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Lithuanian authors have challenges to study Russia's politics of history. The analysis is complicated because of a few factors. Diplomatic disputes and informative wars between Lithuania and Russia concerning historical questions have encouraged researches by historians but not by political scientists. In Lithuania, the questions of who and how is forming the history politics of Russia, what is its content and the function it accomplishes, remain unexamined. The analysis is further complicated by disagreement among Russian political scientists, historians, journalists, and politicians over the existence of such politics. The present analysis demonstrates that post-soviet Russia perceives the importance of historical memory, i.e. it understands that historical memory and its forms depend on the states' politics. Russia's political history genesis testifies that trends of such politics depend on the geopolitical orientation of its government. The end of the Cold War did not manage to conceal the fundamental differences between Europe and Russia. The wave of liberalism and democracy, which spread over Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russian Federation, has caused tension in Russia ruled by B. Yeltsin. Yeltsin's Russia was not able to tackle this problem by using measures of history politics in order to lessen the distance between Russia and the West. V. Putin undertook to find the solution to this situation, and he did. By using changes of international politics, he builds the image of Russia as a great power. Politics of history are subordinated to build this image; also, it is used as an instrument in domestic politics. The history politics of Russia has taken the shape of a manipulative form and serves the interests of V. Putins's power.

Lithuanian authors have challenges to study Russia's politics of history. The analysis is complicated because of a few factors. Diplomatic disputes and informative wars between Lithuania and Russia concerning historical questions have encouraged researches by historians but not by political scientists. In Lithuania, the questions of who and how is forming the history politics of Russia, what is its content and the function it accomplishes, remain unexamined. The analysis is further complicated by disagreement among Russian political scientists, historians, journalists, and politicians over the existence of such politics. The present analysis demonstrates that post-soviet Russia perceives the importance of historical memory, i.e. it understands that historical memory and its forms depend on the states' politics. Russia's political history genesis testifies that trends of such politics depend on the geopolitical orientation of its government. The end of the Cold War did not manage to conceal the fundamental differences between Europe and Russia. The wave of liberalism and democracy, which spread over Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russian Federation, has caused tension in Russia ruled by B. Yeltsin. Yeltsin's Russia was not able to tackle this problem by using measures of history politics in order to lessen the distance between Russia and the West. V. Putin undertook to find the solution to this situation, and he did. By using changes of international politics, he builds the image of Russia as a great power. Politics of history are subordinated to build this image; also, it is used as an instrument in domestic politics. The history politics of Russia has taken the shape of a manipulative form and serves the interests of V. Putins's power.

Lithuanian authors have challenges to study Russia's politics of history. The analysis is complicated because of a few factors. Diplomatic disputes and informative wars between Lithuania and Russia concerning historical questions have encouraged researches by historians but not by political scientists. In Lithuania, the questions of who and how is forming the history politics of Russia, what is its content and the function it accomplishes, remain unexamined. The analysis is further complicated by disagreement among Russian political scientists, historians, journalists, and politicians over the existence of such politics. The present analysis demonstrates that post-soviet Russia perceives the importance of historical memory, i.e. it understands that historical memory and its forms depend on the states' politics. Russia's political history genesis testifies that trends of such politics depend on the geopolitical orientation of its government. The end of the Cold War did not manage to conceal the fundamental differences between Europe and Russia. The wave of liberalism and democracy, which spread over Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russian Federation, has caused tension in Russia ruled by B. Yeltsin. Yeltsin's Russia was not able to tackle this problem by using measures of history politics in order to lessen the distance between Russia and the West. V. Putin undertook to find the solution to this situation, and he did. By using changes of international politics, he builds the image of Russia as a great power. Politics of history are subordinated to build this image; also, it is used as an instrument in domestic politics. The history politics of Russia has taken the shape of a manipulative form and serves the interests of V. Putins's power.

