Dogface Soldiers is an interdisciplinary and image centered cultural history of the Army of the United States' infantry riflemen in the Mediterranean- and European Theaters of Operations of World War II. Its methods transcend the boundaries of conventional historiography and make use of Clifford Geertz's anthropological method of thick description as well as military used comprehensive analysis methods. - Dogface Soldiers ist eine interdisziplinäre und bildbasierte Kulturgeschichte US-amerikanischer Infanterieschützen des europäischen Zweiten Weltkriegs. Methodisch werden konventionelle Grenzen der Histriogarpahie überschritten und Anleihen bei Clifford Geertz und seiner anthropologischen "Thick Description", sowie bei comprehensive analysis-Modellen militärisch-operativer Provenienz genommen.
Dogface Soldiers is an interdisciplinary and image centered cultural history of the Army of the United States' infantry riflemen in the Mediterranean- and European Theaters of Operations of World War II. Its methods transcend the boundaries of conventional historiography and make use of Clifford Geertz's anthropological method of thick description as well as military used comprehensive analysis methods.
Our research establishes a decision-making framework for use during the acquisition of the next individual combat rifle system. We utilize four possible courses of action to display the decision-making model. The four primary evaluation factors to optimize the squad are lethality, accuracy, mobility, and interoperability. The first part of the model is a value approach that normalizes these four different performance factors for system comparison. The second part of the model is a qualitative approach that examines other potential risk factors. We analyze, normalize, and weigh the performance factors, for comparison of each course of action against programmatic, political, and international risks. Program risks focus on the cost, schedule, and performance of each potential course of action, while maintaining the best interest of our soldiers and American taxpayers. Political risks are uncertain based on the stakeholders involved within Congress and militaryメs leadership. International risks are primarily concerned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 5.56mm caliber is the NATO standard, and any adaptation of a new weapon and caliber may invoke criticism from our NATO allies. In the end, our research provides senior leaders with an initial recommendation for gaining overmatch capability against our peer and near-peer adversaries. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program
"Signals of the bugle horn in the movements of light troops," 2 plates at end. ; Imperfect: Plate 9 wanting. ; Translated from the German: Das Verhalten derer Soldaten und Unterthanen . signed P.L. and issued in 1757 in a collection of Prussian army regulations with title Allerneueste acta publica.--cf. Brit. mus. cat., v. 63, col. 1585. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Dogface Soldiers is an interdisciplinary and image centered cultural history of the Army of the United States' infantry riflemen in the Mediterranean- and European Theaters of Operations of World War II. Its methods transcend the boundaries of conventional historiography and make use of Clifford Geertz's anthropological method of thick description as well as military used comprehensive analysis methods. - Dogface Soldiers ist eine interdisziplinäre und bildbasierte Kulturgeschichte US-amerikanischer Infanterieschützen des europäischen Zweiten Weltkriegs. Methodisch werden konventionelle Grenzen der Histriogarpahie überschritten und Anleihen bei Clifford Geertz und seiner anthropologischen "Thick Description", sowie bei comprehensive analysis-Modellen militärisch-operativer Provenienz genommen.
Dogface Soldiers ist eine interdisziplinäre und bildbasierte Kulturgeschichte US-amerikanischer Infanterieschützen des europäischen Zweiten Weltkriegs. Methodisch werden konventionelle Grenzen der Histriogarpahie überschritten und Anleihen bei Clifford Geertz und seiner anthropologischen "Thick Description", sowie bei comprehensive analysis-Modellen militärisch-operativer Provenienz genommen. ; Dogface Soldiers is an interdisciplinary and image centered cultural history of the Army of the United States' infantry riflemen in the Mediterranean- and European Theaters of Operations of World War II. Its methods transcend the boundaries of conventional historiography and make use of Clifford Geertz's anthropological method of thick description as well as military used comprehensive analysis methods.
