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Where "national security" comes from? From the origins of this extraordinarily ambiguous concept, we do not know much, if not what historical literature has long established, i.e. it is an American product of the early Cold War, inspired by the experience of the global conflict and dictated by confrontation with the Soviet Union, accompanying the integration of what was precisely called the "national security apparatus". Without denying the importance of this pivotal moment, this article aims to open a new track, looking at what is happening discreetly, a quarter of a century earlier, in the two smaller armed forces intelligence services, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). On the basis of specific lessons learned from the experience of 'modern war', there is a definitive, theoretical and practical break, with four central distinctions in military thinking: war and peace, military and civilian, interior and outside, friend and enemy. Our assumption is that, in doing so, the intelligence services are silently but concretely paving the way for this form of government rationality that will soon be referred to by the concept of 'national security'. ; International audience ; Where "national security" comes from? From the origins of this extraordinarily ambiguous concept, we do not know much, if not what historical literature has long established, i.e. it is an American product of the early Cold War, inspired by the experience of the global conflict and dictated by confrontation with the Soviet Union, accompanying the integration of what was precisely called the "national security apparatus". Without denying the importance of this pivotal moment, this article aims to open a new track, looking at what is happening discreetly, a quarter of a century earlier, in the two smaller armed forces intelligence services, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). On the basis of specific lessons learned from the experience of 'modern ...

Las estructuras de inteligencia y la propia labor de inteligencia desempeñada por éstas en los Estados democráticos constitucionales, han experimentado profundas transformaciones en las últimas décadas. Cambios sustanciales en sintonía con los nuevos tiempos, auspiciados por el propio encaje constitucional de la inteligencia. Un elemento clave a tener en consideración en el desarrollo del relato constitucional actual, así como en los esfuerzos en aras de la defensa y protección del Estado democrático y la salvaguarda de los derechos y libertades fundamentales constitucionalmente amparados. Todo ello fruto de la madurez institucional bajo el rubro del Estado constitucional, alcanzada por los servicios de inteligencia. Transformaciones de calado que, lejos de su reconocimiento, son percibidas negativamente por un amplio espectro de una ciudadanía desinformada y contaminada por falsas informaciones y estereotipos, con respecto a qué son y para qué sirven, los servicios y actividades de inteligencia. Ante este panorama, urge aproximar a la sociedad, a través de la cultura de inteligencia como vehículo de difusión, la relevancia constitucional de los servicios de inteligencia y su labor, conducente a favorecer la consolidación de la democracia constitucional. Para ello, cobra relevancia difundir la legitimidad de los servicios de inteligencia y el desempeño de sus funciones de protección del Estado y sociedad, de conformidad con la legalidad, como un elemento relevante en términos de calidad democrática. ; The intelligence structures and the intelligence work carried out by them in the constitutional democratic states have undergone profound transformations in recent decades. Substantial changes in tune with the new times, sponsored by the constitutional fit of intelligence itself. A key element to be taken into account in the development of the current constitutional account, as well as in the efforts for the defense and protection of the democratic State and the safeguarding of the constitutionally protected fundamental rights and freedoms. All this fruit of the institutional maturity under the heading of the constitutional State, reached by the intelligence services. Transformations of draft that, far from their recognition, are negatively perceived by a broad spectrum of an uninformed citizenship and contaminated by false information and stereotypes, regarding what they are and what they are for, intelligence services and activities. Given this panorama, it is urgent to bring society, through the culture of intelligence as a vehicle of diffusion, the constitutional relevance of the intelligence services and their work, conducive to favoring the consolidation of constitutional democracy. For this, it is important to disseminate the legitimacy of the intelligence services and the performance of their functions of protection of the State and society, in accordance with the law, as a relevant element in terms of democratic quality. ; Proyecto de investigación DER2017-83436-C2-1-R, titulado "Las respuestas en un Estado de Derecho a los retos de seguridad: fortalecimiento democrático, derechos fundamentales y deberes de la ciudadanía", concedido por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad de España

"An intelligence monograph." ; On cover: CSI 92-005, November 1992. ; Author: George Caldwell. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-30). ; Mode of access: Internet.

