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This article considers the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights disasters. Focusing on the International Criminal Court, or ICC, the article suggests that conceiving of international justice in terms of retribution and accountability diminishes the idea of justice-as-rescue. It is relatively painless for states to endorse a Hague tribunal established by international treaty and cloaked in the mantle of law. It is much harder to seek immediate justice by intervening to prevent or stop atrocities. Trials and interventions are not mutually exclusive, but there are a number of reasons – a preference for law over coercion, public opinion tilting away from intervention and toward tribunals, growing skepticism about armed intervention, UN caution, member-state wariness, and possibly the ICC's own ban on aggression – to believe that decision-makers may opt for legal remedies rather than risk intervention. The article underscores the challenges of grounding humanitarian duty in either law or ethics, but calls for further development of a political framework for intervention in order to balance the pursuit of international justice.

This article considers the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights disasters. Focusing on the International Criminal Court, or ICC, the article suggests that conceiving of international justice in terms of retribution and accountability diminishes the idea of justice-as-rescue. It is relatively painless for states to endorse a Hague tribunal established by international treaty and cloaked in the mantle of law. It is much harder to seek immediate justice by intervening to prevent or stop atrocities. Trials and interventions are not mutually exclusive, but there are a number of reasons – a preference for law over coercion, public opinion tilting away from intervention and toward tribunals, growing skepticism about armed intervention, UN caution, member-state wariness, and possibly the ICC's own ban on aggression – to believe that decision-makers may opt for legal remedies rather than risk intervention. The article underscores the challenges of grounding humanitarian duty in either law or ethics, but calls for further development of a political framework for intervention in order to balance the pursuit of international justice.

This article considers the limits of law in addressing large-scale human rights disasters. Focusing on the International Criminal Court, or ICC, the article suggests that conceiving of international justice in terms of retribution and accountability diminishes the idea of justice-as-rescue. It is relatively painless for states to endorse a Hague tribunal established by international treaty and cloaked in the mantle of law. It is much harder to seek immediate justice by intervening to prevent or stop atrocities. Trials and interventions are not mutually exclusive, but there are a number of reasons – a preference for law over coercion, public opinion tilting away from intervention and toward tribunals, growing skepticism about armed intervention, UN caution, member-state wariness, and possibly the ICC's own ban on aggression – to believe that decision-makers may opt for legal remedies rather than risk intervention. The article underscores the challenges of grounding humanitarian duty in either law or ethics, but calls for further development of a political framework for intervention in order to balance the pursuit of international justice.

The graphic and widespread atrocities committed during conflicts around the world and broadcast across 24/7 news and social media has made war never feel so close and the powerlessness of law so real. This raises difficulties in engaging students in real-life decision-making quadaries where military necessity meets legalism, as well as fundamental ethical questions about the use of realistic, yet explicit, imagery in the classroom. Governments are increasingly turning to military simulations to safely transfer knowledge and skills to their cadets. Virtual simulations can enable students to develop new real-time skills and responsibility to resolve challenging scenarios in light of the rules of international humanitarian law. The School of Law at Queen's University Belfast has developed a series of innovative computer scenarios based on the Arma3 open world tactical war simulator. To bring the battlefield into the classroom, we have developed a detailed fictional internal armed conflict between the Government forces of the island of Altis and a non-state armed group, overseen by UN peacekeepers and civilian humanitarian agencies. A variety of formative scenarios (addressing issues such as cluster munitions and landmines) were developed to familiarise the students with the factual scenario and the computer technology. Subsequently, students engaged in a summative assessment based teaching their legal understanding in the face of increasingly challenging conflict situations, in particular grey-zones where legal argument can justify seeming morally wrongful acts during war. This paper discusses our use of computer-based learning for students for IHL, and for them to experience the messy and challenging reality of real-time responses to humanitarian legal dilemmas, within the confines of a safe and respectful learning platform. This paper examines both the learning objectives of this project, and the project development cycle – from the initial proposal to its implementation in class, as well as positing the benefits and drawbacks in integrating technology and games into the legal teaching environment, reflecting on the emerging and traditional pedogology in this area.

