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I develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained (yet individually rational) distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets. In processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education, health insurance, pensions, etc., individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects (or their children's) versus the costs of misinformed decisions. Because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial, endogenous social cognitions emerge. Thus, an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them, embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government. Conversely, an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez-faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand. With public-sector capital, this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history-dependent dynamics. The model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views, even when ex-post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news.

The Lebanese Shi'ite resistance movement, Hizbullah, is going through a remarkable political and ideological transformation. Hizbullah was founded in 1978 by various sectors of Lebanese Shi'ite clergy and cadres, and with Iranian backing as an Islamic movement protesting against social and political conditions. Over the years 1984/85 to 1991, Hizbullah became a full-fledged social movement in the sense of having a broad overall organization, structure, and ideology aiming at social change and social justice, as it claimed. Starting in 1992, it became a mainstream political party working within the narrow confines of its pragmatic political program. The line of argument in this dissertation is that Hizbullah has been adjusting its identity in the three previously mentioned stages by shifting emphasis among its three components: (1) from propagating an exclusivist religious ideology (2) to a more encompassing political ideology, and (3) to a down-to-earth political program.

The idea of Europe was radically transformed after the accomplishment of the idea of European unification. The European Union (EU) and Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century were defined by a broad common ideology that consists of ideologies such as antinationalism, social democracy, pacificism and environmentalism. These ideologies are presented by pro-EU scholars and politicians as ideologies rooted in European history and parts of European identity and as being mostly absent in the American policies. The emergence of EU ideology is traced in the relaunch of European integration in the mid-1980s and in Delors' conflict with Thatcher. It is argued that the emergence of EU ideology is the result of two long-term historical developments: the deepening and enlargement of European integration ; and the changing relations between the USA and Europe. It is concluded that the emergence of EU ideology resembles the emergence of nationalism and national ideologies.

This paper will analyse the Bioshock series, with a particular focus on the treatment of ideology within these games. This popular and critically acclaimed series contains deeply political themes, including various controversial ideologies such as Objectivism, and Collectivism. The treatment of these ideologies within the games have been widely contested and interpreted. Writers and critics have tended to focus on Bioshock games as a critique of particular political ideologies. By examining the games, with a particular reference the use of procedural rhetoric, this paper will argue that this series instead presents a critique of extreme ideology itself.

Ideology plays a central role in consumer decisions, actions, and practices. While there have been numerous studies of ideological formations in specific consumption contexts, an integrative theoretical framework on consumption ideology has been missing. The theoretical framework presented in this article integrates systemic, social group, and social reality perspectives from social theory with prior consumer research to conceptualize consumption ideology as ideas and ideals that are related to consumerism and manifested in consumer behavior. Consumption ideology originates from conflicts between consumer desires and the system of consumerism. It is reflected in consumers' lived experiences and expressed in social representations and communicative actions related to status-based consumption, brand affinity and antipathy, performed practices, and political consumption. By adapting to the market, consumers confirm the system, but when they resist, they accelerate conflicts in consumer experiences unless resistance is ideologically co-opted by the market. Three illustrative cases—upcycling, Zoom backgrounds, and the commercialization of TikTok—exemplify how the framework may be used to analyze consumption ideology and generate new research questions. The article concludes with future research programs that move beyond micro-theorizations to illuminate the broader role of ideology in contemporary consumerist society.

Ideology is a core and contested concept in the social sciences, but also long deployed in management research to highlight the political, embedded and/or obscuring nature of ideas. Indeed, many would argue that management itself is inherently ideological in legitimating or privileging managerial interests and concealing other groups and ways of organising. In the first systematic review of how ideology has been conceptualized in management studies, this article explores its diverse and changing meanings in order to develop and sustain the concept. It is based on a heuristic review of 175 articles and 41 books published between 1956 and 2018. Further developing categories used in the social sciences around its role, we found views of ideology as: (1) domination; (2) legitimation; (3) interpretation; (4) integration and; (5) normative logic. In addition, emerging perspectives were identified where ideology was an (6) object of critique; and (7) fantasy structuring social reality. We describe, illustrate and evaluate these, often internally diverse and interrelated, perspectives as well as compare them with sometimes competing notions within the management field, such as discourse, culture and legitimation. We also bring together the different approaches and argue for a pluralist, but not infinitely flexible, approach to the concept. In doing so, we identify research agendas for ideology within management and organisation studies.

The article explores the genesis and varieties of the phenomenon of ideology, and its relationship with religion. It begins with the origins of the notion and term in Antoine Destutt de Tracy and Karl Marx, and then continues up to the most recent developments of conservative and liberal ideological schemata. The author pays particular attention to the totalitarian ideologies of Communism and Nazism. The article argues that ideology sometimes tried to replace religion, and sometimes mimicked it. In any case, it exercised a profound impact on churches. This impact is in most cases polarizing for the church, when the latter identifies itself with ideology and thus dramatically reduces itself. Among the instances of such an impact are "political Orthodoxy" in Ukraine, and the "Russian world" in Russia. The author concludes that the church should learn to distinguish what is ideological and what is theological.

The article explores the genesis and varieties of the phenomenon of ideology, and its relationship with religion. It begins with the origins of the notion and term in Antoine Destutt de Tracy and Karl Marx, and then continues up to the most recent developments of conservative and liberal ideological schemata. The author pays particular attention to the totalitarian ideologies of Communism and Nazism. The article argues that ideology sometimes tried to replace religion, and sometimes mimicked it. In any case, it exercised a profound impact on churches. This impact is in most cases polarizing for the church, when the latter identifies itself with ideology and thus dramatically reduces itself. Among the instances of such an impact are "political Orthodoxy" in Ukraine, and the "Russian world" in Russia. The author concludes that the church should learn to distinguish what is ideological and what is theological.

International audience ; If, to speak about organization, we accept the postulate that there are " good reasons " to speak about it, it is then necessary to investigate the universe of ideology and the way by which models plunge their roots in ideology as well as they create a coherent world. Ideology, as justification, produces representations. What is in question here, is the kind of deformation carried by representations. They produce a structure of the world, the validation of which may be an object of science seen as the construction of a truth in a project of "knowledge" of this world. The concept of ideology is particularly difficult. It benefits and suffers from two major influences in its foundations: that of a political perspective with Marx and Engels and that of the sociological reaction (from Max Weber to Raymond Boudon and Pierre Bourdieu). Ideology as an " attractor " raises the question of " ultimate references ". ; Pour parler d'organisation, on retiendra ici le postulat qu'à un moment donné, il y a de « bonnes raisons » d'en parler d'une « certaine manière ». Il est alors nécessaire d'approfondir l'univers de l'idéologie et de la croyance qui est celui dans lequel la « certaine manière » de parler de l'organisation plonge ses racines dans la mesure où elle conduit à créer un monde qui soit cohérent avec ce que porte le discours prononcé. L'idéologie comme justificatrice - productrice de représentations mérite ainsi que l'on s'y intéresse dans la mesure où cette création va aussi dans le sens de la validation – construction de préjugés. Ce qui est en cause ici, c'est bien la question de la déformation, du statut de la preuve quant aux représentations issues d'un contexte idéologique. Les représentations ainsi construites nous livrent en effet une structure interne du monde dont la validation se trouve aussi bien être objet de science que construction de vérité dans un projet de « connaissance » de ce monde. L'idéologie est proche du concept de culture car elle pose le problème de la contingence ...

International audience ; If, to speak about organization, we accept the postulate that there are " good reasons " to speak about it, it is then necessary to investigate the universe of ideology and the way by which models plunge their roots in ideology as well as they create a coherent world. Ideology, as justification, produces representations. What is in question here, is the kind of deformation carried by representations. They produce a structure of the world, the validation of which may be an object of science seen as the construction of a truth in a project of "knowledge" of this world. The concept of ideology is particularly difficult. It benefits and suffers from two major influences in its foundations: that of a political perspective with Marx and Engels and that of the sociological reaction (from Max Weber to Raymond Boudon and Pierre Bourdieu). Ideology as an " attractor " raises the question of " ultimate references ". ; Pour parler d'organisation, on retiendra ici le postulat qu'à un moment donné, il y a de « bonnes raisons » d'en parler d'une « certaine manière ». Il est alors nécessaire d'approfondir l'univers de l'idéologie et de la croyance qui est celui dans lequel la « certaine manière » de parler de l'organisation plonge ses racines dans la mesure où elle conduit à créer un monde qui soit cohérent avec ce que porte le discours prononcé. L'idéologie comme justificatrice - productrice de représentations mérite ainsi que l'on s'y intéresse dans la mesure où cette création va aussi dans le sens de la validation – construction de préjugés. Ce qui est en cause ici, c'est bien la question de la déformation, du statut de la preuve quant aux représentations issues d'un contexte idéologique. Les représentations ainsi construites nous livrent en effet une structure interne du monde dont la validation se trouve aussi bien être objet de science que construction de vérité dans un projet de « connaissance » de ce monde. L'idéologie est proche du concept de culture car elle pose le problème de la contingence de la représentation à un système de valeurs mais elle s'en distingue aussi du fait de la variabilité de son contenu et de la façon dont elle s'articule aux références « ultimes ». Tout comme la vie culturelle, il s'agit de « gérer » les rapports entre des éléments de représentations. L'intrusion du concept de système de valeurs indique que l'idéologie, tout comme la culture, est un processus d'évaluation mais aussi celui de l'affirmation d'une vérité en rapport avec des attentes. Idéologie et culture ont quelque chose à voir avec un processus d'identification et sont le support d'un projet de vie.

