Suchergebnisse

11. september-angrepene og USAs svar utfordret folkerettens regler. Basert på et argument om selvforsvar, lanserte Bush-administrasjonen en global krig mot terrorisme, med fangeleirer, bruk av tortur og utenomrettslige henrettelser. Essayet gir en oversikt over tre folkerettslige hovedproblemstillinger som oppsto i årene etter 2001. Folkerettens regimer om samarbeid for å motarbeide terror var for svake, FN-pakten gav lite klare regler om staters selvforsvarsrett mot ikke-statlige aktører på fremmed jord, og angrepene utfordret folkerettens todeling mellom krig og rettshåndhevelse (humanitærrett og menneskerettigheter). Essayet gjør opp status for hvordan folkeretten utviklet seg på disse områdene etter 2001, og tar stilling til om dette gir grunnlag for å betegne 11. september som et vannskille i folkeretten.
Abstract in English:International Law and 9/11 – a Watershed?The 9/11 attacks and the US global response was a challenge to international law. Based on an argument of self-defense, the Bush-administration launched a global war on terror, established prison-camps, opened up for torture and engaged in targeted killings. The essay provides an overview of the main challenges that arose after 9/11 from the perspective of international law. The international regime for prevention of terrorism was weak, it was unclear to what extent the UN Charter provided states with an independent right to self-defense against non-state actors in foreign states, and the attacks challenged the dichotomy between war and crime (humanitarian law and human rights). The essay analyses how these areas of international law have evolved after 2001 and concludes by assessing whether 9/11 can be deemed a watershed in the development of international law.

Norge er internasjonalt forpliktet til å avstå fra våpeneksport dersom det er overveiende sannsynlig at materiellet som eksporteres kan brukes i humanitærrettsbrudd. I tillegg har Norge nasjonale vedtak om å ikke eksportere våpen til krigende land uten at eksporten er sikkerhetspolitisk motivert, fortrinnsvis av alliansehensyn. Likevel vedvarte Norges eksport av militærmateriell til flere land i den Saudi-Arabia-ledede koalisjonen under krigen i Jemen; en koalisjon som har begått utallige humanitærrettsbrudd i Jemen, og som Norge eksporterer til på kommersielt grunnlag. Denne artikkelen undersøker hvordan norske myndigheter har legitimert våpeneksporten til land som kriger i Jemen. Artikkelen finner at legitimeringen er konstruert rundt fem dimensjoner, hvorav fire tar form som offentlig kommuniserte forsikringer om at norske myndigheter har full kontroll og følger regelverket. En femte dimensjon, bevisst utelatt og ikke-kommunisert av myndighetene, men synlig i lekkede kilder, omhandler bekymringer om at stans i eksporten kan skade forsvarsindustriens markedsmuligheter i regionen. Artikkelens konklusjon er todelt: For det første viser kombinasjonen av forsikringer og utelatelse at legitimeringen av eksporten til koalisjonslandene i stor grad er ment å berolige kritikere. For det andre viser innholdet i legitimeringen at eksporten hviler på en tidvis feilaktig fortolkning av retningslinjene for våpeneksporten.
Abstract in English:Legitimation Between Norms and Interests. Norway's Arms Exports to Countries at War in YemenNorway is internationally obliged to abstain from arms exports in the presence of an overriding risk that the exported equipment can be used in international humanitarian law violations. In addition, Norwegian national decisions state that Norway should not export weapons to warring countries without the export being motivated by security policy, particularly alliance considerations. Nevertheless, Norway's arms exports to several countries in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition persisted during the war in Yemen; a coalition that has committed numerous humanitarian law violations in Yemen, and to which Norway exports on a commercial basis. This article examines how the Norwegian government has legitimized its arms exports to countries in the coalition. The article finds that the government's legitimation is constructed around five dimensions, four of which take the form of publicly communicated reassurances that the government is in full control and follows the regulations. A fifth dimension, deliberately omitted and not communicated by the government, but visible in leaked sources, contains concerns that stopping exports could damage the defence industry's market opportunities in the region. The article's conclusion is twofold: First, the combination of reassurances and omissions shows that the legitimation is largely intended to reassure critics. Secondly, the content of the legitimation shows that exports are based on sometimes incorrect interpretations of the guidelines for arms exports.

