Suchergebnisse

One round-table event was organised within the framework of Work Package III, part of the IECEU project. The events focused on the WP3's four case studies: Libya, CAR, South Sudan and DRC. This report provides information on the round-table event and presents the main points of discussion that emerged during it. The round-table discussion and the subsequent seminar on the Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the four case studies was organised by the Royal Danish Defence College on 31 October-1. November 2016. The round-table participants included experts on Africa in general, sub-matter experts, experts on peace and conflict studies, and practitioners in crisis management. A total of eighteen speakers explored the effectiveness of international assistance to the four African examples from different perspectives, drawing a rather pessimistic picture of the current situation in the four countries in question, but also highlighting the difficulties for the EU in working as a conflict manager in this context. Libya is plagued by international strife to such an extent that the EU had to withdraw from that mission. South Sudan has returned to civil war, and while the technical impact of the small EU airport mission is not in doubt, the larger strategic and medium to long-term impacts are not visible. In CAR the EU force managed to stabilise a critical security situation, thus allowing international humanitarian action and political dialogue to take place. The EU force took the form of a robust bridging mission that was replaced by a UN force, and it largely managed to fulfil its mandate. However, the EU force mission also highlights a number of internal EU challenges that need to be addressed, as well as the medium to long-term impact of this type of military intervention. In the case of the DRC, four cases were debated. The first was Operation Artemis, the EU-led military intervention in the town of Bunia, to stop and pre-empt an unfolding ethnic conflict. The operation was limited in size and time, and it managed to achieve its objectives, but it did not prevent the conflict flaring up after it had left. The significance of Artemis was that it was the first ESDP mission, a trendsetter for the more independent role for the EU that some member states wanted in the future. In 2006 the EU again deployed a robust military force primarily to Kinshasa, mandated to assist the UN force MONUC in securing the DRC elections in that year. Again the EU force deployment was limited in size and time, and managed to achieve its mandate. However, the deployment highlighted a number of lessons for the EU in future operations, especially around national caveats in operations and logistics, but also the different priorities of member states in EU-led military operations, compared, for instance, to NATO operations. This was very visible in the later CAR deployment, for which it was difficult to get EU members to commit and deploy forces. The two other EU missions in the DRC were the EUPOL and the EUSEC missions, which focused on helping implement the SSR program, which constituted a central element of the peace agreement. Even though the EU was involved for many years and introduced a whole range of new initiatives, the missions did not manage to achieve their medium to long-term objectives. The study shows that there was a discrepancy between project formulation and ambitions, as well as between the available budget and reality. The EUPOL and EUSEC missions were plagued by being over-ambitious and by not taking the DRC context into consideration. Furthermore the study shows that there is a slippage between what happens in Brussels and what happens on the ground in the DRC, as well as an urgent need to secure better communications and cooperation between the two levels.

Although official warfare in the Republic of Congo stopped more than eight years ago, the pool region has continued to feel the collateral effects of war until now at a scale largely ignored by the general public. The pool region is where the Ninjas, a group of local militias, originated during the civil strife and retreated to afterwards. Peace and recovery did not gain traction in the area until 2010/11. Key findings of this analysis of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process include: The lack of a public security presence: the pool region has largely been deprived of public security forces over the past thirteen years (1998-2010), which led to power abuse. Until recently, several Ninja bases remained throughout the pool region, led by free-riding commanders operating independently of any official Ninja structure. The recognition of intra-regional disparity: warfare affected localities very differently. While the southern districts have been calm for the past eight years, abuse was regularly reported along the railroad prior to 2011. The economic situation of ex-combatants: There have been many self-demobilizations in the past decade, and many ex-combatants have already learned to cope. The heterogeneity of ex-combatants: ex-combatants do not constitute a homogeneous group. Therefore, their reintegration needs differ. The consulting team developed a typology to help understand the profiles of all ex-combatants. Non-targeted assistance: the consulting team recommends pairing recent governmental disarmament operations with community driven reconstruction programming to provide closure to the population affected by the war. The main focus of programming should be to reenergize local economies destroyed by the war, especially medium-scale agriculture and animal husbandry, and to open up the region to development. The objective of this study was to analyze the extent of reintegration of ex-combatants in the pool region and to formulate recommendations for potential future action.

