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AbstractThis paper discusses how import tariffs interact with transport prices in episodes of trade liberalization. We develop a model of a transport industry that operates under imperfect competition and economies of scale. Double marginalization due to market power reduces the effects of trade liberalization, while a larger trade volume may support them due to economies of scale. We use a large data set of maritime transport data and combine them with tariff data to find that economies of scale beat market power: a decline in the tariff implies a decline in freight rates.

In this paper we study incentives for a government to impose a discriminatory or uniform import tariff on its low and high quality imports. In comparison to free trade both tariffs decrease total welfare. In response to any tariff, firms decrease quality investment and total output sold declines. The degree of product differentiation under both the tariffs increases. Consumer surplus declines by a greater amount than the increase in revenues under an import tariff. While the uniform tariff works to the advantage of the high quality firm, the discriminative tariff works to the advantage of the low quality firm. Total welfare, though lower than under free trade, is greater under a uniform than under a discriminatory tariff.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of sugar import tariffs changes since the tariff import is the only policy to increase the sugar domestic production. This analysis is performed using a CGE (computable general equilibrium) model of Indonesian economy in 2008. Results showed that the increases of sugar import tariff have some different conclusions. If sugar tariff import will rise to 41.6% and to 50%, the domestic output of sugar will increase about 1.89% and 3.77%; and household welfare would increase about 0.52 and 0.76%, respectively. But when the sugar import tariff is removed, domestic output of sugar and sugarcane have not changed, but the agricultural sector would reduce and income of all agents would decrease. Thus, the relevant tariff depends on the purpose of the government whether to increase domestic output and import or export of certain sectors, and the welfare of producers or consumers.

Import tariff receipts represent an important share of government revenues in many developing countries and there has recently been a surge in empirical studies showing how evasion in this field is a pervasive phenomenon. In the case of import tariffs, the tax base is the product of quantity and unit value, both of which have to be reported and need to be assessed by the custom authority during an audit. I show that when the fiscal authority has an imperfect detection technology, there is an additional incentive for the taxpayer to underdeclare, as a greater declaration in one dimension actually increases the fine when evasion in the other dimension is detected, and a tax base presenting this feature is subject to more evasion compared to a tax base that can be assessed directly. Also, when enforcement capacity is low, voluntary compliance is higher when the importer is required to declare only the total value of imports.