on partition would constitute a substantial gamble that Putin does not entertain such ambitions. It is true that he once said, "Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart." But he followed it up with "whoever wants it back has no brain." And, given the military problems that followed his invasion of Ukraine, it seems unlikely that he will mount similar ventures elsewhere where defenders would be better prepared or assured of intervention by more powerful allies in their defense. His pre-war boast that his soldiers "could be in Kyiv in two days" has, to say the least, proved hollow. In addition, it seems clear that in Russian eyes, as Putin biographer Philip Short strongly stresses, Ukraine is much more nearly a special case than a stepping stone to wider adventures — Russia scarcely needs more land.Putin, then, may not have designs on territory he does not currently control and he may be willing to accept, and abide by, a Korea-like partition. Getting the costly mess of a war out of the way with some semblance of dignity would likely have great appeal to him and it certainly would to the Russian people. To make the pill less poisonous, Ukraine could drop the (mindless) laws that have sought to demote the Russian language, such as the one that requires shopkeepers to greet all customers in Ukrainian. The underproductive sanctions on Russia could also be reduced or dropped.Overall, Putin's war will likely go down in history as a fiasco. Ukraine will continue to move out of his orbit and toward the West, Ukrainian nationalism and hostility to Russia have been greatly enhanced, the use of the Russian language there continues to decline, the NATO alliance has been expanded and strengthened, and the huge Western market for Russian oil has largely been obliterated. Even before the war, economists were finding that prospects for substantial Russian economic growth over the next decade in Putin's economically-declining kleptocracy to be "dim." And his war is likely to have alienated prospective buyers and investors for a long time. Moreover, even if Ukraine does not formally join NATO (which several members have opposed anyway due to the country's corruption and other ills), the alliance can still supply something of a security guarantee by pledging arms and other assistance to Ukraine should Putin seek to expand his hold. Nonetheless, Putin will surely try to spin a partition agreement as a victory. For example, he would be able to claim that he now controls a land bridge to beleaguered Russians in Crimea, though that was not one of his demands when he started his war.More importantly, he will claim success because, as he fantasized when launching the war, it undercut a military buildup in Ukraine by NATO that would eventually lead the alliance to invade Russia in the way Germany had in 1941. In his recent interview with Putin, Tucker Carlson suggested that notion was "paranoid," launching Putin into a deeply flawed "historical background" monologue that ran for some 20 minutes. Nonetheless, Putin still stresses that he requires some sort of guarantee that his nightmare fantasy will not become a reality, and that perspective seems to have sold well in Russia. (As usual, people believe what they want to believe.) It must be possible for the West to offer such a guarantee — to effectively forgo doing what it had no intention to do anyway.

