Suchergebnisse

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.

O stanju privatnih šuma u RH u nekoliko smo navrata pisali u Uvodnicima Šumarskog lista, a 2017. godine "Stanje privatnih šuma u Republici Hrvatskoj" bila je stručna tema povodom obilježavanja Dana hrvatskoga šumarstva. Prema podacima Šumskogospodarske osnove područja Republike Hrvatske iz 2016. godine, površina šuma i šumskih zemljišta u RH iznosi 2 759 039,05 ha. Od ukupne površine u državnom je vlasništvu 2 097 318 ha (76 %), a 24 %, tj. 661 721 ha u vlasništvu je privatnih šumovlasnika. Članak 14. Zakona o šumama definira prema površini šuma i šumskog zemljišta privatne šumoposjednike na male s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta do 20 ha, srednje s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 20, a manjom od 300 ha i velike šumoposjednike s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 300 ha. Prema toj klasifikaciji preko 99 % površina šuma i šumskog zemljišta pripada malim šumoposjednicima, njih 418 654, što daje prosječnu veličinu posjeda od 0,5 ha. Kao što ste već u uvodnom dijelu mogli zamijetiti, miješaju se pojmovi šumovlasnik i šumoposjednik, što je rezultat dvojnog vođenja zemljišnih knjiga kroz gruntovnicu i katastar, a njihova nesređenost otežava definiranja stvarnih odnosa. Rješavanje problema uređenja imovinsko-pravnih odnosa uvijek naglašavamo kao prioritet i prvi preduvjet stvaranja organiziranog društva. Isto tako vrijeme je da jasno razlučimo namjenu i korištenje šumskog i poljoprivrednog zemljišta. Od vremena Austro-ugarske monarhije, kada je napravljena prva razdioba, usprkos brojnim zakonskim odredbama, to još nismo učinili. Tako je primjerice velik dio šuma u privatnom vlasništvu nastao obraštanjem poljoprivrednog zemljišta, koje se još uvijek u zemljišnim knjigama vodi kao livada, pašnjak ili oranica. Istovremeno na apsolutnom šumskom zemljištu u državnim šumama podižemo maslinike i vinograde ili izdajemo dozvole za pašarenje??? Povijesne okolnosti definirale su danas izuzetno male posjede šumskog zemljišta u privatnom vlasništvu koji ne omogućuju kontinuirani prihod vlasnicima, već se jednokratnim zahvatom pokušava izvući što veća financijska korist bez pridržavanja potrajnosti, osnovnog načela u šumarstvu. Svijest o potrebi funkcionalnog udruživanja i planiranja šumskouzgojnih zahvata na razini odjela i odsjeka kod naših šumovlasnika nažalost još nije zaživjela, pa se usprkos tomu što za većinu privatnih šuma imamo izrađene programe gospodarenja, ono se u praksi svodi na nepovezane zahvate na pojedinim česticama. U privatnim šumama malih posjednika sve se češće događaju kriminalne radnje vezane za sječu bez doznake, krađu, izvođenje radova pridobivanja drveta od neregistriranih ili nelicenciranih izvođača, nekontrolirano stavljanje drveta u promet, nelegalna trgovina drvetom itd. Nepostojeća jasna i transparentna (tržišna) politika formiranja cijena drveta u Hrvatskoj pogoduje raznim preprodavačima, a vrijedna sirovina bez ikakve kontrole obično završava na stranom tržištu. Sve to navodi nas na razmišljanje o odgovornosti, države kao zakonodavca i njenog odnosa prema toj kategoriji privatnog vlasništva, ali i općeg dobra zaštićenog Ustavom RH. Postavimo ovdje pitanje odgovornosti cijele šumarske struke i njenih institucija, kao i naših kolega ovlaštenih inženjera koji često na terenu provode doznaku, ili otpremu, po načelu "od nečega se mora živjeti". Ako svi, kao što to čini struka, zažmirimo pred ovim problemom, teško da ćemo se u budućnosti moći hvaliti tradicijom potrajnog i prirodnog gospodarenja našim šumama. Prvi preduvjet uvođenja reda u privatnim šumama malih posjednika je organiziranje čuvarske službe. Prema aktualnom ZOŠ-u čuvanje šuma prepušteno je vlasnicima, što je s obzirom na njihovo stanje i dobnu strukturu praktički neprovedivo, ili je dana mogućnost da to obavljaju Udruge šumoposjednika, što se opet u praksi rijetko događa. Kroz povijest uvijek su postojali čuvari šume, bili to općinski (sreski) lugari do sredine 20. stoljeća ili su to donedavno kod nas obavljali djelatnici Hrvatskih šuma. Kako bi riješili ovu situaciju postoji nekoliko opcija: Þ Vratiti nadležnost Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. preregistracijom ove tvrtke. Þ Osigurati provođenje čuvarske službe kroz lokalnu samoupravu, kao što je to bilo propisano prethodnim ZOŠ-om, no u praksi nije bilo sprovedeno. Þ Osnovati "Šumsku policiju" s jasnim ovlastima koja će osigurati red i spriječiti kriminalne radnje. Þ Osnovati Državnu instituciju (agenciju) za šume, koja bi provodila javne ovlasti i interese neovisno o vlasništvu nad šumama i omogućila bi smisleno i sveobuhvatno planiranje i gospodarenje šumama na svim razinama. Uredništvo ; The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia has been treated in the Editorial section of the Forestry Journal on several occasions, and in 2017 "The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia" was a topic discussed at the Day of Croatian