Suchergebnisse

The primary aims are to formulate principles conducive to safeguarding fundamental civil rights and to employ the theory to analyse the Skokie affair. The focus is on the ethical question of the constraints on speech. I advance two arguments relating to the 'Harm Principle' and the 'Offence Principle'. Under the 'Harm Principle', restrictions on liberty may be prescribed when there are sheer threats of immediate violence against some individuals or groups. Under the 'Offence Principle', expressions which intend to inflict psychological offence are morally on a par with physical harm and thus there are grounds for abridging them. Moving from theory to practice, in the light of the formulated principles, the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court which permitted the Nazis to hold a demonstration in Skokie is argued to be flawed.

In November 1998, fourteen neighborhoods in Chicago voted to shut down their liquor stores, bars, and lounges, and four more neighborhoods voted to close down specific taverns. Three additional liquor establishments were voted shut in February 1999. Along with the fourteen other neighborhoods that passed dry votes in 1996 and those that went dry right after Prohibition, to date more than 15% of Chicago has voted itself dry. The closures affect alcohol-related businesses, like liquor stores and bars, but do not restrict drinking in the privacy of one's hoifie. The legal mechanism is an arcane 1933 "vote yourself dry" law, enacted at the time of the repeal of Prohibition, and amended by the state legislature in 1995.

Should the law interfere with individual choices and actions that cause no harm to others but that are regarded as wrong? Is it permissible for the law to restrain individual freedom not for the sake of preventing harm to others but in order to prevent people from performing immoral deeds or from debasing or harming themselves? Doubtless that is the purpose of some laws, although it is not always easy to tell which and to what extent, since most laws pursue, or can be interpreted to pursue, a variety of goals. Standard examples of moralist legislation, such as the criminalization of bigamy, and of paternalist legislation, such as bans on the sale of body parts, may with more or less ingenuity be construed as measures taken to prevent harm to others. It seems indeed that it is not so easy to isolate obvious cases of laws uniquely infused with moralist or paternalist concerns. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion