Suchergebnisse

The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.

Das Abkürzungsverzeichnis gibt in seiner, verbesserten, 2. Auflage den Stand bis März 1990 wieder

leyds-60-8116.pdf created from original pamphlet in the WJ Leyds Collection held in the Africana Section of the Stellenbosch University Library and Information Service. ; Manual on the Law of Insolvency (No. 21 of 1880), amended by Law No. 5 of 1893 of the South African Republic. ; Title and text in English or Dutch.

A theoretical analysis of the problem of conflict between states or alliances, founded on the Nash theory of bargaining & cooperative games (Nash, J. F., "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, 1950, 18, 155-162). Assumptions that must be met to make the use of this theory possible are elucidated. Given these assumptions, precise meanings can be given to such concepts as "dominance" & "strategic equilibrium." Such game-theoretical understanding provides an alternative to warfare as a means of gaining knowledge of relative military strength, thus making unnecessary the Clausewitzian process of repeated warfare. A two-step process -- a stage of strategic rivalry, & a cooperative phase -- leads to attainment of an ideal final agreement for both sides. An application to the global East/West matrix from 1970 to 1987 is presented, & means of applying game-theoretical methods realistically to international relations are proposed. 7 Tables, 3 Figures. Modified HA