In the 12th century, the Curonians dwelt in the east Baltic region between the Rīga area in the north and Klaipėda in the south. They reached the peak of their economic, political and cultural achievements in the 11th century and the first half of the 12th century. The roots of piracy as a phenomenon have a social character. The most active period of the Curonian Vikings begins in around the mid-tenth century, and lasts until the arrival of the Germans in the 13th century. The well-organised piracy of the Curonians became dangerous to navigation on an important maritime trading route along the east Baltic coast. The Curonians attacked traders' boats, robbed coastal churches, devastated Danish and Swedish coastal areas, and even stayed for a while. In the times of the Teutonic Order, in periods of diplomatic and military conflict or trading competition, even officials did not avoid robbery at sea. The Palanga coastal population used to plunder shipwrecked boats, and went marauding in coastal waters until the middle of the 18th century.
In the 12th century, the Curonians dwelt in the east Baltic region between the Rīga area in the north and Klaipėda in the south. They reached the peak of their economic, political and cultural achievements in the 11th century and the first half of the 12th century. The roots of piracy as a phenomenon have a social character. The most active period of the Curonian Vikings begins in around the mid-tenth century, and lasts until the arrival of the Germans in the 13th century. The well-organised piracy of the Curonians became dangerous to navigation on an important maritime trading route along the east Baltic coast. The Curonians attacked traders' boats, robbed coastal churches, devastated Danish and Swedish coastal areas, and even stayed for a while. In the times of the Teutonic Order, in periods of diplomatic and military conflict or trading competition, even officials did not avoid robbery at sea. The Palanga coastal population used to plunder shipwrecked boats, and went marauding in coastal waters until the middle of the 18th century.
The article discuses the problem that was recently raised in the Lithuanian historical literature & public discourse by G. Beresnevieius, A. Bumblauskas, S. C. Rowell: was the medieval Lithuanian state (Grand Duchy of Lithuania; GDL) an empire? Important reason for the emergence of this problem was the partial rehabilitation of the very concept of "empire" due to the dissolution of the the USSR (reputed as "last empire") & the search for common legacies by the historians of the countries involved in the construction of the European Union as a transnational political community. There were important reasons for the traditional historiography to abstain from the use of the concepts of "empire" & "imperialism" in the work on GDL. For Non-Marxist Russian historians, GDL was simply another Russian state, so there could not be Russian imperialism against Russians. For Marxist historians, imperialism was a phase in the "capitalist formation," immediately preceding the socialist revolution & bound to the specific period of world history, so the research on precapitalist empires & imperialism was suspect of anachronism. For the opposite reason, deriving from the hermeneutic methodology, the talk about medieval Lithuanian empire & imperialism was an anachronism for Non-Marxist Polish & German historians too, because they considered as Empires only polities that claimed to be successors to Roman Empire: the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, Byzantine Empire, Moscow Empire. Lithuanian political elite never raised such claims, although theory of the Lithuanian descent from Romans (Legend of Palemon) could be used for this goal. Starting from path-breaking work by S. N. Eisenstadt "The Political Systems of Empires" (1963), comparative politics, history, sociology, anthropology & theory of international relations witnessed the emergence of the field of interdisciplinary studies that can be described as comparative studies of empires & imperialism. Second section of the paper provides the survey of the theoretical work in this field in search of the ideas useful for the analysis of the peculiarities of the medieval Lithuanian state. This survey includes into its scope the work of S. N. Eisenstadt, I. Wallerstein, A. Motyl, B. Buzan, R. Little, A. Watson, M. Beissinger, Ch.Tilly & M. Doyle, whose book "Empires" is considered as the most important contribution to the theorizing of empires & imperialism up to this date. Adapted from the source document.
