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RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE PROVIDED DETAILS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN SEVERAL STATES, INCLUDING NORTH KOREA, IRAN, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN. THIS ARTICLE SUMMARIZES SOME OF THE FINDINGS CONTAINED IN THOSE REPORTS.

THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE INTELLIGENCE WAR IN TURKEY, 1939-1944. IN 1939, AS PART OF THE DIPLOMATIC MEASURES AIMED AT PREVENTING OR CONTAINING ANY AGGRESSIVE MOVES OF GERMANY AND ITALY INTO THE BALKANS, BRITAIN AND FRANCE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF TURKEY. THE NATION WAS PROMISED ASSISTANCE IF ATTACKED, YET IT REMAINED NEUTRAL. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WAR IN THAT REGION ARE OUTLINED IN THE ARTICLE IN RELATION TO TURKEY'S POSITION.

ESSAY ANALYZES SELECTED PUBLICATIONS SINCE 1974 ON US SECRET INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. PUBLISHED WORKS DIVIDE INTO 4 CATEGORIES: MEMOIRS DEFENDING THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, WHISTLE-BLOWING EXPOSES, SCHOLARLY ANALYSES, AND REPORTS FROM EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL STUDIES. THE ARTICLE URGES EXPLOITATION OF A VARIETY OF EVIDENCE RECENTLY AVAILABLE.

Intro -- Foreword -- What Intelligence Agencies Do -- Intelligence Agents -- Intelligence Technology -- United States Intelligence Agencies -- BritishI ntelligence Agencies -- Frenchand German Intelligence Agencies -- Israeli Intelligence -- Series Glossary -- Chronology -- Further Information -- Index -- Picture Credits -- Blank Page.

A WEALTH OF NOW DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTATION HAS ALLOWED HISTORIANS TO MAKE A MORE COMPLETE EVALUATION OF THE THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURE PERTAINING TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. WHAT CAN BE DEDUCED FROM THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AND FROM THE SUBSEQUENT POLICY RESPONSE TO EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLDED IN IRAN? THE ARGUMENT HERE IS THAT THERE WAS ACCURATE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE AT THE DISPOSAL OF POLICY MAKERS, BUT THE AVAILABILITY OF THIS INFORMATION DID NOT REDIRECT THE LONG-STANDING POLICY PREDISPOSITIONS IN WASHINGTON.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA MAY BE REMEMBERED AS THE BEST OF TIMES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORST OF TIMES FOR AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. THIS ESSAY FOCUSES ON KEY CHALLENGES WHICH INCLUDE DETERMINING WHAT PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AND ISSUES SHOULD COMMAND THE INCREASINGLY SCARCE AND CONTESTED RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, HOW MUCH THE EFFORT SHOULD COST, WHAT WOULD IMPROVE PERFORMANCE, AND WHOM SHOULD BE TOLD--AND AT WHAT LEVEL OF DETAIL--AND WHAT CAN AND IS BEING DONE.

DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION WASHINGTON OBSERVED, "THE NECESSITY OF PROCURING GOOD INTELLIGENCE IS APPARENT AND NEED NOT BE FURTHER URGED." IN THIS ESSAY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PRESENTS THE CASE FOR URGING IT IN 1982 AND FOR PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AGAINST ITS ACQUISITION BY ANTAGONISTIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGENTS. HE ASSESSES USSR'S PROGRAMS, COHORTS, TERRORISM.

1. Intelligence costs and fiscal procedures. Hearings bef.the ...,94.Congr.,1.Sess. July,Aug.1975. '75.,Diagr.; 2. The performance of the Intelligence Community. Hearings bef.the ...,94.Congr.,1.Sess. Sept.,Oct.1975. '75.; 3. Domestic intelligence programs. Hearings bef. the ...,94.Congr.,1.Sess. Oct.,Nov.,Dec. 1975. '76.; 4. Committee proceedings. Proceedings of the ..., 94.Congr.,1.Sess. Sept.,Oct.,Nov.1975. '76.; 5. Risks and control of foreign intelligence. Hearings bef.the ...,94.Congr.,1.Sess. Nov., Dec.1975. '76.; 6. Committee proceedings - II. Proceedings of the ..., 94.Congr.,2.Sess. Jan.,Febr. 1976. '76

WE NOW KNOW THAT WINSTON CHURCHILL WAS RECEIVING AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1941. THE BRITISH WERE READING STATE DEPARTMENT SIGNALS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE AMERICANS MORE HEAVILTY IN THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST GERMANY. GIVEN THAT AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS WERE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF SECRECY, AND THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN INTELLIGENCE, BOTH BROADENED AND DEEPENED IN SCOPE DURING THIS PERIOD. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES HOW, WHEN AND WHY THE BRITISH WERE READING AMERICAN SIGNALS AT THAT TIME.

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS DEVELOPED INWARD-LOOKING INSTITUTIONAL CULTURES AND STANDARD WAYS OF DOING BUSINESS. BOTH MUST CHANGE IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1990'S. WILLIAM WEBSTER, THE FIRST POST-COLD WAR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, INITIATED THE PROCESS OF CHANGE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, AND HIS SUCCESSORS HAVE GREATLY ACCELERATED THE PACE. AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS, U.S. INTELLIGENCE IS BEGINNING TO ACQUIRE A NEW LOOK, ALTHOUGH KEY ISSUES REQUIRE FURTHER ATTENTION. AMONG THESE ARE THE NEED TO CLARIFY ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, INCREASE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, SIMPLIFY CLASSIFICATION PRACTICES, AND ADJUST CORE ACTIVITIES.

THE US CAN ANSWER DETAILED QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES, BUT NEXT TO NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON INSIDE SOVIET HEADS. THE US SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND PRIORITIES IN THE STRATEGIC AREA IN ORDER TO ACCURATELY EXAMINE SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS, INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

INTELLIGENCE CHANGES RAINED DOWN UPON THE UNITED STATES IN A GREAT TORRENT DURING THE 1940S AND EARLY 1950S, CULMINATING IN THE CREATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) IN 1947 AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NCA) IN 1952. TO FORM A REALISTIC PICTURE OF HOW AND WHY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)/CIA AND ITS INTELLIGENCE MODERNIZING COMPANIONS WERE CREATED IN THE PERIOD 1941-52, ONE MUST ACKNOWLEGE THE GREAT CHANGES AND CHALLENGES WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THOSE 11 YEARS. THIS ARTICLE ALSO EXAMINES THE MAIN PHASES OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE HISTORY FROM THE CIVIL WAR ERA TO 1942 IN ORDER TO GAUGE WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATIONS OF THE 1940S AND 1950S WERE RADICAL DEPARTURES IN AMERICAN HISTORY OR WERE SIMPLY NEW SUPERSTRUCTURES BUILT ON EARLIER ERAS IN WHICH THE US HAD QUITE EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS.