Suchergebnisse

International audience ; D'où vient l'inflation? De la voracité des intermédiaires, de la pression des salariés, des rattrapages des industriels? Chacun la considère comme une donnée extérieure, et corrige ses prévisions en conséquence: «l'inflation, c'est les autres». Mais quand sévit l'hyperinflation, il faut revoir complètement la gestion, sous peine d'être balayé par la course des chiffres. En Argentine (174 % d'inflation en 1987, 121 % au premier semestre 1988), l'heure de l'hypergestionnaire a sonné. Lorsque l'inflation frôle 30 % par mois, les gestionnaires sont confrontés à deux types de problèmes : connaître leur situation, car toute mesure devient aléatoire, et envisager une stratégie, car la planification n'est plus envisageable qu'à très court terme. Tous les acteurs cherchent à s'en sortir en échafaudant des palliatifs pour se maintenir à flot : c'est le triomphe des logiques locales. Beaucoup d'agents économiques ont donc l'impression de s'en tirer à bon compte (à court terme du moins). mais les conséquences globales de ces comportements élémentaires deviennent incontrôlables. Treize ans d'hyperinflation ont ancré un nouveau système et miné la crédibilité des instances financières de l'Etat: à l'arrivée, nulle politique ne semble plus capable de maîtriser les dérives macro-économiques. Le problème essentiel étant celui de l'assemblage des logiques locales, examinons les manières par lesquelles un certain nombre d'agents économiques, privés ou publics. tentent de s'accommoder de l'hyperinflation.

International audience ; D'où vient l'inflation? De la voracité des intermédiaires, de la pression des salariés, des rattrapages des industriels? Chacun la considère comme une donnée extérieure, et corrige ses prévisions en conséquence: «l'inflation, c'est les autres». Mais quand sévit l'hyperinflation, il faut revoir complètement la gestion, sous peine d'être balayé par la course des chiffres. En Argentine (174 % d'inflation en 1987, 121 % au premier semestre 1988), l'heure de l'hypergestionnaire a sonné. Lorsque l'inflation frôle 30 % par mois, les gestionnaires sont confrontés à deux types de problèmes : connaître leur situation, car toute mesure devient aléatoire, et envisager une stratégie, car la planification n'est plus envisageable qu'à très court terme. Tous les acteurs cherchent à s'en sortir en échafaudant des palliatifs pour se maintenir à flot : c'est le triomphe des logiques locales. Beaucoup d'agents économiques ont donc l'impression de s'en tirer à bon compte (à court terme du moins). mais les conséquences globales de ces comportements élémentaires deviennent incontrôlables. Treize ans d'hyperinflation ont ancré un nouveau système et miné la crédibilité des instances financières de l'Etat: à l'arrivée, nulle politique ne semble plus capable de maîtriser les dérives macro-économiques. Le problème essentiel étant celui de l'assemblage des logiques locales, examinons les manières par lesquelles un certain nombre d'agents économiques, privés ou publics. tentent de s'accommoder de l'hyperinflation.

International audience ; The purpose of the article is twofold. Firstly, it aims at proposing a Post-Keynesian interpretation of hyperinflation. The theoretical building includes elements suggested by Post-Keynesians as well as by structuralists. The accent is put on the role played by a foreign currency in domestic comportments during high inflation periods. Besides, a definition of hyperinflation is suggested: hyperinflation could be seen as a substitution by a foreign currency of a domestic currency. This substitution, violent in its final step, is built gradually. Hyperinflation is caused by a violent distributive conflict which generates a strong inflation, by indexation, by an external indebtedness denominated in a foreign currency and by self-fulfilling prophecies. Secondly, this theoretical framework is confronted to economic facts observed in Argentina from the 1970's to the 1989 hyper-inflationist spurt. The historical political economy analysis allows the spotting of the following sequence: the distributive conflict is highly violent, reshaped several times from the 1970's onwards. It provokes the development of institutional arrangements (indexation), while the dollar becomes more and more important within the economy. This phenomenon is encouraged by the implementation of an original exchange rate regime at the end of the 1970's, in a context of liberalization of the economy. The impossibility to stabilize the exchange rate during the 1980's in a context of external indebtedness makes possible the arising of hyperinflation. It is finally activated by speculation on the exchange rate level and a run on the foreign reserves.

