Suchergebnisse

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: Società, politica e istituzioni(XIX-XX Secolo) ; Una curiosa espressione di Jacques Delors, più volte utilizzata nel corso della sua carriera, definì le istituzioni comunitarie come un "O.P.N.I., oggetto politico non identificato". L'affermazione di Delors appare come un compromesso tra l'interesse a tutela dei diritti degli Stati e la necessità di attribuire al processo di integrazione europea istituzioni stabili e soprattutto autonome. In realtà, i caratteri di profonda instabilità mostrati dal modello di Comunità ne fecero scaturire due orientamenti interpretativi differenti. Il primo considerò il raggiungimento dell'obiettivo prefissato nella realizzazione di una unione politica; come sostiene Riccardo Perissich, "Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un "Senato degli Stati"; l'Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale"1. Il secondo orientamento si basò sull'idea che il principio di sovranità non potesse essere frammentato e che il conferimento di potere previsto dai Trattati fosse più di carattere tecnico che politico. Questa seconda interpretazione aumentò i dubbi e la diffidenza nei confronti della Commissione e ancor più del Parlamento. C'è da dire inoltre, che gli Stati firmatari dei Trattati si riconobbero più nella prima lettura del modello, con un necessario distinguo per la Francia che, all'epoca dell'entrata in vigore era presieduta dal generale Charles De Gaulle, fortemente contrario, come noto, all'idea di una qualsiasi minima cessione di potere a livello sovranazionale. A seguito della fusione di CECA, CEE ed EURATOM una sola Commissione unificò l'apparato amministrativo mentre al Parlamento europeo venne assegnato unicamente il compito di esercitare il potere in materia di bilancio, oltre ad una funzione meramente consultiva; l'elezione diretta del Parlamento fu contemplata nell'articolo n.138 del Trattato istitutivo della Comunità europea nel quale, oltre ad essere indicato il sistema di elezione dei parlamentari europei delegati come provvisorio, 1R. Perissich, L'Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54. venne previsto che il Parlamento avrebbe elaborato progetti volti alla realizzazione di una procedura di elezione uniforme per tutti gli Stati membri. Di fatto, negli anni che intercorsero tra il 1951 e il 1976, furono presentate numerose proposte orientate all'istituzione della procedura di elezione a suffragio universale diretto che, dopo molte difficoltà, trovarono soltanto nel 1979 la loro attuazione; questo risultato rappresentò l'inizio di una nuova era in cui l'importanza della comunicazione politico-istituzionale giocò un ruolo fondamentale per creare il necessario contatto con i cittadini, in previsione della loro partecipazione al voto europeo. Ricordiamo come nel 1974, al vertice francese presieduto da Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, venne adottata la decisione di istituire il Consiglio europeo e l'elezione diretta del Parlamento. L'evento avrebbe esercitato una notevole influenza nella dinamica istituzionale europea; nonostante il suo assetto di Assemblea diversa da quelle nazionali, il Parlamento europeo direttamente eletto avrebbe preteso un aumento della propria influenza politica così come del proprio peso istituzionale. Attraverso le elezioni, i cittadini europei avrebbero potuto accrescere progressivamente il loro interesse nei confronti dei temi comunitari riuscendo a percepire meglio l'esistenza di un'istituzione fino ad allora poco conosciuta. Su questo aspetto federalisti e "gradualisti" si collocarono su posizioni discordanti, in quanto i primi da sempre consideravano il Parlamento eletto come "Congresso del popolo europeo" e quindi come il potere costituente della futura Federazione europea. Personalità di spicco sui singoli piani nazionali, costantemente impegnate nella causa dell'integrazione europea (solo per citare alcuni nomi si ricordano Altiero Spinelli, Simone Veil, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac), oltre ad esponenti politici ed intellettuali che interpretarono un ruolo di forte influenza all'interno dei loro partiti riguardo alla scelta europeista (per l'Italia ricordiamo Giorgio Amendola, Enrico Berlinguer, Mauro Ferri, Gaetano Arfè), si impegnarono con l'intento di legittimarne il ruolo rispetto alle altre istituzioni, in particolar modo la Commissione. I parlamentari eletti nel primo suffragio universale diretto si trovarono quindi ad affrontare temi che andavano dalla questione dei paesi comunisti ai rapporti con il Terzo mondo, alla progettazione di una televisione europea fino alla necessità di redigere una prima bozza di Costituzione europea. Il ricorso alle candidature di personalità politiche ben note all'opinione pubblica quali Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Willy Brandt, si pensò potesse offrire un maggiore potenziale all'organizzazione della propaganda. La campagna elettorale del giugno 1979, così come le altre due successive, fu tuttavia caratterizzata, soprattutto in Italia e Francia, da argomenti troppo spesso collegati alla dialettica politica della propria nazione. In ogni caso l'informazione data ai cittadini europei fu in grado di suscitare un inevitabile interessamento ai problemi comunitari, ma soprattutto alla realtà sovranazionale. L'affluenza al voto fu comunque inferiore rispetto alle elezioni nazionali. Nei motivi della scarsa partecipazione al voto, oltre l'assenza di dibattito propriamente europeo vi fu anche il fatto che le strategie dei partiti tesero ad una sorta di strumentalizzazione delle elezioni europee, puntando attraverso le campagne elettorali al perseguimento di obiettivi nazionali. Il primo scrutinio diretto fu in grado comunque di dare una ventata di novità al concetto di democrazia europea. La nuova legittimità consentì al Parlamento di consolidare nel tempo i propri poteri e di interpretare un ruolo all'interno del processo decisionale comunitario che all'epoca poteva dirsi quanto meno "nebuloso". Una volta fissato il periodo di svolgimento delle prime elezioni, le forze politiche nazionali dovettero sostenere una sfida che le avrebbe costrette a rimettersi in gioco, cercando di rinnovare gli argomenti e i temi individuati per le campagne elettorali nazionali. Una maggiore consapevolezza riguardo alla necessità di allargare l'orizzonte, senza trascurare tuttavia il contatto con i propri elettori e cercando le possibili somiglianze con gli altri partiti europei, avrebbe consentito di conciliare la propria ideologia in un contesto più ampio. Occorre tener presente come tra il 1975 e il 1979 si fossero create all'interno dell'Assemblea parlamentare non eletta, formazioni politiche rappresentative di partiti accomunati da un orientamento affine a quello nazionale. La diversità di ideologie, tuttavia rendeva queste coalizioni molto deboli, soprattutto per via della tanto difficile integrazione ostacolata dalla predominanza degli interessi nazionali anteposti a quelli comunitari. La primazia dei partiti nazionali ha sempre costituito un ostacolo all'autonomia di azione dei gruppi e delle federazioni lasciando, fino ad oggi, inattuata la costituzione di veri e propri partiti europei. All'indomani del primo suffragio universale diretto, tuttavia, il nuovo parlamentare europeo avrebbe assunto il ruolo di trait d'union tra il proprio elettorato, il proprio partito, la coalizione europea e il Parlamento stesso. I tratti caratterizzanti il percorso politico-istituzionale del Parlamento europeo sono stati oggetto di approfondimento nello studio dei casi relativi ai tre Paesi considerati rivelando le differenze che, per la natura stessa del ruolo giocato nel contesto sovranazionale, non hanno risparmiato il processo di integrazione e, nel caso specifico, la partecipazione alle elezioni dirette del Parlamento. Accomunando Italia e Francia, paesi fondatori della Comunità europea che si dimostrarono troppo intenti a trattare temi nazionali durante le campagne elettorali, nel Regno Unito l'idea di Europa si coniugò con la costante valutazione di tutti gli elementi che sarebbero risultati convenienti per partecipare, senza che tutto ciò costringesse a modificare o rinunciare a quanto già in possesso, atteggiamento che trovò nella linea di governo di Margaret Thatcher una perfetta interpretazione durata per l'intero decennio esaminato. Se per il primo suffragio universale diretto l'attività maggiore fu quella di approntare nuovi metodi organizzativi per le campagne elettorali, adatti alla ricerca di un consenso più ampio, diretto a legittimare l'istituzione sovranazionale, nella seconda e terza tornata le riflessioni delle forze politiche si resero necessarie per cercare di individuare le cause del progressivo calo partecipativo. I difetti di una comunicazione politica spesso basata su issues nazionali, soprattutto riguardo la Francia, ha di sicuro rappresentato una delle possibili cause, ma l'atteggiamento stesso dei partiti, apparso frequentemente poco incline a credere seriamente nell'importanza delle elezioni, ha lasciato percepire incertezza ai cittadini europei. Per altro verso, anche le campagne elettorali comunitarie, sebbene abbiano investito molte risorse per cercare di catturare il consenso dell'opinione pubblica, hanno mostrato la parziale efficienza dei mezzi messi in atto. Elezioni di second'ordine quindi? E' possibile parlarne ancora in questi termini? Da quanto emerso nel corso della ricerca condotta sul versante storico-politologico, il livello delle elezioni europee non risulta affatto secondario. Il dato partecipativo, anzi è inversamente proporzionale alla quantità di lavoro preparatorio sia dal punto di vista politico che amministravo-istituzionale, ben superiore a qualsiasi suffragio nazionale. Ci si chiede allora perché gli elettori non abbiano risposto con altrettanto entusiasmo. Qui le risposte trovano differenti possibilità da tenere nella giusta considerazione: la poca attenzione ai temi comunitari, la qualità della comunicazione, l'errore di propagandare l'evento troppo a ridosso delle date di svolgimento, l'eccessiva distanza tra istituzioni e cittadini, il livello culturale degli elettori, i giorni della settimana individuati per i suffragi spesso troppo vicini ad elezioni nazionali appena svolte, la classe politica poco convinta. In realtà tutti questi fattori rappresentano concause della scarsa partecipazione. Il cittadino europeo in mezzo a questo guazzabuglio è il personaggio principale di una performance in cui lui stesso determina la riuscita. Nonostante i numeri evidenzino una progressiva flessione nei dieci anni esaminati, i cittadini non sono rimasti indifferenti di fronte alle novità introdotte dal processo di integrazione europea. Spesso, soprattutto durante i sondaggi, accanto ad una percentuale di "indifferenti" o "euroscettici", molti intervistati hanno lamentato la poca autorità del Parlamento europeo nel contesto istituzionale comunitario2 confidando in ulteriori progressi strutturali. Il mancato raggiungimento di questo obiettivo, preannunciato già prima del 1979, insieme alle vicende politiche legate al proprio Paese, ha gradualmente provocato negli elettori reazioni di protesta attraverso il non voto o il voto negativo3, comportamenti capaci di delineare una partecipazione differente rispetto alla decisione di esprimere la propria scelta. Questo tipo di elettore ha mostrato di essere stato raggiunto dall'informazione diffusa durante le campagne elettorali e, sulla base di quanto appreso, ha deciso consapevolmente di non votare o di esercitare un voto diverso annullando o votando scheda bianca; quindi si è recato ai seggi, 2 Si vedano a questo proposito i risultati emersi nella pubblicazione della Commissione delle Comunità europee, Eurobarometro – L'opinione pubblica nella Comunità europea, Vol.1, 32/89, Direzione generale Informazione, comunicazione e cultura, Bruxelles, 1989. 