Suchergebnisse

In the public discourse on issues of international security in the context of threats created by the Russian Federation, such threats are determined primarily by actions below the threshold of "war" (of a hybrid nature) and are made using non-military means, e.g. in relation to cyberspace. Actions of this nature are carried out by the aggressor's special services or groups of hackers and activists associated with them whose aim is to paralyse the functioning of the attacked state (its administration, critical infrastructure). Such activities are multilateral; activity is undertaken in many fields (social media, provocative events, establishing pro-Russian organizations, creating information portals) and is still escalating. The purpose of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, is to identify the activities and assess the impact of Russian information warfare conducted by the Russian Federation in cyberspace in 2014 and 2022 on the security of Ukraine. The research used general-methodological research methods – primarily, analysis and critique of literature. The case study method was used to identify specific examples of information warfare used by the Russian Federation against selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Keywords: security, information warfare, cyberspace, Ukraine, Russian Federation Streszczenie: W dyskursie publicznym zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w kontekście zagrożeń kreowanych przez Federację Rosyjską determinowane są przede wszystkim przez akcje z użyciem działań poniżej progu wojny (o charakterze hybrydowym) za pomocą środków niemilitarnych, m.in. w odniesieniu do cyberprzestrzeni. Działania o takim charakterze prowadzone są przez służby specjalne agresora lub powiązane z nimi grupy hakerów oraz aktywistów, których celem jest paraliżowanie funkcjonowania państwa atakowanego (jego administracji, infrastruktury krytycznej).

The paper presents the methods and means of conducting information policy by the Ukrainian authorities after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. The analysis is presented in institutional and functional terms using the method of functional analysis, which demonstrated that the information policy of Ukraine during the period of martial law is effective and provides the state (with) information security in terms of military aggression.

Litwa, Łotwa i Estonia są jedynymi państwami wchodzącymi w skład byłego ZSRR, które współcześnie przynależą zarówno do Unii Europejskiej, jak i do Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego, przez co zajmują specjalne miejsce na mapie interesów swoich wschodnich sąsiadów. Praca ma na celu wykazać, że wojna informacyjnawymierzona w państwa bałtyckie jest elementem i przejawem szerszej strategii Federacji Rosyjskiej, wykraczającej daleko poza wspomniany region. Na podstawie analizy kilkuset przekazów medialnych z lat 2016–2020, wyciągnięto wnioski na temat ostatnich trendów i metod prowadzenia kampanii dezinformacyjnych, jak i przedstawiono główne narracje na płaszczyźnie wspólnotowej, politycznej, społecznej, historycznej i gospodarczej. ; Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are the only countries that were part of the USSR, which today belong to both the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, therefore they occupy a special place on the map of interests of their eastern neigbours. The intention of this article is to demonstrate that the information warfare activity against the Baltic States is an element and expression of Russia's broad strategy, which extend far beyond this region. Based on the analysis of several hundred 2016–2020 media covereges, the conclusions were drawn about the latest trends and techniques for conducting disinformation campaigns, as well as the main narratives at the community, political, social, historical and economical level.

The objective of this study is to identify and analyse the methods of disinformation utilized by Russia to disseminate information in the Ukrainian information field. The main tasks include defining the concept of disinformation and explaining its societal dangers, characterising Information-Psychological Operations (IPSO) as a component of Russia's disinformation campaign against Ukraine and investigating the most prevalent elements utilised by Russia in the dissemination of disinformation. This study is aimed at the synthesis and combination of methods of monitoring, content analysis, and comparative analysis. The article selects publications that exhibit disinformation targeted at Ukrainian society. Disinformation propagated by Russia is subsequently refuted by either foreign or Ukrainian publications, including the "NotaEnota" organisation. The study reveals that Russian disinformation aims to propagate specific narratives and manipulate mass consciousness. Disinformation involves intentionally creating misleading and manipulative content, often in the form of artificially created fakes. The information field of Ukraine has become the primary battleground for Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, which include disinformation, propaganda, and fakes. To effectively counter these tactics, society needs to develop critical thinking skills and media literacy to discern and evaluate information critically. Future research aims to delve deeper into the methods employed in creating disinformation, their objectives, and potential strategies to prevent or counteract their influence.

The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.

The name of special services is applied to the civil and military services that organize and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Their operations are an element generating social and political trust between the political authorities and citizens. Given the current conditions of international relations and the international situation, a state is required to have efficient special services at its disposal. Anegative impact of globalization on state functioning, both in its external and internal dimensions, forces Polish special services to strengthen their fundamental function, that is providing information. The weakness of military intelligence and counterintelligence follows from the dissolution in 2000 of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI), and wasting their potential for political reasons. The role and task of special services in a democratic state should be to protect the liberty and democracy of the political system's principles, as set out in the Constitution, instead of protecting particular interests. The nature of the transformations occurring in security circles in Poland and related globalization processes, as well as civilizational, cultural and technological changes and the emergence of a civil society, demand a different attitude to the special services to be taken both by the public authorities and society, and make changes in their functioning necessary. This also calls for the need for a theoretical interpretation of the operations of modern Polish special services in a democratic state of law. ; The name of special services is applied to the civil and military services that organize and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Their operations are an element generating social and political trust between the political authorities and citizens. Given the current conditions of international relations and the international situation, a state is required to have efficient special services at its disposal. Anegative impact of globalization on state functioning, both in its external and internal dimensions, forces Polish special services to strengthen their fundamental function, that is providing information. The weakness of military intelligence and counterintelligence follows from the dissolution in 2000 of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI), and wasting their potential for political reasons. The role and task of special services in a democratic state should be to protect the liberty and democracy of the political system's principles, as set out in the Constitution, instead of protecting particular interests. The nature of the transformations occurring in security circles in Poland and related globalization processes, as well as civilizational, cultural and technological changes and the emergence of a civil society, demand a different attitude to the special services to be taken both by the public authorities and society, and make changes in their functioning necessary. This also calls for the need for a theoretical interpretation of the operations of modern Polish special services in a democratic state of law.

