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This Article introduces and explores the concept of institutional reform shaming, which is the public revelation of a failure to comply with a social norm with the intent of generating structural change. Although litigators have long used shaming as a tool for reform, they have typically done so reflexively and with little attention to the nuances and protocols of true reform shaming. At the same time, institutional reform litigation is itself in great need of innovation. The popular perception that such lawsuits are filed by out of touch and elite lawyers on behalf of irresponsible and unsympathetic clients is reflected in an increasingly restrictive civil procedure, legislative and judicial attitudes, and the academic commentary, which is now more interested in new governance and collaborative problem solving than in unwieldy old-school class actions. Previously, litigators had responded to this cultural narrative with a legal one, invoking only doctrine and rights. However, institutional reform shaming provides them with the cultural counter-narrative they need. Traditional litigation will always be necessary if new governance is to work; it is the stick that prompts institutions to collaborate. Reform shaming can breathe new life into this work by reviving and strengthening litigation's role in governance, while embodying contemporary ideals by driving defendants to the bargaining table.

AbstractThis paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous‐exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.

Die Militärregierung von Nigeria setzte 1985 eine Arbeitsgruppe ein mit der Aufgabe, den Öffentlichen Dienst zu reformieren; (es sind bereits zuvor zahlreiche derartige Versuche ergebnislos geblieben). Die gravierensten Ausgangsprobleme werden aufgezählt, gefolgt von den Reformvorschlägen, deren Realisierung recht skeptisch gesehen werden: Dezentralisierung d.h. Reduzierung der Bundesregierung auf gesamtstaatliche Aufgaben; interne Reorganisation der einzelnen Ministerien; Professionalität und Spezialisierung des Verwaltungspersonals und seine Pflicht zu periodischer Weiterbildung; klare Leistungskontrolle gegebenenfalls mit Disziplinarmaßnahmen; bis eine Verbesserung der grundsätzlich an der Leistung orientierten Bezahlung möglich ist, soll die Regierung für angemessenen Wohnraum und andere Zuatzleistungen sorgen. (APAF-Glz)

AbstractThe Nigerian military government set up a panel in 1985 to reform the Federal Civil Service. This panel discovered the following weaknesses, among others: lack of measurable objectives; inadequate evaluations; mismanagement of time; inadequate facilities; disorganization; personnel mismanagement; and overcentralization. It proposed a number of measures to deal with these weaknesses including: decentralization; reorganization; professionalization; more careful evaluations; and appropriate incentives. While these proposals remain unimplemented, structured regular reviews of the civil service should continue.

As water resources become increasing scare in India and demand only increases, the challenge of sustaining irrigation systems and the lands they serve is a matter of crucial importance. In particular, the livelihood of millions of farmers is threatened. India's canal irrigation systems, which have so far made an enormous contribution to food security, are now in crisis because of increasing competition for water, poor management, and declining funding. The authors of this book examine the nature of large-scale surface irrigation systems in India, analyze their associated problems, and discuss the options for reform. They also assess the impact of several pilot reform projects. Among the other important issues discussed are: (1) the government's financial constraints and the political implications of farmers' demands; (2) viable options for institutional reform, including financially autonomous irrigation agencies and incentives for increasing farmers' participation in management; and (3) the cost of irrigation development and the effectiveness of participatory irrigation management. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI2; SAI; Governance; CAPRi ; MTID; EPTD