Suchergebnisse

There is a prolific debate in contemporary political science involving the determinants of candidates' vote share. Incumbency has been identified as one of the strongest explanatory variables, hence in some contexts this condition may translate, for candidates hoping to win their reelection, a substantive advantage in comparisonto challengers, even in highly partisan scenarios. However, this apparent advantage has been questioned in contexts where the level of consolidation of political and party system is still limited, concluding that in such contexts incumbencyhas a harmful effect upon these candidates.This research constitutes the very first effort to tackle this topic in the Peruvian political context.Therefore, we propose a methodological model suitable for the assessment of electoral performance of candidates in two instances: when these candidates are still not incumbents and, afterwards, when they become so. Accordingto the latest findings regarding this topic, we prove Peruvian results to be similar to those from the group of countries where incumbency is conceived as a disadvantage for candidates. ; En la ciencia política contemporánea existe un prolífico debate sobre los determinantes de la proporción de votos que obtienen los candidatosa diversos cargos de elección popular. La incumbencia ha sido señalada como una de las más fuertes variables explicativas, de manera que en ciertos contextos esta característica puede procurarles a los candidatos reeleccionistas una ventaja sustantiva frente a sus retadores, aun en escenarios altamente partidarizados. No obstante,se ha cuestionado bastante esta aparente ventaja en escenarios en los que se manifiesta un menor grado de consolidación del sistema político y de partidos, y se ha concluido que, inclusoen tales contextos, la incumbencia de hecho tiene un efecto perjudicial para estos aspirantes. La present investigación constituye el primer esfuerzo por abordar esta temática en el marco del contexto político peruano. Proponemos así un modelo metodológico que permitirá identificar el desempeño electoral de los candidatos a las alcaldías en dos momentos: el primero, cuando aún no son incumbentes y, en segundo lugar, tan pronto adoptan esta nómina. En concordancia con los últimos hallazgos en la materia, probamos que los resultados en el Perú se asemejan a los del grupo de países en los que la incumbencia supone una desventaja para los candidatos.

The article tries to explain the performance of peruvian incumbent parties in the immediate electoral process after their term. To do this, the limitations of two possible explanations are explored: retrospective voting and party institutionalization. Against this, the article proposes that, to explain the peruvian government parties poor performance, it is necessary to stressed the importance of the party leader and the presidential candidate. These are key factors that can affect the electoral chances of the Peruvian ruling party in a high caudillism. ; El presente artículo busca explicar el pobre desempeño de los partidos de gobiernos peruanos en los procesos electorales inmediatamente posteriores a su mandato. Para ello, se exploran las limitaciones de dos posibles explicaciones: el voto retrospectivo y la institucionalización partidaria. Frente a esto, el artículo propone que, para explicar los malos resultados obtenidos es preciso revisar el rol del líder partidario y la importancia del candidato presidencial. Ambos resultan factores fundamentales que pueden afectar las oportunidades electorales del partido de gobierno en un contexto de alto caudillismo como el peruano.

In 2017 the new proportional system made its first appearance for the legislative elections in Chile, along with the new rules for campaign financing. Three linear regression models are proposed taking campaign expenditure, contributions from parties, and self-funding as dependent variables, andestimating the effects of incumbency, population density, turn-out in the last election, coalition and sex. Incumbents are more prone to expenditure across each coalition, and Chile Vamos spends markedly more than its competitors.Additionally, candidates from Nueva Mayoría depended more on contributions from their parties in comparison to other coalitions. Population densityhas no effect, although turn-out in the last election has a positive effect on selffunding; women spent slightly less than men, and less from their own income, although gender is not significant for party financing. ; En el año 2017 debutó el nuevo sistema proporcional para las elecciones parlamentarias en Chile, en conjunto con las nuevas reglas sobre financiamiento de campañas. Se proponen tres modelos de regresión lineal que toman como variable dependiente el gasto de las candidaturas, aportes de los partidos, y aportes propios, estimando el efecto de la incumbencia, densidad poblacional, participación en elección pasada, coalición y sexo. Se halla que los incumbentes gastan más, lo que es transversal a todas las coaliciones, y que la coalición Chile Vamos incurre en gasto sustantivamente mayor que sus competidores. Además, los candidatos de la Nueva Mayoría recurrieron más al financiamiento desde sus partidos, en comparación al resto de las coaliciones. La densidad poblacional no es significativa, y la participación en 2016 incide en los aportes propios. Las mujeres gastaron levemente menos que los hombres y realizaron menos aportes propios, pero los partidos donan indistintamente del sexo

