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An increased incumbency effect and American politics -- The consensus about a greater incumbency effect -- The trend in incumbent vote percentages -- Cumulative career changes -- The retirement slump -- An alternative framework : the role of realignment -- A partisan view of incumbent percentages -- The role of realignment -- Conclusions and implications.

This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent's statements may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. This gives rise to the incumbency advantage. We find that, since the incumbent's positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent's incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in the quality of the incumbent, as previously documented by the empirical literature. However, we show that this implies a non-monotonicity in the distortions that arise in equilibrium.

Introduction : dynasties in democracies -- Putting Japan into comparative perspective -- A comparative theory of dynastic candidate selection -- Selection : from family business to party priority -- Election : the inherited incumbency advantage -- Promotion : dynastic dominance in the cabinet -- The consequences of dynastic politics for representation -- Conclusion : family fiefdoms and party politics

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction: Dynasties in Democracies -- 2. Putting Japan into Comparative Perspective -- 3. A Comparative Theory of Dynastic Candidate Selection -- 4. Selection: From Family Business to Party Priority -- 5. Election: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage -- 6. Promotion: Dynastic Dominance in the Cabinet -- 7. The Consequences of Dynastic Politics for Representation -- 8. Conclusion: Family Fiefdoms and Party Politics -- Appendix A -- Appendix B -- Notes -- References -- Index

The presence of dynasties seems to run counter to widely held conceptions of democratic opportunity and fairness. Yet they persist throughout the modern democratized world. Looking at the institutional change in Japan's party system as a comparative model, Daniel M. Smith examines the factors that contribute to their development over time and space and the advantages that members of dynasties reap throughout their political careers

Intro -- CONTENTS -- 1 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE TELEVISION AGE -- 2 ELECTIONS WITH SURROGATE INCUMBENTS -- 3 THE CAMPAIGNS FOR THE PARTY NOMINATIONS: 1999 -- 4 THE CAMPAIGNS FOR THE PARTY NOMINATIONS: 2000 -- 5 THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN BETWEEN MARCH AND AUGUST -- 6 THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN BETWEEN AUGUST AND NOVEMBER -- 7 THE GENERAL ELECTION: OUTCOME AND MEANING -- SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX.

The increase in the "incumbency effect" has long dominated as a research focus and as a framework for interpreting congressional elections. This important new book challenges the empirical claim that incumbents are doing better and the research paradigm that accompanied the claim. It also offers an alternative interpretation of House elections since the 1960s. In a style that is provocative yet fair, learned, and transparent, Jeffrey Stonecash makes a two-pronged argument: frameworks and methodologies suffer when they stop being critically considered, and patterns of House elections over the long term actually reflect party change and realignment. A must-read for scholars and students of congressional elections.

This chapter explores whether and how the incumbent party in Turkey benefits electorally from its partisan ties at the sub-national level. This is an especially important question given the dominance of the nationally ruling party, Justice and Development Party, in Turkish electoral politics and growing concerns about the fairness of elections due to the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) incumbency advantage. The chapter investigates under what conditions and how national incumbent parties benefit electorally from their partisan ties with sub-national governments. It discusses the prevalence of patronage and clientelism referred to by many scholars, who have tried to understand the mechanisms of patron–client relationships in Turkey and their consequences for the party system, the representation of citizen interests, governability and democratic accountability. The chapter provides information about Turkish local governments and their budgetary opportunities, before discussing the possibilities for political manipulation that arise from intergovernmental fiscal ties. It argues that increased municipality healthcare spending brings votes for the AKP nationally.