Lithuanian authors have challenges to study Russia's politics of history. The analysis is complicated because of a few factors. Diplomatic disputes and informative wars between Lithuania and Russia concerning historical questions have encouraged researches by historians but not by political scientists. In Lithuania, the questions of who and how is forming the history politics of Russia, what is its content and the function it accomplishes, remain unexamined. The analysis is further complicated by disagreement among Russian political scientists, historians, journalists, and politicians over the existence of such politics. The present analysis demonstrates that post-soviet Russia perceives the importance of historical memory, i.e. it understands that historical memory and its forms depend on the states' politics. Russia's political history genesis testifies that trends of such politics depend on the geopolitical orientation of its government. The end of the Cold War did not manage to conceal the fundamental differences between Europe and Russia. The wave of liberalism and democracy, which spread over Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russian Federation, has caused tension in Russia ruled by B. Yeltsin. Yeltsin's Russia was not able to tackle this problem by using measures of history politics in order to lessen the distance between Russia and the West. V. Putin undertook to find the solution to this situation, and he did. By using changes of international politics, he builds the image of Russia as a great power. Politics of history are subordinated to build this image; also, it is used as an instrument in domestic politics. The history politics of Russia has taken the shape of a manipulative form and serves the interests of V. Putins's power.

The intensification of historical consciousness in 1988 encouraged the questioning of the remains of the Soviet epoch and the search for heroic examples in the remote history of the state. After the first memoirs were published during the first years of independence, various forms of social memory appeared: a list of memorable days and founding of new museums. But at the period of the rebirth the collective memory was more consensual. The reconstructed monuments of the prewar period became the products of collective memory, the ideological content of which equally satisfied both the post-Soviet elite, aiming for the legitimization, and the nation, thirsty for freedom. At that time the monuments became the instruments of the socio-political power used to legitimize authority, to construct individual and collective memory. The signs of the public places witnessed the configuring of heritage that helped to determine the spirit and direction of the newly established nation-state. Therefore it became a meaningful part of the politics of memory.

The intensification of historical consciousness in 1988 encouraged the questioning of the remains of the Soviet epoch and the search for heroic examples in the remote history of the state. After the first memoirs were published during the first years of independence, various forms of social memory appeared: a list of memorable days and founding of new museums. But at the period of the rebirth the collective memory was more consensual. The reconstructed monuments of the prewar period became the products of collective memory, the ideological content of which equally satisfied both the post-Soviet elite, aiming for the legitimization, and the nation, thirsty for freedom. At that time the monuments became the instruments of the socio-political power used to legitimize authority, to construct individual and collective memory. The signs of the public places witnessed the configuring of heritage that helped to determine the spirit and direction of the newly established nation-state. Therefore it became a meaningful part of the politics of memory.