This article highlights the positive relations between the Jewish and the Kurdish nations, maintained mainly by Kurdistani Jews until their displacement to Israel in the mid-20th century. These positive relations have been transmitted through their oral traditions, documented by both communities and travelers to Kurdistan, and validated by several scholars who studied the Jews of the region, Kurdistan, and Jewish-Kurdish relations. The dearth of historical documentation of both societies has resulted in a 'negative myth' used by the enemies of the Kurds and the Jews to dehumanize them before the 20th century, and therefore delegitimizing their right to statehood in modern times. From the 16th century onward, there is more solid evidence about the Kurdistani Jews and their relations with Kurdish neighbors. There are considerable and certain parallels between the two nations in terms of their oral traditions as well as linguistic and literary practices. The historical ties between the Jews and their neighbors in Kurdistan formed a fruitful ground for the relations between the Jewish people of Israel and the Kurds since 1948. Despite the exodus of almost the entire Kurdistani Jewish population to the State of Israel, Kurdistani Jews have largely retained their identity, culture, and traditions and have effectively influenced Israel's policy towards the Kurds. The often-secret relations between the Kurdish movement in Iraq and Israel since 1960 played an important role in the global security policy of the Jewish nation in the Middle East, and in effect served to keep Baghdad from becoming involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict on one hand, and allowed the Kurdish liberation movement in Southern/Iraqi Kurdistan to survive on the other. These ties were reinforced by the sense of a common fate and struggle for statehood, persecution and genocides, feeling of solidarity, mutual strategic interests, humanitarian and economic dimensions, in post-1988 Halabja Massacre, the operation of the US led coalition against Iraq in 1991, and 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Since the Arab Spring, the military interventions against the self-proclaimed caliphate, Islamic State (IS), and the referendum for an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq in 2017, this relationship allegedly has extended to include the relationships between Israel and the Kurds in Western/Syrian and Eastern/Iranian Kurdistan as well. Notably, Israel was the only state that publicly supported the creation of an independent Kurdish state. With all the development the Kurdish question has paved in the 21st century, the article concludes that the majority of the Kurds of the 21st century can be described as a 'pariah people' in Max Weber's definition and meditation of the term and Hannah Arendt's 'rightless', who 'no longer belong to any community', while describing the different aspects of the political, economic, and cultural calamity of Jews, refugees, and stateless people at the beginning of the 20th century.

A 30-page article written by Raiman al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner titled "War and Pieces: Political Divides in Southern Yemen" appeared among publications of the influential think-tank — European Council on Foreign Relations in January, 2020. It is certainly a noticeable pivlication in the research studies of the five-year old war in Yemen. R. al-Hamdani is a researcher and consultant focusing on issues of security and development in the Middle East and North Africa. Dr. Helen Lackner is an expert of the European Council for Foreign Relations and research associate at SOAS University of London. She is the editor of the Journal of the British-Yemeni Society and a regular contributor to Open Democracy, Arab Digest, and Oxford Analytica. Her most recent book is 'Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State' (published by Saqi Books in 2017; by Verso in 2019; and in Arabic in 2020). The reviewed article reveal the hidden sides of the conflict by offering different angle of approach — the southern part of Yemen completely lacking the "houthi factor", which used to monopolize the bulk of attention in writings on this topic since the war began in March, 2015. The military clashes within Arab coalition between its Saudi and Emirati wings in the South in August, 2019 brought to surface the deep antagonism among coalition's Yemeni 'friends', represented by the Internationally Recognized Government of President A. M. Hadi (IRG) from the one side, and Southern Transitional Council (STC) supported by UAE, from the other. The resulted withdrawal of IRG structures from the temporary capital Aden turned the regime to the merely "exile government" located in Riyadh. The blow put the whole concept of KSA-led military intervention in Yemen in a rather fragile position. It's dedication to the myth of civil war between IRG and houthi rebels representing the shi`a minority of the country was seriously compromised. The profound knowledge of the real country's complicity and authors' great professional experience helped them to reach the very roots of southern separatism and factualism, the core of "southern question" which they actually see as the real focal point of the crises and conflict in Yemen. The same phenomena laid the foundation for the further geopolitical moves of KSA and UAE towards South disintegration. Recent Saudi attempt to cure the devastating result of the August rivalry between IRG and STC by signing the Riyadh agreement on November 5th, 2019 is considered by the authors as nearly void. Therefore the article calls EU states and international community to change policies and enforce proactive role in both narrowing warfare and launching the carefully designed state and nation building programs aiming to keep Yemen united. The review attempts to evaluate the main arguments of this important article in a critical way while sharing the overall direction and goals to reach soonest solution to that largest manmade hotbed of humanitarian catastrophe on the planet.