The fight against terrorism and organized crime require strong collaboration between public security organizations. Public security networks include several agencies that are not bound to each other with strong hierarchical ties. Because of a lack of the strong hierarchical structure, managing public networks is not similar to managing a single government agency. This study aims to examine the factors influencing network effectiveness in the public security sector. The main research questions of the study are: Which factors are important for effectiveness in public security networks? What is the role of inter-organizational trust among partner agencies? Which kind of leadership style will achieve the highest performance in public security networks? What is the relative importance of goal convergence and organizational culture in network effectiveness? How does the relationship between inter-organizational trust, leadership style, goal convergence and organizational culture impact network effectiveness? In order to find these relations, a self-reported survey was sent to 2,095 current and previous Turkish public security network managers. The study found that inter-organizational trust and goal convergence have a positive relationship with network effectiveness. Although facilitator leadership is found to be the most common leadership style in Turkish public security networks, it is found as inappropriate to achieve higher network effectiveness. According to the results, the co-producer network leadership is the most convenient leadership style in terms of network effectiveness. While the results of the descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of organizational culture in public security sector have negative influence on network effectiveness, the hypothesis testing with the covariance structure model only support the negative impact of competition among partner organization. This study contributes to the literature on network effectiveness with particular proposals for the public security managers and practitioners. ; 2014-12-01 ; Ph.D. ; Health and Public Affairs, Dean's Office COHPA ; Doctoral ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

"January 2000." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-42). ; Mode of access: Internet.

From the Book's Introduction: Expanded and updated of Intelligence Community Legal Reference book. The Intelligence Community draws much of its authority and guidance from the body of law contained in this collection. Proves to be a useful resource to professionals across the federal government. ; Shipping list no.: 2009-0431-P. ; "Summer 2009." ; Constitution of the United States of America -- National security act of 1947 -- Intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 2004 -- Central intelligence agency act of 1949 -- National security agency act of 1959 -- Department of defense title 10 authorities -- National imagery and mapping agency act of 1996 -- Homeland security act of 2002 -- Counterintelligence and security enhancements act of 1994 -- Counterintelligence enhancement act of 2002 -- Classified information procedures act -- Foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978 -- Protect America act of 2007 -- USA patriot act of 2001 -- USA patriot improvement and reauthorization act of 2005 -- Detainee treatment act of 2005 -- Military commissions act of 2006 -- Freedom of information act -- Privacy act -- Federal information security management act -- Inspector general act of 1978 -- War crimes act of 1996 -- Interception of wire, electronic and oral communications -- Implementing recommendations of the 9/11 commission act of 2007 -- Executive order 12139 -- Executive order 12333 -- Executive order 12949 -- Executive order 12951 -- Executive order 12958 -- Executive order 12968 -- Executive order 13354 -- Executive order 13355 -- Executive order 13388 -- Executive order 13462 -- Executive order 13467 -- Executive order 13491 -- Executive order 13492 -- Executive order 13493 -- Intelligence sharing procedures for foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted by the FBI -- Guidelines for disclosure of Grand jury and electronic, wire, and oral interception information identifying United States persons -- Guidelines regarding disclosure to the director of Central Intelligence and Homeland security officials of foreign intelligence acquired in the course of a criminal investigation -- Guidelines regarding prompt handling of reports of possible criminal activity involving foreign intelligence sources -- Attorney General's guidelines for domestic FBI operations -- Strengthening information sharing, access, and integration B organizational, management, and policy development structures for creating the terrorism information sharing environment -- Guidelines and requirements in support of the information sharing environment -- Guidelines to ensure that the information privacy and other legal rights of Americans are protected in the development and use of the information sharing environment -- Criteria on thresholds for reporting intelligence oversight matters -- MOU: reporting of information concerning federal crimes -- Intelligence community and government websites. ; From the Book's Introduction: Expanded and updated of Intelligence Community Legal Reference book. The Intelligence Community draws much of its authority and guidance from the body of law contained in this collection. Proves to be a useful resource to professionals across the federal government. ; Mode of access: Internet.