A growing wave of scholarship suggests that ideology has demonstrable effects on various forms of armed conflict. But ideology remains a relative theoretical newcomer in conflict research, and scholars lack developed microfoundations for analyzing ideologies and their effects. Typically, existing research has primarily presented ideology as either an instrumental tool for conflict actors or a source of sincere political and normative commitments. But neither approach captures the diverse ways in which contemporary social science theorizes the causal connection between ideas and action, and both struggle to reconcile the apparently strong effects of ideology on conflict at the collective level with the relative rarity of 'true believers' at the individual level. This article addresses such problems by providing key microfoundations for conceptualizing ideologies, analyzing ideological change, and explaining ideologies' influence over conflict behavior. I emphasize that ideology overlaps with other drivers of conflict such as strategic interests and group identities, show how ideologies can affect conflict behavior through four distinct mechanisms – commitment, adoption, conformity, and instrumentalization – and clarify the role of both conflict pressures and pre-existing ideological conditions in ideological change. These microfoundational claims integrate existing empirical findings and offer a foundation for building deeper explanations and middle-range theories of ideology's role in armed conflict.

We study the causal effect of school curricula on students' stated beliefs and attitudes. We exploit a major textbook reform in China that was rolled out between 2004 and 2010 with the explicit intention of shaping youths' ideology. To measure its effect, we present evidence from a novel survey we conducted among 2000 students at Peking University. The sharp, staggered introduction of the new curriculum across provinces allows us to identify the effects of the new educational content in a generalized difference in differences framework. We examine government documents articulating desired consequences of the reform, and identify changes in textbook content and college entrance exams that reflect the government's aims. These changes were often effective: study under the new curriculum is robustly associated with changed views on political participation and democracy in China, increased trust in government officials, and a more skeptical view of free markets.

Generally, Democrats do not increase military spending, and Republicans do not raise welfare payments. Mostly, ruling politicians stick to the manifesto of their party. The current paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon that does not assume politicians or voters to be ideologists. I explore an environment where both voters and politicians always prefer the policy that is adequate to the world state but contradicts the party manifesto over the policy that is in line with the manifesto but not adequate. I find that nevertheless, the inefficient manifesto-driven policy will often result from their interaction. Besides, I show that a high degree of agreement between the politician in office, his party basis and the voter makes efficient, informed policy rare or even impossible. But if homogeneity of convictions within parties is high, swing voter behavior can solve the problem.

In this article I wish to exemplify how an anti-ideological critique on "violence against women'" in the era of neoliberal India may be conducted. My main source lies in Marx's critique of ideology as a body of content, of "ruling ideas" which are hegemonic, as well as the epistemological process of their production. With this understanding I want to speak about the current conjuncture in India of global neoliberal imperialism, of ideological and political use of religion and patriarchy. It appears to me that this fascistic agenda is present elsewhere in the world, where expanding neoliberal capitalism and fundamentalist religious ideology enter into a holy alliance.

Generally, Democrats do not increase military spending, and Republicans do not raise welfare payments. Mostly, ruling politicians stick to the manifesto of their party. The current paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon that does not assume politicians or voters to be ideologists. I explore an environment where both voters and politicians always prefer the policy that is adequate to the world state but contradicts the party manifesto over the policy that is in line with the manifesto but not adequate. I find that nevertheless, the inefficient manifesto-driven policy will often result from their interaction. Besides, I show that a high degree of agreement between the politician in office, his party basis and the voter makes efficient, informed policy rare or even impossible. But if homogeneity of convictions within parties is high, swing voter behavior can solve the problem.