3 Cfr. A. Gianturco Gulisano, La fenomenologia del non voto, in R. De Mucci (a cura di), Election day. Votare tutti e tutto assieme fa bene alla democrazia?, cit. non è rimasto inerte disinteressandosi di quanto stava accadendo. L'auspicio di un consolidamento istituzionale del Parlamento e di una maggiore coesione politica della Comunità europea non ancora raggiunti, anche per responsabilità delle politiche nazionali, ha posto l'elettore in condizione di negare il proprio contributo o protestare verso il mancato conseguimento dei risultati. L'accrescimento della conoscenza e del coinvolgimento, sebbene presenti, non sono andati di pari passo con la partecipazione. Elementi di insoddisfazione hanno caratterizzato il comportamento dell'elettore realmente europeista. I cittadini europei possono in realtà collocarsi in tre macro aree nelle quali si ritrovano gli europeisti, gli euro avversi e gli euroscettici. Se le aspettative degli europeisti sono rimaste deluse, gli euroavversi hanno parzialmente esercitato il diritto di voto alimentando quelle liste comunque presenti nella competizione europea. Gli euroscettici, invece hanno rappresentato il punto nevralgico dell'elettorato. Trovandosi in quella parte di popolazione attenta ad osservare quali e quanti cambiamenti sarebbero avvenuti a partire dal 1979 hanno avuto modo di consolidare la loro posizione continuando a percepire la Comunità ancora lontana e prevalentemente scomoda se non inutile. A differenza dell'europeista deluso che comunque ha continuato a partecipare, magari protestando, e dell'euroavverso che ha espresso il suo disappunto preferendo i partiti antieuropeisti, l'euroscettico ha proseguito nell'osservazione, affiancandosi agli incerti che sono rimasti a casa. A questo punto sono apparse inevitabili ulteriori valutazioni verso quegli elementi che caratterizzano le elezioni in genere. Ciò che attrae il cittadino ai seggi elettorali è prevalentemente il peso che le elezioni possono esercitare sui cambiamenti del governo nel proprio Paese. Il "less at stake" delle elezioni europee ha rappresentato sicuramente uno dei motivi scatenanti i sentimenti appena descritti; lo scenario si profila diverso, In such 'marker-setting' elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically, but in a sense of the word 'tactical' that is quite different from what we see in National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness of politicians and media, on the other4. La mancanza di conseguenze sul livello nazionale garantita dalle elezioni europee ha "alleggerito" l'elettore della responsabilità di orientare con la propria scelta il corso della politica nazionale. Sebbene nel 1979 vi fu un'attività partitica a livello transnazionale, consentita anche dalla disponibilità di fondi in quel periodo, l'attenzione dell'elettorato fu minima. In termini di risultati transnazionali la percezione fu praticamente irrilevante; circa il cinquanta per cento dei votanti ammise di non aver idea di quali gruppi avessero ottenuto maggiori consensi. Altro aspetto da non sottovalutare si collega allo sproporzionato successo ottenuto dai partiti più piccoli rispetto ai grandi; è in questo caso che si può parlare di voto punitivo nei confronti della politica del governo nazionale. Molte le sfaccettature e tutte fondamentali per riuscire a capire il perché delle differenze comportamentali dell'elettorato, differenze che nei tre Paesi oggetto di studio si sono rivelate estremamente rappresentate. In linea con la tradizione, gli elettori dell'Italia e della Francia hanno mostrato una partecipazione considerevole, evidentemente legata alle vicende che hanno caratterizzato il dibattito politico nazionale negli anni 1979 – 1989. Il voto "pseudo-obbligatorio" dell'Italia ha mantenuto alta la percentuale dei votanti, ma i risultati hanno mostrato orientamenti variabili nelle tre tornate esaminate. Il caso francese ha mostrato una escalation della destra attraverso i consensi ottenuti dal Front National in risposta ad un importante declino del Partito comunista, anche in considerazione di una progressiva dispersione di voti dovuta alla presenza di numerose liste, in particolar modo nel 1989. Il caso anglosassone si colloca in una posizione particolare rispetto agli altri due Paesi, ma sarebbe più giusto dire rispetto a tutti gli altri. A fronte di un orientamento nazionale tendenzialmente contrario alla Comunità europea, fra le ideologie maggiormente rappresentative si è distinto un Partito conservatore desideroso di giocare un ruolo importante nel contesto europeo, consapevole quindi del significato che la competizione europea 4 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide Elections teach us about voters, in "Electoral Studies", vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157. avrebbe potuto assumere per la riuscita dell'intento. L'importanza del suffragio sovranazionale non fu invece immediatamente compresa dai Laburisti, che di fatto ottennero una pesante sconfitta nel corso del primo appuntamento con lo scrutinio europeo, ravvedendosi in seguito e riuscendo a superare i Conservatori anche grazie all'inizio del declino del governo Thatcher. Un elemento che ha accomunato tutti i Paesi della Comunità è stato rappresentato dalla progressiva affermazione dei Verdi. Lo studio effettuato attraverso una costante attenzione al dibattito politico di ciascun Paese, insieme alle strategie attuate dagli attori, consapevoli fin dall'inizio che la sfida europea li avrebbe impegnati non più o meno di quella nazionale, ma sicuramente in modo diverso, ha condotto ad un approfondimento verso il singolo cittadino che assumendo in sé il ruolo di attore principale ne ha determinato gli esiti. Le risultanze dei dati emersi dalle consultazioni avvenute negli anni 1979 – 1989 non possono considerarsi soltanto per il puro dato numerico. La molteplicità dei fattori che hanno influito sulla scelta di votare o meno ha mostrato un elettore che, pur appartenendo a paesi diversi e con differenti livelli culturali, è stato in grado di decidere basandosi su considerazioni affatto superficiali, operando un'attenta scelta dei numerosi elementi che avrebbero potuto favorire il rafforzamento politico-istituzionale europeo: una tacita selezione dell'elettorato, che inevitabilmente ha lasciato fuori tutti coloro che non hanno ritenuto importante impegnarsi per una consultazione ritenuta priva di un qualsiasi tornaconto. Classe politica poco convinta, informazione discutibile, scarsa conoscenza da parte dei cittadini riguardo al ruolo del Parlamento europeo, inefficacia della comunicazione, hanno contribuito a costruire un elettore diverso dal solito, più attento, in possesso di maggiore senso critico nei confronti di uno scenario nuovo e molto più complesso rispetto a quello nazionale5. Dalla pluralità di elementi emersi durante la ricerca attraverso il ricorso all'interdisciplinarietà per cercare di comprenderne maggiormente i significati, sono emersi dettagli che hanno stimolato ad ulteriori approfondimenti. 5 Cfr. Commissione delle Comunità europee, Eurobarometro – L'opinione pubblica e l'Europa, 9/89, Direzione generale Informazione, comunicazione e cultura, Bruxelles, 1989. Successivamente alle considerazioni storico – politiche , ciò che si è voluto sottolineare, attraverso l'analisi sociologica, riguardo alle elezioni europee nel loro complesso e nella loro perpetua considerazione di elezioni secondarie, è che tutti i fattori esaminati ne mostrano un'immagine differente, che non vuole assolutamente porsi in contrasto con l'interpretazione dei dati puri, ma vuole indurre a considerare maggiormente i numerosi fattori, che per la qualità e la quantità riscontrata permettono di ottenere un quadro più completo dei fatti, andando oltre al mero dato partecipativo sul quale, indubbiamente, la differenza con la partecipazione nazionale è di tutta evidenza. L'esame approfondito è apparso ancor più necessario alla luce del tortuoso processo di costruzione europea e del macchinoso assetto istituzionale comunitario, al fine di poter tenere nella giusta considerazione il maggior numero di elementi possibile, non tanto per giustificare i risultati, ma quanto, piuttosto, per riflettere su di essi cercando di distribuire una responsabilità policentrica a partire dalle forze politiche per finire al cittadino stesso. ; Jacques Delors used to talk about European institutions as an O.P.N.I Object Politique Non Identifié. His opinion appears a compromise between his interest to protect National rights and the need to give lasting and autonomous governance to the European integration process. Actually from the European Community model, two different ways of thinking the governance derived both influenced by the instability of the model itself. The first one aimed at a political union; as Riccardo Perissich says: "Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un "Senato degli Stati"; l'Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale"6. The second one tried not to neglect the sovereignty principle by transferring technical and political power according to the Treaties. This second view increased doubts and mistrust towards the European Parliament and Commission as well. European Member States agreed above all with the first view, except for the France of Charles De Gaulle who was still convinced of his idea of not giving power to supranational level. Following the unification between ECSC, EEC and EAEC there was a single Commission for the whole administrative system while the Parliament had competence on the European budget; direct election to European Parliament was referred to as "temporary" in Article 138 of the European Community Treaty; then the Parliament would plan the way for a single procedure election regarding all Member States. Between 1951 and 1976 there were many proposals to define a direct universal suffrage, but only in 1979 this target was achieved. This result meant a significant change also for the polical and institutional 6R. Perissich, L'Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54. communication that became fundamental to reach citizenship during the election campaign. In 1974, during the French summit chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, were both established the European Council and the direct election of the European Parliament. The European Parliament finally elected by European citizens would require an increase in both political and institutional influence. The direct elections would enhance popular interest in European affairs as well as raise people's awareness of the Parliament itself. This last aspect emphasized the differences between the federalist and the "gradualist" trend. The first one considered the direct elected Parliament as a "Congress of European