The doctoral research, which is reported here, was carried out within the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes network in support of international cooperation (RESACOOP). It aims to understand the meaning built on international solidarity -through its history, the social representations that prevail and the external communication of international solidarity associations -as well as to propose and experiment with ways of communicating democratic international solidarity. International solidarity is plural. For associations in the field, it refers to three main activities: humanitarian action, development and education for citizenship and international solidarity. However, while there is much work on the communication of humanitarian NGOs (Carion, 2010; Dauvin, 2010), international solidarity in all its diversity is not the subject of research. The challenge of this thesis is to try to fill this gap.From an epistemological point of view, this research is part of the information and communication sciences. This discipline thinks of links, it is held in the inter (Bougnoux, 1993): it is relationships that give meaning to the world. It then finds its place in methodological relationalism, a paradigm according to which individuals and collective forms are a "specific crystallization of social relations taken in various socio-historical contexts" (Corcuff, 2017, p. 111). The language of "this relational program" (Corcuff, 2017, p. 111) is constructivism. In this constructivist vision, communication contributes to the definition of identities and the common world (Mucchielli, 2000). Conversely, communication between individuals is the result of the social construction of reality. Hence the interest, and this is one of the challenges of this research, in bringing together social representations and communication and, more particularly, social representations of international solidarity and communication of its associative actors.On the theoretical level, this thesis is inspired by the pragmatic approach of the communication proposed by John Dewey. According to him, one of the instrumental aims of communication is to build a Great Community (Dewey[1927], 2010, p. 236) which is the ideal of democracy. To strive towards this ideal implies that everyone has the ability to make public judgments, through participation. In the development of this democratic competence, associations should play a major role. However, the hypothesis that led to this doctoral work is that this is not the case. Indeed, this thesis was born from a disorder related to my professional practice: there is a gap between the end (the aspiration for international solidarity) and the means (a communication inviting "citizens of the North" to "help the victims of the South"). To confirm this disorder and attempt to resolve it, this action research adopts a three-part plan. The first provides the theoretical and methodological framework for what John Dewey ([1938], 1993) calls a "social inquiry" and presents a history of international solidarity. The second confronts the production of associations and reception by audiences. It highlights the failure of communication, which fails to change social representations or achieve the operational objectives set by the communicators met. Based on this observation, the third part tries to propose ways of thinking about a new way of considering and practising communication. It is based on theoretical contributions (decolonial thinking, economic sociology, the incommunication model), but also on experiments conducted throughout these four years of research. ; La recherche doctorale, dont il est ici rendu compte, fait l'objet d'une CIFRE, au sein du réseau Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes d'appui à la coopération internationale (RESACOOP). Elle vise à comprendre le sens construit sur la solidarité internationale – par son histoire, les représentations sociales qui ont cours et la communication externe des associations de solidarité internationale (ASI) – ainsi qu'à proposer et expérimenter des pistes de communication de solidarité internationale (CSI) démocratique. La solidarité internationale est plurielle. Pour les associations du domaine (ASI), elle se réfère à trois activités principales : l'action humanitaire, le développement et l'éducation à la citoyenneté et à la solidarité internationale (ECSI). Or, s'il existe bien des travaux portant sur la communication des ONG humanitaires (Carion, 2010; Dauvin, 2010), la CSI dans toute sa diversité ne fait pas l'objet de recherche. L'enjeu de cette thèse est d'essayer de combler cette lacune. D'un point de vue épistémologique, cette recherche s'inscrit en sciences de l'information et de la communication (SIC). Les SIC pensent les liens, elles se tiennent dans l'inter (Bougnoux, 1993) : ce sont les relations qui donnent sens au monde. Elles trouvent alors leur place dans le relationnalisme méthodologique, paradigme selon lequel les individus et les formes collectives sont une «cristallisation spécifique de relations sociales prises dans des contextes sociohistoriques variés» (Corcuff, 2017, p.111). Le langage de «ce programme relationniste» (Corcuff, 2017, p.111) est le constructivisme. Dans cette vision constructiviste, la communication participe à la définition des identités et du monde commun (Mucchielli, 2000). À l'inverse, la communication entre individus est fruit de la construction sociale de la réalité. D'où l'intérêt, et c'est l'un des enjeux de cette recherche, de faire dialoguer représentations sociales et communication et, plus particulièrement, représentations sociales de la solidarité internationale et communication de ses acteur·rices associatif·ves. Sur le plan théorique, cette thèse s'inspire de l'approche pragmatique de la communication proposée par John Dewey. Selon lui, l'une des visées instrumentales de la communication est de construire une Grande communauté (Dewey [1927], 2010, p. 236) qui est l'idéal de la démocratie. Tendre vers cet idéal implique que chacun·e ait la capacité de former des jugements publics, par la participation. Dans le développement de cette compétence démocratique, les ASI devraient jouer un rôle majeur. Pourtant, l'hypothèse qui a conduit à ce travail doctoral est que tel n'est pas le cas. En effet, cette thèse est née d'un trouble lié à ma pratique professionnelle : il existe un décalage entre la fin (l'aspiration à une solidarité internationale) et les moyens (une communication invitant les «citoyen·nes du Nord» à «aider les victimes du Sud»). Pour confirmer ce trouble et tenter de le résoudre, cette recherche-action adopte un plan en trois parties. La première dresse le cadre théorique et méthodologique de ce que John Dewey ([1938], 1993) nomme une «enquête sociale» et présente un historique de la solidarité internationale. La seconde confronte production des ASI et réception par des publics. Elle met en avant l'échec de la CSI qui ne parvient ni à faire évoluer les représentations sociales ni à atteindre les objectifs opérationnels fixés par les communicant·es rencontré·es. Partant de ce constat, la troisième partie s'efforce de proposer des pistes permettant de penser une nouvelle manière d'envisager et de pratiquer la CSI. Elle s'appuie sur des apports théoriques (la pensée décoloniale, la sociologie économique, le modèle de l'incommunication), mais aussi sur des expérimentations conduites tout au long de ces quatre années de recherche.

The final chapter brings to the scene the European Union whose influence in shaping the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes and the lives of their citizens is highly significant. Today the region is divided into the EU members and the potential candidates for membership. When it comes to the EU's role in influencing, shaping, defining and re-defining the citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslav region, this chapter shows how diverse the EU's actions and results are and how often, alongside obvious improvements, they appear problematic, counterproductive or fruitless. The chapter focuses on five major ways whereby the EU itself (mis)manages these citizenship regimes and their citizens: (a) direct intervention and supervision such as in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia; (b) the visa liberalization process in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia; (c) the pre-accession influence in Croatia (until 2013), Serbia and Montenegro; (d) the post-accession influence in EU members Croatia (after 2013) and Slovenia, and, finally, (e) the influence exerted by individual EU Member States (Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria and, after 2013, Croatia) on non-EU post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. The final chapter in the story of one hundred years of citizenship in and after Yugoslavia brings to the scene another powerful player whose influence in shaping the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes and influencing the lives of their citizens is far from insignificant. The EU has been the most powerful political and economic agent in this region that has effectively divided it into the EU members and the potential candidates for membership. The former Yugoslav space overlaps with the so-called Western Balkans, a changing geopolitical construct forged in Brussels, composed of those former Yugoslav republics that have not joined the EU so far plus Albania. The 'Western Balkans' approach as an umbrella term for the countries outside the EU but completely encircled by the EU, though the Schengen border moves much slower, hides the fact that, regardless of the EU membership, Slovenia is still deeply involved with its southern neighbours and Croatia remains one of the most important actors in the former Yugoslav space. One could say that 'Yugoslavia' in this respect has disappeared as a political entity but not as a geopolitical space.