This master thesis gives a comprehensive overview of the protection of journalists and media facilities in times of armed conflict. First, the thesis analyses, which legal regimes are applicable: international humanitarian or human rights law. In conclusion, it suggests a parallel application of both regimes while international humanitarian law is to be regarded as lex specialis in the event of an armed conflict. In the case of a discrepancy between norms of the two regulatory complexes, the lex specialis maxim solves the inconsistency as an interpretation rule. Thus, the human rights provision is interpreted in the light of the more specific humanitarian law provision. Secondly, the thesis examines the concrete norms under both legal regimes that protect journalists and media facilities. It finds that only human rights norms protect the work of journalists while international humanitarian law protects journalists as civilians and media facilities as civilian objects. In the event, that a (fatal) military attack on journalists or media facilities is justifiable under international humanitarian law, there exists a controversy with the right to life guaranteed in human rights law which is solved by means of the lex specialis principle. Finally, the extent of the de facto protection of journalists and media facilities in comparison to the assured de jure protection is tested. For this purpose, the effective protection of journalists and media facilities in general during the current South Sudan crisis is analysed as well as the protection of female journalists against gender-based rights violations in times of armed conflict. A huge discrepancy between the de jure granted protection and the actual protection is found in both cases. Therefore, this thesis stresses the need to adopt new binding international regulations specifically tailored to afford all journalists and media facilities the highest protection possible – especially in times of conflict.

The public-private dichotomy of warfare is crumbling down as governments are voluntarily surrendering one of the essential and defining attributes of statehood: the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, leading to the privatization of war and conflicts

First published online: 09 June 2021 ; International humanitarian law remains under-theorised. Eric Posner pioneered the use of law and economics methodology to provide an alternative explanation of international humanitarian law. The present article examines how the use of the cognitive framework underpinning the law and economics (L&E) lens in international humanitarian law (IHL) transforms this legal regime. First of all, the article argues that, although the law and economics methodology accounts for the fact that self-interest is one of the motivating factors behind state action, it does not accommodate the constructivist dimension of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, while the Chicago School has descriptive capacity for the principle of military necessity it offers a limited analytic framework for understanding the principle of humanity, both of which are equally important when understanding the foundational basis of IHL. Secondly, the article argues that L&E changes how states interpret the purpose of international humanitarian law, the structure of this legal regime and how individuals apply the legal norms on the battlefield. In other words, it alters the balance between military and humanitarian considerations within IHL norms. The rules of targeting will serve as a case study to illustrate some of the problems associated with the L&E lens to IHL, especially how such rules in fact place limitations on the planning and conduct of military operations.'

This Article will first review how nongovernmental organizations attempt to apply human rights law and humanitarian law during periods of armed conflict. It will next review the practice of one principal inter-governmental organization--the United Nations General Assembly--inciting humanitarian law. Third, this Article will study the reasons why the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations should or should not refer to humanitarian law in support of their human rights work. Fourth, it will consider the preeminent position in implementing international humanitarian law of the ICRC, a private Swiss organization engaged in various international activities including specific functions provided by international humanitarian law. This Article will then consider the role that other--principally nongovernmental--organizations can play in situations of armed conflict. Sixth, it will examine factors affecting fact-finding in periods of armed conflict. Finally, this Article will discuss the effectiveness of nongovernmental organizations in preventing human rights violations during periods of armed conflict.

