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Personality and Philosophy Controversy of M. K. Gandhi in 21st century Modern India Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was one of the most popular 20th century spiritual and political leaders of India. He is widely known for his nonviolent philosophy. He also believed that through satyagraha philosophy he can transform Indian society and ensure long-lasting peace in it. The main problem is that in the Modern India times Gandhi's image is full of controversy - he is widely criticized in public discourses by famous personalities, like Arundhati Roy, Sujatha Gidla and Dalit Diva. This situation is getting worse, because the main political party in current Republic of India is Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is based on hindutva ideology – hindu nationalism, which includes violence, anti-muslim ideology and seeks to make India exclusively only hindu country. Moreover, M. K. Gandhi was killed by Nathuram Godse, which was a member of Hindu Mahasabha organization, which is close to BJP. Through the period of 2014 – 2018, many statues which represented M. K. Gandhi image were eliminated or damaged around the world – from India, Ghana and even in Canada. Popular personalities, like Indian writers and social activists started to criticize M. K. Gandhi personality, moreover, the critique towards M. K. Gandhi transforms into antiGandhi cult. The main object of this paper to analyze, how M. K. Gandhi nonviolent philosophy became controversial in current India context and why his public image has changed. Using hermeneutical and nationalist discourses analysis leads to the conclusion, that BJP do not accept M. K. Gandhi nonviolent and civic nationalism-based ideology, because M. K. Gandhi wanted to unify hindus and muslims, but BJP declared hindu nationalism do not accept any other religions except hinduism. BJP emphasizes, that M. Gandhi can be anti-national because of this muslim-friendly view.

Personality and Philosophy Controversy of M. K. Gandhi in 21st century Modern India Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was one of the most popular 20th century spiritual and political leaders of India. He is widely known for his nonviolent philosophy. He also believed that through satyagraha philosophy he can transform Indian society and ensure long-lasting peace in it. The main problem is that in the Modern India times Gandhi's image is full of controversy - he is widely criticized in public discourses by famous personalities, like Arundhati Roy, Sujatha Gidla and Dalit Diva. This situation is getting worse, because the main political party in current Republic of India is Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is based on hindutva ideology – hindu nationalism, which includes violence, anti-muslim ideology and seeks to make India exclusively only hindu country. Moreover, M. K. Gandhi was killed by Nathuram Godse, which was a member of Hindu Mahasabha organization, which is close to BJP. Through the period of 2014 – 2018, many statues which represented M. K. Gandhi image were eliminated or damaged around the world – from India, Ghana and even in Canada. Popular personalities, like Indian writers and social activists started to criticize M. K. Gandhi personality, moreover, the critique towards M. K. Gandhi transforms into antiGandhi cult. The main object of this paper to analyze, how M. K. Gandhi nonviolent philosophy became controversial in current India context and why his public image has changed. Using hermeneutical and nationalist discourses analysis leads to the conclusion, that BJP do not accept M. K. Gandhi nonviolent and civic nationalism-based ideology, because M. K. Gandhi wanted to unify hindus and muslims, but BJP declared hindu nationalism do not accept any other religions except hinduism. BJP emphasizes, that M. Gandhi can be anti-national because of this muslim-friendly view.

Personality and Philosophy Controversy of M. K. Gandhi in 21st century Modern India Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was one of the most popular 20th century spiritual and political leaders of India. He is widely known for his nonviolent philosophy. He also believed that through satyagraha philosophy he can transform Indian society and ensure long-lasting peace in it. The main problem is that in the Modern India times Gandhi's image is full of controversy - he is widely criticized in public discourses by famous personalities, like Arundhati Roy, Sujatha Gidla and Dalit Diva. This situation is getting worse, because the main political party in current Republic of India is Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is based on hindutva ideology – hindu nationalism, which includes violence, anti-muslim ideology and seeks to make India exclusively only hindu country. Moreover, M. K. Gandhi was killed by Nathuram Godse, which was a member of Hindu Mahasabha organization, which is close to BJP. Through the period of 2014 – 2018, many statues which represented M. K. Gandhi image were eliminated or damaged around the world – from India, Ghana and even in Canada. Popular personalities, like Indian writers and social activists started to criticize M. K. Gandhi personality, moreover, the critique towards M. K. Gandhi transforms into antiGandhi cult. The main object of this paper to analyze, how M. K. Gandhi nonviolent philosophy became controversial in current India context and why his public image has changed. Using hermeneutical and nationalist discourses analysis leads to the conclusion, that BJP do not accept M. K. Gandhi nonviolent and civic nationalism-based ideology, because M. K. Gandhi wanted to unify hindus and muslims, but BJP declared hindu nationalism do not accept any other religions except hinduism. BJP emphasizes, that M. Gandhi can be anti-national because of this muslim-friendly view.

