"Incumbency Advantagerdquo; and Incumbency Resources: Recent Articles1
In: Congress & the Presidency, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 119-136
ISSN: 1944-1053
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In: Congress & the Presidency, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 119-136
ISSN: 1944-1053
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 107
ISSN: 1911-9917
An increased incumbency effect and American politics -- The consensus about a greater incumbency effect -- The trend in incumbent vote percentages -- Cumulative career changes -- The retirement slump -- An alternative framework : the role of realignment -- A partisan view of incumbent percentages -- The role of realignment -- Conclusions and implications.
In: Party Competition in Indian States, S. 284-308
In: Congress & the presidency, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 160-176
ISSN: 1944-1053
In: Economics & politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 13-37
ISSN: 1468-0343
In this article, we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority, though we note that this general approach may also be deployed to understand other aspects of institutional arrangements. We have taken the initial game-theoretic model of seniority of McKelvey and Riezman, simplified it in order to characterize its fundamental implications, generalized these results in several ways, and extended the model by deriving additional implications. The broad messages of our article, articulated by McKelvey and Riezman as well, are two. First, the endogenous choice of institutional features like seniority by self-governing groups is strategic. While the fine-grained ways of doing things in an institutional context surely serve internal functional objectives, these are not the only objectives. Agents making choices on how to govern themselves have private motivations -- in the case of elected politicians they often revolve around re-election. This leads to our second broad message. The institutions through which self-governing groups conduct their business do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in a broader context. Those offering functional explanations for various institutional features overlook this. Particular institutional arrangements have effects outside the governance institution itself. These effects, in principle, could be accidental by-products. Our strategic approach, however, argues that they may well be the primary reasons for a practice being instituted. Adapted from the source document.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 46
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 48, Heft 1, S. 145-163
ISSN: 1939-9162
Do incumbents have an electoral advantage and if so, do these advantages differ across gender? In this study, I estimate the electoral advantages enjoyed by incumbents in 10 Canadian federal elections, across 3059 ridings, from 1990 to 2021. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare men and women who have very narrowly won or lost elections on three different indicators: propensity to run again, probability of winning the next election, and vote share. I find that women incumbents are just as likely to run again in subsequent elections as men incumbents. However, women who lose an election appear to be more likely to quit politics compared to men who lose an election. I do not find clear incumbency effects for probability of winning at the next election and vote share.
This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with-out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates diferent from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.
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Do incumbents in an election have an advantage, and if so, are these advantages heterogeneous across parties or government and opposition? We first present a theoretical discussion on the possible heterogeneity of incumbency effects in a pure two-party system. Then, we estimate the incumbency effect for the direct district candidates in German federal and state elections using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). When studying the heterogeneity in these effects, we find that incumbents from both large parties, the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD, have an advantage only if the SPD is in government. This effect is robust and shows even in state elections that are unrelated to federal elections - calling into question the findings of average incumbency effects in the literature. Because this effect is stronger in the East than in the West and only shows post reunification, we hypothesise that the emergence of the socialist party The Left may be behind this heterogeneity.
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In: Political behavior, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 339-360
ISSN: 0190-9320
In: Congress and the presidency: an interdisciplinary journal of political science and history, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 160-177
ISSN: 0734-3469
In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence "distributive politics?" Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.
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In: British journal of political science, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 119-128
ISSN: 0007-1234
THE ADVANTAGE OF INCUMBENCY HAS MADE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND MANY STATE LEGISLATORS NEARLY INVULNERABLE TO ELECTORAL DEFEAT. FOR EXAMPLE, INCUMBENTS IN THE U.S. HOUSE RECEIVE ABOUT TWELVE EXTRA PERCENTAGE POINTS SOLELY AS A RESULT OF HOLDING OFFICE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. IN THIS ARTICLE, THE AUTHOR EXPLORES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INCUMBENTS' USE OF CONSTITUENCY SERVICES AND THEIR AUTOMATIC LEAD OVER CHALLENGERS.
In: Electoral Studies, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 46-57