People", that is to say the constituent power of the future European Federation. Many famous people were constantly engaged in the European integration cause as politicians and intellectuals did by committing themselves to legitimizing the role of the European Parliament in relation to other institutions, particularly the European Commission. Reference can be made to Altiero Spinelli, Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, just to mention some of them. Members of the European Parliament (MEP's) began their job by addressing many issues such as the question of communist nations or planning for a European TV or preparing a draft for the European Constitution. Appointing political celebrities such as Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Willy Brandt was a way to make the propaganda more effective. The 1979 election campaign as well as the other two following ones was, however, characterized by arguments too often associated with the national political discourse. All the information given to European citizens succeeded in generating interest in supranational reality above all. The turnout was lower than in national elections and the reason has to be found in the behaviour of political parties in discussing mostly national issues aiming at national targets. In spite of this, the first direct election to the European Parliament gave a breath of fresh air to the meaning of European democracy. The newly acquired legitimacy gave the European Parliament the opportunity to consolidate its power by acting a definite role inside the European decisional process that was, at that time, nebulous to say the least. Once the electoral date was scheduled all the national political parties had to face a challenge that forced them to renew their themes and topics previously chosen in national campaign. There was greater awareness of the necessity to broaden the horizon without loosing contact with voters by looking for similarities in other European political parties. This is what would allow single ideologies to merge in a wider context. We must to consider that between 1975 – 1979 inside the European Parliament there were representatives of parties sharing outlooks similar to the national ones, but different ways of thinking made these coalitions too weak, above all because of the predominant national interests. The primacy of national parties has always been an obstacle to the autonomy of groups and federations, neglecting the implementation of European parties. After the first direct European elections the new MEP's were a kind of "trait d'union" with their own electorates, their own party, the European coalition and the Parliament as well. The peculiar features of the political-institutional path of the European Parliament concerning the three countries studied showed differences that have characterized their participation in European elections. While Italy and France, founding members of EC, were too busy to deal with national issues during electoral campaign, the UK was more attentive to evaluate the benefits of participation and Margaret Thatcher, who was Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990 was particularly suited for such an attitude. While during the first direct election there was a need to bring some new element in organizing the electoral campaign in order to reach a wider consensus, the following two elections made political forces more reflective about the decline in turnout. Too many national issues made the communication weak, particularly for the French campaign. What citizens perceived was the little confidence of political parties and that was the reason for such a large incertitude among the people. On the other hand, the Community campaign too showed a partial efficiency. So what kind of elections are we talking about? Still "second order" elections? This is not the picture that emerged from my research conducted on the historical and political fields. Participation is inversely proportional to the preparatory work, both from a political point of view and from an administrative-institutional one, which was far superior to any national suffrage. So, why didn't voters participate so enthusiastically? Many answers are possible because many are the causes of such an odd behaviour: little attention to European issues, quality of communication, propaganda too close to the election date, distance between citizens and istitution, the cultural level of voters, election dates too close to those of national elections, lack of confidence of the political class were all contributing factors in low participation. In the middle of this mess the European citizen becomes the protagonist for the success of such a performance. Despite numbers reveal a gradual decline in the ten years examined, European citizens have not remained indifferent to the changes introduced by the European integration process. Many surveys showed that in addition to a percentage of "indifferent" or "eurosceptical" people, there were citizens who asked for a stronger Parliament hoping that this result would be reached sooner or later. The failure to achieve this goal as well as the political events of each nation have gradually caused an outcry against the vote expressed either in nonvoting or in negative-vote; these different behaviours show a different way of participating . The voter who, though informed by the electoral campaign, decided not to vote or to give a different vote by cancelling his vote or returning blank−voting ballot, went nevertheless to the polling station and didn't stay at home ignoring what was happening. The unfullfilled hope for an institutional strengthening of the Parliament and for greater political cohesion of the European Community, due to political responsibilities, didn't allow the voter to contribute or protest against the non-achievement of results. Citizens' increased knowledge and involvement did not keep pace with the participation; some elements of dissatisfaction have characterized the behaviour of the pro-Europe voter. The three main groups in which European voters may be included are pro- Europe, anti-Europe and eurosceptics. Whereas the pro-Europe voters' expectations have been disappointed, the anti-Europe voters have partially exercised the right to vote feeding this kind of lists in the European competition. Eurosceptics, on the other hand were the centerpiece of the electorate. Being careful observers of which and how many changes have occurred since 1979, citizens have been able to consolidate their position by continuing to perceive the Community as still too distant and mostly uncomfortable if not useless. They have continued their observation by standing together with those uncertain people who stayed at home. At this point it appeared inevitable to assess also those elements that characterized the elections in general. What attracts people to the polling station is mainly the weight that elections may have on the governmental changes in their own countries. The "less at stake" of European elections surely showed one of the reasons just described. We are therefore facing a different context, In such 'marker-setting' elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically, but in a sense of the word 'tactical' that is quite different from what we see in National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness of politicians and media, on the other7. The lack of consequences on the national level where European elections are concerned lightened voters by taking away their responsibility in directing the national political course. Although in 1979 there was a political activity at the transnational level, the electorate's attention was very scarce. The result showed 50% of voters admitting to their disinformation about the groups that achieved greater consensus. 7 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide Elections teach us about voters, in "Electoral Studies", vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157. Another issue is the large success gained by smaller parties; in this case it is possible to talk about a "punishment vote" against the policy of the national government. The three cases studied showed different ways of participating. Italian and French voters showed a considerable participation according to their tradition also because in the 1979 – 1989 period there was an interesting political debate. The Italian "pseudo-compulsory" vote kept the percentage of voters high, but the outcome showed changing directions during the above mentioned period. Looking at the outcomes got by the Front National the French case showed an escalation of the Right next to to a significant decline of the Communist Party. There was also a substantial dispersion of voting because of so many rolls, particularly during the 1989 elections. The British case is a special one for the particular behaviour towards the European integration process. The Conservative Party wanted to play an important role in the European context and for this reason European elections were considered as a way to succeed in it. On the contrary the Labour Party did not immediately understand the importance of such a crucial opportunity; the outcome of the 1979 European elections was disastrous and they met an evident defeat that therefore was useful to understand many things for future elections. All three countries have seen the progressive growth of the Green Party. The present study has paid constant attention to to the political debate in each country, and to the strategies implemented by the actors, who were aware from the beginning that the European challenge would engage them in different ways. It was, moreover, focused on the individual citizen's ability to determine the election outcome. Considering the outcome through the mere numerical data gives a partial view of the whole context. There are so many aspects that influenced the decision to vote or not. There was a selection among voters that showed citizens who desired a more political union operating a political and institutional strengthening in opposition to those who did not want to engage themselves in an election without any gain. An unconvinced political class, questionable information, lack of knowledge among citizens about the role of the European Parliament have built a different voter, a more attentive one, with a greater critical sense towards a newer context different from the national one. The diverse elements which have emerged from this interdiciplinary study have led to further insights. After historical considerations, a sociological analysis has been carried out on European elections as a whole and their "second order" perception. From these considerations a new picture has emerged, which is not in absolute contrast with the interpretation of the raw data. The quality and the quantity of so many factors allow a more complete picture of the facts, going beyond the mere participation on which, undoubtedly, the difference with the national presence is quite evident. Detailed examination appeared necessary in the light of the tortuous European building process, in order to take into account as many elements as possible, not only to justify the results, but rather because, to reflect on them trying to deploy a polycentric responsibility from the political forces to the citizens themselves.