The article is devoted to the peculiarities of demilitarized and neutralized territories in international humanitarian law. Attention is drawn to the fact that these institutions have deep historical roots, but the history of their formation and development is partially studied by the science of international law. The author of the article notes that by the beginning of the XXth century demilitarized and neutralized territories were considered as indistinguishable concepts, due to which there was a certain uncertainty of the features that distinguishes them. The experience of the First World War required to solve this problem, as a result, the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 provided for the formation of a demilitarized zone (Rhine). Its peculiarities were, firstly, a clear regulation of the content of measures implemented within the demilitarized zone, secondly, its certainty of the location, and thirdly, the existence of the mechanism to guarantee such a regime by the Parties to this agreement. It is noted that international humanitarian law regulates the minimum requirements of the establishment and operation of special regimes for demilitarized and neutralized territories (zones) (in particular regulated by the Geneva Convention on the amelioration of wounded and sick in armed forces of August 12, 1949 and the Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war of August 12, 1949, as well as the Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, concerning the protection of victims of international armed conflicts). At the level of bilateral and multilateral agreements, the conditions for the establishment of these zones can be clarified. The author of the article defines demilitarized territories as the establishment on the basis of the agreement between states of the certain limited areas, which are prohibited to be used for military purposes and to carry out any kind of military activities on them. Demilitarization of the territory can be permanent (for example, the Eland Islands, the Suez Canal), or temporary as a means of eliminating the effects of armed conflict in the war zone (for example, the demilitarization of Srebrenica). It is noted that neutralized territories are established by agreement between the states certain space restrictions, the purpose of which is to protect persons from the effects of war (wounded and sick combatants, non-combatants, as well as personnel responsible for the organization and management of these zones and areas). Attention is drawn to the fact that in international humanitarian law, the regimes of these territories (zones) are limited in time: neutralized zones can be created at the beginning or during an armed conflict; demilitarized zones established in peacetime (then it will be preventive), war, post-war period (will be restorative). Finally, the author formulates a conclusion on the main features of demilitarized and neutralized zones in international humanitarian law. ; Статтю присвячено особливостям демілітаризованих і нейтралізованих територій у міжнародному гуманітарному праві. Акцентується увага на тому, що вони мають глибоке історичне коріння, але історія становлення та розвитку не досить досліджена наукою міжнародного права. Авторка статті зазначає, що до початку ХХ ст. демілітаризовані й нейтралізовані території розглядалися як тотожні поняття, у зв'язку із чим відбувалася певна невизначеність ознак, що їх відрізняє. Події Першої світової війни змусили звернутися до цієї проблеми, як наслідок, Версаль-ський мирний договір 1919 р. передбачив утворення демілітаризованої зони (Рейну). Його особливістю була, по-перше, чітка регламентація змісту заходів, які впроваджувались у межах демілітаризованої зони, по-друге, її визначеність на місцевості, по-третє, наявність механізму забезпечення такого режиму з боку Сторін цього договору. Зазначено, що міжнародне гуманітарне право регламентує мінімальні вимоги до створення та функціонування спеціальних режимів демілітаризованих і нейтралізованих територій (зон) (зокрема, їх регулює Женевська конвенція про поліпшення долі поранених і хворих у наявних арміях від 12 серпня 1949 р. і Женевська конвенція про захист цивільного населення під час війни від 12 серпня 1949 р., а також Додатковий протокол 1977 р. до Женевських конвенцій від 12 серпня 1949 р. щодо захисту жертв збройних конфліктів міжнародного характеру). На рівні двосторонніх і багатосторонніх угод умови створення цих зон можуть бути уточнені. Авторка статті визначає демілітаризовані території як встановлені на підставі угоди між державами певні обмежені на місцевості райони, які заборонено використовувати у воєнних цілях і здійснювати на них будь-які види воєнної діяльності. Демілітаризація території може мати постійний (наприклад, Аландські острови, Суецький канал) або тимчасовий характер як засіб ліквідації наслідків збройного конфлікту в зоні бойових дій (наприклад, демілітаризація Сребрениці). Зазначено, що нейтралізовані території -це встановлені на підставі угоди між державами певні обмежені на місцевості простори, метою створення яких є захист осіб від впливу війни (поранених і хворих комбатантів, некомбатантів, а також персонал, який відповідає за організацію та управління цими зонами й місцевостями). Акцентується увага на тому, що в міжнародному гуманітарному праві режими цих територій (зон) обмежені в часі: нейтралізовані зони можуть створюватися на початку або під час збройного конфлікту; демілітаризовані зони встановлюються в мирний час (тоді це матиме превентивний характер), воєнний, післявоєнний період (матимевідновлювальний характер). Наприкінці авторка формулює висновок щодо головних ознак демілітаризованих і нейтралізованих зон у міжнародному гуманітарному праві.

In the future, a growing number of combat operations will be carried out by autonomous weapon systems (AWS). At the operational level, AWS would not rely on direct human input. Taking humans out of the loop will raise questions of the compatibility of AWS with the fundamental requirements of international humanitarian law (IHL), such as the principles of distinction and proportionality, as well as complicate allocation of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This Article addresses the development toward greater autonomy in military technology along three dimensions: legal, ethical, and political concerns. First, it analyzes the potential dehumanizing effect of AWS with respect to the principles of distinction and proportionality and criminal responsibility. Second, this Article explores, from an ethical perspective, the advantages and disadvantages of the deployment of AWS independent of legal considerations. Authors from various fields have weighed in on this debate, but often times without linking their discourse to legal questions. This Article fills this gap by bridging these disparate discourses and suggests that there are important ethical reasons that militate against the use of AWS. Third, this Article argues that the introduction of AWS alters the risk calculus of whether to engage in or prolong an armed conflict. This alteration is likely to make that decision politically more palatable and less risky for the political decision makers.

This contribution argues that autonomous weapon systems may have advantages from the perspective of ensuring better respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), if they are one day capable of perceiving the information necessary to comply with IHL, then to apply IHL to that information, and if it can be ensured that they will not do what humans who created them did not want them to do. In view of the author, targeting decisions do not imply subjective value judgements, a machine would be unable to make. However, to respect IHL by using such autonomous systems, agreement must be found on how to interpret certain IHL rules discussed in this contribution properly when a machine executes autonomously attacks according to parameters established by human beings. In particular, the accountability of those who produce and program such systems must be clarified; the sytem must be constantly updated with information on the military advantage to enable it to determine what is a military objective and to apply the proportionality principle; parameters must be established for comparing the performance of autonomous weapon systems with that of human beings in carrying out attacks; and the feasibility of precautions must be redefined in relation with attacks using such systems.