This paper aims to identify the determinants of incumbents' electoral performance on the 2010 Peruvian provincial elections. It uses data from several sources, from ministries to international organizations, to compile indicators at provincial level. Using a linear regression model to determine which factors influence vote percentages of the mayors and organizations who sought reelection, results showed that incumbents' expenditure capacity has an influence over their re-election result; voters have a favorable perception of an increase in expenditure in election years; incumbents who won the previous election with large numbers and by a greater margin tend to also perform well in re-election; and that sharing a political party with a strong regional candidate—first two places of his election—favors the provincial incumbent. The study's intention is to contribute, with the available information, to national literature on subnational electoral behavior. ; El presente trabajo se enfoca en discutir qué factores influyen en los resultados electorales que obtienen los alcaldes y/u organizaciones que se presentan a una reelección en el Perú —es decir, su desempeño electoral—, en particular en el nivel subnacional. Se analizan las elecciones provinciales del 2010 mediante una regresión lineal del porcentaje de votos que obtuvieron en sus intentos reelectorales. Utilizando una base de datos propia —construida a partir de información proveniente del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Infogob y PNUD, se encuentra que la capacidad de gasto de los incumbentes influye sobre el número de votos que estos obtienen; que el aumento del gasto en años electorales es visto favorablemente por los electores; que los candidatos que ganaron en 2006 con mayores porcentajes y mayor diferencia respecto al segundo se desempeñan mejor en las reelecciones; y que compartir partido con un candidato regional fuerte —es decir, que quedó entre los dos primeros de su elección— favorece al candidato del nivel inferior, en este caso, provincial. Reconociendo la posibilidad de que elementos distintos a los planteados importen, así como los límites de las hipótesis y variables esbozadas, el trabajo pretende, a partir de la información disponible y la revisión de distintas investigaciones, dilucidar elementos útiles para futuras aproximaciones respecto al comportamiento electoral en el nivel subnacional peruano.

The peruvian political system is characterized by incumbent's low reelection rates at sub-national level, in that sense, incumbency has been qualified as a disadvantage to politicians in search of reelection. Owing to that, the existence of some cases of mayors that have managed to stay in office for multiple periods of government is surprising; Magdalena del Mar is an exam- ple of it. In this district, Francis Allison has attained reelection in three consecutive elections, obtaining high percentages of vote. For that reason, the present article seeks to explain Allison's trajectory in the office of district mayor, through political strategies analysis used to manage continuity in office and citizens' perceptions of themselves. The importance of attributes linked to incumbency are stressed; in that sense, Allison's success comes from his capacity to satisfy ci- tizens' needs (using formal and informal governance mechanisms) and from his political ability. To succeeding its aim, the investigation has recourse to data compilation about the municipality; semi-structured interviews to government employees and key actors in civil society; and stratified multistage surveys in the district. ; El sistema político peruano se caracteriza por las bajas tasas de reelección del incumbente a nivel subnacional; en ese sentido, la incumbencia ha sido calificada como una desventaja para los políticos en búsqueda de la reelección. Debido a ello, sorprende que, a nivel distrital, existan algunos casos de alcaldes que han logrado mantenerse en el cargo por múltiples periodos de go- bierno. Magdalena del Mar es un ejemplo de ello. En este distrito, Francis Allison ha logrado la reelección en tres períodos consecutivos, con altos porcentajes de votación. Por eso, el presente artículo busca explicar la trayectoria de Allison en el cargo de alcalde distrital a través del análisis de las estrategias políticas empleadas para lograr la continuidad en el cargo y de las percepciones ciudadanas sobre las mismas. Se destaca la importancia de atributos ligados a la incumbencia. De esta manera, el éxito de Allison proviene de su capacidad de satisfacer las necesidades de los ciu- dadanos (a través del uso de mecanismos formales e informales de la gestión gubernamental) y de su habilidad política. Para cumplir su objetivo, la investigación recurre a la recopilación de datos sobre la municipalidad; la realización de entrevistas semi-estructuradas a funcionarios públicos y a actores claves de la sociedad civil; y la aplicación de encuestas estratificadas polietápicas en el distrito.

