In an exceptional interview with Uri Dan, the head of Israeli military intelligence offers a glimpse of the organization's activities. From Al-Qaeda to Palestinian terrorists, from Saudi Arabia to Syria, Aharon Ze'evi looks at all the threats linked to the Arab-Muslim world, not only for the Jewish state, but also for Western nations. Commenting on the U.S. intervention in Iraq, he is convinced that the only reason allied troops did not find weapons of mass destruction was that Saddam Hussein successfully either hid them in Iraq or moved them to Syria. He thinks that Iran is pursuing its secret nuclear weapons program despite the efforts of the international community to dissuade it, & that the country will be delighted when the upcoming elections in Iraq spawn the first Shiite Arab regime in history. This regional upheaval is certainly not a harbinger of only good news. Adapted from the source document.
The Politicization of French Intelligence Services: From Military to Political Control (1940-1947) Sébastien Laurent The exceptional military and political events due to the World War II have deeply modified the conditions under which the French intelligence services acted beforehand. The strict partition between military and political fields at the time of the third Republic has to be considered ail over again. The purpose of this article is to analyse the reasons of this drastic upheaval consisting in the intelligence services escaping from the military command. In London, then in Algiers there was a series of conflicts between the inner French Resistance and the de Gaulle's attendants, leading to the foundation of the SDECE (Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage). Hereafter the intelligence services, linked since 1945 to those of the Presidence du conseil became the aims of hard political struggles in parliamentary circles as in the press of the new regime. The "Passy affair" which occurred in 1946 appeared as a typical example of the new balanced political and journalistic influences from which since then, the secret officers could not escape.
An article that is said to be based on avoiding an amalgam between Islam and terrorism, without however losing criticism. The latter needs to be turned to regarding all subjects, religious or other, starting from the moment when respect of the other is limited. The article continues by saying that Belgium has been involved in the dismantling of the first networks related to the Algerian GIA in 1995 (related to both Afghanistan and Al-Qaida), the "Mellouk" network and the "Goal" and "Asparaguses" files. Adversity is said to stimulate creativity and a lack of means, a maximum use of limited resources and improvisation (only 30 officers of police and intelligence services were involved). Moreover, privileged partnerships are used with befriended services, the fastest possible division of information, and an empathy based on knowing the "other" and its fundamental beliefs. The author sees a threat in the deterioration of religion reduced to simplistic and revengeful political slogans. References. Adapted from the source document.
Résumé Ce texte esquisse l'histoire culturelle d'un groupe de 80 officiers S.S. Nés entre 1900 et 1910, ces hommes sont des enfants de la Grande Guerre et sont à ce titre la cible d'une pédagogie de légitimation du conflit spécifique. L'engagement précoce de ces hommes peut ainsi être appréhendé à l'aune d'un imaginaire de poursuite de la lutte commencée en 1914. L'engagement au sein de la S.S., terme de leur parcours militant, témoigne de la capacité d'attraction du système de croyances nazi et de sa dimension désangoissante. Intégrés à la S.S., ces hommes y combinent un travail de formulation dogmatique à des activités de renseignement et de répression policière. En 1941, ils sont envoyés à l'Est pour diriger les <i>Einsatzgruppen</i>, et, réinvestissant les rhétoriques de guerre intériorisées auparavant, ils les transforment en un imaginaire extirpateur qui leur permet de légitimer les politiques génocides dont ils assument une part non négligeable. This paper tries to sketch out the cultural background of a group of 80 S.S. officers. They were born between 1900 and 1910 and were the children of the Great War, which made them the target of a spécifie pedagogy whose aim was to legitimize the conflict and his increasingly growing violence. The early involvement of thèse men can be viewed as the implementation of a vision of the world in which they pursued the fight begun in 1914. Their enrolment in the S.S. seen as the crowning achievement of their militant life clearly shows the appeal of nazi ideology and its soothing dimension. Integrated into the S.S., they were engaged in ideological work, intelligence activity and police repression. In 1941, they were sent to the Eastem front to lead the Einsatzgruppen. Using the rhetoric of war they had internalized before, they transformed them into a vision of the world based on ethnie eradication, which enabled them to legitimaze the génocide policies, playing a non-negligible rôle in their implementation.