Refugees are defined as people who are due to a reasonable fear of persecution, caused by reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in certain social groups and political parties, are outside their nationality and do not want protection from the country. When refugees leave their home country or residence, they leave their lives, homes, possessions and family. The refugees cannot be protected by their home country because they are forced to leave their country. Therefore, protection and assistance to them is the responsibility of the international community. In countries receiving refugees, they often experience inhumane treatment such as rape, assault, discrimination, repatriated by force, those lead to the violation of human rights. There has been regulation for human rights in refugee issues both internationally and regionally, for instance Convention related to Status of Refugee 1951 and The Protocol related to the Status of Refugee 1967. There are at least five basic rights of refugees, they are the right to be protected from returning to the country of origin forcibly (non refoulement), the right to seek asylum, the right to obtain equality and non-discrimination, the right to live and to be secured, as well as the right to return home.

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B), of Strathmore University ; Cyber warfare for it is a new concept in the conduct of war and is thus not properly understood hence considered a grey area with inadequate legislation. This dissertation seeks to bring to light the emergence and steady growth of cyber warfare as a method of war and to emphasize on the pressing need to regulate such wars. War is inevitable and many States are adopting this method of war because it harbors many benefits for the perpetrators who at first instance have their identity sealed and this enables them to escape liability for such actions. International Humanitarian Law is presently the legal basis through which cyber warfare is regulated. This paper offers an in-depth understanding of the 'law of war' vis-à-vis Cyber warfare. It seeks to examine the principles, philosophies, scope, laws, policies, rules and the rationale of International Humanitarian Law as a foundational basis to its applicability to Cyber warfare. It also looks into the manifestations of cyber warfare in the recent past and present as well as other institutional and regulatory influences in this field such as the Tallinn Manual which further provides that there are no treaty provisions directly addressing cyber warfare and although International law may also derive from custom, it is difficult to establish given the novelty of the field whether there is always enough available material and practice to draw conclusions of customary law from. This dissertation also offers some recommendations for future success in the regulation of cyber war.

The purpose of this research paper is to examine how international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) are applied to the Guanta?namo Bay detention center. This paper was completed through the research of international treaties, court cases, and secondary sources that thoroughly discussed issues pertaining to Guanta?namo and international law. This paper first examines the differences between the two laws by looking at the particular roles each is meant to play in the subject of international law, as well as how the two have been applied thus far to the situation at Guanta?namo. Second, the paper discusses the topic of whether or not IHL and IHRL should be mutually exclusive, or can be interpreted alongside each other. In addition, a discussion of the opposing viewpoints on this topic will be presented including the United States argument of lex specialis, and the opposing arguments of the international community. Chapter three will cover the topic of extraterritorial application and how it affects the international treaties and court cases that deal with issues pertinent to Guanta?namo. The fourth chapter discusses the effects that Guanta?namo has on the reputation of the United States internationally, and how it affects human rights around the world. Chapter five discusses possible recommendations in order to achieve the long-term goal of ending the Guantanamo Bay controversy, and protecting and promoting human rights everywhere. ; 2016-12-01 ; B.A. ; College of Sciences, Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

The typical functions of private military and security companies (PMSCs) are designed to operate in the context of situations of crisis, which mostly take place in the event of armed conflicts. International humanitarian law (IHL) plays therefore a particularly significant role in regulating the activities of PMSCs. In playing this role, however, IHL interacts with international human rights law (HRL) to a very strict extent. While it is commonly held that HRL and IHL represent two distinct legal regimes, their strict interrelation is evident both in light of their common purpose and of the formulation and content of most of their provisions. According to the International Court of Justice, in the event of armed conflict both HRL and IHL find application, but IHL, being specifically designed to regulate the conduct of fighting, is to be considered as lex specialis. This does not prevent, however, that the most fundamental rules of HRL apply in any case, even if the relevant situations they regulate might also be covered by other rules of international law, including IHL. IHL must therefore conform with the fundamental rules of IHR, according to the principle of complementarity. Nevertheless, this operation may be hardly translated into practice with respect to certain specific rights, particularly the fundamental right to life. This problem has been extensively addressed in the recent practice of the monitoring bodies established by regional human rights instruments, according to which basic human rights fully apply also in the event of armed conflict, and IHL remains an interpretative tool for better defining the scope of application of those rights.