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The development of a strict methodology of observation & analysis in soc sci has always met with resistance. In the current debate on this topic in the US, 2 positions can be distinguished. There are the 'theorists,' who find their inspiration in the work of recent philosophers such as H. Marcuse & J.-P. Sartre; they rate the formation of a pol'al theory as a 1st priority. Then there are the 'behaviorists,' whose first care is for sci'fic method. This contrast is reviewed on the basis of the document, "Political Science at Berkeley, An Invitation to a Discussion," which was published anonymously by a group of students. The criticism of these students can be summarized under the headings 'commitment' & 'relevance.' As far as commitment is concerned, the critics reproach the behaviorists for not taking stands in important contemporary moral issues, & for identifying with the status quo. It is argued here that what leads to acceptance of & identification with the existing pol'al order is not behaviorist methodology as such, but rather the mood of the behaviorists. As far as 'relevance' is concerned, the critics are impatient with the futile detail analysis & data collecting of the behaviorists. The behaviorists' use of a strict methodology of explanation by generalization leads to a reduction of the scope of analysis. Then only the 'easy' aspects ('easy' to quantify, 'easy' to collect, etc) are analyzed, & discontinuous developments are neglected. The argument presented here is that the lack of a dynamic theory of the pol'al process is an impediment indeed for pol'al sci, but that, again, behaviorism as such cannot be accused of being 'conservative' or 'conformistic': the refutation of race theories, for example, was rather a radical undertaking. It is concluded that for the time being it is not necessary to lay other bounds on pol'al sci than those that follow from the claims of rational debate & intellectual honesty. HA.

J. Galtung's redefinition of the concept of peace is a classic example of an attempt to reorient a discipline by coining a new term; but it should not be the pleasant connotation of the term 'positive peace', but its usefulness in studying factual violence, which should be decisive in determining the merits of the new definition. Three objections to Galtung's definition are raised: (1) It is quite ineffective to criticize the 'minimal' definition of violence, which is meant to refer to observable phenomena, by counterproposing a theoretical construct. Galtung's definition of violence, which, apart from 'direct' violence, includes also 'structural' violence, needs prior operationalization before it can be used in empirical research. (2) Although Galtung's use of the term 'structural violence' suggests otherwise, any indication of the social units to which the 'actual' & 'potential realizations' in his definition of violence refer, is lacking. Most of Galtung's examples are at the individual level. Social interdependencies (eg, those resulting from the DofL) necessitate the introduction of properties of the SE order in Galtung's terminology & require that he make explicit how 'the best attainable realizations' (as the most likely interpretation of 'potential realizations') can be incorporated in his thinking. (3) In drawing a distinction between 'personal violence' & 'structural violence', Galtung mistakes a distinction between theoretical alternatives in the study of violence (ie, the Clausewitzian approach vs the causal-empirical approach) for a distinction between kinds of violent relationships. In emphasizing that the causes of war should also be searched for in periods of peace, Q. Wright has shown that 'positive peace' cannot be considered as an alternative for 'negative peace'. Nevertheless, Galtung's use of the term has induced serious disagreement among peace researchers about the most desirable research strategy in their discipline. 'Critical' peace researchers (Galtung not included) tend to rely on ideological testimony instead of empirical proof for the causes of violence. Research into those causes, including the relationship between social injustice & violence, is regarded a more fruitful approach. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

How to break the identification of 'scientific' with quantitative? Introduction
How to break the identification of 'scientific' with quantitative? Introduction
Teachers in qualitative methods feel that their courses do not break students' quantitative idea of scientific research and scientific knowledge. Why is that? And what can be done to break this misidentification? Three prominent lecturers in qualitative methods give their opinion. With a comment by Fijgje de Boer.

The bad reputation in the social sciences of social Darwinian theories is one of the main hindrances to paying attention to ethology, the biological study of behavior. Although developments in this area of research suggest interesting implications for political science, so far, very few political scientists have dealt with these matters. First, the biological way of thinking about behavior is introduced. The object & method of ethology are dealt with, & attention is paid to the problems of function, causation, & history of behavior of animal & man. The neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, which is fundamental to ethology & to the main argument presented here, is summarized. It is concluded that morphology & behavior are both evolutionary organisms. Next, man is considered in the perspective of evolution. The belief in a rigid distinction between nature & nurture is discussed. The modern biological view that the human capacity for making culture is genetically coded is accepted. In a second part, some aspects of this biological view of behavior, relevant to political science, are discussed. From a comparison of definitions in ethology & political science, it appears that social behavior is the most important problem in both disciplines. Social scientists usually study behavior as an autonomous subject while biologists integrate their vision of behavior in the larger context of evolution. There is a fundamental similarity between ethological concepts of social behavior & some recently developed conceptions of political behavior. It is argued that relinquishing the more traditional focus of political science on state-oriented or group-centered action is an important condition.