The intensification of historical consciousness in 1988 encouraged the questioning of the remains of the Soviet epoch and the search for heroic examples in the remote history of the state. After the first memoirs were published during the first years of independence, various forms of social memory appeared: a list of memorable days and founding of new museums. But at the period of the rebirth the collective memory was more consensual. The reconstructed monuments of the prewar period became the products of collective memory, the ideological content of which equally satisfied both the post-Soviet elite, aiming for the legitimization, and the nation, thirsty for freedom. At that time the monuments became the instruments of the socio-political power used to legitimize authority, to construct individual and collective memory. The signs of the public places witnessed the configuring of heritage that helped to determine the spirit and direction of the newly established nation-state. Therefore it became a meaningful part of the politics of memory.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine condition of the Sámi historical memory in Sweden. This is done by analysing and comparing Sámi history representations in two museums: Nordiska museum, which reflects Swedish perspective and Ájtte museum, which reflects Sámi perspective. Sweden receives a lot of criticism from international organs (such as United Nations and Council of Europe) regarding restrictions of Sámi rights and influence. Sámi communities are concerned about failed inclusion of Sámi history into the major narrative. Nowadays stories about Sámi people history are heard more often but despite that criticism does not disappear. By examining narratives of the chosen museums I will try to understand why it is so. In this research I apply qualitative method and perform comparative analysis of two exhibitions, I also conduct interviews with museums' representatives and visitors. Theoretical base that I construct for this research consists of collective memory and cultural trauma theories. They provide a framework which allows to understand history representations, as well it predicts possible perpetrators' and survivors' narratives. In this case it appeared that they did not reflect actual narratives, which says that chosen representations have to be analysed in consideration of what mnemonic actor present them. It also shows that cultural trauma that develops out of longstanding history of the routine harm is not so different from trauma process which begin with some sort of shock. In the end they both produce similar narratives. Museums' narratives can be understood as attempts to cope with historical trauma. In Ájtte museum it is done by creating a new narrative for Sámi people, which do not include Sweden as a main actor and trauma as a main process. Nordiska museum choose a different approach – it reveals history of Sámi oppression and reflects how the museum was part of it. It seems that these narratives should lead to conciliation, but actually they do not make a difference. Why Sámi people are still disappointed about how they history is treated? There are two reasons: first of all, it is because of representations itself. Even though Nordiska talks about the oppression, in most cases representations are shallow, they lack deeper analysis and personal stories, and furthermore, Sámi are seen in relation with the state and Swedish society, which do not reflect them as active actors in their own history. Second of all, this new narrative of the perpetrators do not affect official state position and politics in any way.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine condition of the Sámi historical memory in Sweden. This is done by analysing and comparing Sámi history representations in two museums: Nordiska museum, which reflects Swedish perspective and Ájtte museum, which reflects Sámi perspective. Sweden receives a lot of criticism from international organs (such as United Nations and Council of Europe) regarding restrictions of Sámi rights and influence. Sámi communities are concerned about failed inclusion of Sámi history into the major narrative. Nowadays stories about Sámi people history are heard more often but despite that criticism does not disappear. By examining narratives of the chosen museums I will try to understand why it is so. In this research I apply qualitative method and perform comparative analysis of two exhibitions, I also conduct interviews with museums' representatives and visitors. Theoretical base that I construct for this research consists of collective memory and cultural trauma theories. They provide a framework which allows to understand history representations, as well it predicts possible perpetrators' and survivors' narratives. In this case it appeared that they did not reflect actual narratives, which says that chosen representations have to be analysed in consideration of what mnemonic actor present them. It also shows that cultural trauma that develops out of longstanding history of the routine harm is not so different from trauma process which begin with some sort of shock. In the end they both produce similar narratives. Museums' narratives can be understood as attempts to cope with historical trauma. In Ájtte museum it is done by creating a new narrative for Sámi people, which do not include Sweden as a main actor and trauma as a main process. Nordiska museum choose a different approach – it reveals history of Sámi oppression and reflects how the museum was part of it. It seems that these narratives should lead to conciliation, but actually they do not make a difference. Why Sámi people are still disappointed about how they history is treated? There are two reasons: first of all, it is because of representations itself. Even though Nordiska talks about the oppression, in most cases representations are shallow, they lack deeper analysis and personal stories, and furthermore, Sámi are seen in relation with the state and Swedish society, which do not reflect them as active actors in their own history. Second of all, this new narrative of the perpetrators do not affect official state position and politics in any way.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine condition of the Sámi historical memory in Sweden. This is done by analysing and comparing Sámi history representations in two museums: Nordiska museum, which reflects Swedish perspective and Ájtte museum, which reflects Sámi perspective. Sweden receives a lot of criticism from international organs (such as United Nations and Council of Europe) regarding restrictions of Sámi rights and influence. Sámi communities are concerned about failed inclusion of Sámi history into the major narrative. Nowadays stories about Sámi people history are heard more often but despite that criticism does not disappear. By examining narratives of the chosen museums I will try to understand why it is so. In this research I apply qualitative method and perform comparative analysis of two exhibitions, I also conduct interviews with museums' representatives and visitors. Theoretical base that I construct for this research consists of collective memory and cultural trauma theories. They provide a framework which allows to understand history representations, as well it predicts possible perpetrators' and survivors' narratives. In this case it appeared that they did not reflect actual narratives, which says that chosen representations have to be analysed in consideration of what mnemonic actor present them. It also shows that cultural trauma that develops out of longstanding history of the routine harm is not so different from trauma process which begin with some sort of shock. In the end they both produce similar narratives. Museums' narratives can be understood as attempts to cope with historical trauma. In Ájtte museum it is done by creating a new narrative for Sámi people, which do not include Sweden as a main actor and trauma as a main process. Nordiska museum choose a different approach – it reveals history of Sámi oppression and reflects how the museum was part of it. It seems that these narratives should lead to conciliation, but actually they do not make a difference. Why Sámi people are still disappointed about how they history is treated? There are two reasons: first of all, it is because of representations itself. Even though Nordiska talks about the oppression, in most cases representations are shallow, they lack deeper analysis and personal stories, and furthermore, Sámi are seen in relation with the state and Swedish society, which do not reflect them as active actors in their own history. Second of all, this new narrative of the perpetrators do not affect official state position and politics in any way.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine condition of the Sámi historical memory in Sweden. This is done by analysing and comparing Sámi history representations in two museums: Nordiska museum, which reflects Swedish perspective and Ájtte museum, which reflects Sámi perspective. Sweden receives a lot of criticism from international organs (such as United Nations and Council of Europe) regarding restrictions of Sámi rights and influence. Sámi communities are concerned about failed inclusion of Sámi history into the major narrative. Nowadays stories about Sámi people history are heard more often but despite that criticism does not disappear. By examining narratives of the chosen museums I will try to understand why it is so. In this research I apply qualitative method and perform comparative analysis of two exhibitions, I also conduct interviews with museums' representatives and visitors. Theoretical base that I construct for this research consists of collective memory and cultural trauma theories. They provide a framework which allows to understand history representations, as well it predicts possible perpetrators' and survivors' narratives. In this case it appeared that they did not reflect actual narratives, which says that chosen representations have to be analysed in consideration of what mnemonic actor present them. It also shows that cultural trauma that develops out of longstanding history of the routine harm is not so different from trauma process which begin with some sort of shock. In the end they both produce similar narratives. Museums' narratives can be understood as attempts to cope with historical trauma. In Ájtte museum it is done by creating a new narrative for Sámi people, which do not include Sweden as a main actor and trauma as a main process. Nordiska museum choose a different approach – it reveals history of Sámi oppression and reflects how the museum was part of it. It seems that these narratives should lead to conciliation, but actually they do not make a difference. Why Sámi people are still disappointed about how they history is treated? There are two reasons: first of all, it is because of representations itself. Even though Nordiska talks about the oppression, in most cases representations are shallow, they lack deeper analysis and personal stories, and furthermore, Sámi are seen in relation with the state and Swedish society, which do not reflect them as active actors in their own history. Second of all, this new narrative of the perpetrators do not affect official state position and politics in any way.

