Suchergebnisse

Since Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's famous 'System of custom' article (Annales, 1972), the problem of customary geographies, an invention of lawyers, has so far become a common territory of historians, ethnologists and legal historians. The present text explores the intellectual origins of this problem in historiography and isolate three major presupposed premisses: the principle of family autonomy, the 'photographic' nature of legal sources and the cultural relativity attributed to the structures which the study of inheritance practices makes it possible to identify. Thus, the culturalist roots led, from Herder to Savigny, from Klimrath to Yver and Le Roy Ladurie itself, to a question about the concept of culture, both as a sign and cause for the geographical differentiation of social organisation norms. ; Ever since the famous article "Système de la coutume" by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (Annales, 1972), the customary geographies issue has become a common ground for historians, ethnologists and legal historians. The present paper explores the intellectual origins of this problematic in historiography and stresses three major underlying aspects: the principle of autonomy of kinship systems, the "photographical" character of legal sources and the cultural relativity associated with the structures which the study of inheritance patterns allows to indentify. Thus, the culturalist paradigm leads, from Herder to Savigny, from Klimrath to Yver and Le Roy Ladurie himself, to a questioning of the mere idea of culture, altogether as a sign and a cause of the geographical differentiations of the norms of social organisation. ; Since Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's famous 'System of custom' article (Annales, 1972), the problem of customary geographies, an invention of lawyers, has so far become a common territory of historians, ethnologists and legal historians. The present text explores the intellectual origins of this problem in historiography and isolate three major presupposed premisses: the principle of family autonomy, the ...

First, we prove the existence of a specific centrist political thought that goes from Aristotle to French centrist President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. To do so, considering each great age of political thought, we build a syndox (Ancient greek, « common thought ») of thinkers who stood for the virtue of moderation on the field of political thought. Thus we can identify a paradigm of centrist political thought. We then prove this paradigm is an ideology. Secund, we prove contemporary centrist voters (1999-2012) approve this ideology. We also deduct from their preferences among political parties and famous politicians that there are four families embodying Centre: centre-right, centre-left, green-centre, extreme-centre. We also identify parties and politicians that embodied these four families from 1999 to 2012. Third, we identify these four families from French Revolution to nowadays. We also prove, thanks to tools coming from economic science, that financing of political parties is a competitive market, whereas access to seats at National Assembly is a duopoly. We then build a model that allows us to explain and predict tactical choices made by parties: the « GRADD model. » It explains that centre is divided into four families because of divergent tactical preferences when considering both sides of the duopoly. Interviews with major politicians also make it possible to confirm our conclusions. ; Dans un premier temps, cette thèse démontre l'existence d'une pensée politique spécifique du centre sur le temps long de l'histoire des idées, d'Aristote à Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Elle établit dans ce but, pour chaque grande époque de l'histoire des idées, un syndoxe (du grec « pensée commune ») des penseurs ayant transposé la vertu de mesure dans la pensée politique. Elle en déduit un paradigme de la pensée politique du centre, et établit que cette pensée politique constitue une idéologie. Dans un deuxième temps, cette thèse démontre que l'électorat contemporain du centre (1999-2012) se reconnaît dans cette idéologie. ...