In this research note we present preliminary evidence on the characteristics of twenty-four congressional electoral campaigns during the Chilean national elections of 2005 & then utilize it to create a typology of campaign types for incumbents & challengers. The evidence was collected through participant observation & in-depth interviewing in six electoral districts of the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. Additionally, we systematized secondary information available for each district & candidate. The statistical & Boolean analysis of this data yields the following results: a) different campaign profiles exist; b) the most important variable in causing those divergent profiles is incumbency, as incumbent legislators seeking reelection spend systematically more than their challengers; c) although the previous trend holds among different types of districts & across political parties, incumbent candidates of the Alianza spend more than their counterparts of the Concertacion, especially when competing in popular districts; d) other theoretically important factors such as candidate's access to an extensive partisan network in the district, the use of party-symbols in campaigns, the reliance on anti-party or outsider rhetoric, or congressmen's Congress attendance record do not seem to affect election or reelection chances. Our analysis also identifies the campaign types that are most likely to generate the election of incumbents or challengers. Most notably we found that the most effective (but very unusual) way for challengers to beat an incumbent is to spend more than, & aggressively confront, their own coalition's incumbent candidate. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

The objective of this research is to explore the existence of budgetary political cycles at municipal level in Chile. As stated in the literature, the existence of budgetary policy cycle encourages / motivates a politician in exercise to modify the structure of expenditure with the objective of obtaining re-election in office. In the case of the elections of mayor of Chile in 2012, we made a cross-section estimation and the results show a positive relationship of the municipal spending of the 2 years prior to the election over the vote received by an incumbent. In addition, the previous vote of the incumbent and the membership of a political coalition affect the percentage of votes received. ; La presente investigación tiene como objetivo explorar la existencia de ciclos políticos presupuestarios a escala municipal en Chile. Tal como se ha planteado en la literatura, la existencia de ciclo político presupuestario incentiva/motiva a un político en ejercicio a modificar la estructura de gasto con el objetivo de obtener la reelección en el cargo. Para el caso de las elecciones de alcalde de Chile del año 2012, realizamos una estimación cross-section y los resultados evidencian una relación positivo del gasto municipal de los 2 años previo a la elección sobre con la votación que recibe un incumbente. Además, la votación previa del incumbente y la pertenencia a una coalición política inciden en el porcentaje de votos recibidos.

Analyzes elections in 1991, 1994, and 1997 to explain changes in voting; relevance of incumbents' economic performance and voter turnout. Summary in English p. 309.

Electoral preferences radically changed between 1994 and 2012. Based on surveys taken from voters as they left the polling place, this article analyzes the relationship between the voter's perception of change in the economic situation and preference for the incumbent party in this period. Economic retrospective vote is one feature of voter's behavior widely present, of a small magnitude and almost constant in all elections, except in moments of big economic changes. The effect of economic perceptions on the vote for the incumbent party is of a limited magnitude, because voter's party identification mediates this relationship between perceptions and vote. Adapted from the source document.

We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model¿s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that affected local state capacity across Mexican municipalities and over time. Our difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a national shock that threatened the Mexican government¿s hegemony in the early 1960s. The intensity of this shock, which varied across municipalities, was partly explained by severe droughts that occurred during the 1950s.