Having reached the mark of 2,118 delegates, Barack Obama has gone from candidate in the closest head-to-head primary ever to presumptive nominee. Appropriately, he will accept the nomination at the August convention in Denver, on the 45th anniversary of Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech. This is political history in the making: he is the first African-American to be the head of the presidential ticket of a major party. After years of angst and self doubt, there is a renewed optimism on the street, and a whole new group of voters has been mobilized. However, Obama, who has run on a message of hope and change, faces an extremely difficult path ahead. His vulnerabilities have become apparent in the succession of events over the last few weeks of this long primary season.He lost nine of the last fourteen primaries, including South Dakota, where he was favored (55% to 45%), and Puerto Rico (68% to 42%); he has had to cut ties with his Church due to its radicalism and anti-establishment stance, and, one day after Obama claimed the nomination, one of his top fund-raisers was found guilty of wire fraud and money laundering in a federal court in Chicago. Now his campaign will have to overcome this dry patch and move forward to the greater challenge, that of defeating McCain. His next task at hand is to choose a vice-president, and this, too, poses a serious dilemma.In the first place, Hillary Rodham-Clinton took five days to acknowledge defeat, giving cause for some speculation that she is pressing for the vice-presidential spot with the implied threat that she will continue fighting all the way to the convention. She has the right to do so, if we consider the fact that she has won all of the big states and probably a larger number of the popular vote (around 18 million). And, as she not so humbly claims, she is the more experienced candidate who could better stand up to McCain. On the other hand, there is great concern that Barack's image as the unconventional, charismatic, post-modern Washington outsider will be damaged if he chooses her. So the decision will require reflection, pondering and a lot of vetting interviews of alternative candidates.Much ink will be spent in speculating why Hillary lost the primary. Here, I will just offer a few reflections, leaving the second guessing of the way her campaign was run to those who will manically analyze every decision taken, every tactic used, every gesture, every word, and will have their eureka moments when finding the flaw, the error, the underestimation that brought her down. And yet, quite often fate, luck and other imponderables irrevocably determine the outcome of a narrow race, regardless of the brilliant strategies of the campaign managers, advisers and other experts. It has already been said that Rodham Clinton started her campaign as the inevitable candidate, as the incumbent, and that her sense of entitlement turned many voters away. At the same time, her main message was one of change, of moving forward, of undoing the Bush legacy, but Obama co-opted that message, and he was much more convincing as an agent of change. Hillary began her campaign running not as a woman, but as the most hardened and experienced, candidate that would deliver both peace and prosperity to all Americans. Obama ran from the beginning as the post-racial candidate and this theme remained constant throughout his campaign. She was trying to woo independents and disaffected Republicans and had thus to prove that she was as tough as John McCain. Obama had no intention of treading down that path, which he derided as part of the Washington game. Instead, he stuck fearlessly to his convictions. It was this independent streak, his absolute confidence in the soundness of his cool, post-modern world vision that was irresistible to the young voters. This should not obfuscate the fact that both ran historic campaigns and have unremittingly shattered the barriers of gender and race in American politics at the highest level. Still, the promise of change was more credible when pledged by the young unknown than by the seasoned insider. With no substantial philosophical differences between the two, the richer contrast was all inspiration and charisma versus politics as usual.First of all, we need to consider a fundamental fact: even if the media and their respective campaigns have played up the differences between the two candidates, their basic policy choices and ideologies are one and the same. From health care to fiscal policy, from education to foreign policy, there may be some minimal disagreements but they both share the basic ideology of more equitable economic distribution, protection of civil rights and overall tolerance toward others that typify Democrats in the United States. Some observers may bring up Hillary's vote in favor of the Iraqi invasion of 2003 as evidence of an important disagreement, and also a cause of her loss of popularity in the early stages of the campaign. That certainly did her harm, which is ironic because, in academic and political circles alike, few believe it represents her real conviction. As a Senator for New York and a future presidential candidate, she carefully chose to vote in favor of a war that, in October 2002, had a high rate of approval among the population, who had clearly bought the Republican idea that the invasion "over there" would make us safer "over here". At the time, she hedged that gamble against the fact that "there was enough evidence" Saddam was piling up WMDs, which had little to do with 9-11 and Al Qaeda. But a scared populace is an easy target for deception and false reassurances. Intent on proving her masculine toughness on security issues, she fell into the Republican trap. Five years down the road, this carefully measured decision came back to haunt her, and the controversy over that vote generated an enormous surge of support for Obama that might have created the momentum that helped him win the early contests, namely, the Iowa caucuses and the wins of February 5th. This momentum, coupled with the televised debates, proved he was a worthy, viable candidate; it brought the media to his side and attracted new voters. He irradiated a cool self-assurance, a subdued charm, an understated intelligence that was indeed enchanting to young voters, to black voters and to hard core Democrats tired of the vitriol of Washington. The country, it seemed, was ready for Obama. His timing was impeccable and had the effect of making Rodham-Clinton look tired, strident and blasé. The media had found its golden boy and started treating Hillary as the intruder, who would do anything to prevent a new Camelot.After his initial sweep, Hillary slowly started to recover and as the campaign progressed, her message became more focused and she found her voice. She switched strategies and, from being the more experienced candidate that would deliver peace and prosperity to all Americans, she turned back to her traditional constituencies, namely, women and blue-collar workers. Speaking to her strengths, namely, her devotion to public service and her familiarity with the intricacies of policy-making, she became a great communicator that invariably connected with her audiences. And she started winning again.Even those that dislike her have to acknowledge her skills as a campaigner, her endurance and poise under tremendous pressure and, more importantly, her dramatic recovery of the popular vote towards the end of the campaign, which made her claim to bring this battle to the convention quite legitimate. Her wins in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia, as well as her immense support in the Hispanic community as shown by the Puerto Rican vote, cannot be discounted by the party when it looks ahead to the national election in November.One should bear in mind that these primaries were the closest contest in primary history, and in spite of having the whole media establishment against her from the beginning, Hillary did not at any time show signs of faltering or self-doubt and never allowed herself to make the road easier for Obama. She stayed on message, speaking to the issues, proving she was ready to become the first woman president. Both her competency and her warmth gained her a huge following. But once she lost the media she also started losing the super-delegates from inside the party. One after the other, the big names in the party started lining up behind Obama: Tom Daschle, Ted and Caroline Kennedy, Christopher Dodd, Bill Richardson, and towards the end, even John Edwards.This took many by surprise, and is related to another phenomenon that very few had perceived before: the animosity that the Clintons, especially Bill, provoke from within the party itself. Although Bill and Hillary are the most powerful brand name in the Democratic Party, there is a surprising amount of anger against them that had remained latent till now. Bill Clinton's harsh remarks in South Carolina primary astonished many and may have hurt her campaign, reinforcing the perception that the Clintons would do anything, even play the race card, in order to win the White House.Then there was the question of demographics and identity politics. Although Rodham-Clinton attempted to run as the candidate for all, after the first losses and as she increasingly won the vote of women and blue collar workers, she turned to her natural constituencies. She started running as a woman and as the champion of the working class. In her new more populist persona, she also won among Jews, Catholics and rural workers. Obama did best among college educated youth, intellectuals and black voters. In other words, they both win the identity vote. Identity has come up often during the campaign, and not in a positive way. Irate at the way the media were treating Hillary and indulging Obama especially in interviews (there was even a sketch in Saturday Night Live that parodied this noticeable difference), Geraldine Ferraro accused the media of sexism and went as far as saying that Obama would not be treated with so much deference if he was a white man. After disproportionate outcry by the media and the public, Clinton had to fire Ferraro as her advisor. Thus, bringing up sexism completely backfired for Hillary.The irony once again, is that Identity Politics is most likely the prism through which both Hillary and Obama, see America: as a society divided by categories of class, gender, race, ethnicity and sexual preference. His as well as her policies are informed by this view. But Obama skillfully downplays it and tries to portray himself as the candidate for all Americans who want change and are tired of Washington politics. He does not deny that race and gender play a role in politics but prefers not to bring it up since it is "not productive". His strategy has