While ensuring public safety and fighting against criminals the police are given exceptional powers such as the use of force to protect themselves as well as others in the process of fighting criminals. In a democratic society the limits of the use of force given by the state to the police is regulated by law. Misuse of power by the police, regarding humanitarian concerns, in terms of philosophical dilemmas and political implications has great impact on people. Use of force is defined as; use of physical strength and any equipment in increased proportion to neutralize acts of resistance or attack. The power to use of force is a direct intervention to the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons. Therefore, use of excessive force is considered as a direct violation of human rights. There have been numerous researches and studies about Police use of force. However, the complex structure of use of force, and it association with many factors creates a lot of limitations in this area. Therefore, the researchers have systematized the use of force by the police and focused on situational and institutional factors. Individual factors affecting the use of power and force by the police officers are defined as; The age of the police officer, education level and occupational experience. Regarding situational factors the researchers have focused on characteristics like; type of event that the police officer has encountered the public and the characteristics the suspects. Regarding explaining the Institutional factors it is focused on; the affect of the police culture (subculture) and service delivery philosophy of de unit that the officer is working at. ÖzetKamunun güvenliğini sağlama ve suçlularla mücadele etme görevini yerine getirirken polise hem kendisini hem de başkalarını koruması ve suçlularla mücadele edebilmesi için zor kullanma gibi bir takım istisnai yetkiler verilmiştir. Demokratik toplumlarda devletin polise vermiş olduğu zor kullanma yetkisinin sınırları hukuk tarafından düzenlenmiştir. Polisin sahip olduğu gücü suiistimal etmesi insani kaygılar, felsefi ikilemler ve politik sonuçlar açısından halk üzerinde büyük etkilere sahiptir. Zor kullanma; direnme ve saldırı karşısında bu fiilleri etkisiz hale getirecek derecede artan nispette bedeni kuvvet her türlü teçhizatı kullanmak şeklinde tanımlanmaktadır. Zor kullanma yetkisi kişilerin temel hak ve özgürlüklerine doğrudan bir müdahaledir. Bu nedenle zor kullanma yetkisinin aşılması doğrudan insan hakları ihlali sayılmaktadır. Polisin zor kullanması ile ilgili sayısız araştırmalar ve çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Ancak, zor kullanmanın kompleks yapısı ve çok çeşitli nedenlerle ilişkili olmasından dolayı bu alanda oldukça fazla sınırlamalar vardır. Bu nedenle, araştırmacılar polisin kuvvet kullanmasını sistematize ederek bireysel, durumsal ve kurumsal faktörlerin üzerinde durmuşlardır. Polis memurlarının güç ve kuvvet kullanmasını etkileyen bireysel faktörler; polis memurlarının yaşı, eğitim seviyesi, mesleki tecrübesi gibi karakteristikleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Durumsal faktörler; polislerin halk ile karşı karşıya geldikleri olayların cinsi ve şüphelilerin karakteristikleri üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Kurumsal faktörler; polisin memurlarının görev yaptığı polis biriminin kurumsal kültürü ve hizmet anlayışının etkilerini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

This thesis aims to investigate the phenomenon of war rape in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to understand the dynamics, contextual realities and consequences of its perpetration. Practical and theoretical knowledge is generated which is relevant for health care interventions, humanitarian assistance and peace initiatives, that are cognizant of the actual needs of the affected populations. The study employed ethnographic methodology involving prolonged engagement with the field, participant observation, formal and informal interviews, keeping of field notes and the continuous practice of reflexivity. The four papers in this thesis represent formal interviews with participants from three distinct groups: local leaders (Paper I), ex-child soldier boys (Paper II) and women survivors of sexual violence (Paper III & IV). Qualitative Content Analysis was used for the interview study with local leaders (Paper I). Findings from this study reveal how mass rape and the methods of perpetration create a chaos effectively destroying communities. The leaders draw attention to the fact that an exclusive focus on raped women misses other structural factors that contribute to war and sexual violence, factors such as the global political economy, international apathy, the stance of the church, effects of militarization, inappropriate aid and interpretations of gender roles. Through the theoretical lenses of militarised masculinity and gender based violence, interviews with ex-child soldier boys, seen as both victims of war as well as proxy perpetrators of sexual violence, were analyzed using thematic analysis. Findings revealed the systematic and violent construction of children into soldiers, inculcating a rigid set of stereotypical hyper-masculine behaviors promoting dominance by violating the subordinate "other". These findings argue for a more complex, contextualized view of the perpetrator resulting from the ways society has (re)constructed gender, ethnicity and class. Papers III and IV reflect the interviews and narratives provided by women survivors. Guided by thematic analysis and a matrix of theories: Structural violence, Intersectionality and "new wars"; Paper III bears witness to the women's expressions of their profound losses and dispossession as they struggle to survive stigmatization in the impoverished margins of the warzone, along with children born of rape. The perpetrator is cited here as well as by the leaders as predominantly Interhamwe. Payne's Sites of Resilience model used in Paper IV situates stigmatized women survivors suffering in a global context as they navigate survival, demonstrating resilience in the margins through support from their faith in God, scarce health services, indigenous healing and strategic alliances. Findings suggest that collaborations of existing strengthened networks, ie: the church, healthcare and indigenous healers, could extend the reach of sustainable and holistic support services, positively effecting already identified sites of resilience. Findings draw attention to the challenges faced by public health in addressing mass trauma. Women's raped bodies represent tangible material damage, embedded in a matrix of globalization processes and structural violence involving gender, ethnicity and class. This requires serious reflection.