The EU does not only directly influence its members (Slovenia and Croatia), supervises the Western Balkan candidates – 'negotiations' being a euphemism for a one-way communication amounting to the huge translation operation of the acquis communautaire – but it actually maintains there two semi-protectorates (Bosnia and Kosovo). It has developed varied approaches: bilaterally negotiating membership (Croatia before 2013, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania), punishing and rewarding (Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania), managing (Bosnia), governing (Kosovo) and, finally, ignoring (Macedonia blocked in the name dispute with Greece). The EU in the Balkans is therefore not only a club that tests its candidates. It is an active player in transforming them, politically, socially and economically. David Chandler concludes that 'the EU's discourse of governance enables it to exercise a regulatory power over the 174candidate member states of Southeastern Europe while evading any reflection on the EU's own management processes, which are depoliticized in the framing of the technocratic or administrative conditions of enlargement' (2010: 69). If the EU basically builds future or potential member states, then we have to ask how the EU manages both citizenship regimes of the post-Yugoslav states and their citizens.

A thesis submitted to the University of Bedfordshire, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ; Background Addressing the shortage and increasing the 'home grown' NHS workforce is a key aspect of the Government's Widening Participation agenda British South Asians (BSA) and men are underrepresented within the nursing workforce. Existing evidence highlights some salient barriers (and enablers) for underrepresented groups entering and progressing in nursing careers. There is however little evidence exploring the experiences of 'home grown' BSA men. Therefore, this study aimed to take an intersectional approach to examining the barriers and enablers for BSA men entering and progressing in NHS nursing careers in England. Methods A convergent parallel mixed methods approach was adopted. A quantitative secondary descriptive analysis (using proportion ratios, for comparison between BSA and White men, using confidence intervals to test statistical significance) was conducted on national data on applications (n=150,445 applicants over 3 year period), acceptances and attrition rates (n=416,457 total enrolled students over 3 year period) in relation to nursing pre-registration courses in England and NHS nursing workforce (n=1,254,368 full time equivalent staff posts) from 2013-2016 inclusive. Qualitative focus groups were conducted in Luton, with BSA young men (n=22) and BSA parents (n=35). One to one interviews were conducted nationally with professionals and stakeholders (n=5 nurses, 5 other professionals) to ascertain their views. A Framework Approach was used for analysis purposes. Results and Findings The review of national data showed that BSA men are twice as likely to apply for nursing pre-registration courses than their British White male counterparts (PR=2.32: 95% CI: 2.22-2.42); half as likely to be accepted on nursing pre-registration courses (PR=0.54: 95% CI: 0.47-0.62); 18% more likely to leave their nursing course without achieving the intended award (PR=1.18: CI 95%: 1.15-1.21); and underrepresented in senior, management or specialist roles within the workforce (PR=0.35: CI 95%: 0.30- 0.40). The focus groups and interviews revealed a number of themes. Barriers included poor pay and conditions negative family views, negative media representations, ethnicity including culture; religion; masculinity and gender, a lack of knowledge and awareness of the nursing profession, and less favourable comparison of nursing with medical doctors as a profession. Enablers included personal circumstances, role models including friends and family, ethnicity including religion and masculinity and nursing as a noble profession. Conclusion and Recommendations Quantitative results suggest variation in nursing education outcomes based upon ethnicity which merit further enquiry via qualitative research to identify institutional barriers in selection practices. Difficulties in identifying 'home grown' BSA nurses (as opposed to internationally recruited nurses in the NHS workforce) highlight a significant challenge for benchmarking aspirations to develop a 'home grown' workforce. Data capture systems should be reviewed in the light of this finding. Qualitative findings suggest the need for culturally specific interventions to reduce the stigma associated with nursing in the BSA community to attract a more diverse nursing workforce, including an emphasis on the values common to BSA masculinities and aspects of the nursing profession. BSA male nurses experience institutional racism, which impedes their career progression, therefore NHS employer organisations should review relevant recruitment and retention policy and practice for this group.