The Opening Address at the Sch of War, Brussels, for the Academic yr 1968-69. The role of a military academy is discussed. Then major contemporary theories on war & pol are examined. Special attention is given to the problem of military responsibility, psychol'al warfare, & the influence of PO on military strategy. It is noted that military & pol'al sci has become a sci of 'crisis manag.' Reference is made to the recent military conflicts in Korea, the Middle East, & Vietnam. Crisis management in modern days has become a power play among the big countries. The military strategy of the communist world is reviewed on the basis of the principles laid down by K. Marx & F. Engels. L. Trotsky's theories on war & poi are compared with the Marxist-Leninist pol'al & strategic doctrine. Brief mention is made of the military writings of Mao Tse Tung & their influence on Che Guevara &others. The development of pol'al sci in the US is traced. Instruction at such Sch's as the Nat'l War Coll & the Industr Coll of the Armed Forces is compared with the teaching of pol'al & military sci at US U's. It is noted that pol'al & military sci has come to recognize the internat'l aspects of its problems. Belgium, by its geographical situation, is tied to the changes going on in the European continent. Military sci in Belgium therefore orients itself towards that of other European countries, eg, as taught at the U's of Aberdeen, London, Oxford, the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere (Center for the Study of Foreign Policy), Paris, etc. The Netherlands has the 'Defensie Studiecentrum' (Center for Defense Studies), in which students are instructed in the pol'al, psychol'al, econ, & military aspects of defense. It is concluded that military sci has come of age & fulfills an important role in training the responsible pol'al leaders needed in the modern world. M. Maxfield.

Het acroniem in de titel staat voor Qualitative Research in the Social Sciences in Europe. Euroqual is een programma van de European Science Foundation. Het loopt parallel aan het ESF-programma 'Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences' (QMSS). Het gaat hier om een zogenoemde Research Networking Program (RNP) van de European Science Foundation. Euroqual is een vijfjarig programma met een totaal budget van (momenteel) € 768.000. Dit 'momenteel' slaat op de financieringsstructuur van het programma. Aangezien de partners bijdragen aan het budget van een RNP, bepaalt het aantal partners de hoogte van het budget. Ten tijde van de eerste bijeenkomst van de stuurgroep was de ESF nog in onderhandeling met Frankrijk over deelname aan Euroqual. Het budget kan dus nog toenemen.

It is assumed that it is the purpose of a theory to explain something. An explanation is an answer to a question of the linguistic form 'why 7'; its logical structure is of the following form: L1,....Ln That is, on the basis of a certain set of postuC1 ....Cn lates, or 'laws,' (L1,....Ln), & a set of given, observed 'circumstances' (C1,....Cn), 'E', the conclusion is deduced. Accordingly, the character of an explanation & consequently, of J a theory, is deductive. II - As regards the structure of a theory several elements should be distinguished. (1) The logical mathematical, or probabilistic system in which the theory is formulated. (2) The calculus which may be conceived as the axiomatic nucleus of the theory & which consists of a set of primitive concepts & postulates governing the use of the primitives. On the basis of primitives & postulates new concepts & theorems are deduced. It is to be noted that the content of the primitives (their 'meaning') consists of the way they are used within the relational structure of the calculus; that is they are defined implicitly. (3) An interpretative system of rules connecting the 'abstract' calculus with other structures of knowledge. In this way the calculus can be given cliff interpretations, which constitute models of the initial calculus. In order to explain empirical reality, there should at least be an empirical model of the calculus, that is, the calculus has to be connected with observable reality. In this case the interpretation is given by a set of 'operational definitions' as they are commonly called. It is shown that these definitions can be conceived as 'quickly decidable sentences' by means of which the empirical model can be falsified. III - The role which theory construction plays with regard to the formation of reality is indicated. Making explicit its logical structure & its empirical interpretation, theory formation leads to 'intersubjectively transmissible knowledge.' It results in the construction of a reality which transcends individual & parochial idiosyncracies & which is accessible to everybody. Of the conditions a theory should fulfill, 2 stand out: (a) it should be consistent, & (b) it should be falsifiable. Finally, it is shown that there is some ground to assume theory formation to be possible-even in the soc sci's-difficult though it may be. IPSA.