The thesis' aim is to focus on the subject of internally displaced persons, IDPs, in Colombia. In particular, this paper seeks to underline the special role played by the Constitutional Court in defending the fundamental rights of IDPs, both as a judge and a public political actor. Colombia has the second highest number of IDPs in the world, making it a crucial social problem for human rights and humanitarian law. The Colombian constitutional judge declared the « estado de cosas inconstitucional » vis-à-vis the IDPs situation: this refers to the fact that internal displacement is a dramatic situation that needs the intervention of many public institutions to be solved. In this thesis I'll state that Colombian Constitutional court became, de facto, a sort of public policies maker, in order to guarantee the rights to be effective. In particular, since 2004 it is becoming a real policy maker, editing a log of follow-up decisions to the T! -025 sentence, including specific orders to the local and national authorities, to protect the IDPs' rights. In particular, the Constitutional court stated a « special constitutional protection » for victims of displacement including children, women, afro Colombian community, indigenous communities, and disabled people. We consider Colombia a relevant case of study, with both a well-developed legal system of protection of IDPs and a sui generis Constitutional judge hyperactivisme that may be considered as a model for others countries dealing with an internal conflict, but relying on a firm institutional framework. ; Cette recherche espère apporter quelques éléments nouveaux à la réflexion critique sur les migrations forcées intra-muros. Ce phénomène a été défini par la Cour Constitutionnelle comme une émergence sociale, et, par la littérature internationale et nationale, comme un problème des droits de l'homme et de droit international humanitaire. Notre étude concerne le rôle de la Cour Constitutionnelle face au déplacement colombien en tant que régulatrice des politiques publiques: il s'agit de démontrer que le juge constitutionnel colombien joue un rôle sui-generis, par rapport au traditionnel travail mis en place par le juge constitutionnel dans les systèmes de Western Legal Tradition. L'idée principale de ce travail est celle de souligner son hyper activisme, dans le cadre d'une démocratie qui fait face à un conflit armé interne. Cette compétence, qui avec le temps s'est consolidée dans la pratique constitutionnelle colombienne, peut être expliquée au travers du manque de volonté politique des autres pouvoirs de l'Etat pour mettre en place des politiques publiques dans certains domaines, davantage dans le domaine économique que dans celui des droits sociaux. Cette expérience pourrait envisager une nouvelle conception de démocratie à niveau global, dans laquelle la Cour Constitutionnelle fait pression sur les autres pouvoirs publics afin d'avancer, de facto, sur le plan de la protection des droits fondamentaux des victimes des violations des droits, et pourrait être un modèle pour d'autres pays qui vivent le drame du déplacement forcé.

