The Hidden 'Alliance': The CIA and MI6 before and after Suez
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 95-120
ISSN: 0268-4527
Most accounts of the history of US & British foreign policy since 1945 neglect the role of intelligence not only in implementation but also in policymaking. A study of the influence of the CIA & MI6 in policy & operations before & after the Suez Crisis of 1956 illuminates a more complex "history" that awaits discovery. The CIA worked within an integrated system in the US Executive. It was MI6 that was the "maverick" organization, carrying out an alternative foreign policy that led to British failure in Egypt. Yet, despite the idiocy of MI6's plans, the CIA maintained cooperation with the British service during & after Suez. How to account for this "special relationship"? It was based not on emotional or cultural ties but on the CIA's pragmatic if wayward assessment that MI6 was vital to the achievement of US objectives in the Middle East. The Agency's shortsightedness was not because of Egypt & Nasser, with whom the CIA had a working relationship, but due to its obsession with intervention in Syria. Adapted from the source document.