Suchergebnisse

Ougaard, M. Dimensions of Hegemony. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIII, 1988, 197- 214. The first section of the article deals briefly with the history of the concept of inter national hegemony. The second section identifies several dimensions in various defi nitions of the concept. The first dimension is the distribution of resources implying that hegemony is defined as a preponderance of material power resources, while the second dimension is control over outcomes. In some definitions the hegemon has a greater control than other actors, no matter which outcomes are attained. In other definitions a specific kind of outcome is required, such as the provision of certain collective goods. A related question is whether the hegemon takes care of shared interests or is catering to its own interests, to the detriment of those of others. This points to what is arguably a somewhat neglected dimension of hegemony: the underlying pattern of interests. It is suggested that the concept of hegemony is relevant in situations with common basic interests and secondary but significant contradictory interests. In such a situation hegemony is defined as one actor's ability to provide for its own interests in conflicts of a secondary nature. The third section focuses on the patterns of interests underlying US hegemony. Three possible changes that can lead to declining hegemony are examined: increasing difficulties for the common interests, increasing incompatibility between the interests of the hegemon and its allies, and finally a growing disparity within the hegemon's own interests. The evidence is only suggestive and points in different directions, but on balance it tends to strengthen the case for declining hegemony.

Ougaard, M. Dimensions of Hegemony. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIII, 1988, 197- 214. The first section of the article deals briefly with the history of the concept of inter national hegemony. The second section identifies several dimensions in various defi nitions of the concept. The first dimension is the distribution of resources implying that hegemony is defined as a preponderance of material power resources, while the second dimension is control over outcomes. In some definitions the hegemon has a greater control than other actors, no matter which outcomes are attained. In other definitions a specific kind of outcome is required, such as the provision of certain collective goods. A related question is whether the hegemon takes care of shared interests or is catering to its own interests, to the detriment of those of others. This points to what is arguably a somewhat neglected dimension of hegemony: the underlying pattern of interests. It is suggested that the concept of hegemony is relevant in situations with common basic interests and secondary but significant contradictory interests. In such a situation hegemony is defined as one actor's ability to provide for its own interests in conflicts of a secondary nature. The third section focuses on the patterns of interests underlying US hegemony. Three possible changes that can lead to declining hegemony are examined: increasing difficulties for the common interests, increasing incompatibility between the interests of the hegemon and its allies, and finally a growing disparity within the hegemon's own interests. The evidence is only suggestive and points in different directions, but on balance it tends to strengthen the case for declining hegemony.

This article analyzes the concept of hegemony and examines its relationship to power and autonomy. Refuting the conventional belief that it is ideology that distinguishes hegemony, the article argues that it is autonomy that constitutes the distinguishing characteristic. Although hegemons tend to evolve into imperialists, hegemony involves leadership of an alliance, not domination by coercion. It is impossible to conceptualize hegemony without also including autonomy. In this conceptualization, the primary source of autonomy lies in a specific hegemonic system of domination that itself embodies the notion of autonomy for both the polity and its citizenry, a limiting construction that hinders the tendency toward imperialism. Such a system includes one type of autonomy that can be designated as autonomy within hegemony. In addition, the article discusses two other types of autonomy: counterhegemony and a largely power-based opposed hegemony. Thus, the article concludes, hegemony is a complex concept, with several types of manifestation, that can more usefully be understood in connection with autonomy and power than as a stand-alone concept.

This article asks whether Laclau and Mouffe are the right theoretical partners for thinking about the project of democracy today. It concludes that they still have quite a lot to offer that project, but it also suggests we should be wary of embracing their thought too wholeheartedly, specifically because of their fondness for Gramsci and hegemony, and perhaps also, as a result, their willingness to engage the state and its institutions in the struggle for democracy.

The United States' notice of withdrawal from the ILO is to be understood in terms of hegemonic power relations. "Tripartism" is an ideology based upon a dominant historical tendency, namely the emergence of a corporative form of state in both developed and underdeveloped countries. The AFL-CIO has participated in the construction of the corporative state in the US and has supported its hegemonic role in the world in concert with American business interests and the CIA. Neither the ILO nor international trade union organizations (especially the ICFTU) has enjoyed a stable relationship with the center of hegemonic power in the labor field, since the AFL-CIO has conducted a unilateral foreign policy. The functionalist strategy of executive leadership asserting the autonomy of an international organization through task expansion in technical fields has been almost totally irrelevant to the issue. Nor has the ILO found an alternative counter-hegemonic base of support, e.g., in the Third World. The existing hegemony has reasserted itself through the ILO program and ideology even as the US has withdrawn material support. Hegemony, which no longer operates through majority votes in international organizations, works instead through bureaucratic controls. This structure of power has prevented the ILO from confronting effectively the real social issues of employment-creation, land reform, marginality, and poverty in general. Initiatives that have been taken to deal with such issues have all ultimately been diverted into programs consistent with the hegemonic ideology and power relations.

