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Lately there have been works that show that Kant bases human rights on innate freedom as the only innate right that man has by virtue of his humanity. However, innate freedom cannot justify a theory of human rights because it is only an innate right over my inner self that allows for empirical possession, and although a human right is inalienable, it must be renounced in order to enter the world; Moreover, the four analytical derivations of innate freedom generate consequences that are incompatible with a human rights doctrine, for as human rights refer to all, innate equality and innate independence apply to a limited number of people; Finally, there is a differentiation in the interpretation of humanity's formula in law and ethics, because, subjectively, treating humanity as an end requires the agent to consider that the end of humanity is the motive of his action in ethics, but in law it is only required that its external behavior be in accordance with the end of humanity, and objectively, in law, treating humanity as an end produces criminal law contrary to human rights and the law of humanity requires that innate integrity be suspended during the period of condemnation, furthermore, this differentiation in the idea of ​​humanity becomes explicit in innate imprehensibility, for in ethics lie is the greatest violation of the duty of humanity in his person, but in law only violates the right of humanity if it causes harm to others.

In this article we try to show the troublesome relation between biopolitcs, biopower and human rights in Michel Foucault. The notion of right is a classical notion, insofar as it pertains to the juridical conception of politics and to the techniques of sovereign power. On the other side, the idea of the human animal as human being appears only in Modernity, within the different dispositives that constitute what Foucault called the modern biopower. Therefore, talking of human rights one puts together the idea of right and the idea of human being, i.e. two notions belonging to two historically distinct techniques of power. In the awareness of this distinction, one has to question why Foucault, in face of what was going on in his days, did nevertheless appeal – against governments – to the rights of those who are governed. Classical right may have nothing to do with biopolitics; however with regard to the so-called human rights we cannot claim the same.

In the current debate on human rights, the political conception is attractive in its ability to try to find solutions to the central questions and problems, which the orthodox conception has difficulties in solving, because of its own nature (the political formulation of human rights) it does not need a moral foundation that is independent of the recognition established by international law and practice. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the current practice and the international doctrine consider human rights as tools addressed, mainly, to establish the limits of the legitimate sovereignty of the state, thus, recognizing the plausibility of the political conception. On the other hand, the article intends to show that this specific function, while important, should not exhaust all that human rights perform. Therefore, the political conception runs the serious risk of weakening the normative force of human rights and conflating two different agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. To go through this argument, first of all, the article presents the contemporary genesis of the political conception of human rights based on the work of John Rawls. Secondly, it focuses on the reformulation given by Raz and Beitz's approaches. Finally, in the third section, I criticize three main assumptions which ground the current paradigm of political conception of human rights.