Dogface Soldiers ist eine interdisziplinäre und bildbasierte Kulturgeschichte US-amerikanischer Infanterieschützen des europäischen Zweiten Weltkriegs. Methodisch werden konventionelle Grenzen der Histriogarpahie überschritten und Anleihen bei Clifford Geertz und seiner anthropologischen "Thick Description", sowie bei comprehensive analysis-Modellen militärisch-operativer Provenienz genommen. ; Dogface Soldiers is an interdisciplinary and image centered cultural history of the Army of the United States' infantry riflemen in the Mediterranean- and European Theaters of Operations of World War II. Its methods transcend the boundaries of conventional historiography and make use of Clifford Geertz's anthropological method of thick description as well as military used comprehensive analysis methods.
Publisher's adverisements on p. [1]-[14] (2nd group). ; "Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1861, by J.B. Lippincott & Co. in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Easern District of Pennsylvania"--T.p. verso. ; At head of title: By authority. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The organization of command in the mechanized section on M80A infantry fighting vehicle is defined by the regulations and textbooks of mechanized units. The problem that is not covered in the regulations is the organization of subordination of soldiers of the mounted crew when performing tasks outside the vehicle. The regulations stipulate in principle that command is executed by single seniority and subordination, but that the mechanized section commanders organize their crews in the way they think is appropriate, in accordance with a certain mission and tasks. The decision-making on transfering commanding competencies and organization of subordinates in the chain of subordination within the mechanized section is a dilemma even for experienced commanders of mechanized units because this is defined by general principles of performing activities, whereby it is not known where the riflemen, sniper and machine gunners should be when they are outside the fighting vehicle. During preparation and execution of activities, the mechanized section commander should adapt the model of subordination in relation to task, space, time and other factors that occur in combat operations. Thus, it can happen that the commander or deputy commander divides the mounted part of the mechanized section into several smaller units (groups, teams) in order to perform some task. The research performed by the analysis of content in regulations and textbooks, observing the way of work during the performance of activities, anticipating possible situations and discovering examples of good practice of the mechanized section commanders, the models presented in this paper have been formed. After studying literature and questioning professional military personnel, the results of the research are the models of subordination in the mechanized section when the mounted part of the section is outside the vehicle. The analyzed models are divided into groups of models, where the dismounted part of the section is divided into: 1) basic model, 2) two groups and 3) three groups.
Pages 136-172 are also numbered 8-44. Pages 182-208 are also numbered 10-32. Pages 218-303 are also numbered 6-91. ; Each part has also separate pagination. ; pt. I. Infantry tactics.--pt. II. Cavalry tactics.--pt. III. Artillery tactics.--pt. IV. Regulations. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Military Service Inst.
This paper will first define the words and terms applicable to the topic of light infantry that appear in eighteenth-century literature so that there is an understanding of how an eighteenth-century soldier conceived of warfare. After establishing this connection, this paper will follow a chronological chain of events that focuses on the creation of regular light infantry in European armies in Europe and North America from the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) until the beginning of the Revolutionary War (1740-1775), how those events influenced Washington, the first use of light troops during the Revolutionary War, and how the Continental light infantry developed through the war. This paper will not delve into the intricacies of battles because historians have well-examined the few notable battles involving the Continental light infantry. However, this paper will draw from battles the tactics that highlight the regular and irregular methods used by the light infantry and highlight details from campaigns and battles that depict how Washington and other leaders employed the light infantry. This paper argues that Washington recognized that trained, properly equipped, and competently led light infantry was more effective against regular and irregular enemies, rather than other American irregular light troops that often proved ineffective against those same enemies. Washington based his decision first, by drawing from his military experiences on the North American frontier, and second from European theory and practical application of regular light infantry forces in European armies. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; "The Picked Corps of the American Army": The Light Infantry of the Continental ArmyBrian K. GerringA paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for theMaster of Arts in Military HistoryNorwich UniversityMH 562D Capstone PaperDr. John RocheAugust 23, 2020 Gerring 1This position is only twenty miles from New York island; and was accordingly occupied by the van guard, consisting of light infantry; that is to say, the picked corps of the American army.—Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North-AmericaThe history of the War of American Independence is replete with studies of military campaigns, leaders, weapons, and tactics. Historians frequently focus on particularmilitary units that have becomeingrained into American folklore concerning the war, such as the minutemenmilitia or Daniel Morgan's riflemen. Even the broadtopicof the Continental Army receives an adequate amount of scholarly consideration. However, one element within the army's structure that does not receive significant attention is the light infantry. Writing in 1900, Henry Johnston noted this absence of research concerning the Continental light infantry, concluding that "our books contain little about them."1In 1926, John Wrightsimilarly noted that the Continental light infantry suffered from scholarly neglect.2There has been minimal scholarly research into the Continental light infantry nearly a century later. When scholars do mention the Continental light infantry, they relegate those forces to a paragraph or two containing some form of exposition.This paper will begin to fill that scholarly voidby providing abroad overview of the history of the Continental light infantry.The inattention from historians towards theContinental light infantry likely stems from the seemingly insignificant role these forces played in the Revolutionary War's overall outcome.While onlybriefly touching on that topic, this paper arguesthat the Continental light infantry did fulfill a unique role for the army during the war. The Continental light infantry wasso unique that John Wright assessed them asthe first elite unit created within the regular American army 1Henry P. Johnston, The Storming of Stony Point (New York: James T. White, 1900), 68.2John W. Wright, "The Corps of Light Infantry in the Continental Army," The American Historical Review31, no. 3 (1926): 461. Gerring 52perception proved that the regular light infantry wassuddenly the preeminentelite force within the Continental Army.Wayne also advocated for a distinct uniform for the light infantry, which again indicatestheir status as elite troops. Contemporary troops considered as elite wore something unique, either headgear or uniforms—the most notable examples were the tall grenadier caps covered in bear fur and leather helmets of the British dragoons and light infantry.252Wayne wrote to Washington,expressing that as the commander of the corps, he should "have it in our power to Introduce Uniformity among the Light Corps belonging to the Respective States, andInfuse a Laudable pride and Emulation into the Whole."253He further concluded that the light infantry should have:an Elegant Uniform & Soldierly appearance—so much so that I would much rather risque my life and Reputation at the Head of the same men in an attack Clothed & Appointed as I could wish, with a Single Charge of Amunition—than to take them as they appear in Common with Sixty Rounds of Cartridges.254However, Washington opposed the outfitting of the light infantry with distinctive uniforms, noting that "the Light Infantry being only considered as detachments from the line ought to bear the uniform of the Regiments from which they are taken."255Despite this, Wayne did order the light infantry under his command to adorn their caps with hair, which was not a regular standard for the army's headgear.256252Cuthbertson's suggestion that light infantry should wear "jackets made from old coats . . . and snug little caps composed from old hats, and the pairing of the coat skirts" is evident in the British light infantry uniforms during the Revolutionary War. Bennett Cuthbertson, Cuthbertson's System for Management for the Complete Interior of a Battalion of Infantry, rev. ed. (Bristol: Rouths and Nelson, 1776), 190-191.253"From Brigadier General Anthony Wayne," July 4, 1779, Fort Montgomery, in PGW, https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-03-21-02-0289[accessed 28 Jun 2020].254Ibid. 255"To Brigadier General Anthony Wayne," September 14, 1779, West Point, in PGW, https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-03-22-02-0353[accessed 28 Jun 2020].256Robert Gamble, "The Orderly Book of Captain Robert Gamble[. . .]," in Collections of the Virginia Historical and Philosophical Society[. . .] (Richmond: T. W. White, 