When, in 2006, Joseph Kabila became the first democratically elected president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many Congolese and international observers hoped that stability had finally come to the country. During the previous decade, Congo had been ravaged by widespread violence, including the world's deadliest conflict since World War II -- a conflict that involved three Congolese rebel movements, 14 foreign armed groups, and countless militias; killed over 3.3 million Congolese; and destabilized most of central Africa. In 2001, the United Nations dispatched to the country what was to become its largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission. A peace settlement was reached in 2003, paving the way for the 2006 elections. The entire effort was touted as an example of a successful international intervention in a collapsing state. Yet over two million more Congolese have died since the official end of the war. According to the International Rescue Committee, over a thousand civilians continue to die in Congo every day, mostly due to malnutrition and diseases that could be easily prevented if Congo's already weak economic and social structures had not collapsed during the conflict. In mid-2007, in the eastern province of Nord-Kivu, low-level fighting between government forces and troops of the renegade Tutsi general Laurent Nkunda escalated into a major confrontation, both playing off and exacerbating long-standing animosity between the Tutsis, the Hutus, and other groups. Since then, clashes have killed hundreds, maybe thousands, of fighters and civilians and forced half a million people to relocate. Congo is now the stage for the largest humanitarian disaster in the world -- far larger than the crisis in Sudan. The international community has admittedly been facing a very complex situation: all the parties have legitimate grievances, but all are also responsible for massive human rights violations; the fighting involves many armed groups, and these often fragment and shift alliances. Still, the main reason that the peace-building strategy in Congo has failed is that the international community has paid too little attention to the root causes of the violence there: local disputes over land and power. If anything, international efforts to bring peace have enhanced local tensions. While it focused on organizing the presidential, legislative, and provincial elections of 2006, the international community overlooked other critical postconflict tasks, such as local peace building and overhauling the justice system. Meanwhile, the electoral process fueled ethnic hatred and marginalized ethnic minorities, making the reemergence of armed movements all the more likely. The international community must fundamentally revise its strategy. It must focus on local antagonisms, because they often cause or fuel broader tensions, and regional and national actors hijack local agendas to serve their own ends. Until the local grievances that are feeding the violence throughout eastern Congo are addressed, security in the entire country and the Great Lakes region overall will remain uncertain.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, much ink has been spilled on the future of his private military company (PMC), Wagner Group, and its affiliated companies. Most attention remains on Ukraine, where the PMC has not been formally active since Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20. Meanwhile, Wagner continues to conduct military operations in both Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).On November 14, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), backed by Wagner, took the separatist stronghold of Kidal. Despite entering a town nearly abandoned, the capture was undeniably a symbolic victory for Mali's Interim President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and his military regime. There is a significant risk that FAMA's March on Kidal will further exacerbate humanitarian crises in the region, all at a time when the international community is stepping back from the Sahel. This is a mistake. The Sahel has become the epicenter of the West's, including the United States', two great threat narratives: jihadist terrorism and the expansion of Russian influence. Their accompanying containment narratives almost ensure counterproductive, knee-jerk reactions to future events on the ground.To avoid these pitfalls, the international community must focus today on creative solutions that account for Russia's presence in Africa.BackgroundThe past five years have seen a popular backlash against peacekeeping and humanitarian-military operations in central Africa and the Sahel. While politicized, the criticism has not been without merit. Peacekeeping missions have undoubtedly improved the lives of many. They have also often empowered the most violent and produced more, not less, armed groups. Yet it was Wagner Group's interventions in Sudan and CAR that turbocharged the criticism.
The structure of Wagner's 2017 intervention in Sudan initially followed standard practices for Africa's private security sector: training and security provision in exchange for mineral concessions. (A notable exception was the political consulting and media operations Prigozhin's team also offered.) In Sudan, the structure stayed consistent. In CAR, events on the ground shaped the nature of Wagner's intervention. In 2018, Prigozhin's men became diplomats.Wagner's diplomacy in CARIn February 2019, the CAR government and 14 major armed groups signed the Khartoum Agreement — a peace deal hailed by the United Nations. A considerable contribution to this process belonged to Prigozhin's working group, although experts from various Russian government entities also participated.
For Prigozhin, the prospect of peace would translate into increased access to mining concessions. It would also deliver a win to Moscow and increase the chances for Kremlin subsidies to fund his Africa gambit. For armed group leaders, the Agreement was a chance to obtain lucrative ministerial positions, while President Faustin-Archange Touadéra could shore up his vulnerable position vis-à-vis the armed groups.
The significance of the Agreement was immense, but unfortunately most walked away with the wrong conclusions. The international community felt it could finally distance itself from CAR's seemingly endless problems. The CAR government and Prigozhin, victims of their own success, felt they could abandon notions of an inclusive government. All seemed unable to account for the return of the largest potential spoiler of the peace, former president François Bozizé, and his decision to run in the 2020 presidential elections.
Despite rising tension between Touadéra and Bozizé, the CAR government, Wagner, and the international community pushed elections at all costs, even as a new coalition of armed groups — nominally led by Bozizé and including six of the fourteen Khartoum Agreement signatories — advanced on Bangui, the capital.
As a result of the rebellion, Wagner's mandate changed from that of a training mission to a military operation. The resulting counteroffensive brought nearly all major towns under government control.