First, we prove the existence of a specific centrist political thought that goes from Aristotle to French centrist President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. To do so, considering each great age of political thought, we build a syndox (Ancient greek, « common thought ») of thinkers who stood for the virtue of moderation on the field of political thought. Thus we can identify a paradigm of centrist political thought. We then prove this paradigm is an ideology. Secund, we prove contemporary centrist voters (1999-2012) approve this ideology. We also deduct from their preferences among political parties and famous politicians that there are four families embodying Centre: centre-right, centre-left, green-centre, extreme-centre. We also identify parties and politicians that embodied these four families from 1999 to 2012. Third, we identify these four families from French Revolution to nowadays. We also prove, thanks to tools coming from economic science, that financing of political parties is a competitive market, whereas access to seats at National Assembly is a duopoly. We then build a model that allows us to explain and predict tactical choices made by parties: the « GRADD model. » It explains that centre is divided into four families because of divergent tactical preferences when considering both sides of the duopoly. Interviews with major politicians also make it possible to confirm our conclusions. ; Dans un premier temps, cette thèse démontre l'existence d'une pensée politique spécifique du centre sur le temps long de l'histoire des idées, d'Aristote à Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Elle établit dans ce but, pour chaque grande époque de l'histoire des idées, un syndoxe (du grec « pensée commune ») des penseurs ayant transposé la vertu de mesure dans la pensée politique. Elle en déduit un paradigme de la pensée politique du centre, et établit que cette pensée politique constitue une idéologie. Dans un deuxième temps, cette thèse démontre que l'électorat contemporain du centre (1999-2012) se reconnaît dans cette idéologie. ...

Over the last six decades, a significant number of Western scholars approached the Legion – Archangel Michael as one of the most popular and yet inconsistent variant of European fascism, and portrayed it as too mystical, religious, fanatic, violent, irrational, rabid anti-Semitic, obsessed with an atavistic cult of death and the idea of sacrifice. The article aims to point out that
the Legion, a variant of European fascism in its epoch, only made politics religious, supplied
(some of) the Romanians with a new political ideology but also with a new religion, political and quasi-secular, that took birth from disillusions and despair as to give men (and women) energy and hope, a religion that encapsulates the European spirit of that time and has less to do with Romania's Christian Orthodox heritage.

International audience ; Is "rural" a dirty word? Indeed, in France, in the zoning of territories in urban areas by INSEE, the word "rural" has disappeared. No territory would therefore be rural. Perhaps this means that the evolution towards an exclusively urban France is almost complete. It is therefore imperative to examine the evidence of such an outcome. However, does not an examination of their explanatory nature mean that they are based on an ideology of an exclusively urban France? Doesn't this examination lead to the conclusion that rurality remains not only important in France, but that its capacity for innovation, whenever actors are mobilized for the love of their territory, is real ; « Rural » est-il un gros mot ? En effet, en France, dans le zonage des territoires en aires urbaines de l'Insee, le mot « rural » a disparu. Aucun territoire ne serait donc rural. Cela signifie peut-être que l'évolution vers une France exclusivement urbaine est quasiment achevée. Il est donc impératif d'examiner les éléments témoignant d'un tel aboutissement. Toutefois, l'examen de leur caractère explicatif ne signifie-t-il pas qu'ils sont fondés sur une idéologie d'une France exclusivement urbaine ? Cet examen ne conduit-il pas à conclure que la ruralité demeure non seulement importante en France, mais que ses capacités d'innovation, chaque fois que des acteurs se mobilisent par amour de leur territoire, sont réelles ?

International audience ; Is "rural" a dirty word? Indeed, in France, in the zoning of territories in urban areas by INSEE, the word "rural" has disappeared. No territory would therefore be rural. Perhaps this means that the evolution towards an exclusively urban France is almost complete. It is therefore imperative to examine the evidence of such an outcome. However, does not an examination of their explanatory nature mean that they are based on an ideology of an exclusively urban France? Doesn't this examination lead to the conclusion that rurality remains not only important in France, but that its capacity for innovation, whenever actors are mobilized for the love of their territory, is real ; « Rural » est-il un gros mot ? En effet, en France, dans le zonage des territoires en aires urbaines de l'Insee, le mot « rural » a disparu. Aucun territoire ne serait donc rural. Cela signifie peut-être que l'évolution vers une France exclusivement urbaine est quasiment achevée. Il est donc impératif d'examiner les éléments témoignant d'un tel aboutissement. Toutefois, l'examen de leur caractère explicatif ne signifie-t-il pas qu'ils sont fondés sur une idéologie d'une France exclusivement urbaine ? Cet examen ne conduit-il pas à conclure que la ruralité demeure non seulement importante en France, mais que ses capacités d'innovation, chaque fois que des acteurs se mobilisent par amour de leur territoire, sont réelles ?