The thesis explores the postcolonial failures in the Middle East through a case study of Syria. Syria like the whole Middle East as we know it nowadays is a state and region of imagination drafted by the colonial Europe after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Author defines the concept of postcolonial state of Syria and argues that after the Arab upheaval, Syria as a postcolonial state does not exist anymore. Since the "Arab Spring" Syria got dragged into an ongoing civil war and the Assad regime has refused to go down peacefully. The conflict broke out in 2011 hence the developments in Syria through 2011-2015 are the key interest for the study, however in their analysis author has to take into account the historical context and certain vital developments in Syrian history. Currently, Syrian government is unable to deliver the basic services to its population and thus has been regarded as a failed state. Author analyzes the concept of the failed state, its application in Syrian case and attempts to understand what factors led to the failure of the postcolonial state of Syria. The study builds on an argument that postcolonial state of Syria has failed due to the foundational problems and the failure of the national identity, accompanied with the involvement of external actors, which are further prolonging the conflict. Author tries to examine to what extent have those actors promoted or undermined the failure of the postcolonial state of Syria and further sectarianization of the country. Theories of National identity failure and Constructivism are used as a theoretical framework to guide the whole research; with the former providing the explanation of the failure of the Syrian state and the latter addressing the logic behind the involvement of external actors and assists in generalizing the pattern detected in Syria over the whole Middle East, examining whether postcolonial Middle East has ended in light of Syrian case and given way to the emergence of New Middle East.
The thesis explores the postcolonial failures in the Middle East through a case study of Syria. Syria like the whole Middle East as we know it nowadays is a state and region of imagination drafted by the colonial Europe after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Author defines the concept of postcolonial state of Syria and argues that after the Arab upheaval, Syria as a postcolonial state does not exist anymore. Since the "Arab Spring" Syria got dragged into an ongoing civil war and the Assad regime has refused to go down peacefully. The conflict broke out in 2011 hence the developments in Syria through 2011-2015 are the key interest for the study, however in their analysis author has to take into account the historical context and certain vital developments in Syrian history. Currently, Syrian government is unable to deliver the basic services to its population and thus has been regarded as a failed state. Author analyzes the concept of the failed state, its application in Syrian case and attempts to understand what factors led to the failure of the postcolonial state of Syria. The study builds on an argument that postcolonial state of Syria has failed due to the foundational problems and the failure of the national identity, accompanied with the involvement of external actors, which are further prolonging the conflict. Author tries to examine to what extent have those actors promoted or undermined the failure of the postcolonial state of Syria and further sectarianization of the country. Theories of National identity failure and Constructivism are used as a theoretical framework to guide the whole research; with the former providing the explanation of the failure of the Syrian state and the latter addressing the logic behind the involvement of external actors and assists in generalizing the pattern detected in Syria over the whole Middle East, examining whether postcolonial Middle East has ended in light of Syrian case and given way to the emergence of New Middle East.
The thesis explores the postcolonial failures in the Middle East through a case study of Syria. Syria like the whole Middle East as we know it nowadays is a state and region of imagination drafted by the colonial Europe after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Author defines the concept of postcolonial state of Syria and argues that after the Arab upheaval, Syria as a postcolonial state does not exist anymore. Since the "Arab Spring" Syria got dragged into an ongoing civil war and the Assad regime has refused to go down peacefully. The conflict broke out in 2011 hence the developments in Syria through 2011-2015 are the key interest for the study, however in their analysis author has to take into account the historical context and certain vital developments in Syrian history. Currently, Syrian government is unable to deliver the basic services to its population and thus has been regarded as a failed state. Author analyzes the concept of the failed state, its application in Syrian case and attempts to understand what factors led to the failure of the postcolonial state of Syria. The study builds on an argument that postcolonial state of Syria has failed due to the foundational problems and the failure of the national identity, accompanied with the involvement of external actors, which are further prolonging the conflict. Author tries to examine to what extent have those actors promoted or undermined the failure of the postcolonial state of Syria and further sectarianization of the country. Theories of National identity failure and Constructivism are used as a theoretical framework to guide the whole research; with the former providing the explanation of the failure of the Syrian state and the latter addressing the logic behind the involvement of external actors and assists in generalizing the pattern detected in Syria over the whole Middle East, examining whether postcolonial Middle East has ended in light of Syrian case and given way to the emergence of New Middle East.
