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The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.

The last decades saw Turkey evolving from its Cold War era model of foreign relations, when it was the bastion of the West in the region, which involved alliance with the US and Israel. Following the doctrine of Ahmed Davutoĝlu, a theoretician of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002, Turkey opened to the neighbouring states, striving to become a regional power by diplomatic rather than military means and through cultural and economic incentives. Both the internal and international actions of AKP governments were initially successful, and Turkey with its version of Islamic democracy was considered a model during the Arab Spring and a sound counterbalance to such countries as Iran. However, Turkey's bid to join the EU was stalled, and its approach to the civil war in Syria as well as other issues has been heavily criticized both in the West and in the region. The internal tensions are growing too, as the government has failed to recognize the rights of large minority groups, particularly the Kurds and the Alevi, which may threaten the integrity of the country.

This article addresses relations between Europe and the countries of the Middle East and the implications of these relationships over the past two decades, through an examination of the events of the 'Arab Spring.' The Arab Spring refers to a chain of events that swept through the Arab countries from late 2010, characterized by demonstrations, violence, and civil war. This was sparked by resistance to tyrannical regimes and led to the fall of the rulers of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. However, Islamists were able to utilize the protesters, who sought democracy, an equal economy, and the elimination of governmental corruption, to further their ambitions. At that time, it was not clear what the new regimes would look like, but it was widely expected that Islamist elements would gain power. Europe responded positively to these events, in terms of declarations, policy, and physical involvement, from the fear that Islamist forces would take advantage of the outcomes of the protests, despite the fact that, for decades, there had been collaboration and friendly relations between Western nations and many of the overthrown tyrants. This policy of turning a blind eye to the lack of democracy and human rights violations in these countries, however, had been perceived by many as contrary to European values. On May 25, 2011, the European Union published a document admitting their failure to achieve political reforms in the neighboring Arab countries. Following the events of the Arab Spring, a new approach to strengthening the partnership between Europe and the Arab world was needed. The objectives of European policy towards the Muslim world include halting massive Muslim migration, reducing the influence of fundamentalist and radical Islam in the Middle East and among Muslims in Europe, and ensuring a supply of energy resources obtained from these countries. Meeting these challenges will be a significant step in the right direction. ; Artykuł omawia stosunki między Europą i krajami Bliskiego Wschodu oraz konsekwencje tych relacji w ciągu ostatnich dwóch dekad, poprzez analizę "arabskiej wiosny". Określenie "arabska wiosna" odnosi się do serii wydarzeń obejmujących demonstracje, przemoc i wojnę domową, które przetoczyły się przez kraje arabskie od końca 2010 r. Wywołane przez siły oporu wobec autorytarnych reżimów doprowadziły do upadku przywódców Egiptu, Tunezji i Libii. Protesty zwolenników demokracji, zrównoważonej gospodarki i likwidacji korupcji rządowej udało się jednak wykorzystać do swoich celów islamistom. Wprawdzie nie było wówczas jasne, jakie nowe reżimy przejmą władzę, ale powszechnie oczekiwano, że będą to siły islamistyczne. W kategoriach deklaracji, polityki i zaangażowania fizycznego Europa zareagowała na wydarzenia arabskiej wiosny pozytywnie w obawie, że wyniki protestów mogą zostać wykorzystane przez siły islamistyczne, mimo że przez dziesięciolecia państwa Zachodu łączyła z wieloma obalonymi tyranami współpraca i przyjazne stosunki. Polityka przymykania oka na brak demokracji i łamanie praw człowieka w tych krajach była jednak często postrzegana jako sprzeczna z wartościami europejskimi. W dniu 25 maja 2011 r. Unia Europejska opublikowała dokument przyznający, że nie udało jej się przeprowadzić reform politycznych w sąsiednich krajach arabskich. Po wydarzeniach arabskiej wiosny konieczne było wypracowanie nowego podejścia do wzmocnienia partnerstwa między Europą a światem arabskim. Cele europejskiej polityki wobec świata muzułmańskiego obejmują powstrzymanie masowej migracji muzułmańskiej, zmniejszenie wpływu fundamentalistycznego i radykalnego islamu na Bliskim Wschodzie, a także wśród muzułmanów w Europie, oraz zapewnienie dostaw surowców energetycznych z tych krajów. Sprostanie tym wyzwaniom będzie znaczącym krokiem we właściwym kierunku.

The history of the Polish parliamentarianism has aroused numerous disputes since long due to many factors, causing difficulties in determining the beginnings of existence of this institution in the former Poland. The basic problem emerged in the distinction of the term "Sejm" ("Polish Parliament") from the earlier rallies, court veches, local conventions or those covering larger areas of the country, or even all-state conventions, summoned by the particular regional dukes and after the unification of the state by monarchs. The disputes were related to the critical look at the role of Parliament in the history of the state: some glorified it, others expressed their critical view, determined by the historical school which the particular author belonged to. During those disputes, the final form was gained by the Polish Parliament as a bicameral parliament with the king, as one of the states, with the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in the years 1493–1505. ; The history of the Polish parliamentarianism has aroused numerous disputes since long due to many factors, causing difficulties in determining the beginnings of existence of this institution in the former Poland. The basic problem emerged in the distinction of the term "Sejm" ("Polish Parliament") from the earlier rallies, court veches, local conventions or those covering larger areas of the country, or even all-state conventions, summoned by the particular regional dukes and after the unification of the state by monarchs. The disputes were related to the critical look at the role of Parliament in the history of the state: some glorified it, others expressed their critical view, determined by the historical school which the particular author belonged to. During those disputes, the final form was gained by the Polish Parliament as a bicameral parliament with the king, as one of the states, with the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in the years 1493–1505.

The purpose of this article is to capture one of the key features of the political thought that developed in the United States of America. Assuming that the USA's political culture is indeed exceptional, the author attempts to find the common denominator that would reflect the singularity of the American political mind. The author states that such a feature is the radical anti-historicality of the American mode of thinking about politics. It is a phenomenon that is deeply-rooted in the political and spiritual past of the United States and seems to be crucial because it never developed to such an extent in other traditions. Furthermore, even today to a large extent it defines both the American left and right. It is also very much present in academic discussion as well as in ordinary political activities. By anti-historicality the author means the rejection of the thesis that politics within a given society depends on that society's past experience. The phenomenon defies simple normative assessments. On the one hand, it protects American politics from the perils of radical historicism; on the other hand, it hinders the USA's contacts with other political bodies. However, the author concludes that understanding American anti-historicality is crucial when entering into any relations with the USA.

In both the 20th and the first two decades of the 21st century, Saudi Arabia has remained a strategic actor in the US foreign policy towards the Middle East. Relations between these countries can undoubtedly be called special. Multi‑faceted and complex connections have led the two countries to a state of symbiotic cooperation which, at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, seems to be impossible to change. The Donald Trump administration, despite the split into Saudi enthusiasts (supporters of strengthening the alliance with Riyadh) and Saudi realists (critics of thoughtless pro‑Saudi politics), undoubtedly has been strengthening the symbiotic cooperation with Saudi Arabia. What strengthens and determines the symbiotic cooperation is Iran, perceived by the US and Saudi Arabia as the greatest threat to the realization of their own interests in the Middle East.