paid off so far, but this topic will certainly be revisited in the national election. Due to his background and life experience, McCain has a very different view based on patriotism and service to the country, on individual responsibility and a common civic culture. He will find a way to turn the notion of Identity Politics against Obama, who, in spite of his unifying message, often speaks about redressing balances and ending injustice.Finally, the closeness of the race and the resilience of these two formidable candidates were again in display towards its end, and led to a new critical stage. The momentum that had carried Obama through the early and middle stages started to weaken. As time went by, more scrutiny brought up the issue of his membership in a radical Black Liberation Theology Church, the (inane) fact that he did not wear a US flag pin on his lapel (a symbol of patriotism that became particularly important after 9-11, when even academics came under no small degree of peer pressure to wear one), and this past week, the conviction by a Chicago federal jury of former fund-raiser and friend, Antoin Retzko.As momentum weakened, and as Clinton seemed to resurrect and come closer to Obama in the delegate count, party rules regarding delegate selection became more important . Because in most primaries there has been an early front-runner, and because the last primary contest that had to be taken all the way to the convention without a presumptive nominee was in 1976, very few party leaders and even fewer journalists are aware of the rules. As they began to play out, we were all submitted to a crash course on these intra-party rules. The Democratic Party has a centralized structure, so all states play by the same rules, and its selection system is based on proportional representation, the most democratic form of representation: within each state, any candidate that reaches a threshold of 15% of votes is allocated delegates proportionally to the vote. This, while it is better for representation, tends to prolong the race and make it closer. While Clinton was recovering and making important gains, Obama still continued to pick up a few delegates here and there, and the media kept its constant drum roll in his favor. Super-delegates were swayed to his side, irrevocably. In contrast, Republicans have a decentralized structure so that each state establishes its own rules, and most choose a winner-take-all selection system. This system, while less democratic and representative, enabled them to have a clear winner by March, with all the advantages that that entails.This year a very peculiar situation arose out of Michigan and Florida, where the state governments scheduled the primaries too early, in breach of the Democratic Party rules, so the Democratic National Committee determined they would not seat their delegates. There were 313 delegates at stake. Obama withdrew his name from the ballot in Michigan, and did not campaign in Florida. Clinton won both. At that time nobody thought this issue would become decisive for the nomination, but in such a close race, it certainly did. Last weekend the DNC met with representative so both sides and settled on a formula that allocated delegates to both in a very non-scientific way. It gave each of those delegated half a vote at the convention. While the formula was accepted by both sides, it has been perceived as a bonus for Obama, whose name was not even on the ballot in Michigan and yet he still got delegates allocated. This may still come up again at the National Convention in August. Many factors have thus combined to make Obama the presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party. In addition to momentum and rules we should also consider the fortunate pairing of Obama to the spirit of the times. The timing for an unconventional candidate could not have been better, and he emerged as the prophetic leader the times demanded. His demeanor, his background, and his non-assuming attitude, all make for the perfect post-modern candidate. The public embraced him and the media anointed him. Now, the question still remains, is his "gift of grace" strong enough to unify America? Can he summon the support he needs to win a national election? Given the complex electoral system based on state votes and an electoral college, and not on the popular vote, can he win the major states and the swing states?Here is where the selection of a vice-president becomes crucial.There is a big movement both from the grassroots and from Clintonites inside the party (yes, there are still some left!) to pressure Obama to pick Hillary as running mate. There are of course, both huge advantages and dismal disadvantages for Obama to ponder in his selection. His first consideration must be to win the election, but he also needs to be able to govern, once he wins.Hillary would bring in those votes that have eluded Obama: mature women, blue collar, rural. Seventy-six of her supporters want her to be Vice-president. She energizes audiences and has won the hearts of all those groups above-mentioned. They feel very strongly about her place in History and demand respect for their candidate. Some may not even come out to vote if Obama's ticket does not include her. She would also help win the big states (she won them all, among them California, Texas and New York) and the swing states, noticeable among them, Ohio, that determined Bush's victory in 04. On the other hand, she does evoke the past in the minds of many voters, and she is now undoubtedly a Washington insider (in fact, her experience has been counted as both an asset and a liability in this sense). She would distort Obama's image as the unconventional candidate, and his message of change and hope may be, if not lost, at least diminished.Insofar as governing, their ideologies and policy positions are perfectly compatible, if not identical, so that would not constitute a problem. She has been studying the intricacies of policy and politics since she was a university student at Wellesley College. She is capable, efficient, convincing and tireless. She is experienced in navigating the meandering straits of policy making, and can muster bipartisan support with her well-reasoned arguments.Another often-mentioned handicap is Bill Clinton himself. With his larger than life personality, can he play prince consort? Or would he be the one that governs behind the scenes, and have his own shadow cabinet, Cheney-style? His reputation has suffered a lot lately, not any more because of that infamous blue dress but because he has not disclosed the list of donors to his library, among which there allegedly are several Middle Eastern governments. There is real vitriol against him, and that is directly transferred to Hillary.For now, both candidates seem to be catching their breaths.Hillary postponed her concession speech for as long as possible, some say to put pressure on Obama to include her in the ticket. Barack, on his part, has quietly named a vetting team for a vice-presidential search. Caroline Kennedy is among its members, as is Eric Holden, President Clinton's former attorney- general. It is headed by Jim Johnson, former Chairman of Fannie Mae, who vetted VPs for John Kerry and Walter Mondale. After exhaustive interviews and background checks, Obama will decide.In the last two months of the campaign, the pundits were prone to repeating that the "math" was against Hillary. This was a gross oversimplification of a race that was characterized by peculiar circumstances and surprises at every turn, and one which was less about math than about intangibles: momentum, media frenzy, rules, emotions, charisma and zeitgeist . In the end, however, it may all very well come down to the "math": if Barack can be convinced that he needs Hillary to win against McCain, then he will pick her as his VP and put the rest of his concerns aside. This will also heal party wounds and bring into the fold her loyal constituencies. But public opinion is fickle, politics is an inexact science and many times emotions can trump the best thought- out and scientifically devised plans. Like Sisyphus rolling the boulder up the mountain, Obama may find he has to prove himself all over again and then come out empty-handed in November.In the meantime, and just for good measure, Obama, the "transformative candidate" is now wearing a US flag pin on his lapel.Puerto Ricans do not have the right to vote in national elections due to the "associated state "status, but they can vote in primary elections.This dynamic in the relationship between momentum and rules has been pointed out in a recent article by Jason Bello and Robert Shapiro, published in the Political Science Quarterly, vol. 123 No.1 Spring 08.Super delegates are unpledged party leaders who do not have to declare their presidential preferences until balloting takes place at the ConventionSenior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan kansanmusiikin tallentamiseen ja keräämiseen liittyviä ideologioita ja arvovalintoja 1900-luvun alusta 1970-luvulle saakka. Tutkimuksen kohteena on kansanmusiikin tutkimuksen tärkeimmän sotienjälkeisen auktoriteetin, tutkijan ja tallentajan Erkki Ala-Könnin (1911–1996) toiminta. Keskeinen tutkimuskäsite ovat metodologinen nationalismi, kansallinen katse, jolla viitataan tapaan rakentaa käsitystä suomalaisesta kansanmusiikista. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan, miten kansakunnan rakentaminen ja kansallinen katse ohjasivat keruutoimintaa, ja minkälaisia metodologisen nationalismin muotoja arkistokokoelmien keruuseen liittyi. Tutkimuksen näkökulma on oppihistoriallinen; tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten kansanmusiikin keruutyö asettui osaksi musiikkitieteen ja kansanmusiikin tutkimuksen oppiaineiden painopisteitä. Erkki Ala-Könnin toiminta nivoutui näiden oppialojen kehittymiseen, ja Ala-Könnin tavalla määritellä kansanmusiikkia on ollut merkittäviä ja edelleen vaikuttavia seurauksia monin tavoin. Se on vaikuttanut muun muassa arkistokokoelmien sisältöihin, kansanmusiikin tutkimukseen, Yleisradion ohjelmapolitiikkaan ja kansanmusiikkitapahtumiin. Tutkimuksen aikarajaus, vuodet 1941–1974, kattaa Ala-Könnin uran hänen ensimmäisestä kansanmusiikin keruumatkastaan professorin arvonimen saamiseen saakka. Tutkittavalla ajanjaksolla kansanmusiikin tutkimus kuului niin sanottuihin kansallisiin tieteisiin, jotka käsittivät myös kotimaisten kielten ja suomen sukukielten, kotimaisen kirjallisuuden, kansatieteen ja folkloristiikan tutkimuksen. Nämä oppialat joutuivat ristipaineeseen sen suhteen, mitä käsitykset kansasta ja kansakunnasta pitivät sisällään ja mitä ne sulkivat ulkopuolelleen. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu haastatteluaineistoista ja Erkki Ala-Könnin keräämien äänitallenteiden sisällysluetteloista. Näitä tarkastellaan laadullisin ja tilastollisin menetelmin. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kansalliseen katseeseen liittyneitä ihanteita ja kansan käsitteen määrittelyjä toisen tasavallan Suomessa, jolla tarkoitetaan sotien jälkeistä aikaa. Toisen tasavallan Suomen osalta nojataan Pertti Alasuutarin (1996) jaotteluun: moraalitalouden vaiheeseen (sotien jälkeisestä ajasta 1960-luvun puoliväliin) ja suunnittelutalouden vaiheeseen (1960-luvun lopulta 1980-luvun alkupuolelle). Ensimmäisen tasavallan aikana 1917–1944 keruutyöstä vastasivat pääasiassa Ala-Könnin opettajat ja esikuvat, kaksi jälkimmäistä vaihetta ajoittuvat toisen tasavallan Suomeen, eli Ala- Könnin aktiivisen työuran ajalle. Perinteen keräämistä ja tallentamista leimasivat Suomessa 1800-luvulta aina sotien jälkeiseen aikaan asti ihanteet, joissa luku- ja kirjoitustaidoton kansa kuvattiin sivistyneistöön nähden alemmalle tasolle. Ala-Könni noudatti tätä näkemystä aina 1960- luvulle asti ja korosti kansanmusiikin esittäjien nuotinlukutaidottomuutta. Tutkijoiden ja tallentajien mielenkiinto kohdistui ensimmäisen tasavallan aikana itään, mutta sotien jälkeen Itä-Karjala jäi uusien rajojen taakse, ja Ala-Könni kohdensi keruu- työnsä 1940- ja 1950-luvuilla monien muiden perinnetieteiden kentällä toimineiden tutkijoiden tavoin varsinkin Etelä- ja Keski-Pohjanmaalle, talonpoikaiseen Suomeen. Kokoelmat rakensivat kansasta varsin yhtenäistä kuvaa, mutta todellisuudessa kansa ei kuitenkaan ollut 1940-luvun Suomessa niin eheää kuin kokoelmat antavat ymmärtää. Jo yksin sisällissotaa koskeva muistitieto jakoi kansaa kahteen eri leiriin. Ala-Könnin näkemykset muuttuivat ja talonpoikaisen idyllin ihanne alkoi murtua siinä vaiheessa, kun hän aloitti neuvottelut kokoelmiensa siirrosta osaksi Tampereen Yhteiskunnallista Korkeakoulua ennen 1960-luvun puoliväliä. Tähän vaikuttivat Yhteiskunnallisen Korkeakoulun ja sittemmin Tampereen yliopiston sisällä painottuneet sosiologiset virtaukset. Erityisesti nuoremman ikäpolven sosiologit painottivat ristiriitojen tunnistamista osana yhteiskunnallisten ongelmien ratkaisua. Tämä oli selkeä sysäys, jonka myötä Ala-Könnin keruutyö laajeni kaupunkeihin ja huomioi myös sisällissodan molempien osapuolten tulkinnat. Kansanperinteen laitos perustettiin vuonna 1965, ja laitoksen johtajana Ala-Könni järjesteli useita kuntakeruita ympäri Suomen. Valtion kunnille myöntämä aluepoliittinen tuki mahdollisti keruumatkojen kustantamisen ja paikallismuseoiden perustamisen, mitä Ala-Könnin toiminta osaltaan edisti. Keruiden suosion rinnalla yhtenä 1960-luvun lopun uusista yhteiskunnal- lisista ja kulttuurisista liikkeistä nousi myös kansanmusiikkiliike, joka pyrki muun muassa vakiinnuttamaan kansanmusiikin tutkimuksen. Poliittisena tukipylväänä kansan- musiikkiliikkeelle oli Keskustapuolue, jonka ideologisista päämääristä alueellinen hajasijoittaminen ja maaseudun puolesta puhuminen sopivat myös kansanmusiikkiliikkeen päämääriin. Kun kansallinen katse määrittyi vielä ensimmäisen tasavallan aikana poliittisen oikeiston suunnasta, siirtyi se sodan jälkeen kohti poliittista keskustaa. Kansanmusiikkiliikkeen vahvistuessa Ala-Könni ryhtyi myös tukemaan uuden kansanmusiikin sovitus- ja sävellystyötä, mikä mursi aiempaa erontekoa kansan ja sivistyneistön välille. Tilanne ei kuitenkaan ollut edelleenkään joka suhteessa tasa-arvoinen, mikä arkistokokoelmissa näkyy erityisesti naisten, alkuperäisväestön ja vähemmistöjen asemaa tarkasteltaessa. Näitä ryhmiä koskevaa tallennettua aineistoa on vähän, eikä suhtautumista voi pitää nykymittapuilla kulttuurisensitiivisenä. Kansallisen katseen eri kehitysvaiheiden hahmottaminen auttaa Ala-Könnin keräämien aineistojen luonteen ymmärtämistä, niihin liittyvien valintojen tekemistä näkyväksi sekä metodologisen nationalismin osuutta suomalaisessa (kansan)musiikin- tutkimuksessa. Ala-Könnin tallentamia arkistonauhoitteita hyödynnetään aktiivisesti niin tieteellisessä kuin taiteellisessa tutkimuksessa yhä tänä päivänä. Arkistot tarjoavat tärkeää ja ainutkertaista lähdemateriaalia, mutta hankalampaa voi olla hahmottaa, mitä arkistoihin on tallennettu valikoiden tai jätetty tallentamatta. Tutkimuksessani pyrin tuomaan esiin myös näitä arkistojen hiljaisuuksia ja uusia tapoja tarkastella arkistokokoelmia, jotta hiljaisuudet pääsevät paremmin esiin. ; This doctoral dissertation explores the ideologies and guiding principles for the col- lection of traditional folk music in Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s. It focuses on the work of folk music scholar and collector Erkki Ala-Könni (1911–1996), who was a leading authority on Finnish folk music research. It takes its analytical stance from the concept of methodological nationalism, adopting a national gaze to scrutinise how the concept of Finnish folk music was con- structed. The analysis concentrates on how nation-building and a national gaze guided data collection practices and what characteristics of methodological nationalism were involved in the collection of archive materials in Finland. The study is situated within a framework of intellectual history: it examines how the collecting of traditional Finnish folk music was emphasised as a part of musicology and folk music research. Ala-Könni's work intertwined with the development of these disciplines and his conceptualizations about folk music have had a lasting im- pact. For example, they have affected archive collections, folk music research, the music policy of the Finnish Broadcasting Company and folk music events. This study addresses the period from 1941 to 1974, covering Ala-Könni's early career, from his first fieldwork until he received the title of professor. During this period, folk music research was a part of the so-called national disciplines, which also encompassed research on domestic and Finno-Ugric languages, Finnish literature, ethnology and folkloristics. These disciplines were soon in a state of cross-pressure in terms of what the concepts of folk and nation included and excluded. The sources used for this dissertation include interviews and lists of contents for audio recordings compiled by Ala-Könni, which are subjected to qualitative and statistical analyses, respectively. The analyses illuminate the changing ideological foundations of the national gaze and how the definitions of Finnish folk were set during the time that historian Pertti Alasuutari (1996) calls the second republic of Finland. Alasuutari further divides this period into the stage of moral economy (from the end of the Second World War until the mid-1960s) and the stage of planned economy (from the late 1960s until the early 1980s). During the period of the first republic (from 1917, when Finland gained independence, to 1944), the collection work was mainly carried out by Ala-Könni's teachers and mentors, while the two stages comprising the second republic of Finland coincided with his active professional career. From the 19th century until the end of the Second World War, ethnographic collection practices were characterised by ideals that portrayed the illiterate population as inferior compared to the intelligentsia. Ala-Könni followed this view by pointing out musical illiteracy of traditional folk music performers. During the first republic, ethnographers were mainly interested in East Finnish traditions. However, this emphasis shifted when Finnish Eastern Karelia was ceded to the Soviet Union after the Continuation War (1941–1944). Along with many other researchers, Ala- Könni redirected his fieldwork in the 1940s and 1950s to Western Finland, in particular the land-owning rural population of Southern and Central Ostrobothnia. These collection interests gave an image of an apparent coherent population. In reality, however, the population of Finland during the 1940s was not as homogenous as the collections might imply. For example, oral histories relaying the Finnish Civil War separate the population into two camps. The analysis shows that Ala-Könni's views changed over time and that the ideal of a rural idyll started to crumble in the early 1960s, when he began negotiations on transferring his collections to Tampere School of Social Sciences ( Tampereen Yhteiskunnallinen Korkeakoulu , soon thereafter renamed the University of Tampere). This change was driven by sociological trends favoured within the school. In particular, the younger generation of sociologists stressed that acknowledging conflicts should be part of the solution to social problems. This was a clear impetus for Ala- Könni to expand his fieldwork to urban areas and to take both parties of the Finnish Civil War into account. The Department of Folk Tradition was established in 1965, and as head of the department, Ala-Könni organised several fieldwork courses to municipalities all around Finland. Regional policy support, as granted to the municipalities by the State, allowed for the financing of these trips and the establishment of local museums, to which Ala-Könni's activities also contributed. As collecting folk tradition rose in popularity, new movements emerged in the late 1960s, including a folk music movement aimed at establishing the discipline of folk music re- search. A politically supportive structure for this was the Centre Party of Finland, whose objectives of promoting an ideology of regional decentralisation and rural advocacy were in line with the aims of the folk music movement. While the national gaze during the first republic of Finland was highly influenced by the political right, after the war, it was increasingly determined from the political centre. As the folk music movement gained momentum, Ala-Könni supported the work of musical composition and arrangement in contemporary folk music, which tore down the earlier division between the ordinary Finnish people and the intelligentsia. Circumstances, however, were still not equal, and the archive collections show this, especially in examining the status of women, indigenous people and minorities. The amount of the archive material related to these groups is relatively small and, from a contemporary point of view, the attitudes represented cannot be understood as culturally sensitive. Understanding the various stages of the Finnish national gaze is useful for com- prehending the nature of the materials Ala-Könni collected and the role of methodological nationalism in Finnish (folk) music research. The audio samples he recorded are still actively worked with to this day in both academic and artistic research. This dissertation also stresses the importance of studying not only what the archives contain but also how the materials in the collections were chosen and what was left out. Thus, these archival silences, as well as new ways to examine collections so that these silences can be better represented, are also highlighted in this study.