" Long-distance nationalism ", an expression coined by Benedict Anderson, is often used in reference to transnational political activities. But the dynamics of this expatriate nationalism tend to be neglected. Mere nostalgia or even spontaneous mobilisations are evoked to explain this phenomenon. They, however, fail to explain the mechanism that lies behind " long-distance nationalism ". This paper wishes to highlight, through the example of the Hindu nationalist movements, the implication of political entrepreneurs in the country of origin and the instrumental dimension of " long-distance nationalism ". The Sangh Parivar, a network of nationalist Hindu organisations, was indeed replicated among the Hindu diaspora and its structure was litterally exported by a centralised body located in India itself. Of course, the spread of the Sangh Parivar and of its Hindutva ideology abroad was greatly facilitated by local policies like multiculturalism and by the rise of racism in the countries of emigration. A comparison of Hindu nationalist outlets in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada brings to light the two main factors in instilling " long-distance nationalism " : a favorable local context for ethnic mobilisation among migrants on the one hand, and a centralised organisation in the country of origin on the other hand. Eventually, the engineering of long-distance Hindu nationalism from India questions the changing nature of nationalism in a globalised world. ; L'expression " nationalisme à distance " que l'on doit à Benedict Anderson est souvent utilisée pour évoquer toute une série d'activités politiques transnationales. Pourtant, les dynamiques à l'oeuvre dans le nationalisme des expatriés sont rarement explorées. La simple nostalgie ou même la mobilisation spontanée servent trop souvent d'explications à ce phénomène dont elles ne suffisent pourtant pas à saisir les mécanismes. Il s'agit ici, en prenant l'exemple des mouvements nationalistes hindous, de souligner l'implication d'entrepreneurs ...

" Long-distance nationalism ", an expression coined by Benedict Anderson, is often used in reference to transnational political activities. But the dynamics of this expatriate nationalism tend to be neglected. Mere nostalgia or even spontaneous mobilisations are evoked to explain this phenomenon. They, however, fail to explain the mechanism that lies behind " long-distance nationalism ". This paper wishes to highlight, through the example of the Hindu nationalist movements, the implication of political entrepreneurs in the country of origin and the instrumental dimension of " long-distance nationalism ". The Sangh Parivar, a network of nationalist Hindu organisations, was indeed replicated among the Hindu diaspora and its structure was litterally exported by a centralised body located in India itself. Of course, the spread of the Sangh Parivar and of its Hindutva ideology abroad was greatly facilitated by local policies like multiculturalism and by the rise of racism in the countries of emigration. A comparison of Hindu nationalist outlets in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada brings to light the two main factors in instilling " long-distance nationalism " : a favorable local context for ethnic mobilisation among migrants on the one hand, and a centralised organisation in the country of origin on the other hand. Eventually, the engineering of long-distance Hindu nationalism from India questions the changing nature of nationalism in a globalised world. ; L'expression " nationalisme à distance " que l'on doit à Benedict Anderson est souvent utilisée pour évoquer toute une série d'activités politiques transnationales. Pourtant, les dynamiques à l'oeuvre dans le nationalisme des expatriés sont rarement explorées. La simple nostalgie ou même la mobilisation spontanée servent trop souvent d'explications à ce phénomène dont elles ne suffisent pourtant pas à saisir les mécanismes. Il s'agit ici, en prenant l'exemple des mouvements nationalistes hindous, de souligner l'implication d'entrepreneurs politiques du pays d'origine et la dimension instrumentale du " nationalisme à distance " qui en résulte. Le réseau du Sangh Parivar, une nébuleuse d'organisations nationalistes hindoues, a en effet été répliqué dans la diaspora et sa structure été exportée par un centre névralgique situé en Inde même. L'expansion du Sangh Parivar et de son idéologie - l'Hindutva - a toutefois été grandement facilitée, dans les pays d'accueil, par les pratiques locales contrastées mais aux effets convergents, en l'occurrence, comme le multiculturalisme et des discriminations raciales. La comparaison des branches nationalistes hindoues au Royaume-Uni, aux États-Unis et au Canada permet donc de mettre en avant deux facteurs majeurs du " nationalisme à distance " : un contexte local favorable à la mobilisation ethno religieuse des migrants dans leurs pays de résidence d'une part, et l'existence d'une organisation centralisée dans le pays d'origine d'autre part. La fabrication, depuis l'Inde, du nationalisme hindou à distance témoigne de la résilience du nationalisme dans la mondialisation.