The partial victory — armed groups are down but not out — led to overconfidence within Wagner's ranks: Military solutions were possible. The PMC came to view the Khartoum Agreement through a cynical lens as insiders reframed it as a clever way to weaken and divide the armed opposition, rather than the genuine effort at conflict resolution it was at the time.Wagner began to fashion itself as Russia's "security solution," Moscow's most successful export to Africa. Back then, Prigozhin had the ear of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Taking advantage of Moscow's light footprint on the continent, Wagner's boss could define what Moscow's interests in Africa were.Wagner's military solution in the SahelBy 2020, all actors recognized the value of the "Wagner threat" to Africa; not least African governments which leveraged narratives of "cooperating with" or "countering" Wagner to extract concessions or support from both Russia and the West.
Cold War containment narratives became a self-fulfilling prophecy in 2021 when, after a second coup, tensions between Colonel Goïta and France resulted in French military withdrawal from Mali and Wagner's arrival. Goïta's grievances with Paris were first political: He wanted France to recognize his government. Second, anti-French rhetoric helped build political legitimacy for the military regime.
The rhetoric tapped into genuine grievances with France's Operation Barkhane, especially among Mali's military class. At the top of the list was France's quiet cooperation with Tuareg separatists to oust the jihadists in northern Mali. Bamako saw that cooperation as a violation of sovereignty. Intervenors and those intervened upon could not agree on who the terrorists were.
Wagner's arrival in Mali further revealed the conflict's separate realities. Western analysts focused on human rights abuses and the territorial expansion of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) to prove Wagner's intervention a failure.
Goïta's circle was far less focused than western analysts on controlling territory outside the capital. The potential for another coup in Bamako was more important, and the government relied on internet influencers and political entrepreneurs to shore up its popularity. In turn, it became a prisoner of its own jingoistic claims to return Kidal to the fold.The resulting Wagner-backed operation has enjoyed more success than predicted. The Malian army has demonstrated increased combat capability and coordination between branches of the armed forces. Wagner's operations in Mali also reflect a new level of cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Russian officers are involved in planning military operations and acting as advisors. Wagner mercenaries participate in ground operations, but, unlike in CAR, they are always embedded within FAMA.A return to diplomacyFAMA does not have the ability or capacity to fight both separatists and jihadists. Indeed, FAMA and Wagner are on the path to an unwinnable counterinsurgency in the north. Interaction between Tuareg separatists and JNIM suggest the jihadi group is not quite neutral in the conflict, and its role could grow.Despite the current success of Wagner's military solution, it is evident that only peace talks, a process of reconciliation, and the equitable distribution of power and resources between Bamako and the provinces can end the conflict.The victory in Kidal puts the government in Bamako in a stronger position to negotiate with separatists. But given the prospect of an unwinnable war in the north, the continued threat of jihadist groups, and a host of economic woes, the window for "cashing in" on victory will be short.Of course, the Malian government has demonstrated little interest in serious negotiation to date. Few outside powers have leverage over its decision-making. Russia, and the Wagner Group in Mali, have more influence than most. For Russian diplomats, efforts to bring peace to Mali would reinforce Moscow's growing prominence in the Sahel. Wagner Group, too, has consistently engaged in diplomacy when it sees greater potential for profit in peace than open warfare.The international community has leveraged the presence of Wagner Group in Mali as a pretext to step away from the conflict. Yet the crisis in Mali, and the Sahel more generally, cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to create at least conditions for a negotiating process.The West's exceptional concentration on the war in Ukraine and its support for Israeli operations in Gaza have damaged its credibility in the Global South. Competing with or trying to contain Russia (or China, for that matter) in Africa only does further damage to that credibility. Limited, compartmentalized work with all partners in the Sahel will show that the U.S. can view issues in the Global South outside these prisms.Russia is here to stay in Africa. Mali, and the Sahel more generally, should be an opportunity to engage in geopolitical deconfliction rather than competition.

