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There is a principle difference between the structures of, say, an ant colony, however elaborate and finely structured it may be, and that of a modern, capitalist society. On the face of it, this is of course a trivial point. Of course, ants and humans are different. We have much more complicated and varied behaviour, invent technologies and find surprising ways of destroying ourselves. Ants have one or very few purposes, while humans are full of ideas and constantly renew themselves. Nonetheless; elaborating more precisely, wherein the principle difference consists, contains, I would claim, some implications for Alenka Zupančič' precise ontological, as well as political, position, which are not that trivial after all. Something else appears in human society, which exceeds or deviates from nature as it otherwise appears, or which, as Zupančič formulates it, represents nature's own inherent deviation (from itself). The difference between the two communities of ants and humans is therefore not only one of degree. Humans are not (just) more "intelligent", efficient, malicious etc.; they are constructing societies that are based on a radical deviation from (anything else in) nature or is this very deviation. The precise nature of this deviation is in many ways the theme of What IS Sex?, (because sex itself is the name of this deviation), and what I would like to do here is to draw some consequences from it, which relate to the political and ontological commitments in the book that are maybe not entirely clear from the text itself.

There is a principle difference between the structures of, say, an ant colony, however elaborate and finely structured it may be, and that of a modern, capitalist society. On the face of it, this is of course a trivial point. Of course, ants and humans are different. We have much more complicated and varied behaviour, invent technologies and find surprising ways of destroying ourselves. Ants have one or very few purposes, while humans are full of ideas and constantly renew themselves. Nonetheless; elaborating more precisely, wherein the principle difference consists, contains, I would claim, some implications for Alenka Zupančič' precise ontological, as well as political, position, which are not that trivial after all. Something else appears in human society, which exceeds or deviates from nature as it otherwise appears, or which, as Zupančič formulates it, represents nature's own inherent deviation (from itself). The difference between the two communities of ants and humans is therefore not only one of degree. Humans are not (just) more "intelligent", efficient, malicious etc.; they are constructing societies that are based on a radical deviation from (anything else in) nature or is this very deviation. The precise nature of this deviation is in many ways the theme of What IS Sex?, (because sex itself is the name of this deviation), and what I would like to do here is to draw some consequences from it, which relate to the political and ontological commitments in the book that are maybe not entirely clear from the text itself.

Gathering into lively conversation scholars in medieval, early modern and object studies, Inhuman Nature explores the activity of the things, forces, and relations that enable, sustain and operate indifferently to us. Enamored by fictions of environmental sovereignty, we too often imagine "human" to be a solitary category of being. This collection of essays maps the heterogeneous and asymmetrical ecologies within which we are enmeshed, a material world that makes the human possible but also offers difficulties and resistance. Among the topics explored are the futurity that inheres in storms and wrecks, wood that resists its burning or offers art and dwelling, hymns that implant themselves like viruses, the ontology of everyday objects, the seep and flow of substance, the resistant nature of matter, the dependence of community upon making things public, and the interstices at which nature and culture become inseparable. Tinker as you will.

AbstractDieser Beitrag erkundet und beschreibt das anthropologische Konzept einer sensorisch und besonders klanglich bestimmten Persona. Hintergrund bilden hierbei die künstlerischwissenschaflichen Forschungsmethoden desSoundwalksnach Hildegard Westerkamp, desSensobiographic WalkingoderSensory Memory Walksnach Helmi Järviluoma sowie Jean-Luc Nancys Körperbegriff und Mario Perniolas Entwurf einer sensorisch verankerten Ideologie unter dem Begriff derSensologie. Am Ende des Beitrags steht der Vorschlag einer Anthropologie, die sich dezidiert anti-normalistisch und nicht-heteronormativ versteht: eine Anthropologie nicht des Posthumanen, das allzu oft reale Diversität, soziale und materiale Differenzen sowie die Partikularitäten und Idiosynkrasien ignoriert und verdrängt; stattdessen argumentiert dieser Beitrag für eine Anthropologie des Inhumanen, der sogenannten "humanoid aliens". Diese Anthropologie versteht sich dann als eine Xenologie, als eine Erforschung des Fremden.