Abstract: Declining visitor interest in traditional markets is one of the problems currently faced by traditional markets. The form of government effort to maintain the existence of traditional markets is by conducting a revitalization program. Semarang Peterongan Market is one of the Semarang City public facilities located on Jl. MT. Haryono No.936, Peterongan, Kec. South Semarang. Before burned, the conditions were very poor namely slums, dirty, irregular arrangement of shanties and unavailability of parking lots. This study aimed to identify the factors that caused traders not to occupy the 2nd and 3rd floors of the Peterongan Market , identifying buyer preferences to the efforts of the revitalization program that have been carried out at the Peterongan Market and to evaluate the physical, non-physical components and infrastructure that exist in the Peterongan Market. The study used a descriptive qualitative approach. Data collection is done by means of observation and interviews with market agencies, visitors and traders. The results showed that there were factors that caused traders not to occupy the 2nd and 3rd floors, buyers were reluctant to go up to the 2nd and 3rd floors, there was worst accessibility for traders or buyers, there were obstacles in the circulation of merchandise, design and size of kiosks and booths. accommodate the needs of traders. Buyers and traders' preferences are access and circulation that can accommodate their needs in the market, design kiosks and booths that are suitable for their trade. Based on the analysis results of the Semarang Peterongan Market building evaluation analyzed with regulations that apply to the physical component, it is generally appropriate.Keyword: zoning, circulation, user preferences,revitalizationAbstrak: Menurunya minat pengunjung terhadap pasar tradisional menjadi salah satu masalah yang sedang dihadapi pasar tradisional sekarang ini. Bentuk usaha pemerintah untuk menjaga eksistensi pasar tradisional yaitu dengan melakukan program revitalisasi. Pasar Peterongan Semarang merupakan salah satu fasilitas publik Kota Semarang yang berlokasi di Jl. MT. Haryono No.936, Peterongan, Kec. Semarang Selatan. Sebelum mengalami kebakaran,kondisi pasar sangat memprihatinkan yaitu kumuh,kotror,penataan lapak yang tidak teratur serta tidak tersedianya lahan parkir.Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi faktor-faktor pengaruh preferensi pengguna tentang apa saja penyebab pedagang tidak menempati lantai 2 dan lantai 3 Pasar Peterongan Semarang,mengidentifikasi preferensi pembeli terhadap upaya program revitalisasi yang sudah dilakukan di Pasar Peterongan serta mengevaluasi komponen fisik,non fisik serta prasarana yang ada pada Pasar Peterongan. Penelitian menggunakan metode pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif . Pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan cara observasi dan wawancara dengan dinas pasar,pengunjung serta pedagang. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan adanya faktor-faktor penyebab pedagang tidak menempati lantai 2 dan lantai 3 adalah pembeli enggan naik ke lantai 2 dan 3,tidak adanya aksesbilitas yang baik untuk pedagang maupun pembeli,terdapat kendala dalam sirkulasi barang dagangan,desain serta ukuran kios dan los tidak mengakomodasi kebutuhan pedagang. Preferensi pembeli dan pedagang cenderung dengan adanya akses serta sirkulasi yang dapat mengakomodasi kebutuhan mereka didalam pasar,desain kios serta los yang sesuai dengan jenis dagangan mereka. Berdasarkan hasil analisis evaluasi bangunan Pasar Peterongan Semarang dianalisis dengan peraturan yang berlaku pada komponen fisik,umumnya sesuai.Kata Kunci: zoning,sirkulasi,preferensi pengguna,revitalisasi

Child labor is very severe social obstacle of the world of under develop nations like Pakistan. Still most of the young children are working in different sectors for the livelihood of their homes. This study explore the anticipated regret and moral norm in consumers' intention to select child labor restaurants with the uses of augmenting the theory of planned behavior. Present study carried out in the five districts of south Punjab, Pakistan. There are three hundred questionnaires is filled from the owners of the restaurants from the selected regions. SPSS is used for the analysis of the data and multiple regression is used for testing the hypothesis. The results showed that theory of planned behavior constructs are significantly influence the intention of the child. Many owners took child as a labor because its cheap. While augmenting version of the planned behavior theory also good predictor of the child labor intentions. Government and NGOs take some actions to eliminate the child labor and sent into the schools. ; El trabajo infantil es un obstáculo social muy severo en el mundo de las naciones subdesarrolladas como Pakistán. Aún así, la mayoría de los niños pequeños están trabajando en diferentes sectores para el sustento de sus hogares. Este estudio explora el arrepentimiento anticipado y la norma moral en la intención de los consumidores de seleccionar restaurantes de trabajo infantil con el fin de aumentar la teoría del comportamiento planificado. Estudio actual realizado en los cinco distritos del sur de Punjab, Pakistán. Hay trescientos cuestionarios llenados por los propietarios de los restaurantes de las regiones seleccionadas. SPSS se utiliza para el análisis de los datos y la regresión múltiple se utiliza para probar la hipótesis. Los resultados mostraron que la teoría de los comportamientos planificados influye significativamente en la intención del niño. Muchos dueños tomaron al niño como mano de obra porque es barato. Si bien la versión aumentada de la teoría de la conducta planificada también es un buen predictor de las intenciones del trabajo infantil. El gobierno y las ONG toman algunas medidas para eliminar el trabajo infantil y las envían a las escuelas. ; O trabalho infantil é um obstáculo social muito grave do mundo dos países em desenvolvimento, como o Paquistão. Ainda a maioria das crianças jovens estão trabalhando em diferentes setores para o sustento de suas casas. Este estudo explora o lamento antecipado e a norma moral na intenção dos consumidores de selecionar restaurantes de trabalho infantil com o objetivo de aumentar a teoria do comportamento planejado. Presente estudo realizado nos cinco distritos do sul de Punjab, Paquistão. Existem trezentos questionários preenchidos pelos proprietários dos restaurantes das regiões selecionadas. O SPSS é usado para a análise dos dados e a regressão múltipla é usada para testar a hipótese. Os resultados mostraram que a teoria dos construtos de comportamento planejados influencia significativamente a intenção da criança. Muitos proprietários levaram criança como um trabalho de parto porque é barato. Enquanto aumenta a versão da teoria do comportamento planejado também bom preditor das intenções de trabalho infantil. O governo e as ONGs tomam algumas medidas para eliminar o trabalho infantil e enviá-las para as escolas.