Last month, Foreign Policy published a report that stirred the debate on U.S. Middle East policy. It claimed "the Biden administration is reconsidering its priorities" in Syria and may conduct "a full withdrawal of U.S. troops." Now, legacy media is debating the future of American involvement in Syria. Missing from this discussion is the suffering that involvement has caused.Writing for the New York Times, retired general Kenneth McKenzie warns "it's not time for our troops to leave" Syria. Mere talk of a withdrawal (let alone actually withdrawing), he argues, is "seriously damaging to U.S. interests." It "gives hope to Tehran" that Iran might rival American influence in the Middle East — which is bad, supposedly. Why Iran has less of a right to influence its own region than people thousands of miles away is unclear.McKenzie also argues that American troops must remain to "secure the prisons holding ISIS fighters." Without boots on the ground, militants might escape and the Islamist group could "rejuvenate itself." McKenzie doesn't believe the Syrian government could prevent prison breaks on its own, or even with Russian and Iranian support.This argument is highly speculative. If the Americans leave, imprisoned ISIS fighters might escape. And, if enough do, they might rebuild their organization into a force too formidable for Syrian forces to handle. Multiple unlikely contingencies must materialize to even warrant taking this reasoning seriously.But McKenzie's claim suffers a more fundamental problem. It confuses the cause for the antidote. Everyone from Noam Chomsky to Rand Paul knows American intervention created the conditions that allowed ISIS to grow. Bombing Arab nations to smithereens, toppling their leaders, and starving governments through sanctions and outright theft generated a power vacuum. As did deploying troops indefinitely, which prevented states like Syria from maintaining territorial integrity and establishing the mechanisms for self-governance.McKenzie believes the Syrian government is simply too weak to quell the increasingly small threat an ISIS in retreat poses. Assuming he's correct, it's worth asking why that's the case. The facts again point to American intervention.Nearly 13 years into its ongoing civil war, Syria is in tatters. Once a middle-income nation with respectable living standards, it's now the poorest country on Earth. More than 90% of Syrians live below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day. Their paychecks are worthless, with the Syrian pound losing virtually all of its relative value since the war began.It's not all America's fault. The Syrian government undoubtedly bears significant blame for the humanitarian crisis. But American sanctions hamstring it from improving matters. The infamous Caesar Act targets anyone who "engages in a significant transaction" with the Syrian government. Signed into law by Donald Trump, this heinous policy effectively precludes the international community from helping Syria rebuild.A bipartisan but overwhelmingly Democratic coalition of lawmakers recently voted against slapping new sanctions on Syria. Unfortunately, for every one of them, there were 12 supporters of the legislation. Dubbed the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act, it would extend the sunset of the Caesar sanctions by eight years. The bill would also expand the list of proscribed transactions.But there's more. Years ago, with America's blessing, Turkish-backed militias stole capital from over 1,000 factories in the city of Aleppo alone. This assault on the productive forces of Syria's industrial hub left its economy in tatters. But that's not all the United States and its allies stole. America's occupying troops routinely commandeer Syrian wheat and petroleum. Trump admitted as much, saying that soldiers "were staying in Syria to secure oil resources."The Syrian state is starving. More American intervention isn't what Syria needs. It needs the United States' boot off of its neck.In these discussions of states and militants, we mustn't lose sight of what matters most: the people. American militarism in Syria has wrought dire human costs. It has helped to plunge Syrians into the depths of unimaginable despair. Over 80% of them are food-insecure and a similar proportion lack sustained access to electricity. Many enjoy just one hour of it per day. Without electricity, you can't refrigerate food and it rots. That causes shortages. People have taken to eating out of the garbage.McKenzie seems to care little about this immense suffering. And why would he? His job as a general was to project American military might, whatever the costs, a position he apparently continues as a guest writer for The New York Times.