This paper examines the politics of urban space in the Indian city of Ahmedabad, focussing particular attention on the relationship of urban redevelopment to neoliberalism, Hindu nationalist politics and their intersections. While many scholars have studied the multiple ways in which urban landscapes are being re-imagined and re-configured as a result of neoliberal programs, few like Jane M. Jacobs and Arjun Appadurai have sought to specifically focus on the ways in which these neoliberal reconfigurations of the city intersect with racial, religious, and ethnic politics. This paper seeks to contribute to this slim but important body of literature so that we might better understand the multiple articulations and geographical specificities of this intersection and the challenges that it poses for creating inclusive cities in many parts of the world. Furthermore, by locating this study in Ahmedabad, a city which on the one hand has witnessed recurring violence against its minority Muslims at the instigation of Hindu nationalist organizations, and on the other hand is increasingly becoming an important local and regional site for articulating the desire to be "global," this paper hopes to shed light on the ways in which, through their intersections in urban space, the neoliberal project and religious identity politics reconfigure each other, opening up at the same time greater challenges and new possibilities in the struggle for social justice. The paper examines the politics of urban space in Ahmedabad largely through the lens of an ambitious urban redevelopment project – the Sabaramti River Front Development Project, a US$ 262 million project currently under implementation. By interrogating the discourses and practices that constitute the multiple visions for and claims to the spaces marked for redevelopment under the project, and by examining the ways in which various actors attempt to negotiate their desires, interests and needs through the project, the paper seeks to make three arguments. First, that there are tensions in the pursuit of the project because of frictions between maintaining local legitimacy and pursuing neoliberal rationalities. Second, that the relationship between neoliberalism and Hindu nationalist politics is an uneasy one as a result of tensions between pursuing a wider political legitimacy for the state in order to attract global investment and pursuing blatantly exclusionary projects like Hindutva (a nationalist ideology that views India as a Hindu nation). And third, that as the class bias of urban redevelopment has collided with the religious bias of Hindu nationalist politics in a city where class and religion do not neatly overlap, the project has given rise to new, albeit fragile, alliances in the struggle for social justice and the right to the city.

Violence between Hindus and Muslims is a structural given of Indian society. One finds its traces very early in the country's history, a fact that can drive the analyst to explain the phenomenon by referring to the incompatibility of Hindu and Muslim cultures. However, those historians interested in the phenomenon have always emphasized the economic dimension of the rivalry between Hindus and Muslims, which springs from territorial conflicts or commercial competition. Among sociologists and political scientists, this approach has found favour with many authors more or less inclined to Marxist categories. The interpretation of violence between Hindus and Muslims that I have suggested during the last wave of riots between 1989 and 1992 is very different. This interpretation values the role of politics in two complementary aspects, the ethno-religious ideology and the exploitation of communal issues by political parties. Indeed, research on communal riots in India after 1947 suggests that these riots largely originate from a distorted idea – ideology – of the Other; the Hindu though representing an overwhelming majority, often perceive of the Muslims as a 'fifth column' threatening them from within Indian society. And the Hindu nationalist parties, which have codified this ideological pattern, employ it for electoral means in the course of campaigns laying the ground for the outbreak of violence. These parties have, in fact, learned to mobilise Hindus against Muslims on the basis of real or presumed 'sacred' issues since the emergence of electoral politics in colonial times. Their goal is to provoke such kinds of riots in order to polarise the electorate along the religious cleavage more effectively. This explanatory model of Hindu-Muslim riots has to be verified again in the light of the Gujarat riots of 2002. Moreover, these riots also commit us to reconfirm the role of the Hindu nationalist party. The latter has to be weighted even more heavily due to the events in Gujarat, for the party held political power in that State. This state of things explains the rather exceptional intensity of the Gujarat riots. Because, this time, communal violence was not so much a reflection of the common logic of communal riots in India, but rather the result of an organised pogrom with the approval of the State acting not only with the electoral agenda in mind, but also in view of a veritable ethnic cleansing. Beyond that, the intensity of the riots has also demonstrated that this kind of violence has triggered a feedback in society even among groups so far less inclined to ethnic nationalism like, for example, the tribals. But there is an effect of yet another political strategy at work, which reminds us of the ideological core of our explanatory model: the more and more thorough diffusion of Hindutva in reaction to a fear of Jihad.