Humans have altered nearly every natural disturbance regime on the planet through climate and land-use change, and in many instances, these processes may have interacting effects. For example, projected shifts in temperature and precipitation will likely influence disturbance regimes already affected by anthropogenic fire suppression or river impoundments. Understanding how disturbance-dependent species respond to complex and interacting environmental changes is important for conservation efforts. Using field-based demographic and movement rates, we conducted a metapopulation viability analysis for piping plovers (Charadrius melodus), a threatened disturbance-dependent species, along the Missouri and Platte rivers in the Great Plains of North America. Our aim was to better understand current and projected future metapopulation dynamics given that natural disturbances (flooding or high-flow events) have been greatly reduced by river impoundments and that climate change could further alter the disturbance regime. Although metapopulation abundance has been substantially reduced under the current suppressed disturbance regime (high-flow return interval similar to 20 yr), it could grow if the frequency of high-flow events increases as predicted under likely climate change scenarios. We found that a four-year return interval would maximize metapopulation abundance, and all subpopulations in the metapopulation would act as sources at a return interval of 15 yr or less. Regardless of disturbance frequency, the presence of even a small, stable source subpopulation buffered the metapopulation and sustained a low metapopulation extinction risk. Therefore, climate change could have positive effects in ecosystems where disturbances have been anthropogenically suppressed when climatic shifts move disturbance regimes toward more historical patterns. Furthermore, stable source populations, even if unintentionally maintained through anthropogenic activities, may be critical for the persistence of metapopulations of early-successional species under both suppressed disturbance regimes and disturbance regimes where climate change has further altered disturbance frequency or scope. ; Nebraska Environmental Trust ; Nebraska State Wildlife Grant Program ; Nebraska Wildlife Conservation Fund ; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) ; USFWS North Atlantic Landscape Conservation Cooperative ; Virginia Tech ; Funding was provided by the Nebraska Environmental Trust, the Nebraska State Wildlife Grant Program, the Nebraska Wildlife Conservation Fund, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the USFWS North Atlantic Landscape Conservation Cooperative, and Virginia Tech. We thank C. Aron, K. Brennan, R. Cobb, K. Crane, E. Dowd-Stukel, C. Huber, K. Kreil, C. Kruse, G. Pavelka, G. Wagner, W. Werkmeister, S. Wilson, L. Yager, and cooperators from the National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and Parks, Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, and the Missouri River Institute for support throughout the project. We would like to thank sand and gravel mining companies and lakeshore housing development communities for access to property. We acknowledge the tireless efforts of our many technicians from 2005 to 2013. We also thank five anonymous reviewers, T. Simmons, and C. McGowan (USGS) for their comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. This work was conducted under Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee permits 877 and 14-003, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Threatened and Endangered Species Permits TE070027-0 and TE103272-3. Any use of trade, firm, or product names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

On September 25, Mali's military government announced it will delay elections that were slated for February 2024. The authorities cited technical reasons for the postponement and did not name a replacement date.

Viewed against the backdrop of the junta's actions since taking power in 2020, the delay appears the latest in a series of maneuvers by the junta to extend its rule, even as the junta has failed egregiously in its promises to restore security. The United States has little influence over what happens in Bamako, but by taking a clear and public stand against open-ended military rule in Mali and other countries in the region, Washington can enhance its credibility in the long term.

A recent wave of coups in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa has involved officers who show no serious willingness to hand power back to civilians. Military officers have now seized power in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023). Add to this the coups in Guinea (2021) and Sudan (2021) and one has a "coup belt" that evokes the dark days of the Cold War. Amid much talk of "coup contagion," each putsch has had its own, primarily domestic causes — but what has been contagious is coup-makers' playbooks.

Mali's Colonel Assimi Goita and associates have been key movers in elaborating this playbook, extending their "transition" time and again. Goita and company came to power in August 2020, appointed a civilian-led transition, overthrew their own civilian appointees in May 2021's "coup within a coup," defied sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), compromised on a transition for 2024, and have now begun to tamper with that timetable.

Mali's colonels have repeatedly exposed the weak hand of regional and Western diplomats. ECOWAS first sought to impose an 18-month timetable in August 2020 — meaning the February 2024 elections should have already occurred in February 2022. What happens in Mali has serious ramifications for how officers in the other countries — some of whom are in close contact with Mali's junta — will approach their own transition timetables.

The U.S. has few good options in Mali or elsewhere in the region. In Washington, there are concerns that criticizing and antagonizing juntas would diminish whatever influence the U.S. may command in the Sahel. Washington also prefers to take the region's countries and their coups case by case, frowning on those in Mali and Burkina Faso while showing a significantly more ambivalent and even lenient attitude towards those in Chad and Niger.

And certainly there are diplomatic costs to criticism, as France has learned in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where its soldiers and diplomats are effectively unwelcome.

Yet U.S. "influence" in the region is overstated — what is there to preserve? After 20 years of military training programs, the U.S. has no significant and enduring counterterrorism accomplishments to report. On the political side, if the U.S. has avoided the backlash that has greeted France, it has also not been able to convince soldiers to return to barracks, or even to temper the overreach of some of its favored civilian leaders (the decision by Senegalese President Macky Sall not to seek a third term in 2024 is one bright spot in the region, and may reflect behind-the-scenes international pressure, but Sall continues to crack down severely on the opposition).