International audience ; The purpose of the article is twofold. Firstly, it aims at proposing a Post-Keynesian interpretation of hyperinflation. The theoretical building includes elements suggested by Post-Keynesians as well as by structuralists. The accent is put on the role played by a foreign currency in domestic comportments during high inflation periods. Besides, a definition of hyperinflation is suggested: hyperinflation could be seen as a substitution by a foreign currency of a domestic currency. This substitution, violent in its final step, is built gradually. Hyperinflation is caused by a violent distributive conflict which generates a strong inflation, by indexation, by an external indebtedness denominated in a foreign currency and by self-fulfilling prophecies. Secondly, this theoretical framework is confronted to economic facts observed in Argentina from the 1970's to the 1989 hyper-inflationist spurt. The historical political economy analysis allows the spotting of the following sequence: the distributive conflict is highly violent, reshaped several times from the 1970's onwards. It provokes the development of institutional arrangements (indexation), while the dollar becomes more and more important within the economy. This phenomenon is encouraged by the implementation of an original exchange rate regime at the end of the 1970's, in a context of liberalization of the economy. The impossibility to stabilize the exchange rate during the 1980's in a context of external indebtedness makes possible the arising of hyperinflation. It is finally activated by speculation on the exchange rate level and a run on the foreign reserves.

International audience ; The purpose of the article is twofold. Firstly, it aims at proposing a Post-Keynesian interpretation of hyperinflation. The theoretical building includes elements suggested by Post-Keynesians as well as by structuralists. The accent is put on the role played by a foreign currency in domestic comportments during high inflation periods. Besides, a definition of hyperinflation is suggested: hyperinflation could be seen as a substitution by a foreign currency of a domestic currency. This substitution, violent in its final step, is built gradually. Hyperinflation is caused by a violent distributive conflict which generates a strong inflation, by indexation, by an external indebtedness denominated in a foreign currency and by self-fulfilling prophecies. Secondly, this theoretical framework is confronted to economic facts observed in Argentina from the 1970's to the 1989 hyper-inflationist spurt. The historical political economy analysis allows the spotting of the following sequence: the distributive conflict is highly violent, reshaped several times from the 1970's onwards. It provokes the development of institutional arrangements (indexation), while the dollar becomes more and more important within the economy. This phenomenon is encouraged by the implementation of an original exchange rate regime at the end of the 1970's, in a context of liberalization of the economy. The impossibility to stabilize the exchange rate during the 1980's in a context of external indebtedness makes possible the arising of hyperinflation. It is finally activated by speculation on the exchange rate level and a run on the foreign reserves.

Manifestations of hyperinflation in Chile since September 1973. The very rapid rise in prices is accompanied by a squeeze in money supply, income and domestic consumption. It results in a redistribution of national income to capital holders. The purchasing power of employees was reduced on average by two thirds between September 1973 and September 1975. Popular consumption is dramatically reduced. As a result, agriculture and industry working for the internal market are facing a very serious crisis. The new face of Chile, wanted by the dictatorship, thus appears: a country exporting raw materials and semi-finished products with undernourished masses with a leading class in the North American lifestyle. ; International audience ; Manifestations of hyperinflation in Chile since September 1973. The very rapid rise in prices is accompanied by a squeeze in money supply, income and domestic consumption. It results in a redistribution of national income to capital holders. The purchasing power of employees was reduced on average by two thirds between September 1973 and September 1975. Popular consumption is dramatically reduced. As a result, agriculture and industry working for the internal market are facing a very serious crisis. The new face of Chile, wanted by the dictatorship, thus appears: a country exporting raw materials and semi-finished products with undernourished masses with a leading class in the North American lifestyle. ; Manifestations de l'hyper-inflation au Chili depuis septembre 1973. La hausse très rapide des prix s'accompagne d'une compression de la masse monétaire, des revenus et de la consommation nationale. Elle engendre une redistribution du revenu national en faveur des détenteurs de capitaux. Le pouvoir d'achat des salariés a été amputé en moyenne des deux tiers entre septembre 1973 et septembre 1975. La consommation populaire est dramatiquement réduite. En conséquence, l'agriculture et l'industrie travaillant pour le marché intérieur subissent une crise très grave. Ainsi apparaît le nouveau ...

For almost ten years, from August 1914 to February 1924, the various Russian governments resorted to printing money in order to finance all or part of their expenses. This phenomena, incredible in and of itself for any specialist in monetary issues at the time, S. A. Fal'kner was going to study it starting in the Spring of 1918, not as a temporary expedient, a pathological manifestation, a "deviation from the norm", but as a durable situation, an emission economy, having its own rules of development, and being susceptible to be controlled and used par the Soviet power, as long it had analyzed correctly how it worked. Needless to say, it went against general opinion.Starting in 1923, on the basis of Fal'kner's ideas, O. Schmidt and V. Bazarov elaborate two models of mathematical laws of the emission economy. There will be a discussion at the Socialist Academy on whether the use of mathematical models in social sciences is legitimate. Kacenelenbaum, Yurovskii and Preobrazenskii disapproved of this kind of attempt.However running an emission economy has negative effects, especially for distribution since those who have fixed wages, such as salary workers, will be subject to most of the emission tax. Fal'kner proposes to put in place a rationing system and to set administered prices of basic necessities to regulate the system in order to reduce its disruptiveness on the national economy.Through a long process of trial and error, the Bolshevik government will finally succeed in putting an end to financing the country's budget by issuing paper money. Here again two opposite orientations will emerge: the iemission economy partisans, with Kuzovkov, will endorse a progressive stability of the paper-ruble, whereas the "orthodox" monetary issues specialists, whether they be Marxists such as Sokol'nikov, or former tzariste Secretary, such as Kutler, will endorse a completely different monetary unit and the adoption of the gold-currency. ; Pendant presque dix ans, d'Août 1914 à Février 1924, les différents gouvernements ...