National audience Choice to teach occitan is of course an ideological choice. However, the history of this teaching shows us that the ideology behind it varies in its continuity and that it often has to play the big gap between singularity and institutionalisation. ; National audience Choisir d'enseigner l'occitan est un choix évidemment idéologique. Cependant, l'histoire de cet enseignement nous montre que l'idéologie qu'il sous-tend varie dans sa continuité et qu'il doit souvent jouer au grand écart entre singularité et institutionnalisation.

National audience Choice to teach occitan is of course an ideological choice. However, the history of this teaching shows us that the ideology behind it varies in its continuity and that it often has to play the big gap between singularity and institutionalisation. ; National audience Choisir d'enseigner l'occitan est un choix évidemment idéologique. Cependant, l'histoire de cet enseignement nous montre que l'idéologie qu'il sous-tend varie dans sa continuité et qu'il doit souvent jouer au grand écart entre singularité et institutionnalisation.

National audience Choice to teach occitan is of course an ideological choice. However, the history of this teaching shows us that the ideology behind it varies in its continuity and that it often has to play the big gap between singularity and institutionalisation. ; National audience Choisir d'enseigner l'occitan est un choix évidemment idéologique. Cependant, l'histoire de cet enseignement nous montre que l'idéologie qu'il sous-tend varie dans sa continuité et qu'il doit souvent jouer au grand écart entre singularité et institutionnalisation.

In the scientific literature, ideology is traditionally studied in relation to the structuration of a group, a society, or a regime. This thesis aims to explain how an ideology, here dedicated to the building of an independent communist Yugoslavia, was on the contrary responsible for the breakdown of the regime and for the dislocation of the Yugoslav federation. A detailed study of the doctrine and political practice derived from the Yugoslavist ideology highlights the contradictions that were to lead to the failure of the Yugoslav model. To reconsider the autonomy of the political actors and their ideas enables to make fully intelligible the stalemate of the yugoslav model. ; La littérature scientifique associe communément l'idéologie à la construction d'un groupe, d'une société, d'un régime. Ici, il s'agit d'expliquer comment une idéologie, projetant de bâtir une Yougoslavie communiste et indépendante, cause la chute du régime et la dislocation de la fédération yougoslave. Un examen minutieux de la doctrine ainsi que de la pratique politique issues de l'idéologie yougoslaviste met en exergue les contradictions à l'origine de l'échec yougoslave. Reconsidérer l'autonomie des acteurs politiques et de leurs idées offre de rendre pleinement intelligible l'impasse du modèle yougoslave.

Loin to be reduced to the question of relationship between text and image and logocentrism, the novel study of the relationship between Visual Studies and iconology shows that any logos of and on images have a theoretical but also practical, ideological or even idolâtric dimension. Based on a genealogy of iconology, from Philostrate to Cesare Ripa, from Luther to Bacon, from Jesuit to W. J. T. Mitchell, an archaeology of Visual Studies shows that, successively knowing by image and knowing the image, iconology goes beyond the artistic sphere from the outset to place the question of the meaning and power of images in the rhetorical, religious and political field. ; Loin de se réduire à la question des rapports entre texte et image et du logocentrisme, l'étude inédite des rapports entre Visual Studies et iconologie montre que tout logos des et sur les images engage une dimension théorique mais aussi pratique, idéologique voire idolâtrique. S'appuyant sur une généalogie de l'iconologie, de Philostrate à Cesare Ripa, de Luther à Bacon, des jésuites à W. J. T. Mitchell, une archéologie des Visual Studies montre que, successivement savoir par l'image et savoir sur l'image, l'iconologie dépasse d'emblée la sphère artistique pour situer la question du sens et du pouvoir des images dans le champ rhétorique, religieux et politique.