This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and rules), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare also. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of Insurgency as well
This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well.
This article is the second of three articles which present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well.
This year marked an important transition for the Berkeley Planning Journal: we are now an electronic, open access publication. Our new publication method of record is eScholarship, a service of the University of California. eScholarship allows us to publish our articles online, in an indexed publication, while granting our readers a wide range of rights to download, print, and share our author's work. We are part of a movement in academia in which many scholars are taking a closer look at the way access to their research is controlled.
The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed the motivational impulse for much conflict between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. However, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many more nonstate actors. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience. ; "January 2005." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 18-21). ; The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed the motivational impulse for much conflict between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. However, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many more nonstate actors. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Urban climate insurgency refers to the ensemble of grassroots initiatives aiming to tackle climate change from a radical point of view. Insurgency in this case does not imply violence but rather refers to the radical rejection of the current socioecological system. While explicitly challenging planetary ecocide and climate-change effects, these forms of insurgency target all policies that make the urban condition yet more precarious, demonstrating that climate mobilization is inherently intersectional. The focus here is on the urban dimension of this global climate insurgency that unsettles the dichotomy between rural and urban. It is on the urban terrain, already fissured by racial capitalism but also traversed by antiracist and promigrant movements, that the climate emergency becomes a climate and social justice issue. This introductory essay offers a fresh approach to the new municipalist project and digs into its environmental agenda. From New York to Mälmo, from Rio de Janiero to Istanbul, passing through Jakarta, Bangalore, and Naples, this special issue explores the articulation of radical climate-change politics, the materialization of climate injustices, and grassroots reactions to these injustices in the urban sphere. ; QC 20220328 QC 20220715 ; Occupy Climate Change
Boko Haram emerged as an independent group in Nigeria in the early 2000s and has since begun an insurgency, primarily operating in the northeastern region of Nigeria and increasingly further south and across the country's borders. Researchers have conducted numerous studies analyzing the causes of the insurgency. However few have compared it to other insurgencies in Nigeria or Africa. This thesis analyzes the causes behind Boko Haram's operations by drawing on the main debates within the literature on causes of insurgency in Africa. This analysis demonstrates how the academic literature on insurgency in Africa highlights important causes of Boko Haram's insurgency, but it also identifies gaps in the literature. One of the most important findings of the thesis is that religion can be a dominate cause of conflict. I argue that one of the main causes of Boko Haram's insurgency is the political competition over various issues between Nigerian Islamic organizations and political organizations. The most recent examples are the implementation of Sharia law across many of the states in northern Nigeria coupled with elite mobilization of youth groups affiliated with mosques. The role of religion as a cause of Boko Haram´s insurgency should not however be exaggerated as specific state weaknesses, especially a weak security apparatus, caused by democratization have also been one of the significant causes.
Touching on a top U.S. foreign policy priority, this Special Report identifies several possible outcomes of the insurgency in Iraq, and recommends to U.S. policymakers the best strategies to deal with the current situation and the unfolding futures. ; "October 2006." ; Caption title. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 10). ; Introduction -- The scenario workshops -- The long slog to overcome ethnic and sectarian politics -- Ethnic-sectarian politics derail the political process -- Descent into hell -- Neighboring helping hands -- "Lebanonization" -- Conclusions and recommendations. ; Touching on a top U.S. foreign policy priority, this Special Report identifies several possible outcomes of the insurgency in Iraq, and recommends to U.S. policymakers the best strategies to deal with the current situation and the unfolding futures. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The current study focuses on the mismanaged development sector of Kashmir. It is a well-known fact that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is under the grip of political unrest during the past few decades, which put negative alterations in every sector especially on the development sector. Official estimates indicate that during the continuous cycles of turbulence, the infrastructure/development sector of the state remain in devastated condition. Further the corrupt Government of past as well as the current ruling authority did not take serious concern in the shaping the infrastructure/development sector of the state and as a result the development sector remain inverse in the state.
Afghanistan has been wrapped in insurgency since the Russian withdrawal in 1979, followed by civil war. The emergence of Taliban to power with their self-styled type of imposition of Islamic law compelled the great powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. September 2001 was a turning point in the history of Afghanistan as the NATO forces made their entry under the garb of security. The establishment of a democratic government in the country could not help in uprooting terrorism and insurgency from the country. Since the period of Russian Withdrawal, the country witnessed different eras of Taliban and the democratic governments coupled with the NATO mission. It is a fact that during the long stay of the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan, insurgency could not be completely uprooted since new threats from different groups of insurgents have overpowered the country. Some of the provinces are hit hard by insurgency and terrorism. Efforts to hold peace talks were always dashed to the ground when the ISAF started its military operations against the terrorists.
L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.
L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.
L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.
Afghanistan has been wrapped in insurgency since the Russian withdrawal in 1979, followed by civil war. The emergence of Taliban to power with their self-styled type of imposition of Islamic law compelled the great powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. September 2001 was a turning point in the history of Afghanistan as the NATO forces made their entry under the garb of security. The establishment of a democratic government in the country could not help in uprooting terrorism and insurgency from the country. Since the period of Russian Withdrawal, the country witnessed different eras of Taliban and the democratic governments coupled with the NATO mission. It is a fact that during the long stay of the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan, insurgency could not be completely uprooted since new threats from different groups of insurgents have overpowered the country. Some of the provinces are hit hard by insurgency and terrorism. Efforts to hold peace talks were always dashed to the ground when the ISAF started its military operations against the terrorists.
The primary thrust of the monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms f the instability it wreaks upon governmnet and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these "new" nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial enviornment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the "Duck Analogy" applies. Third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks - a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless! This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena. ; "March 2005." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-47). ; The primary thrust of the monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms f the instability it wreaks upon governmnet and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these "new" nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial enviornment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the "Duck Analogy" applies. Third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks - a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless! This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena. ; Mode of access: Internet.