In a previous note on these same pages, we made reference to Obama's unpredictable use of executive power and his tendency to overuse it for certain domestic policies, while deferring to the military and foreign policy establishmenton issues he is ambivalent about, such as the international use of force. We also alluded to his tendency to isolate himself and rely excessively on his own judgment in shaping policy, to the detriment of his relations with staff, cabinet and other leaders. The long-drawn decision to seek Congressional approval before striking Syria is a case study of these proclivities.After resisting calls for intervention in Syria by Senate Republican "hawks"and foreign policy specialists since 2011, a year ago Obama conceded that, in spite of his aversion to intervene in "sectarian struggles",certain actions such as the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against the opposition would constitute a "red line" which, once crossed, would automatically bring about an armed response by the United States. This week he had to face the consequences of his own words.Whenrobust evidence of the use of sarin gas by Bashar Al Assad's forces in rebel occupied territory was produced, the President had no choice but to spendthelast week of the month of Augustfrantically building a case for immediate intervention. Acting simultaneously as Chief Executive, policy shaper and his own spokesman, he used several venues, including an NPR interview, to announce to the American people that the time had come to act.But while Secretary of State John Kerry made a compelling speech on the need to act swiftly to punish the "moral obscenity" committed by the Assad regime, Obama appeared much more circumspect in his appeals to the American people. His early words conveyed both his outrage at the disproportionate actions by Assad as well as his empathy with the war-weary American citizens. In private, he confided he had qualms both about the legality and the political legitimacy of military action. In public, his argument focused on the violation of an international convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the absolutely unavoidable duty to enforce it. But the fact that UN inspectors had not completed their field report on the attack, coupled with the refusal of the UN Security Council to consider armed action, gave him pause and forced him to confront his own doubts once again.In the meantime, momentum was building in the United States where, according to press reports, it was all but certain there would be a military strike to "punish and deter" the Syrian regime, by Labor Day weekend. GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were vocal in their support of intervention but demanded more than just a punitive strike and showed some impatience towards the President's pondering an action that should have been decided long ago.Abroad, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia were in favor of the US action. As it is widely known, Russia was against it and that is why the US had to bypass the UN Security Council where Russia has veto power. While NATO allies all offered strong support (indeed, both France and Britain were the first to insist on support for the rebels a year ago), Prime Minister David Cameron was delivered a strong blow when he lost a vote in the House of Commons, with some of his own backbenchers voting against intervention. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, facing a coming election and against the perennial background of German Basic Law constraints, had already told the President that Germany would stand in the sidelines, while offering moral support. The long shadow cast by the Iraqi war around the world once again became evident. But the French President, not required by the Fifth Republic Constitution to consult the legislature, and encouraged by France's recent successful actions in Mali and Libya, remained firm.By Friday, Obama's tortured deliberations came to an end as he abruptly changed courses. Against the advice of his National Security and political advisors team, he made a dramatic announcement from the Rose Garden: his decision on the need for a narrow punitive action against Syria had been made, he said, but he had decided to ask for Congressional authorization first. As Commander in Chief, and in spite of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, he is not obligated to do this. He thus appears to be shifting responsibility onto the legislature while simultaneouslybuying some time to explore diplomatic solutions in the upcoming G-20 summer.The cerebral constitutional law professor and the risk- taking politician in him have made a Faustian bargain. If Congress authorizes the use of force, he will have both legal and political cover for his action while at the same time fulfilling his moral duty of punishing a violator of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Humanitarian law. If they vote No, he can just blame them for his own lack of action and use all the power of the Presidency on his domestic agenda.It is, in any case, a big gamble, one that has the potential of weakening him and turning him into a lame duck for the rest of his Presidency. The GOP is internally divided on many issues, among them foreign policy, where conservative ideologies run the gamut from minimalist /isolationist to neo-cons/regime- change interventionists and all the shades in-between. And the far left in Obama's own party is against intervention. So there is no guarantee he will get Congressional approval. The cost of losing this vote is enormous: it may set a strong precedent in diminishing Presidential prerogatives.To be fair to the President and his vacillating stance, this is not an easy decision. None of the world leaders have made a compelling public case for a strategic need of intervention in Syria. The proposed limited "punitive" strike will most likely be inconclusive: it will not deter further extreme actions by Assad, who has now been given time to disperse his military assets and capabilities. The strike will not significantly degrade his capacity to fight, and there will be little change in his main goal, namely, to destroy the opposition and regain total control of the country.This is a fight to the end by both sides. If overthrown, Assad and his Alawite supporters (as well as the Christians who have traditionally been under his protection) will be massacred. There are no desirable outcomes in this conflict. The rebels are divided and the biggest group is that ofthe jihadists with strong support of Al Qaeda. While Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the side of the United States and want a moderate alternative to the Assad regime, Iran, to an extent Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon are on the dictator's side (as, incongruously, is Venezuela). The Palestinian group Hamas, previously favoring Assad has now changed sides and is supporting the rebels. So in many ways this is a war by proxy that could become a generalized regional war. There is no indication that the President or anyone else has a political plan or a diplomatic effort in mind for the post-strike scenario.However, US inaction at this time undermines the security of its allies, especially Israel. Even though Netanyahu has adopted a "no comment" stance and hasn't, accordingly, said a word on this issue, other Israeli politicians are worrying out loud about the implications the US lack of resolve will have on other "red lines": Will the United States act when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold? Or will Israel find itself facing Iran alone?They bitterly remind themselves of Obama's speech in Jerusalem, in March this year, when he said in Hebrew: "Atem lo levad" ("You are not alone"). They are very skeptical, now more than ever, that the President will match his lofty rhetoric with action.In the United States the momentum is gone, Congress won't reconvene until September 9, and the President is using the last week of summer to energetically lobby House and Senate leaders and persuade skeptics through intelligence briefings. Urgent issues in the domestic agenda will thus have to be postponed.What no one, either at home or abroad denies, is that the credibility of the Presidency and with it, that of the United States, is at stake. International support for the operation is unlikely to improve. A negative vote by Congress will further weaken the President and may complicate the White House legislative agenda, where he will have to spend all his political capital and still,perhaps, fall short.In a keynote speech to the National Defense University earlier this year, Obama expressed the need to chart a new way in American foreign policy, one that would end the "perpetual wartime footing" that characterized the post 9-11 era, after G.W. Bush got a virtual blank check from Congress in the use of military force and intelligence gathering. So far, Obama has ended two protracted unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is clear he will not engage in regime change. But a new foreign policy strategy has not crystallized yet. There is no Obama doctrine, no overall framework to guide his decisions and give predictability to his actions.His whole approach to the Middle East, the most explosive region in the planet today, is misconceived. His tepid reaction to the Egyptian situation had already given some approximation of how reluctant he is about taking sides in conflicts in the region. Syrian use of chemical weapons has confirmed his ambivalence and exposed his indecision. At the same time, it has provoked a collapse of American credibility abroad, anduncertainty about its reliability as an ally. Regardless of what follows after this week, his hesitancy will have dire consequences for American foreign policy into the future.The larger problem that looms over the heads of world leaders and that few seem to acknowledge is that this is not about Syria or Egypt or Libya or Yemen or Tunisia as separate conflicts; it is a regional conflagration that has to be addressedcomprehensively, within the larger regional and international context. All major actors, whether it is Europe, Russia, or China and of course the United States, have a stake in the region and it is in their interest to define the rules of the game and together find an overall solution to this predicament.

1 Jordbrukskooperationen idag Svensk jordbrukskooperation upplever för närvarande två stora problem. 1 Den producentkooperativa företagsformen utsättes för så stark kritik från så många betydelsefulla maktcentra att det är berättigat att tala om en legitimitetskris. I synnerhet kan den nya konkurrenslagen betraktas såsom ett utslag av misstroende mot jordbrukskooperationen. 2 Till följd av ökande konkurrens och allt öppnare marknader finns behov av effektiviseringar i de jordbrukskooperativa företagen. Det gäller kostnadsnedskärningar såväl som marknadssatsningar, och de är nödvändiga oberoende av om Sverige blir EU-medlem eller ej. De erforderliga effektiviseringarna och den återvunna legitimiteten kan nås på olika sätt; genom interna rationaliseringar inklusive strukturrationalisering, genom förbättrade utbytesrelationer med de olika intressenterna i omvärlden samt genom omprövning av det sätt, varpå medlemsrelationerna är uppbyggda. Här analyseras endast det sistnämnda, alltså relationerna mellan medlemmarna och det kooperativa företaget. Hur dessa relationer är upp¬byggda uttryckes av de kooperativa principer, som företagen följer. Således granskas om dessa kooperativa principer kan omtolkas på ett sådant sätt att effektivitetsgraden höjes, dvs kooperationen och lantbrukarna blir mera konkurrenskraftiga, samtidigt som förtroendet till jordbrukskooperationen återställes. 