More than 130 years of shared history between France and Algeria followed by one of the most brutal wars of decolonization in 1962 generated important developments in both countries and their self-perceptions. However, immediately after the war, France began a policy of "national amnesia" towards the memories of Algeria. There is a "halo effect" that imputes an Algerian origin to any Arab-looking individual. Thus, since the biggest part of Arabs in France are of North African descent, in this research, Algeria is seen as a medium through which France perceives its Arab part of identity. The fact that the shared history with Algeria, memories and France's wrongdoings during the war were not included in the national narrative of France had negatively influenced France's ability to integrate its Arab population. The awareness of its own growing pluralism and inability to accept it has created an identity crisis. This article attempts to address this particular issue.

More than 130 years of shared history between France and Algeria followed by one of the most brutal wars of decolonization in 1962 generated important developments in both countries and their self-perceptions. However, immediately after the war, France began a policy of "national amnesia" towards the memories of Algeria. There is a "halo effect" that imputes an Algerian origin to any Arab-looking individual. Thus, since the biggest part of Arabs in France are of North African descent, in this research, Algeria is seen as a medium through which France perceives its Arab part of identity. The fact that the shared history with Algeria, memories and France's wrongdoings during the war were not included in the national narrative of France had negatively influenced France's ability to integrate its Arab population. The awareness of its own growing pluralism and inability to accept it has created an identity crisis. This article attempts to address this particular issue.

More than 130 years of shared history between France and Algeria followed by one of the most brutal wars of decolonization in 1962 generated important developments in both countries and their self-perceptions. However, immediately after the war, France began a policy of "national amnesia" towards the memories of Algeria. There is a "halo effect" that imputes an Algerian origin to any Arab-looking individual. Thus, since the biggest part of Arabs in France are of North African descent, in this research, Algeria is seen as a medium through which France perceives its Arab part of identity. The fact that the shared history with Algeria, memories and France's wrongdoings during the war were not included in the national narrative of France had negatively influenced France's ability to integrate its Arab population. The awareness of its own growing pluralism and inability to accept it has created an identity crisis. This article attempts to address this particular issue.

More than 130 years of shared history between France and Algeria followed by one of the most brutal wars of decolonization in 1962 generated important developments in both countries and their self-perceptions. However, immediately after the war, France began a policy of "national amnesia" towards the memories of Algeria. There is a "halo effect" that imputes an Algerian origin to any Arab-looking individual. Thus, since the biggest part of Arabs in France are of North African descent, in this research, Algeria is seen as a medium through which France perceives its Arab part of identity. The fact that the shared history with Algeria, memories and France's wrongdoings during the war were not included in the national narrative of France had negatively influenced France's ability to integrate its Arab population. The awareness of its own growing pluralism and inability to accept it has created an identity crisis. This article attempts to address this particular issue.