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This article pushes beyond hard power and soft power to insist on smart power, defined as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently. It argues that advancing smart power has become a national security imperative, driven both by long-term structural changes in international conditions and by short-term failures of the current administration. The current debates over public diplomacy and soft power suffer from failures to address conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions of the challenge, three dimensions the author addresses in this article. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2008 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

This article pushes beyond hard power and soft power to insist on smart power, defined as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently. It argues that advancing smart power has become a national security imperative, driven both by long-term structural changes in international conditions and by short-term failures of the current administration. The current debates over public diplomacy and soft power suffer from failures to address conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions of the challenge, three dimensions the author addresses in this article.

Schon der Florentiner Politiker und Schriftsteller Niccolo Machiavelli sprach in seinem Werk "Vom Fürsten" von der Notwendigkeit "harten Handelns" bei der Führung von Staaten. Machiavelli erkannte die äußeren Schwächen der italienischen Staatenwelt und damit eine Bedrohung ihrer Existenz. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)

This book analyses whether European leaders are able to deal with the 'hard power' problems of military provocation, mass migration, and terrorism. Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea was just one example of recent revisionist policies by the state. In 2015, Europe experienced a massive influx of illegal immigrants and refugees whilst also suffering many terrorist attacks in recent years. Common to these policy challenges is the need for using hard power (military, police) in order to confront, stop, stabilize and hinder undesirable outcomes. European politicians are mostly used to wielding incentives-based policy and are unfamiliar with strategic thinking. How well do the British, French, and German governments deal with this triad of hard power problems? What about NATO and the EU? This book examines the responses to determine whether European politicians can still act strategically. Janne Haaland Matlary, DM, is professor of political science at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Military Command and Staff College. Her most recent book is Ukraine and Beyond: Russia's Strategic security Challenge to Europe, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). She was previously deputy foreign minister of Norway.

In late 2014 and early 2015, the United States dramatically increased its presence in the oil market. This tremendous increase in production, which placed the United States ahead of every OPEC country besides Saudi Arabia, caused a global change in supply and demand that dropped the price of crude oil to $58 per barrel. This translated to an average gasoline price of $2.55 per gallon nationally on Dec. 15, 2014. The price drop reverberated throughout the global economy, affecting countries from Malaysia to Norway. In Venezuela, for example, it is estimated that a one dollar drop in the price of oil will cost the country approximately $770 million in annual revenue. The United States' decision to act influenced the entire world, and this is no surprise – economic control is just one of the many facets of hard power and hegemony.

Es gibt eine lange Diskussion über Indien als Regionalmacht, regionale Ordnungsmacht oder (regionalen) Hegemon in Südasien.1 Bereits der Blick auf die Landkarte offenbart die geographische Dominanz Indiens in der Region, die durch die Größe der Bevölkerung sowie durch die Ressourcen und die überlegene Militärmacht im Vergleich zu den Nachbarn unterstrichen wird. Konzepte wie Regional- oder Ordnungsmacht unterstellen, dass diese aufgrund ihrer überlegenen Ressourcen auch in der Lage ist, die Politik in den angrenzenden Staaten eigenen Vorstellungen entsprechend zu beeinflussen. Der Blick auf die indisch-pakistanischen Beziehungen zwischen 1998 und 2004, die in rascher Folge zwischen Krieg und Annäherung pendelten, sowie auf die indische Südasienpolitik in den neunziger Jahren werfen allerdings eine Reihe von Fragen hinsichtlich der These von der "Regionalmacht Indien" auf. Kann Indien z.B. nach den pakistanischen Atomtests 1998 noch als Regionalmacht im Sinne militärischer Dominanz bezeichnet werden? Konnte Indien seine überlegenen Ressourcen nutzen, um die Nachbarstaaten zu seinen Gunsten zu beeinflussen?