RiassuntoIl contributo si concentra sui Gaboye, un insieme di gruppi genealogici minoritari stanziati nei territori somali, e su alcuni snodi storici della loro presenza nel contesto urbano di Hargeysa, la capitale dell'autoproclamatasi Repubblica del Somaliland. Secondo le fonti di epoca coloniale i Gaboye erano oggetto di varie forme di marginalizzazione come l'esclusione dalle istituzioni politiche, la segregazione matrimoniale ed il legame con alcune attività professionali disprezzate e rifiutate dal resto della società. I Gaboye sono un gruppo professionale di basso status, costituiscono un caso analogo ad altri diffusi in numerose società africane ma raramente oggetto di studi specifici. Le varie forme del loro insediamento nella città di Hargeysa sin dal terzo decennio del Novecento hanno inciso profondamente sui processi di trasformazione della loro marginalizzazione. La migrazione dalle zone rurali durante il periodo coloniale ha costituito un momento di svolta. Ad essa sono legate le mobilitazioni dei Gaboye ad Hargeysa che hanno permesso loro di negoziare l'accesso alle medesime strutture socio-politiche fondamentali che regolavano la vita dei gruppi maggioritari. A partire da questo snodo storico, l'articolo ripercorre il loro coinvolgimento nella pianificazione urbana in epoca coloniale e postcoloniale, l'impatto della guerra civile, del collasso delle istituzioni statuali nei territori somali ed il loro accesso all'aiuto umanitario a seguito della pacificazione del Somaliland. Il filo conduttore nella ricostruzione di questa traiettoria storica è il rapporto circolare tra lo spazio costruito della città, le relazioni tra i gruppi gaboye di Hargeysa ed i gruppi maggioritari e le rappresentazioni collettive della loro condizione marginale.Gaboye in Hargeisa: the urban space as a sedimentfor marginalization processesThis article focuses on the Gaboye, a cluster of minority genealogical groups settled in the Somali territories, and on the turning points in the history of their presence in the town of Hargeysa, the capital of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. The written sources of the colonial times described the Gaboye as object of different forms of marginalisation such as the exclusion from political institutions, marriage segregation and the association with some occupational activities despised and forbidden for the members of majority groups. The Gaboye are one of the low status occupational groups diffused in numerous African societies which received limited attention by African studies. After the 1920s, the changing forms of their settlement in Hargeysa deeply affected the transformation of their marginalisation. During colonial times, rural-urban mobility was a turning point. It is linked to the Gaboye's urban-based mobilisations which allowed them to negotiate their access to the same fundamental socio-political institutions which organised the internal life of the majority groups. This article reconstructs what happened after this crucial moment: the effects of colonial and postcolonial interventions of urban planning, the impactof civil war, the collapse of the state in the Somali territories and the Gaboye's access to humanitarian help after the pacification of Somaliland. The analysis of this historical trajectory outlines the interrelationship between the structures of the urban built space, the relations between the Gaboye and the majority groups in Hargeysa, and the collective representations of their marginality.

В статье рассматриваются взаимоотношения России с территориями постсоветского пространства, пророссийски ориентированными в своем политическом, экономическом и социокультурном направлениях развития. Анализируется военный потенциал этих анклавных регионов с точки зрения создания дуги безопасности в Восточной Европе и на Кавказе с целью противостояния расширению НАТО на Восток. Проблема национальной безопасности последовательно раскрывается в ходе изучения внешних угроз России в начале 1990-х гг., последствий распада СССР, концептуальных подходов к формированию нового внешнеполитического курса России. Анализируется военно-политическая ситуация в Приднестровье, Абхазии, Южной Осетии, а также самопровозглашенных территориях Украины с позиции лояльности к российской политике. Участие России в урегулировании конфликтов на постсоветском пространстве приводится с целью объяснения той позиции, которую власти заняли в условиях конституционного кризиса, проводится параллель с общественными настроениями и поддержкой самопровозглашенных территорий широкими слоями населения, в том числе российского казачества. В статье анализируется понятие мягкой силы с точки зрения воздействия на миграционные потоки и национальные диаспоры, делается вывод о том, что данный инструмент влияния не был использован и задействован в полном объеме, что сделало мало возможным влияние России на политические и гуманитарные процессы в мире и конкретных странах постсоветского пространства. Дипломатические усилия России по нормализации отношений в самопровозглашенных и частично признанных республиках бывшего СССР показали, что до военного вмешательства Грузии в Южной Осетии в 2008 г. Россия поддерживала международноправовой принцип территориальной целостности государств. ; The article examines Russia's relations with the territories of post-Soviet, Pro-Russian oriented in its political, economic and socio-cultural areas of development. Analyzes the military capabilities of these enclave regions from the point of view of creating arcs of safety in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus with the aim of countering NATO expansion to the East. The issue of national security has consistently revealed during the study of external threats to Russia in the early 1990s, the consequences of the USSR collapse, and conceptual approaches to the formation of a new foreign policy course of Russia. Examines the military-political situation in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the breakaway territories of Ukraine from the position of loyalty to Russian politics. The participation of Russia in conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space is given to explain the position that the government took in terms of constitutional crisis, draws a parallel with public sentiment and support for the breakaway territories by broad segments of the population, including Russian Cossacks. The authors analyzes the concept of soft power from the point of view of impact on migration flows and ethnic diasporas, the conclusion is that the instrument has not been used and utilized to the full extent that did little possible Russia's influence on the political and humanitarian processes in the world and particular countries of post-Soviet space. The diplomatic efforts of Russia on normalization of relations in the self-proclaimed and partially recognized republics of the former USSR has shown that before the military intervention of Georgia in South Ossetia in 2008, Russia supported the international legal principle of territorial integrity of States.