In the article, the origin of the Balts' cavalry is analysed, based on the findings of archaeological researches and written sources. The opinion of the contemporary Lithuanian historiography that Lithuanian servicemen could not fight mounted in the 13th century and could perform the only function – transportation (from the three functions of a horseman – to create the break-through forces in a battle, to carry out reconnaissance and to perform transportation) is valued critically. Some researchers still assert that in the 13th century the Lithuanian military forces comprised only infantrymen, whereas cavalry as a separate tactical unit did not exist at that time. At present, this theoretical scheme is accepted as an axiom more often. The scheme is designed tendentiously ignoring obvious data of archaeological, paleozoological and historical sources. The written sources give direct evidence that Lithuanians could fight mounted and fought in this way (the conflict among the Lithuanians, the Livonian Brothers of the Sword and the Semigallians in 1208) and manoeuvred cleverly while using the distance weapons – throwing spears – during battles. The Lithuanians as well as their enemies fought not only mounted, they also jumped down from their horses if there was a need (e. g., battle in the forest). According to data of paleozoological and biometric researches, in the beginning of the second millennium, horses bred in the territory of Lithuania were perfectly suitable for the needs of light cavalry.[.]
In the article, the origin of the Balts' cavalry is analysed, based on the findings of archaeological researches and written sources. The opinion of the contemporary Lithuanian historiography that Lithuanian servicemen could not fight mounted in the 13th century and could perform the only function – transportation (from the three functions of a horseman – to create the break-through forces in a battle, to carry out reconnaissance and to perform transportation) is valued critically. Some researchers still assert that in the 13th century the Lithuanian military forces comprised only infantrymen, whereas cavalry as a separate tactical unit did not exist at that time. At present, this theoretical scheme is accepted as an axiom more often. The scheme is designed tendentiously ignoring obvious data of archaeological, paleozoological and historical sources. The written sources give direct evidence that Lithuanians could fight mounted and fought in this way (the conflict among the Lithuanians, the Livonian Brothers of the Sword and the Semigallians in 1208) and manoeuvred cleverly while using the distance weapons – throwing spears – during battles. The Lithuanians as well as their enemies fought not only mounted, they also jumped down from their horses if there was a need (e. g., battle in the forest). According to data of paleozoological and biometric researches, in the beginning of the second millennium, horses bred in the territory of Lithuania were perfectly suitable for the needs of light cavalry.[.]
In the article, the origin of the Balts' cavalry is analysed, based on the findings of archaeological researches and written sources. The opinion of the contemporary Lithuanian historiography that Lithuanian servicemen could not fight mounted in the 13th century and could perform the only function – transportation (from the three functions of a horseman – to create the break-through forces in a battle, to carry out reconnaissance and to perform transportation) is valued critically. Some researchers still assert that in the 13th century the Lithuanian military forces comprised only infantrymen, whereas cavalry as a separate tactical unit did not exist at that time. At present, this theoretical scheme is accepted as an axiom more often. The scheme is designed tendentiously ignoring obvious data of archaeological, paleozoological and historical sources. The written sources give direct evidence that Lithuanians could fight mounted and fought in this way (the conflict among the Lithuanians, the Livonian Brothers of the Sword and the Semigallians in 1208) and manoeuvred cleverly while using the distance weapons – throwing spears – during battles. The Lithuanians as well as their enemies fought not only mounted, they also jumped down from their horses if there was a need (e. g., battle in the forest). According to data of paleozoological and biometric researches, in the beginning of the second millennium, horses bred in the territory of Lithuania were perfectly suitable for the needs of light cavalry.[.]