For almost ten years, from August 1914 to February 1924, the various Russian governments resorted to printing money in order to finance all or part of their expenses. This phenomena, incredible in and of itself for any specialist in monetary issues at the time, S. A. Fal'kner was going to study it starting in the Spring of 1918, not as a temporary expedient, a pathological manifestation, a "deviation from the norm", but as a durable situation, an emission economy, having its own rules of development, and being susceptible to be controlled and used par the Soviet power, as long it had analyzed correctly how it worked. Needless to say, it went against general opinion.Starting in 1923, on the basis of Fal'kner's ideas, O. Schmidt and V. Bazarov elaborate two models of mathematical laws of the emission economy. There will be a discussion at the Socialist Academy on whether the use of mathematical models in social sciences is legitimate. Kacenelenbaum, Yurovskii and Preobrazenskii disapproved of this kind of attempt.However running an emission economy has negative effects, especially for distribution since those who have fixed wages, such as salary workers, will be subject to most of the emission tax. Fal'kner proposes to put in place a rationing system and to set administered prices of basic necessities to regulate the system in order to reduce its disruptiveness on the national economy.Through a long process of trial and error, the Bolshevik government will finally succeed in putting an end to financing the country's budget by issuing paper money. Here again two opposite orientations will emerge: the iemission economy partisans, with Kuzovkov, will endorse a progressive stability of the paper-ruble, whereas the "orthodox" monetary issues specialists, whether they be Marxists such as Sokol'nikov, or former tzariste Secretary, such as Kutler, will endorse a completely different monetary unit and the adoption of the gold-currency. ; Pendant presque dix ans, d'Août 1914 à Février 1924, les différents gouvernements ...

For almost ten years, from August 1914 to February 1924, the various Russian governments resorted to printing money in order to finance all or part of their expenses. This phenomena, incredible in and of itself for any specialist in monetary issues at the time, S. A. Fal'kner was going to study it starting in the Spring of 1918, not as a temporary expedient, a pathological manifestation, a "deviation from the norm", but as a durable situation, an emission economy, having its own rules of development, and being susceptible to be controlled and used par the Soviet power, as long it had analyzed correctly how it worked. Needless to say, it went against general opinion.Starting in 1923, on the basis of Fal'kner's ideas, O. Schmidt and V. Bazarov elaborate two models of mathematical laws of the emission economy. There will be a discussion at the Socialist Academy on whether the use of mathematical models in social sciences is legitimate. Kacenelenbaum, Yurovskii and Preobrazenskii disapproved of this kind of attempt.However running an emission economy has negative effects, especially for distribution since those who have fixed wages, such as salary workers, will be subject to most of the emission tax. Fal'kner proposes to put in place a rationing system and to set administered prices of basic necessities to regulate the system in order to reduce its disruptiveness on the national economy.Through a long process of trial and error, the Bolshevik government will finally succeed in putting an end to financing the country's budget by issuing paper money. Here again two opposite orientations will emerge: the iemission economy partisans, with Kuzovkov, will endorse a progressive stability of the paper-ruble, whereas the "orthodox" monetary issues specialists, whether they be Marxists such as Sokol'nikov, or former tzariste Secretary, such as Kutler, will endorse a completely different monetary unit and the adoption of the gold-currency. ; Pendant presque dix ans, d'Août 1914 à Février 1924, les différents gouvernements ...