Given that U.S. influence has not appreciably bent the curve of the region when it comes either to endemic insecurity or the militarization of politics, it would be better for the U.S. to be consistent, vocal, and clear when it comes to denouncing coups and distorted transition timetables. As of September 30, for example, there was no statement by the U.S. on the Malian junta's delay of the elections. Nor has the U.S. clarified, more than two months after the coup in Niger, whether it considers that takeover to be a coup in legal terms — a decision that would trigger a suspension of much assistance to Niger.

As one analyst recently commented, allowing ambiguity to fester when it comes to the U.S. stance on Niger is a recipe for exacerbating conspiracy theorizing about whether the U.S. and other Western powers actually support the coups in the region.

Speaking out at key moments would elicit rebukes from Bamako and Niamey, but it would also send vital signals to the actual people of the Sahel. The region's populations are Washington's most important audience at this point, because it is more important to shape positive perceptions of the U.S. over the long term than it is to tiptoe around generals and colonels who rule capitals by force.

Over the long term, moreover, it is in the U.S. interest to give moral support to genuine grassroots democratic culture in the region, which has been a serious force in Sahelian history time and again. At the moment, the U.S. should not materially support civilian organizations that seek to challenge the juntas politically, because doing so could pose profound risks to such civilians (of being arrested and/or tarred with the charge of being Western puppets) and could create unnecessary credibility risks for the U.S. itself.

But by being blunt and forthright that military rule is unacceptable, the U.S. can help set the expectation that norms, and not crass and misguided efforts at realpolitik, will guide Washington's and others' policies towards the Sahel.
Publicly criticizing and privately pressuring the region's military rulers does not mean that Washington will be loathed as much as Paris is. Washington does not have Paris's colonial baggage, and French officials, from President Emmanuel Macron down to individual ambassadors, have been particularly imperious and insensitive to Sahelian concerns, squandering numerous easy opportunities to appear flexible and humble.The U.S. can be a more friendly critic, clarifying that it disapproves of juntas' choices but leaving the door open to conversation

After thirteen years of discussion, the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated on 30 August 2007 and this law entered into force in August 2008. During the legislative process, a particular challenge was to determine the goal of competition law in China. This challenge can be best illustrated by the merger control policy under the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, which has been formulated by incorporating economic goals as well as various social and political considerations. This dissertation investigates to what extent competition goals may affect merger policy by taking a comparative perspective. This central research question has been discussed in four chapters. After the introduction, in the second chapter, the legislative history of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and merger policy has been presented, in order to explain why competition law and policy in China incorporates a multitude of policy goals. In the third chapter, a particular attention has been paid to the debate on competition goals in the US and the EU. The evolution of the antitrust debate shows that in the US, competition goals focus on economic goals, in particular consumer welfare and total welfare, whereas social and moral judgments on antitrust conduct have been largely dismissed. In the EU, competition policy is utilized to achieve broader goals of the European Union, and economic goals have to be balanced with other non-economic goals. Another finding in the third chapter is that throughout the evolution of the debate on competition goals, the development of economic theory has played an important role in shaping the understanding of competition law. In line with the development of modern economic techniques, economic goals have gradually been accepted by judges, legislators and policy makers in the US and the EU. This finding can be further strengthened in the fourth chapter which investigates the evolution of incorporating the efficiency goal in merger policy. In both the US and the EU, efficiency arguments have been treated with much less hostile today than decades ago. By following the theoretical debate on competition goals in the third and the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter addresses the issue of the extent to which competition goals may affect merger analysis. Taking economic theories and modern economic techniques as the benchmark, this chapter shows that the divergent competition goals in the US, the EU and China may lead to a different outcome of merger cases. The main contribution of this research is to understand the differences between merger policy in China, the US and the EU from a perspective of competition goals. The ultimate goal of this research is to draw lessons for competition policy makers in China by learning from the experiences in the US and the EU. After the investigation of antitrust goals and their impacts on merger cases, there are two lessons that can be drawn: Firstly, competition policy makers in China may learn from the evolution of competition goals in the US and the EU concerning moving forward from political goals to economic goals, at the same time switching the focus from producers to consumers. The second implication is that, as was shown in both the US and the EU, to improve the merger decisions in China, on the one hand economic analysis should be strengthened in merger decisions, and on the other hand it will be important to invite economists to join the investigation team and to train specialized staff by establishing research centers and by promoting competition culture.