1833), 256. Gerring 53Congruent with the light infantry under Wayne in the main army was the light infantry operating with MajorGeneral John Sullivan. Washington tasked Sullivan to engage and destroy most of the Indians of the Six Nations, including any Tory allies and any British troops,in western New Yorkin late spring of 1779. Washington originally devised that a quarter of the troops participating in this campaign would "harrass and distract the enemy, and create diversions, in favor of the principal operation," which are known aspects of lapetite guerre.257However, Washington's later conception of the campaign involved Sullivan operating in the irregular tactics of the Indians, coupled with regular tactics. Washington suggested to Sullivan:as general rules ought to govern your operations—to make rather than receive attacks attended with as much impetuosity, shouting and noise as possible, and to make the troops act in a loose and dispersed a way as is consistent with a proper degree of government concert and mutual support—It should be previously impressed on the upon the minds of the men when ever they have an opportunity, to rush on with the warhoop and fixed bayonet—Nothing will disconcert the Indians more than this.258This reflects that Washington relied on his experiences because he understood howto engage and defeat Indians using proven combat-tested methods. Sullivan began his campaign on June 18, 1779 after months of extensive preparations. During Sullivan's Expedition, there was a designated light corps composed of various troops under the command of BrigadierGeneral Edward Hand.259Some of these troops were regular light infantry companies. Captain Leonard Bleeker—the Major of the Brigade for BrigadierGeneral James Clinton—records that each of the four regular regiments in Clinton's brigadehad 257"To Major General Horatio Gates," March 6, 1779, Middlebrook, in PGW, https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-03-19-02-0391[accessed 07Jun 2020].258"To Major General John Sullivan," May 31, 1779, Middlebrook, in PGW, https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-03-20-02-0661[accessed 07Jun 2020].259Dearborn, Journals of Henry Dearborn,164; Adam Hubley to Hand, June 22, 1779, Sunbury, in Linn and Egle, Pennsylvania in the War, 2:11. Gerring 54light infantry companies.260Bleeker notes that these light infantry companies operated in conjunction with riflemen under Hand.261Therefore, these light infantry soldiers operated more in-line with the light troops at Saratoga, which were a combination of riflemen and designated light infantry troops. It is unlikely these light infantry troops receivedthe same training as Wayne's troops because the two bodies of troops were separate from each otherand Wayne was actively conducting operationsduring Sullivan's Expedition. Despite this, Hand's corps did containsome troops with experiencein light operations, such as some remnants of Morgan's Regiment.262During movement, Hand's light corps acted as the forward element, staying a mile in front of Sullivan's troops.263If attacked on the move, the light corps acted as a maneuver element to either surround the enemy or move through the regular troop formation to form a rear-guard.264The light corps routinely operated well in advance and detached from the main force.265Due to their ability to move quickly, Hand's light corps also operated as a quick reaction force.266On one occasion after Sullivan's troops repelled an ambush, the light infantry chased the fleeing Indians three miles.267On August 13, Hand led a portion of the light infantry in advance of the armyoutside the village of Chemung; Indians ambushed this force, and the light 260Leonard Bleeker, The Order Book of Captain Leonard Bleeker, Major of Brigade[. . .] (New York: Joseph Sabin, 1865), 104-105, 128. The Major of the Brigade was the Brigade Inspector, which operated under the auspice of the Continental Army's Inspector General, see Bleeker, Order Book,11-12. The four regiments under Clinton were the 3rd, 4th, 5th New York, and the 7th Massachusetts, see Dearborn, Journals of Henry Dearborn,165n28. 261Bleeker, Order Book, 128.262Richard B. LaCrosse, Revolutionary Rangers: Daniel Morgan's Riflemen and Their Role on the Northern Frontier, 1778-1783(Westminster, MD: Heritage Books, 2007), 46-48, 119.263Dearborn, Journals of Henry Dearborn,165.264Ibid., 166-168.265Linn and Egle, Pennsylvania in the War, 2:17.266Dearborn, Journals of Henry Dearborn,186; Adam Hubley, "Journal of Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Hubley," in Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan, ed. Frederick Cook (Auburn, NY: Knapp, Peck, Thomson, 1887), 150.267Ibid., 178. Gerring 75Martin, James Kirby and Mark Edward Lender. 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Each part has also separate pagination. ; pt. 1. Infantry tactics.--pt. 2. Cavalry tactics.--pt. 3. Artillery tactics.--pt. 4. Regulations. ; Mode of access: Internet.