Forestry. According to the Forest Management Plan of the Republic of Croatia from 2016, forests and forestland in Croatia cover 2,759,039.05 ha. Of the overall area, state owned forests account for 2,097,318 a (76 %), while privately owned forests account for 661,721 ha (24 %). Article 14 of the Law on Forests classifies private forest owners into three groups: small owners with forests and/or forestland of up to 20 ha, medium owners with forests and/or forestland of more than 20 ha but less than 300 ha, and large forest owners with forest area and/or forestland exceeding 300 ha. According to this classification, over 99 % of the area of forests and forestland are owned by small forest owners (418,654 owners), which means that the average size of the forest property is 0.5 ha. As you may have noticed in the introductory part, there is an ambiguity relating to the terms forest owner and forest holder, which is the result of the dual keeping of land books through the land register and cadastre. Their unsettled status makes it more difficult to define real relationships. We always stress that the regulation of property-legal relations is the priority and the first precondition for creating an organized society. We must also make a clear distinction between the purpose and the use of forest and agricultural land. The first division was made during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but despite numerous legal provisions we have not yet done so since. Thus, for example, a large part of privately owned forests came into being by agricultural land being overgrown, but in land registers they are still registered as meadows, pastures, or ploughland. At the same time, we raise olive groves and vineyards or issue permits for grazing over an absolute forest land in state forests??? Due to historical circumstances, there are exceptionally small areas of forestland in private ownership today, and as such they do not ensure continuous income to their owners. Instead, there is an attempt to derive as much financial profit as possible through one operation without adhering to the principle of sustainability, the fundamental principle in forestry. The awareness of the need to functionally merge and plan silvicultural treatments at the level of compartments and sub-compartments has regrettably not yet taken root among Croatian forest owners. Therefore, despite the fact that management plans have been drawn for most private forests, in practice management is reduced to disconnected operations in individual plots. Private forests of small forest holders are witnessing an increase in criminal actions such as felling without marking, theft, timber extraction by unregistered or unlicenced contractors, uncontrolled placing of timber on the market, illegal timber trade, etc. The absence of clear and transparent (market) price forming policy in Croatia favours various resellers, while valuable raw material, usually without any control, ends up on foreign markets. All this makes us think about the responsibility of the state as a legislator and its attitude towards this category of private property, but also towards the common good protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Let us also tackle the responsibility of the entire forestry profession and its institutions, as well as our colleagues, certified engineers, who mark trees or dispatch timber in the field guided by the principle "one must have something to live on". If we, as a profession, turn a blind eye to this problem, we will hardly be able to boast in the future of the tradition of sustainable and close-to-nature management of our forests. The first precondition for installing the order in private forests of small holders involves setting up a guard service. According to the valid Law on Forests, the guarding of forests is the responsibility of their owners, which is practically unfeasible given their condition and age structure, or this could be done by forest owners' associations, which again rarely happens in practice. Throughout history there have always been forest guards. Until the mid-20th century they were municipal (regional) forest rangers, and until very recently this job was performed by employees of the company Croatian Forests. There are several options which might solve this situation: Þ Restore the jurisdiction of Croatian Forests Ltd by re-registering the company. Þ Implement guard services through local self-government bodies, similar to the regulations set down in the previous Law on Forests; however, this was not applied in practice. Þ Establish a "Forest Police" service with clearly defined powers to ensure order and prevent criminal activities. Þ Establish a State Forest Institution (Agency), which will exercise public powers and promote interests independently of forest ownership, as well as enable meaningful and comprehensive planning and management at all levels. Editorial Boards

Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.