In the article, the origin of the Balts' cavalry is analysed, based on the findings of archaeological researches and written sources. The opinion of the contemporary Lithuanian historiography that Lithuanian servicemen could not fight mounted in the 13th century and could perform the only function – transportation (from the three functions of a horseman – to create the break-through forces in a battle, to carry out reconnaissance and to perform transportation) is valued critically. Some researchers still assert that in the 13th century the Lithuanian military forces comprised only infantrymen, whereas cavalry as a separate tactical unit did not exist at that time. At present, this theoretical scheme is accepted as an axiom more often. The scheme is designed tendentiously ignoring obvious data of archaeological, paleozoological and historical sources. The written sources give direct evidence that Lithuanians could fight mounted and fought in this way (the conflict among the Lithuanians, the Livonian Brothers of the Sword and the Semigallians in 1208) and manoeuvred cleverly while using the distance weapons – throwing spears – during battles. The Lithuanians as well as their enemies fought not only mounted, they also jumped down from their horses if there was a need (e. g., battle in the forest). According to data of paleozoological and biometric researches, in the beginning of the second millennium, horses bred in the territory of Lithuania were perfectly suitable for the needs of light cavalry.[.]
Regionalization refers to the process of cooperation, integration, cohesion and identity creation in a regional space and involves state as well as non-state actors. Regionalization serves as a tool for settling conflicts and securing peace among nations. The conflicts and the spillovers they produce in regions such as the Middle East are acknowledged as being of paramount concern to international security. Building regional peace and security is a stepping stone to the construction of a more secure global order. Transforming regions into pluralistic security communities, moving from zones of war to stable zones of peace, has assumed increasing importance. The ongoing spatial formation is defined and explained as a gradual regional transformation movement from a Machiavellian-Keynesian geopolitical rationality toward a Porterian-Floridian one. These political rationalities are motivated by the perceived nature of the contemporary security environment in which a specific type of competitiveness (competitive regionalism/city-regionalism) has partly superseded military-based security issues. There is a growing emphasis on endogenous processes, utilizing regional assets, institutions and knowledge and promoting intra-regional links via cluster policies as the key to regional economic success in a global political economy. It is acknowledged that innovation, competitiveness, clusters, networks, and top quality are key shibboleths in the plans which present long-term future visions for the regions. The author is crafting a research that could measure regional performance in political, socio-economic, societal and environmental aspects with respect to regionalization processes, regional security and regional transformation. Rather than using European Union as the standard from which to explain all other cases of regionalization, or excluding European Union altogether in theorizing attempts, author emphasizes that it is important to enhance the comparative regional analysis. In order not to be restrained to the European Union model, the volume encompass multi-paradigmatic and eclectic analysis that could explain in detail why the European Union regionalization model cannot be replicated in the Middle East, in the core countries of the Levant in particular.
Regionalization refers to the process of cooperation, integration, cohesion and identity creation in a regional space and involves state as well as non-state actors. Regionalization serves as a tool for settling conflicts and securing peace among nations. The conflicts and the spillovers they produce in regions such as the Middle East are acknowledged as being of paramount concern to international security. Building regional peace and security is a stepping stone to the construction of a more secure global order. Transforming regions into pluralistic security communities, moving from zones of war to stable zones of peace, has assumed increasing importance. The ongoing spatial formation is defined and explained as a gradual regional transformation movement from a Machiavellian-Keynesian geopolitical rationality toward a Porterian-Floridian one. These political rationalities are motivated by the perceived nature of the contemporary security environment in which a specific type of competitiveness (competitive regionalism/city-regionalism) has partly superseded military-based security issues. There is a growing emphasis on endogenous processes, utilizing regional assets, institutions and knowledge and promoting intra-regional links via cluster policies as the key to regional economic success in a global political economy. It is acknowledged that innovation, competitiveness, clusters, networks, and top quality are key shibboleths in the plans which present long-term future visions for the regions. The author is crafting a research that could measure regional performance in political, socio-economic, societal and environmental aspects with respect to regionalization processes, regional security and regional transformation. Rather than using European Union as the standard from which to explain all other cases of regionalization, or excluding European Union altogether in theorizing attempts, author emphasizes that it is important to enhance the comparative regional analysis. In order not to be restrained to the European Union model, the volume encompass multi-paradigmatic and eclectic analysis that could explain in detail why the European Union regionalization model cannot be replicated in the Middle East, in the core countries of the Levant in particular.