"The Political Economy of Hegemony: The (Surprising) Persistence of American Hegemony" published on by Oxford University Press.

Most citations to "hegemonic masculinity" focus on gender ideals and men's attempts to justify domination. Few scholars have tested the theory that masculinity can be hegemonic in effect by gaining the overt consent of others to their domination. We specify this largely untested theory and use data from a pilot study of middle-age men for our demonstration of how to operationalize and recognize hegemony. We argue that scholars will find that effect at intersections of gender and other inequalities such as age. We show that, in their discussion of linked ideals of gender and age, three respondents mention domination of older men by younger men, and then both consent to that domination and accept personal responsibility for forestalling it through regimens of fitness, productivity, and health. We call for further research on the hegemony of masculinity via study of intersections of gender with such understudied inequities as age.

The settlements, today a fact on the ground, had certain effects both on
the Palestinian life and on the peace process and they have become obstacles to
two-state solution as the irreversible entities. This article is an attempt to analyse
the settlement activity in the occupied territories via the Gramscian concept
of hegemony. In the first hand, the
study would apply the concept of hegemony to the Israeli settlement policy via
demonstrating the changing political climate within the country and the ideological
attitudes towards the occupied territories. By doing so, the study would seek
to reveal how Israel's settlement activity has become hegemonic and
additionally, it would examine whether Israeli policies vis-à-vis the
Palestinians in the occupied territories that culminated with the First
Intifada in 1987 have created a counter-hegemonic alternative in a Gramscian
sense.

This article examines the discursive strategies, the ideological dominations and interrelated material tools employed by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in maintaining its rule. It also unravels the hegemonic crisis it has encountered, and the counter-hegemony it has confronted since 2015. Gramscian novelties of historical bloc, hegemony, organic crisis, counter-hegemony, and interregnum, are deployed in order to understand the continuities, ruptures and crises witnessed in Ethiopia's politics for the past thirty years. The article interprets the crisis of the TPLF since the 2015 protests through the prism of organic crises and analyses the counter-hegemonic contestations, the interregnum and the ongoing war since 4 November 2020. The article adds to the recent resurgence of interest in Gramscian perspectives by demonstrating the relevance of Gramscian concepts to the understanding of politics in the states of the global south.

THE CURRENT POWER CONFIGURATION OF THE WORLD SYSTEM IS UNIPOLARITY WITHOUT HEGEMONY. NONHEGEMONIC UNIPOLARITY AFFECTS THE CHARACTERISTIC STRUCTURE OF "DEADLY QUARRELS" IN THE WORLD SYSTEM, AND ALLOWS SOME APPROACHES TO THE POLICY ISSUE OF "DEADLY QUARRELS" NOT READILY AVAILABLE IN LESS CENTRAIZED SYSTEM STRUCTURES. UNIPOLARITY WITHOUT HEGEMONY DESERVES FURTHER COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL ATTENTION.

Abstract
To date, the vast majority of post-growth thinking has been focused on explaining why a post-growth transition is needed and the policies this would entail. Less attention, in contrast, has been paid to the relations of power and structural mechanisms through which 'growth hegemony' is continuously reproduced, and even less to the mechanisms, counter-hegemonic strategies, and coalitions that could plausibly drive post-growth transitions in core states of the world-system. This article will explore these issues through the lens of Neo-Gramscian theory, particularly the 'complex hegemony' framework developed by Alex Williams. From this perspective, rather than reducing growth to capitalist relations of production (as Marxists typically do), we should instead frame it as an emergent hegemonic structure and process shaped by the reciprocally determining forces of political economy, ideology, and militarisation. I will argue that this approach provides more insight into the messiness of possible post-growth futures – which may confound neat binaries such as capitalism/socialism – as well as the mechanisms and struggles through which the world-system might be pushed in post-growth directions.