Abstract: When do oil dependent governments spend oil rents in expanding political machines through patronage and clientelism, as rentier theories claim, or in providing better public services? Using regression analysis for panel data and two case studies for the Argentine provinces (1983-2013), this study shows that infrastructure can rise and patronage decline during oil booms. When rents are high and the oil sector creates new jobs, incumbents tend to increase capital investment. They cannot compete with oil salaries and use infrastructure to cope with the sector?s pressures for basic services. When rents decline in contexts of job destruction in the oil sector, and the rest of the private sector cannot absorb the layoffs, incumbents tend to increase patronage to contain social turmoil and secure core voters.

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

This article reviews the role that economic performance plays as incumbents look to maintain political support in Latin America. Survey data from 18 Latin America countries in 2014 show that Latin Americans' perceptions of economic performance reflect macroeconomic outcomes, respondents' own personal situations, and political considerations. Respondents hold politicians accountable for perceived sociotropic outcomes, with those who perceive that things have gone badly considering alternatives to the incumbent more than abstention or nullifying their vote. Finally, the electoral effect of economic performance varies systematically across countries, with economic volatility increasing its salience while political and economic factors that concentrate control of economy in domestic actors and economic policy in the incumbent party facilitate attributing responsibility to the government. While perceived outcomes have their roots in a variety of national-level and personal factors, voters generally approach accountability for those outcomes in a sophisticated manner. ; Este artículo revisa el papel que tiene el desempeño económico sobre el apoyo político de los presidentes en América Latina. Con datos de una encuesta de 18 países de América Latina en 2014, muestro que las percepciones de los latinoamericanos de desempeño económico reflejan los resultados macroeconómicos, las situaciones personales propias de los encuestados, y consideraciones políticas. Los encuestados hacen responsable a los políticos por los resultados sociotrópicos percibidos, y aquellos que perciben que las cosas consideran alternativas electorales al presidente y su partido más que la abstención o anular su voto. Por último, el efecto electoral del desempeño económico varía sistemáticamente entre los países, con la volatilidad económica incrementando su relevancia mientras que los factores políticos y económicos que concentran el control de la economía en los actores nacionales y la política económica en el partido del presidente facilitan la ...

El carácter descentralizado que presenta la integración multinivel en determinados partidos que compiten en distintas arenas al interior de regímenes federales, se torna evidente en las largas y complejas negociaciones pre-electorales que se desarrollan entre actores que desempeñan cargos ejecutivos. Como resultado de las mismas, los oficialismos nacionales, provinciales y municipales pueden adoptar estrategias de cooperación y competición que impactan sobre las arenas de competencia de sus contrapartes. El objetivo de esta tesis es explicar la variación de estas estrategias entre presidentes e intendentes de los 24 municipios del conurbano bonaerense en el peronismo argentino, a partir del análisis de resultados electorales y estrategias de integración correspondientes a los comicios anteriores. Para ello, se conceptualizará a la vinculación entre oficialismos de distintos niveles de competencia como una relación entre principales y agentes, la cual nos permitirá analizar la dinámica que asume la delegación multinivel de labores electorales al interior de los partidos políticos. Las consecuencias observables de este enfoque analítico dan a lugar a cuatro hipótesis, tres de las cuales son confirmadas. ; The decentralized nature of multilevel integration in certain parties that compete in different arenas within federal regimes, becomes evident in the long and complex pre-electoral negotiations that take place between incumbents. As a result of these, the national, provincial and municipal incumbents can adopt cooperation and competition strategies that impact on the competence arenas of their counterparts. The goal of this disertation is to explain the variation of these strategies between presidents and mayors of the 24 municipalities of the Buenos Aires' suburbs in the argentinian peronism, from the analysis of electoral results and integration strategies corresponding to the previous votings. In this vane, the link between incumbents of different arenas will be conceptualized as a relationship between principals and agents, which will allow us to analyze the dynamics assumed by the multilevel delegation of electoral tasks within the political parties. The observable consequences of this analytical approach give rise to four hypotheses, three of which are confirmed.