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The United States suffers political and social polarization at its worst since the Civil War. Is Trump the "result" or the "cause" that accelerated this malaise? As a former Washington correspondent who covered the Trump administration last four years, I tried exploring answers for this American self-questioning. Trump-style governance, so-called Trumpism, has been characterized with its unique communication style to inspire anti-elite ressentiment among American public especially for white male middle-class who feel themselves less and less belongings to mainstream in their country. This communication sometimes takes the form of "dog whistle" aiming at Trump's core supporters or at other times takes the form of sense of complicity sharing misinformation intentionally. The anti-elite undercurrent and the partisan confrontation which accelerates political polarization have been fostered in the US even since before the rise of Trump. In this respect the Trumpism can be called the "result". On the other hand, it is also pointed out that Trump would be the "cause" which overturned the hierarchical order of policymakers, bureaucrats, experts and major media institutions playing himself destroying the existing order. In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic played a major role in amplifying its effects. This reminds us of importance of further exploration to find out how infectious disease has caused significant impact on the state of democracy.

The conflict over Kashmir has been a core issue between India and Pakistan since their independence. It is not only just a territorial conflict but also the core issue of the region, which has been changing along with the regional and international environment. In particular, after the 1990's, the people of Kashmir committed to armed resistance, which has become the focus of the risk to regional and international security because both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. Resolution of this problem is quite difficult because it would require committing to the ideas of national integration of both countries. Specifically, for India, it is secularism; for Pakistan, it is the two-nation theory. However, the people of Kashmir want to choose their own destiny—integration with neither India nor Pakistan. India promised Kashmir a degree of freedom and democracy under article 370 of the Indian Constitution; however, for the time being, these right have been curtailed. To resolve this issue, two main plans have been presented by both countries; a referendum and the partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. But, these ideas disregard the right of self-determination or the nationalist sentiment of the people of Kashmir. Recently a new idea emerged based on the notion of shared sovereignty. The history of discord between India and Pakistan has caused critical anxiety for regional peace and stability. However, there will is hope that a constructive solution to this problem can be found in the future through continuity of dialogue and negotiation between the two countries. We as an international society surrounding these nations, we should maintain a supportive stance for continued cordial dialogue.

The conflict environment is changing, and—after almost two decades of continuous COIN, stabilisation and counterterrorism missions—government and public opinion in western and allied countries are unlikely to support continued large-scale or long-duration missions of this type. Yet history demonstrates that such missions are, and are likely to remain, some of the most frequent and geographically widespread. Likewise, ground forces are critical for success in COIN and stabilisation missions, due to the need to interact closely with local government and populations, which implies the need to establish and maintain a physical presence in the area of operations, which in turn implies the need to survive and prevail in a close combat environment, which only ground forces can do. Thus, despite their unpopularity, ground forces can expect (and must be prepared) to continue engaging in these types of operations. However, the same factors that have enhanced the threat in recent decades—in particular, connectivity and the ability to conduct collaborative and remote engagement— also create opportunities for new operating methods for ground forces conducting COIN and stabilisation. These include the ability to deploy only a small element forward on the ground, conducting SFA and FID tasks, while supporting it with a QRF and other enablers that remain offshore in a sea-base or in regionally-deployed FOBs. In such a scenario the main force might be withheld from the theatre of operations and either deploy for a brief initial period only, or not at all. For a force operating in this manner, protected mobility and communications would remain essential, as would the ability to access and deliver precision fire support when required. Deployed forces would probably be modular to a very low level, operating in a mesh of multi-role, semi-autonomous small teams supporting each other and swapping roles as needed. Traditional intelligence, engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations and military governance capabilities would remain essential, but might be called forward as needed. Ultimately, however, while ground forces will almost certainly continue to play a central role in counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations, the way they perform this role, the organisation and equipment with which they do so, and the environment in which they conduct such missions is likely to change, and keep changing, into the foreseeable future.