The situation in Kosovo up to 1999, and all attempts which failed in order to find a just and lasting solution for that problem, have fully justified the above criteria for a lawful humanitarian intervention which was undertaken by the NATO forces against the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It seems, however, that the responsible persons in the NATO were not aware of the competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to investigate to prosecute persons responsible for use of prohibited arms and for destruction of some objects. Some of these unlawful acts constitute grave breaches of the 1959 Geneva Conventions and violations of laws and customs of war. In these circumstances it is the legal duty of the Prosecutor to undertake an investigation. In case that he fails in his duty, there are no statutory limits in respect of the crimes provided in the Statute of the Tribunal. (SOI : SOEU: S. 98f.) + Most legal writers in their writings confuse notions of humanitarian intervention, intervention of a State in order to protect its citizens abroad and humanitarian relief. The use of force for protection of citizens abroad, when they are in immediate danger of losing their lives or suffering serious injury, can exceptionally be justified by a state of necessity as regulated in article 33 of Drafts Article on State Responsibility by the International Law Commission. Further conditions for such an intervention are provided in the wording of the US State Secretar, Daniel Webster in the Caroline case of 1837, relating to the self-defence. Actions of humanitarian relief have nothing unlawful in their character, but a question can arise of the obligation of parties to a conflict to receive and allow its distribution to a who are in need. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the First Protocol of 1977, provide in this respect a legal obligation of all parties to internation armed conflicts. Such relief actions can be imposed as obligation to parties to internal armed conflicts as well, by UN Security Council resolutions based on Chap. VII of the UN Charter. + In the view of this author there is no rule of positive international law granting a right to foreign States to intervene by force, either in protection of their citizens, or when a humanitarian intervention is required. The matter can only be of exceptional circumstances precluding wrongfulness of the use of force, which otherwise remains prohibited. When the matter is of humanitarian intervention, circumstances precluding the wrongfulness would, according to this author, be the following: (1) There should be a situation of systematic, repeated and widespread commission of international crimes by a State authority against its own citizens. Special problems are created to the international community by widespread practices of ethnic cleansing. (2) Such a situation constitutes itself a "threat to the peace" calling for an enforcement action by the Security Council according to the Chap. VII of the UN Charter. (3) In case that the Security Council fails in its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and when there are no other means, a group of States or an organization can undertake a humanitarian intervention by use of force in order to stop the commission of crimes. In these circumstances it acts as de facto organ of the entire international community of States. (4) In these extreme and exceptional circumstances, States taking part in such an action cannot obtain any advantages in their profit. (5) Collective intervention by a single State acting in the name of several other States or an organization. However, even such an intervention should have priority over humanitarian intervention undertaken by a State acting in its o name. (6) It is self-evident that in performing a humanitarian intervention there should not be committed international crimes especially against protected persons, including civilian population

The war in Kosovo and Metohia was the result of a decade long tensions between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. It was led from the air in order to avoid more potential victims in case of land invasion. The end of war was the result of mutual concessions: from NATO side and the Serbian one. The sovereignty of FRY was not put into question, but a great autonomy of Kosovo was predicted including the possibility of independence acquisition (secession). The Resolution 1244 was not abolished, but it was being derogated in order to prepare the fundament of Kosovo independence. Serbian military-security forces were withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo and Metohia. NATO intervention was not legal from the point of view of international law, but it subordinated sovereignty to human rights. Intervention was justified in cases of humanitarian need. Event though humanitarian need (catastrophe) is taken as the basis for the intervention, the example of such kind could not be found in the past. So, Kosovo cases were qualified as sui generis one. Thus, the war in Kosovo became an example to be followed in the future, and an unresolved situation may become the threat to the peace and security in the surrounding countries. Democratic countries give themselves the right to interfere and intervene into internal affairs of others differently from the autocratic ones, which was supposed to be neither correct nor consistent. Kosovo conflict and war rattled global power structure, especially with China and Russia as new challengers of the USA power. Both countries are trying hard to reach USA, but they are still in transition with unstable financial systems, migrations and unresolved system of social protection. Regarding Kosovo conflict and war, they engaged themselves rather indirectly than directly. As Security Council permanent members they were voting against the independence of Kosovo, but did not involve themselves into the war directly. Kosovo war showed how China is backward regarding war technique, and Russia regarding financial engagement. In addition, China expected membership in WTO, and Russia a great financial assistance. Russia engaged in negotiations via the Contact Group. With the arrival of Putin, Russia could not engage in Balkan more militarily but only commercially due to the fact most Balkan countries entered NATO or Partnership for Peace Programme. Internal cohesion of Russia with centralistic governance was reinforced, and ethnic tensions were calmed down. The perspective of Russia is United Nations and commerce through pipeline.