Der Autor analysiert von einem ökonomischen Standpunkt aus die katastrophale Entwicklung des zairischen Geldes seit Ende der 80er Jahre sowie Versuche einer Gegensteuerung des Staates gegen die Hyperinflation. Unzureichendes Handeln sei für die Krise verantwortlich gewesen. (DÜI-Kör)

High Inflation and Transition in the Formally Centrally Planned Economies This thesis starts from the observation that the standard theory of high inflation, derived from Cagan's works in the Fifties, is not able to explain the main characteristics of the high inflationary process in the transition countries of Eastern Europe. For the two following reasons, a reversal of methodology is adopted. First, the main question is not to know how the money creation acts on the price level but why governments of centrally planned economies raise seigniorage revenues to satisfy their financing requirements. Second, the standard monetary and finance modelling deals with short periods of extremely high monetary instability. Such situations do not correspond with the economic reality of the transition countries suffering of both persistent and high inflation. In order to move away from the standard link issue of fresh money - inflation and thereby studying the sources of monetary phenomena occurring in the Eastern countries in transition, this thesis adopt and evolve the "Bottom up" approach recently introduced by Axel Leijonhufvud in the field of Economics. This new methodology is used to explain the high inflation period in Ukraine between 1991 and 1995. ; Cette thèse analyse les périodes de transition vécues par les économies anciennement planifiées de l'Europe Centrale et de l'ex-URSS. Compte tenu de la grande diversité qui existe entre tous ces pays -quant à la culture, les institutions politiques et sociales, l'histoire, la coordination des capacités productives - il est nécessaire de trouver un fil directeur grâce auquel il devient possible de mettre de l'ordre dans tout ce désordre, de tirer un enseignement de toute cette diversité. En d'autres termes, il s'agit de trouver un dénominateur commun à tous ces pays. Le choix du «fil» s'impose naturellement. Depuis le démarrage de la transition, toutes les économies auxquelles nous nous intéressons ont subi, ou subissent encore une considérable instabilité monétaire. Cette ...

High Inflation and Transition in the Formally Centrally Planned Economies This thesis starts from the observation that the standard theory of high inflation, derived from Cagan's works in the Fifties, is not able to explain the main characteristics of the high inflationary process in the transition countries of Eastern Europe. For the two following reasons, a reversal of methodology is adopted. First, the main question is not to know how the money creation acts on the price level but why governments of centrally planned economies raise seigniorage revenues to satisfy their financing requirements. Second, the standard monetary and finance modelling deals with short periods of extremely high monetary instability. Such situations do not correspond with the economic reality of the transition countries suffering of both persistent and high inflation. In order to move away from the standard link issue of fresh money - inflation and thereby studying the sources of monetary phenomena occurring in the Eastern countries in transition, this thesis adopt and evolve the "Bottom up" approach recently introduced by Axel Leijonhufvud in the field of Economics. This new methodology is used to explain the high inflation period in Ukraine between 1991 and 1995. ; Cette thèse analyse les périodes de transition vécues par les économies anciennement planifiées de l'Europe Centrale et de l'ex-URSS. Compte tenu de la grande diversité qui existe entre tous ces pays -quant à la culture, les institutions politiques et sociales, l'histoire, la coordination des capacités productives - il est nécessaire de trouver un fil directeur grâce auquel il devient possible de mettre de l'ordre dans tout ce désordre, de tirer un enseignement de toute cette diversité. En d'autres termes, il s'agit de trouver un dénominateur commun à tous ces pays. Le choix du «fil» s'impose naturellement. Depuis le démarrage de la transition, toutes les économies auxquelles nous nous intéressons ont subi, ou subissent encore une considérable instabilité monétaire. Cette ...

High Inflation and Transition in the Formally Centrally Planned Economies This thesis starts from the observation that the standard theory of high inflation, derived from Cagan's works in the Fifties, is not able to explain the main characteristics of the high inflationary process in the transition countries of Eastern Europe. For the two following reasons, a reversal of methodology is adopted. First, the main question is not to know how the money creation acts on the price level but why governments of centrally planned economies raise seigniorage revenues to satisfy their financing requirements. Second, the standard monetary and finance modelling deals with short periods of extremely high monetary instability. Such situations do not correspond with the economic reality of the transition countries suffering of both persistent and high inflation. In order to move away from the standard link issue of fresh money - inflation and thereby studying the sources of monetary phenomena occurring in the Eastern countries in transition, this thesis adopt and evolve the "Bottom up" approach recently introduced by Axel Leijonhufvud in the field of Economics. This new methodology is used to explain the high inflation period in Ukraine between 1991 and 1995. ; Cette thèse analyse les périodes de transition vécues par les économies anciennement planifiées de l'Europe Centrale et de l'ex-URSS. Compte tenu de la grande diversité qui existe entre tous ces pays -quant à la culture, les institutions politiques et sociales, l'histoire, la coordination des capacités productives - il est nécessaire de trouver un fil directeur grâce auquel il devient possible de mettre de l'ordre dans tout ce désordre, de tirer un enseignement de toute cette diversité. En d'autres termes, il s'agit de trouver un dénominateur commun à tous ces pays. Le choix du «fil» s'impose naturellement. Depuis le démarrage de la transition, toutes les économies auxquelles nous nous intéressons ont subi, ou subissent encore une considérable instabilité monétaire. Cette ...