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This article explores the advantages and disadvantages for Arab democratization of the political integration of Islamist movements. Because of the vastness of the subject I will focus on only one such organization, namely the Palestinian Hamas. In the course of the paper I will analyze Hamas' origins, structure and ideology and reasons for seeking political inclusion. The paper concludes with an in-depth evaluation of Hamas' actions once it managed to acquire political power, namely their overall impact on the peace process and on Palestinian democratization.

Israel eliminated Hamas battalion commanders and targeted Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's home in Gaza. A Houthi missile was fired at Eilat and Israel's Defense Minister discussed the importance of preventing Hezbollah threats to Israeli communities in the north. In the West Bank a raid uncovered tunnel shafts in Jenin.
The post Israel targets Hamas leader's house while eliminating seven Hamas battalion commanders first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

This book consists of two sections. The first section focused on the rise of Hamas as the most important and popular group in Palestine especially after the general elections of 2006. Using social movement theories as the framework for analysis, this section seeks to investigate the causes and consequences of the rise of Hamas. It is examined the causes of the continuing rise of Hamas by looking especially at the views and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood as a mother organization of Hamas in Palestine that has been involved in the Arab - Israeli conflict since 1936. The second section examines Indonesian foreign policy on the Arab - Israeli conflict. This conflict has been concerned by the Government of Indonesia since Indonesian independence because of two reasons: firstly, a domestic sentiment especially coming from Indonesian Muslim; and secondly, the involvement of the major powers in the world in this conflict. The government response to the conflict is based on the views that Israel has occupied Palestinian territory illegally. Indonesia also has supported Palestinian independence state. However, how the regimes have realized this policy in the history of Indonesian foreign policy on this conflict is not similar. The differences are shaped by domestic politics and international considerations.

This article engages with the concept of liminality by focusing on two, theoretically and empirically dubious categories: the EU and Hamas. Theoretically, both are in-between the traditional categories we use to make sense of the world and as such they challenge state-based, Westphalian, Eurocentric categories that dominate International Relations (IR). By analysing Hamas and the EU as liminals this article demonstrates how far certain collective discourses and non-state identities can go in challenging pre-existing categories on which the social order of international relations relies. Hamas does not 'fit' into pre-existing social categories of the social order in world politics. The EU does not fit into the system of states in international relations, although it attempts, in part, to behave like one at a supranational level. Empirically, both the EU and Hamas are able to exercise power to differing degrees depending on context. Both engage in politics on a procedural, day-to-day level that has significant consequences for their knowledge of themselves and the Other. This article explores how the liminal identity of these two actors impacts on their relations with each other and importantly their relations of Self. In exploring the procedural relations of the EU and Hamas it argues for the necessity of recognising liminal categories in IR theory and practice while at the same time highlighting the limits of such in-between categories in a world order still structured around the state ; This article engages with the concept of liminality by focusing on two, theoretically and empirically dubious categories: the EU and Hamas. Theoretically, both are in-between the traditional categories we use to make sense of the world and as such they challenge state-based, Westphalian, Eurocentric categories that dominate International Relations (IR). By analysing Hamas and the EU as liminals this article demonstrates how far certain collective discourses and non-state identities can go in challenging pre-existing categories on which the social order of international relations relies. Hamas does not 'fit' into pre-existing social categories of the social order in world politics. The EU does not fit into the system of states in international relations, although it attempts, in part, to behave like one at a supranational level. Empirically, both the EU and Hamas are able to exercise power to differing degrees depending on context. Both engage in politics on a procedural, day-to-day level that has significant consequences for their knowledge of themselves and the Other. This article explores how the liminal identity of these two actors impacts on their relations with each other and importantly their relations of Self. In exploring the procedural relations of the EU and Hamas it argues for the necessity of recognising liminal categories in IR theory and practice while at the same time highlighting the limits of such in-between categories in a world order still structured around the state.

Hamas employs an extensive propaganda network during times of war with Israel.
The post Inside Hamas' propaganda game first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

At the start of this conflict, I wrote, "China has effectively thrown its lot in with Hamas." Beijing has only made its choice more apparent in the days since.
The post China Stands with Hamas appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

Nach dem unerwarteten Erdrutschsieg bei den palästinensischen Wahlen am 25. Januar 2006 wird die Hamas im Palästinensischen Legislativrat mit einer absoluten Mehrheit der Sitze (74 von 132) vertreten sein. Als Partei unter dem Namen »Wandel und Reform« angetreten, hat die Hamas nach dem Wahlsieg ihre Bereitschaft erklärt, Regierungsverantwortung zu übernehmen und andere politische Kräfte in die Regierung einzubeziehen. Entsprechend hat sie Beratungen über mögliche Koalitionen, die Verteilung von Posten und die Festlegung von Positionen aufgenommen. Für eine Gruppierung, die sich gerade erst entschlossen hat, im politischen System mitzuarbeiten, nachdem sie sich auf die Rolle einer starken Opposition eingestellt hatte, stellt dies eine enorme Herausforderung dar. Die Enttäuschung der Fatah-Basis über die Wahlniederlage hat sich in gewalttätigen Ausschreitungen entladen, die ein großes Eskalationspotential bergen. (SWP-aktuell / SWP)

The trend of events in Gaza in the first months of 2008 has highlighted once again that the current situation is untenable. From Hamas's bulldozing the border-fence with Egypt to enable Gazans to break out of their international blockade and stock up on food and energy essentials, to the rocket-attacks on Israeli towns and Israel's punitive military incursions, it is clear that something has to give. The question is: what? In this article, I will argue that the present policy of Israel and its western allies of dealing exclusively with Fatah in the West Bank, isolating Hamas and weakening it by making its fiefdom, Gaza, economically unviable, is both counterproductive and dangerous. Instead, I will argue for engaging Hamas and ending Gaza's isolation. Beyond the policy's grave humanitarian costs and its long-term effect on the unity of the Palestinian territories, there are three compelling reasons for engagement: * an analysis of Hamas's past behaviour suggests that, rather than being a "total spoiler", incapable of compromise, Hamas is capable of (some level of) compromise - if the political conditions are right. Permanent exclusion, conversely, reduces Hamas's incentives to compromise, and strengthens its more militant members, while driving the movement as a whole further into the arms of hardliners in Iran and Syria * Hamas, its violent actions notwithstanding, represents a series of grievances that a significant portion of Palestinians hold and that need to be addressed for a future settlement to be stable * the exclusion of Hamas from the political process is likely to undermine any agreement, since Fatah's leadership lacks the popular legitimacy needed to implement it.

As long as the Palestinians do not transform their goals, the conflict will not be resolved, only managed. Israel will continue to live by the sword and to mow the grass as needed. In Operation Protective Edge, Jerusalem set out once again to destroy Hamas's military capabilities with the understanding that it is engaged in an intractable, protracted conflict requiring a strategy of attrition. Ultimately, this objective was achieved. One third of Hamas's rocket and missile stockpile and most of its rocket-manufacturing infrastructure were destroyed. Most of its thirty-two attack tunnels were likely destroyed, and about 1,000 Hamas combatants, including some high-level leaders, were killed. It could be that more targeted killings and an earlier relaxing of the restraints on airpower could have expedited the acceptance of the ceasefire by Hamas and thus avoided much of the destruction in the Strip. Nevertheless, it is clear that Hamas lost this campaign. Adapted from the source document.