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This paper examines the history of the phenom enon of Information Warfare and the increasingly dominant role that deception is taking within its framework. The concept of information warfare began as a technology oriented tactic to gain information dominance by superior command and control. This soon developed into a realization of the power of information as both a 'weapon' as well as a 'target'. The importance of information ra ther than its associated vehicle – information technology − created a situation where influence became a critical factor in conflict. As the nature of conflict changed to being an almost ongoing situation, control over mass communication be- came a high priority task for governments as we ll as the military. As such, the manipulation of information became an essential function. Thus, th e world of deception became an integral part of official communications between governments and their constituency.

The conceptions of warfare and battlefield have astonishingly evolved, going from a traditional view of military ammunition performed in land, sea or air, to the most novel electronic devices which rule today's international conflict strategies in cyberspace. Some examples of the latter weapons operating in the so-called fifth domain, like pen drives, drone strikes, keyboards and malware, are even considered innocuous at the first glimpse, especially when compared to other type of classic artillery. Howbeit, these gadgets were the ones that fostered the current limitless cyber race – which was noticeably triggered by the cyber attack occurred in Estonia (2007) – and has since then proved capable of causing way more alarming consequences, mainly if targeting critical national infrastructures. This present dissertation will dwell on the analysis of the enforcement of international law bodies towards acts of cyber war carried out by state or non-state agents, taking into specific consideration the application of the international criminal law norms. Thereunder, the focus of the study will remain on the characterization of cyber attacks, as either potential crimes of war or aggression.

This paper examines the ethics of the practice of information warfare at both the national and corporate levels. Initially examining the present and past actions of individual hackers, it moves to the more organised, future military and economic warfare scenarios. It examines the lack of legal or policy initiatives in this area.

Cyber information warfare (IW) is a double-edged sword. States use IW to shape the hearts and minds of foreign societies and policy makers. However, states are also prone to foreign influence through IW. This assumption applies mainly to liberal democratic societies. The question examined in this article is how Russia uses IW on other countries but protects itself from the same activities. The authors' main argument is that while Russia executes influence operations and IW in cyberspace, it strives for uncompromising control over its domestic cyberspace, thus restricting undesirable informational influence over its population.

Poland presents an interesting case study for Russian information warfare, as Russia's strategies and methods carry deeper meanings given the long history of antagonism between the two countries. Polish strategies to counter Russian information warfare have been much more effective than those of other countries that have fallen victim to this war tactic. In Poland, the Law and Justice Party has been tightening control over the domestic political space and adding new physical structures - such as cybersecurity hardware, surveillance mechanisms, and new federal agencies - that have contributed to its efforts to combat Russian information warfare. At the same time, however, these methods have undermined the rule of law within Poland.