Central Asia, an area stretching from the Caspian Sea to Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan, has been firmly under Moscow's influence for several centuries due to Russian and Soviet conquest. However, as Russia has concentrated its attention and resources on the Ukraine war and China's economic engagement with Central Asia has deepened, Moscow's role in the region has diminished. Meanwhile, the region has grown in importance to the United States, first during the "Global War on Terror," when the United States established temporary bases (now closed) in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and later as a source of natural resources, including oil and gas and rare-earth minerals. The changing dynamics of Russian, Chinese, and American engagement in Central Asia raise a critical question: What combination of great power involvement and Central Asian autonomy will best advance American interests and ensure stability in the region? As the region's most populous and influential player, Uzbekistan is the key to answering this question. Recognizing this, Washington has formed a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan. Recently, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu met with Uzbek officials last month to highlight mutual open channels of communication, aiming to boost trade and investment, specifically in energy and technology.U.S. policy toward Uzbekistan has made several missteps that compromise what could be a fruitful, limited partnership with Tashkent. The most significant of these blunders has been the relentless harping on Washington's commitment to Uzbekistan's "independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." Support for Central Asian sovereignty implies military assistance akin to the Regional Cooperation 22 military exercise, which took place in 2022 with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan participating. These military activities in a region with a robust Russian security presence are dangerous and unnecessary. After Washington's proper decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, not only is Central Asia's relevance to U.S. national security relatively low, but Uzbekistan's chances of being invaded by Russia are slim, as Moscow continues to face difficulties in achieving maximalist goals in Ukraine.A better strategy for Washington is to allow Russia, Central Asia's historic security guarantor, to continue to play a security role in what Vladimir Putin calls Russia's "most stable region." There is little danger that Russia, already overstretched in Ukraine, will be capable of restoring its former dominance in Central Asia. But Russia helps to maintain regional stability through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), encompassing its military allies Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, all of which host Russian military bases. Deepening U.S. military involvement in Central Asia ruins Tashkent's attempts to balance regional actors, cooperate with the West, and not be stuck in the middle of great power competition. While military exercises between the United States and Uzbekistan may seem appealing to Tashkent in the short term, such practices will inevitably raise Moscow's threat perceptions and contribute to a higher degree of great power competition in the region. Rather than Washington viewing its relationship with Tashkent as an opportunity to expand militaristic influence in Russia's backyard, Uzbekistan should be considered by the United States as a regional facilitator and convenor, as Uzbekistan has acted as such in recent years. This would improve Uzbekistan's ability to counterbalance Russian and Chinese involvement and facilitate an equilibrium between great power actors in the region. After Uzbekistan's first president, Islam Karimov, died in 2016, Uzbekistan quickly mended ties with Tajikistan and its other neighbors, removing the greatest obstacle to regional cooperation. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who took power in 2016, Tashkent's foreign policy has been one that has strived for regional connectivity and cooperation. It has also sought to present Central Asia as a platform for multilateral cooperation to expand the region's economic, transport, and logistics potential.The desire for Central Asia to act as a transport and logistics hub has materialized through the "Middle Corridor," a trade route that spans the Central Asian steppe, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus Mountains. Amid a lack of viable alternatives, the Middle Corridor will only become more relevant as the geopolitical disruption of the Russo-Ukrainian War obstructs other trade routes like the "Northern Corridor" that flows through Russia. The Middle Corridor also facilitates the transport of Chinese goods to European consumer markets.Openness with regional great powers, including Russia and China, will be critical to the success of Central Asian connectivity projects. China's incentives for such transit projects are clear as they give Beijing more significant access to Western markets. On the surface, it may appear that Russia will disapprove of alternative trade routes. Still, these routes could be useful for Moscow in the future as the Middle Corridor has turned into a North-South logistic opportunity rather than a direct challenge to the Northern Corridor, with Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan becoming critical corridors for Russia to reach international markets. Uzbekistan could continue to act as a regional facilitator to ensure openness among all parties.Unfortunately, legislation that was relevant to the Soviet Union is still inhibiting constructive cooperation with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, along with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, is subject to the archaic, Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a law designed to punish the Soviet Union on Jewish immigration issues and other human rights. This legislation denies permanent trade relations with its targeted countries, including Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.One could argue that independent Uzbekistan should be exempt from Jackson-Vanik because Tashkent is being penalized for the actions of the Soviet Union. Since Uzbekistan's independence, it has never repressed its Jewish population. Independent Uzbekistan has allowed its Jewish population to emigrate freely to destinations like Israel and the United States. Emigration from Uzbekistan to other countries has been mainly due to better economic opportunities elsewhere rather than oppression. Uzbekistan has a vibrant Jewish population that practices its religion openly and has access to Jewish schools and synagogues in Bukhara, the historical Jewish center of Uzbekistan, where Jews have lived for more than two thousand years.Additionally, the United States continues to punish Tashkent for its human rights record despite its improvements. For decades, the government of Uzbekistan, under President Karimov, forced adults and children to pick cotton under appalling conditions during the harvest season. However, under President Mirziyoyev, these forced labor policies were abolished, and Uzbekistani cotton is now 100% free from any allegations of forced labor. Despite the United States lifting sanctions on Uzbek cotton in 2019, Uzbekistan is still punished by being included under Jackson-Vanik.The United States has a valuable opportunity to contribute to peaceful, limited cooperation and expand economic opportunities in Central Asia. Abandoning militaristic activities, focusing on the transit of goods that serve the U.S. interest while maintaining openness with regional great powers, and discarding irrelevant legislation will be conducive to a productive relationship with Uzbekistan, a regional leader for years to come.