The name of special services is applied to the civil and military services that orga-nize and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Their operations are an element generating social and political trust between the political authorities and citizens. Given the current conditions of international relations and the international situation, a state is required to have efficient special services at its disposal. A negative impact of globalization on state functioning, both in its external and in-ternal dimensions, forces Polish special services to strengthen their fundamental func-tion, that is providing information. The weakness of military intelligence and counterintelligence follows from the dissolution in 2000 of the Military Intelligence Services (WSI), and wasting their potential for political reasons. The role and task of special services in a democratic state should be to protect the liberty and democracy of the political system's principles, as set out in the Constitution, instead of protecting particular interests. The nature of the transformations occurring in security circles in Poland and related globalization processes, as well as civilizational, cultural and tech-nological changes and the emergence of a civil society, demand a different attitude to the special services to be taken both by the public authorities and society, and make changes in their functioning necessary. This also calls for the need for a theoretical in-terpretation of the operations of modern Polish special services in a democratic state of law.

The article presents a proposal for changes in the regulations concerning broadly understood wiretapping. The dynamics of the development of crime using new technologies, in particular cybercrime, poses increasing challenges to the judiciary, law enforcement authorities and special services, which can only be met by introducing new legal solutions to enable the latest technological developments to be applied. At the same time, judicial case law imposes an obligation on the legislator to seek and create new legal solutions that would be able to reconcile the interests and rights of an individual with the common good. The question, therefore, arises whether a further revision of the rules is necessary in this regard, or whether a completely new approach is needed to look at the way of legal regulations concerning issues related to procedural and operational wiretapping. The article attempts to present this issue, taking into account, in particular, the changes in surveillance regulations due to the continuous and progressive development of the 5G network and the planning of the gradual implementation of the 6G network. In the authors' opinion, the presented constructive comments de lege ferenda should be helpful in establishing a new law on operational control. The law that would comply with constitutionally guaranteed standards on civil rights while equipping the state and its law enforcement and special services with effective tools to combat new forms and manifestations of crime. The authors intend to present the issue of wiretapping – in the broad sense, against the background of modern technologies and new legal solutions, while respecting the principles of the Polish criminal trial and the expectations of practice in combating the most serious crimes effectively. ; W artykule przedstawiono propozycję zmian w przepisach dotyczących szeroko rozumianego podsłuchu. Dynamika rozwoju przestępczości posługującej się nowymi technologiami, a w szczególności przestępczości cybernetycznej, stawia przed wymiarem sprawiedliwości, organami ścigania i służbami specjalnymi coraz większe wyzwania, którym można sprostać, jedynie wprowadzając nowe rozwiązania prawne pozwalające na stosowanie najnowszych osiągnięć technicznych. Jednocześnie orzecznictwo sądowe nakłada na ustawodawcę obowiązek poszukiwania i tworzenia nowych rozwiązań prawnych, które potrafiłyby pogodzić interesy i prawa jednostki z dobrem ogólnospołecznym. Powstaje zatem pytanie, czy konieczna jest kolejna nowelizacja przepisów w tym zakresie czy też niezbędne jest całkowicie nowe spojrzenie na sposób unormowań prawnych dotyczących zagadnień związanych z podsłuchem procesowym i operacyjnym. W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę przedstawienia tej problematyki, biorąc pod uwagę przede wszystkim zmiany przepisów inwigilacyjnych w związku z ciągłym i progresywnym rozwojem sieci 5G i planowaniem stopniowego wdrażania sieci 6G. Przedstawione konstruktywne uwagi de lege ferenda w ocenie autorów powinny stać się pomocne do ustanowienia nowego prawa dotyczącego kontroli operacyjnej. Prawa, które czyniłoby zadość normom gwarantowanym konstytucyjnie w zakresie praw obywatelskich i jednocześnie wyposażałoby państwo i jego organy ścigania oraz służby specjalne w skuteczne narzędzia walki z nowymi formami i przejawami przestępczości. Intencją autorów jest przedstawienie problematyki dotyczącej podsłuchu sensu largo na tle współczesnych technologii i nowych propozycji rozwiązań prawnych przy jednoczesnym poszanowaniu zasad polskiego procesu karnego oraz oczekiwań praktyki w skutecznym zwalczaniu najpoważniejszych przestępstw.