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We examine the effects of signed industry-average earnings management on the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). We posit that the variation in an IPOs earnings management is related to industry-average earnings management and, therefore, provides useful information regarding the IPO valuation. We find that higher industry-average earnings management negatively affects the pre-issuance price update and the initial return of IPOs. Our findings lend support to the partial adjustment phenomenon of IPO pricing which suggests information that influences valuation is partially incorporated in the initial offer price and more fully incorporated in the share price during the first-day of secondary market trading.

Greater partisan alignment among lawmakers enhances their ability to respond rapidly to adverse shocks, but it also undermines the quality of checks and balances and encourages excessive governmental intervention in local areas aligned with the ruling party. We investigate how this form of local policy risk affects IPO underpricing. One standard-deviation increase in political alignment between local politicians and the federal government translates into an extra $1.58 million being left on the table, which corresponds to 5.39% of the average valuation discount. This effect is concentrated in firms that are vulnerable to legislative interventions and has important long-term implications. Our robustness analysis also shows that our baseline results are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of influential states and years with high IPO activity.

Greater partisan alignment among lawmakers enhances their ability to respond rapidly to adverse shocks, but it also undermines the quality of checks and balances and encourages excessive governmental intervention in local areas aligned with the ruling party. We investigate how this form of local policy risk affects IPO underpricing. One standard-deviation increase in political alignment between local politicians and the federal government translates into an extra $1.58 million being left on the table, which corresponds to 5.39% of the average valuation discount. This effect is concentrated in firms that are vulnerable to legislative interventions and has important long-term implications. Our robustness analysis also shows that our baseline results are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of influential states and years with high IPO activity.