En Deudas coloniales: el caso de Puerto Rico, Rocío Zambrana ofrece una robusta conversación con pensadorxs, creadorxs y activistas de Puerto Rico y el Sur Global, así como con algunxs de lxs observadorxs más conocidxs en el contexto europeo y norteamericano, en torno a la deuda como forma y práctica de captura, sujeción, control y desposesión que profundiza y expande el alcance de la modernidad capitalista colonial. Al mismo tiempo, Zambrana insiste, el caso particular de Puerto Rico demuestra que, para lograr lo anterior, el capitalismo requiere la continua "actualización" de la condición colonial como orden racista, no sólo como subordinación jurídico-política, en "condiciones materiales e históricas alteradas." La deuda financiera en la colonia, entonces, es una "manifestación de la deuda histórica" de la conquista y la esclavitud, fungiendo así como agente del régimen de raza/género/clase que "la colonialidad del poder" (el concepto es de Aníbal Quijano) perpetúa en el presente a través de nuevas rondas de invasión, saqueo y explotación. No obstante, Puerto Rico también ejemplifica, plantea la autora, formas esperanzadoras de "organizar el pesimismo," que pueden advertirse en variadas prácticas de resistencia, tales como el rehusarse, la subversión y el rescate/ocupación. Éstas interrumpen la sujeción de la deuda, tanto financiera como histórica, pese a los inherentes desafíos de la cooptación neoliberal. Así sea con gestos que parecen inconsecuentes o temporeros, nuestras resistencias constituyen modos descoloniales y reparadores de "vincular la vida." Con la publicación de esta traducción de Raquel Salas Rivera al español, nuestras series Otra universidad y Libros libres continúan aportando saberes a las luchas por el archipiélago liberado al que aspiramos y que forjamos, día con día, en cada una de nuestras subversiones. --- In Deudas coloniales: el caso de Puerto Rico, Rocío Zambrana offers a robust conversation with thinkers, creators, and activists in Puerto Rico and the Global South, as well as with some of the most well-known analysts in European and North American contexts, on debt as a form and a practice of capture, subjection, control, and dispossession that deepens and expands the reach of colonial capitalist modernity. To achieve this, as Zambrana shows through her analysis of Puerto Rico's particular case, capitalism requires the colonial condition's constant "updating" as a racist order, and not only as a juridical-political subordination, in "altered material and historical conditions." Financial debt in the colony, then, is a "manifestation of the historical debt" from conquest and slavery, thus operating as an agent of the race/gender/class regime that Aníbal Quijano's "coloniality of power" perpetuates in the present through new sequences of invasion, plunder, and exploitation. However, the author argues that Puerto Rico also exemplifies hopeful forms of "organizing pessimism," which can be noticed in various resistance practices, such as refusal, subversion, and rescue/occupation. These interrupt the subjection of both financial and historical debt, despite the inherent challenges associated with neoliberal cooptation. Even when its gestures might seem inconsequential or temporary, our resistance constitutes decolonial and reparative modes of "life binding." With the publication of this translation into Spanish by Raquel Salas Rivera, our series Otra Universidad and Libros Libres continues contributing to the struggles for the liberated archipelago we aspire to and craft, every day, in all our subversions.

The United Nations has a target for developed countries to spend 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) on Official Development Assistance (ODA). The UK had previously set this target, then reduced it to 0.5%, but now targets returning to 0.7% in 2024-2025.Some commentators criticize the UK, and indeed the USA, for contributing too little to the development of poorer countries, but the amount the two countries give is much higher than the figures show. The statistics only show what governments contribute (£15.2bn), but data from the World Bank shows that £23.6bn is paid in remittances from the UK, with £10.6bn in charitable donations. People who came here as immigrants send money to their families back home, and thereby make a significant impact on their domestic economy. The same is true in the United States.Furthermore, this direct person to person aid does more economic good than government to government aid. As Professor Peter Bauer pointed out, government aid signals to ambitious people in poor countries that they must turn to the government to improve their lot. People who might otherwise go into business or start businesses themselves, turn instead to seek contracts from government or positions within government. There are also fewer opportunities for corruption and waste in person to person transfers of wealth, although some smaller fraud has occurred. The money goes straight into the local economy and helps to fund things such as education, as well as raising living standards.There is something else that works. It is the low tax, light regulation model that boosted Hong Kong from abject poverty into first world affluence. It did the same in Singapore, in Taiwan, and in South Korea. It was behind the West German "Economic Miracle" of Ludwig Erhard, and of Japan's rapid post-war recovery.The UK should boost development in poorer countries by the two things that we have ascertained work in practice. It should encourage person to person aid transfers from UK people to their relatives in poorer countries. This could be done by giving such contributions the same kind of tax relief that goes to those who make donations to registered charities through Gift Aid. An allowance would be set at such a level as to avoid this generous tax relief being used for tax avoidance or overly advantaging those whose families live abroad.The UK could also collaborate with poorer countries to have an area, preferably including a port, assigned on a lease of perhaps 30 or 50 years to a consortium, solely at the invitation of the host. It would be a freeport and much more. The governing consortium would set the levels of taxation, and run the area's policing and judicial administration. They would determine its property laws and its regulatory structure. The aim would be to recreate what Hong Kong and the others did. With the right conditions, property rights and rule of law, international investment would pour in, creating both businesses and jobs locally. Local people would rush to work or live there because of the opportunities.There is little doubt that untrammelled enterprise would achieve far more than development aid has managed to attain after decades of effort. Combined with incentives to augment person to person transfers, this could set poorer countries on that upward path to affluence and increased prosperity.