2 Kooperativa värden Med kooperativa principer förstås en uppsättning regler för hur en organisation ska vara uppbyggd för att kunna fungera såsom kooperativ, dvs för att dess ägare också ska (1) vara dess samhandelspartners, (2) kunna styra organisationen och (3) erhålla överskottet från organisationens verksamhet. De kooperativa principerna specificerar hur medlemmarna ska förhålla sig till varandra samt hur det kooperativa företaget ska agera gentemot medlemmarna. För att medlemmarna ska vilja acceptera dessa principer är det nödvändigt att de åtminstone i någon grad erkänner sig till en bestämd uppsättning av värderingar eller normer, nämligen de s k kooperativa värdena. Med detta är sagt att kooperativa värden och principer kan förstås utifrån en logisk, funktionalistisk tankelinje. Det är inte nödvändigt att inkludera resonemang om kooperativ ideologi i en förklaring av kooperativ verksamhet. Ideologiska förklaringar kan tvärtemot skapa mer förvirring än klarhet. Till skillnad från ideologin kan de kooperativa värdena bidra till förståelsen av kooperationsfenomenet. I litteraturen förekommer åtskilliga redovisningar av kooperativa värden. Ett sätt att strukturera dessa är i två huvudklasser. Den ena är socialitetsvärden, som uttrycker att medlemmarna har tillräckligt förtroende för varandra för att våga engagera sig i ett gemensamägt företag. Det krävs engagemang vad gäller verksamhetens målsättning, resursanskaffning, verksamhetens bedrivande, medlemsbehandlingen samt styrningen av verksamheten. Den andra klassen är suveränitetsvärden, vilka reducerar medlemmarnas risker för att den kooperativa organisationen inte skulle bli framgångsrik – det handlar om kooperationens oberoende och om medlemmarnas frihet och frivillighet. 3 Kooperativa principer Litteraturen om kooperativa principer avslöjar att det finns vitt skilda uppfattningar om vilka de kooperativa principerna är och därmed också i grunden vad begreppet står för. Mycket ofta utgår framställningarna från historiska betraktelser och ideologiska övertygelser. Med det syfte, som den föreliggande studien har, är det emellertid angeläget att de kooperativa principerna förstås i ett vetenskapligt sammanhang och att deras ekonomiska betydelse står i fokus. Det betyder att en annan klassificering av de kooperativa principerna är nödvändig. En huvudindelning göres här i föreningsprinciper, som preciserar hur medlemmarna ska förhålla sig till varandra, samt affärsprinciper, som anger hur det kooperativa företaget ska agera gentemot medlemmarna. Med dessa båda kategorier av regeluppsättningar kan en del av de i den gängse litteraturen nämnda principerna förkastas och andra kan omprövas. Sålunda blir resultatet att fyra principer urskiljes. För att ett företag ska kunna fungera som kooperativt ska medlemmarna … 1) utforma medlemskårens sammansättning (principen om medlemskap), 2) äga företaget (principen om medlemsfinansiering), 3) styra företaget (principen om medlemsstyrning) och 4) driva samhandel med företaget (principen om medlemshandel). 4 Kooperativa principer i principiell belysning Inom ramen för de fyra kooperativa principerna finns stora variationsmöjligheter. Principen om medlemskap innebär sålunda att en kooperativ förening kan vara mer eller mindre sluten. Det kan införas strikta krav på vem som ska tas in som ny medlem, eftersom nya medlemmar inte får skada de befintliga medlemmarna. Likaså är det ibland lämpligt att ställa hårda krav på utträde ur föreningen, dvs kräva att en medlem måste ta ansvar för sina handlingar inför de kvarvarande medlemmarna. Av stor betydelse är vilken grad av integration som finns mellan medlemmar och kooperativt företag – för att uppnå en effektiv verksamhet i en hård konkurrens måste integrationsgraden vara tämligen hög, dvs medlemmarna bör vara fast knutna till det kooperativa företaget. Principen om medlemsfinansiering innebär att ingen annan än medlemmarna ska stå för egenkapitalet, men vissa undantag kan tänkas för perifera verksamhetsgrenar. Det individuella egenkapitalet kan och i regel bör tillskjutas med hjälp av ett flertal olika finansieringsinstrument, och överlag bör det individuella egenkapitalet svara för en hög andel av det samlade egenkapitalet, åtminstone klart högre än i svensk jordbrukskooperation. Kollektivt egenkapital är lämpligt för investeringar i anläggningar, som ger en fast kostnad oavsett medlemsantal. En mycket hög andel kollektivt kapital är problematisk såtillvida att ägandet är svårt att identifiera. Oavsett om kapitalet är individuellt eller kollektivt är det självklart att det utsättes för avkastningskrav, som motsvarar marknadsränta. Den gängse kooperativa principen och lagparagrafen om begränsad insatsränta förkastas således, då den medför inoptimal allokering av resurser. Vanligtvis är medlemsstyrningen av företagen demokratisk, dvs man följer en regel om en medlem, en röst. I tillfällen med starkt heterogen medlemskår och svag sammanhållning mellan medlemmarna kan differentierad röststyrka tänkas. I situationer med hård ekonomisk press är differentiering av priser och service nödvändig vid medlemshandel. En differentiering efter de kostnader, som medlemmen åsamkar föreningen, leder till att det samlade resursutnyttjandet inom kooperativet förbättras. Differentiering efter medlemmarnas priskänslighet är däremot ofta problematisk, i det att den kan medföra slitningar inom medlemskåren. I övrigt innebär principen om medlemmarnas samhandel att det kooperativa företaget förvisso kan sälja till och köpa från också ickemedlemmar, förutsatt att detta ligger i medlemmarnas intresse. Däremot är det diskutabelt om det kooperativa företaget ägnar sig åt verksamheter helt utan medlemsanknytning, eftersom de vinster som göres där ger förvrängda marknadssignaler, om de utbetalas till medlemmarna i form av högre avräkningspriser eller lägre produktionsmedelspriser. Ett liknande resonemang kan föras för verksamheter långt fram i förädlingskedjan – de vinster, som det kooperativa företaget gör i dessa, bör utbetalas i form av kapitalavkastning till medlemmarna för att inte förorsaka alltför stor överproduktion, som pressar prisnivån. 5 Jordbrukskooperationens kooperativa principer Den svenska jordbrukskooperationens regelverk består av (1) lagregler, fr a lagen om ekonomiska föreningar, (2) LRF:s uppsättning av kooperativa principer, som man dock inte är tvungen att följa, (3) föreningarnas egna stadgar samt (4) regler, normer och principer, som man följer utan att de finns nedtecknade och tvingande. De kooperativa principerna för de fem föreningar, som redovisas i praktikfallsform, visar betydande skillnader. Alla tre mejerierna lider av överskottsproduktion, men de har valt delvis olika vägar för att lösa problemet. Arla har omfattande export till förlustbringande världsmarknadspriser; Skånemejerier har satsat mera på ostproduktion för den svenska marknaden; Milko har slutit föreningen i hopp om att reducera överskottet. Även i övrigt finns skillnader, bl a såtillvida att Milko bekänner sig till ett kooperationsbegrepp av traditionellt svenskt snitt, medan Skånemejerier är mera nytänkande. Skillnaderna visar sig exempelvis i intresset för prisdifferentieringar. Intressant är Arlas proportionella insatssystem, som emellertid leder till att det individuella kapitalet reduceras kraftigt. Föreningarna är eniga om att rösträttsfördelningen en medlem, en röst ligger fast. En annan likhet består i att man inte betalar ränta på medlemsinsatserna. Då det gäller medlemskap avviker Scan Väst såtillvida att pensionerade medlemmar mister sin rösträtt. På flera håll, bl a i Väst-svenska Lantmän, finns ett strävan att öka det individuella egenkapitalets andel på bekostnad av det kollektiva kapitalet. Sammantaget måste erkännas att de fem föreningarna under senare år har börjat tänka på de kooperativa principerna på ett mera otraditionellt sätt, och i viss mån har man också genomfört konkreta förändringar. Icke desto mindre är de i huvudsak uppbyggda enligt den kooperationsuppfattning, som har sin rot i den strikta jordbrukspolitik, som tidigare rådde i Sverige. Det finns med andra ord utrymme för åtskilligt nytänkande. 6 Jordbrukskooperationen inför framtiden För att de svenska jordbrukskooperativa företagen ska kunna bedriva en maximalt effektiv verksamhet krävs lagändringar, framför allt vad gäller föreningslag, skattelag och konkurrenslag. Det övergripande är att den kooperativa verksamhetsformen ska ges betydligt friare händer så att den får möjlighet att anpassa sig till en ständigt föränderlig omvärld. Föreningslagen bör rensas från de ideologiska element, som begränsar möjligheterna till effektivitet, bl a kravet på likabehandling, taket för insatsräntan och kravet på öppna föreningar. Det bör ges möjligheter till nya finansieringsinstrument. I anslutning härtill bör skattelagstiftningen inte som nu främja föreningar, som är uppbyggda på ideologiska grundvalar (exempelvis lika rösträtt), och förfördela föreningar, som är organiserade på basis av ekonomiska hänsyn. Konkurrenslagen måste erkänna att det finns och bör finnas producentkooperation, och att denna måste tillåtas att vara uppbyggd på ett effektivitetsbefrämjande sätt. Förbudet mot förhandlingskooperation bör tas bort och federativ verksamhet måste tillåtas. Särskilt angeläget är att kraven på fri medlemsrörlighet måste försvinna, eftersom det betyder att samtliga lantbrukskooperativa systematiskt blir försvagade beträffande medlemsstyrning, finansiering och produktion. Viktigt är att man inom de lantbrukskooperativa företagen snarast vidtar åtgärder. Dels finns det åtskilliga förändringar i kooperativa principer, som företagen kan göra inom den nuvarande lagstiftningens ramar. Eftersom det i de flesta fallen tar några år från det att olika kooperativa principer har omprövats till dess att man kan skörda frukterna av denna modernisering, är det angeläget att dessa åtgärder kommer till stånd snarast. Dels krävs en medlemsdebatt och ett medlemsengagemang, eftersom frågor om vilka kooperativa principer företagen ska bygga på är helt grundläggande. Det vore dock önskvärt med engagemang också från annat håll. Här tänkes på massmedia, näringslivet i övrigt och regeringskansliet, eftersom dessa kretsar dels har stort inflytande över hur regelverket kan bli för den svenska livsmedelssektorn, och dels har tidigare uttryckt visst intresse för hithörande frågor. Till denna lista ska också nämnas andra forskare, som förhoppningsvis genom denna bok kan få ett intresse väckt för det i Sverige så viktiga producentkooperativa företagandet. Genom att dessa skilda grupper deltar i diskussioner och undersökningar kan de bidra till att kooperationens regelverk blir i bättre överensstämmelse med framtidens ekonomiska krav och därmed att kooperationens legitimitet stärkes.

A sweeping history of libertarian thought, from radical anarchists to conservative defenders of the status quoLibertarianism emerged in the mid-nineteenth century with an unwavering commitment to progressive causes, from women's rights and the fight against slavery to anti-colonialism and Irish emancipation. Today, this movement founded on the principle of individual liberty finds itself divided by both progressive and reactionary elements vying to claim it as their own. The Individualists is the untold story of a political doctrine continually reshaped by fierce internal tensions, bold and eccentric personalities, and shifting political circumstances.Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi trace the history of libertarianism from its origins as a radical progressive ideology in the 1850s to its crisis of identity today. They examine the doctrine's evolution through six defining themes: private property, skepticism of authority, free markets, individualism, spontaneous order, and individual liberty. They show how the movement took a turn toward conservativism during the Cold War, when the dangers of communism at home and abroad came to dominate libertarian thinking. Zwolinski and Tomasi reveal a history that is wider, more diverse, and more contentious than many of us realize.A groundbreaking work of scholarship, The Individualists uncovers the neglected roots of a movement that has championed the poor and marginalized since its founding, but whose talk of equal liberty has often been bent to serve the interests of the rich and powerful

"This book is clearly written, admirably concise, and well situated in the secondary literature on gender and conservatism and the foreign and domestic Cold War. ... Brennan's study offers another valuable reminder that niether Joe McCarthy nor June Cleaver can stand as convenient shorthard for our historical narratives of the Cold War era." Journal of American History.

Skepsis ist das Urelement der Demokratie. Doch längst schon hat westlicher Selbstzweifel selbstzerstörerische Züge angenommen. Eine solche Grundhaltung trifft sich mit der Herrschaftsideologie des Putinismus, die Menschenrechte und demokratische Freiheiten zu Propagandaerfindungen und Camouflage westlicher Vormachtsinteressen erklärt hat. (IP)