From the Book's Introduction: "We have expanded and updated the Reference Book to reflect legal developments since the previous edition was published in 2009 and in response to comment received from the intelligence community to that edition. The Intelligence Community draws much of its authority and guidance from the body of law contained in this collection. We home this proves to be a useful resource to professionals across the federal government." -P. iii. ; "Winter 2012." ; From the Book's Introduction: "We have expanded and updated the Reference Book to reflect legal developments since the previous edition was published in 2009 and in response to comment received from the intelligence community to that edition. The Intelligence Community draws much of its authority and guidance from the body of law contained in this collection. We home this proves to be a useful resource to professionals across the federal government." -P. iii. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper presents an approach to comparatively analyze the 38 member countries of the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) in terms of government performance in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, taking as a starting point the essence of intelligence services for national security. ; Este trabajo presenta una aproximación para analizar comparativamente a los 38 paísesmiembros de la Organización parala Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) en cuantoal desempeño gubernamental enla atención de la pandemia porCOVID-19, tomando como punto departida la esencia de los serviciosde inteligencia para la seguridadnacional. ; Ce document présente les avancées du projet doctoral qui analyse de manière comparative les 38 pays membres de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), afin d'identifier les cas les plus performants face à la pandémie de COVID-1919 et trouver des éléments reproductibles pour le cas mexicain du point de vue des services de renseignement pour la sécurité nationale. ; Questo documento presenta gli avanzamenti del progetto di dottorato che analizza comparativamente i 38 paesi membri dell'Organizzazione per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo economico (OCSE), al fine di identificare quei casi che hanno avuto una performance migliore nell'affrontare la pandemia di COVID-19.19 e trovare elementi replicabili per il caso messicano dal punto di vista dei servizi di intelligence per la sicurezza nazionale.

At head of title: Committee print. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Issued: [pt.1], corrected print, Apr. 19, 1978; pt. 2, July 20, 1978. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; At head of title: Committee print. ; CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 74 S522-24 ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The paper was presented at the German Historical Institute Moscow on 17 October 2019. The author summarizes the development and key results of recent official history on German public authorities. It shows, that over the past about ten years, historians in Germany have focused intensively on the history of the origins of federal ministries and agencies after the Second World War. Relevant research projects have already been initiated for more than 20 government authorities. Their focus is, on the one hand, to provide confirmed knowledge about personal and conceptual continuities with authorities before 1945. On the other hand, they examine the effects of such continuity on official duties in post-war years. Most recently, in a comparative perspective GDR-ministries were also included in this field of research. The paper gives an overview of these main research perspectives and summarizes key findings. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the research project concerning the history of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), presents the project genesis and first results. It unveils the approaches that have been applied in order to get insights into the cryptic structure, the personnel networks and the clandestine action of the intelligence agency. For this purposes, previously inaccessible intelligence records were disclosed and examined for the first time. Regarding this completely new information basis, the paper concludes by presenting a cultural-historical approach to write a modern official history of the BND. It shows that actions and organisational change can be explored by a combined perspective that reflects internal beliefs and interests as well as the political goal of securing a position for the BND in the emerging West German state. This approach allows to contextualize different recent research results and to classify the manifold continuities of the early BND to its past. ; Der Vortrag wurde am 17. Oktober 2019 am Deutschen Historischen Institut Moskau präsentiert. Darin fasst der Autor die ...

The purpose of the research is to find out the organizational and functional features of the intelligence structures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists foreign centers (1945 – 1950-ies), according to their tasks in the context of the interbloc and socio-political confrontation in the post–war World (during the Cold War). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism and Ukrainocentrism, certain general scientific (analysis, synthesis, systematization) and special-historical (historical-comparative, historical-genetic) methods have been used, which made it possible to investigate the creation and activities of intelligence units of foreign centers of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization in connection with the historical events and processes that took place from the mid–1940-ies to the end of the 1950-ies. The scientific novelty consists in the fact of the very research on the creation of special intelligence units within the structure of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists during the post–war period, their cooperation with Western special services, and the peculiarities of its personnel with the experience of secret anti–Soviet activities in the USSR. The Conclusions. The intelligence activity of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists was one of the least explored aspects of the nationalist movement and the history of national intelligence services. Intelligence training was carried out at the NATO's Special Intelligence Centers. The main way to conduct reconnaissance was to send specially trained teams of emissaries and couriers across the border. According to the strategy of preparation for a possible global conflict with the USSR and the Communist bloc, the intelligence officers were tasked with gathering information about the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the USSR, the secret anti-communist armed activities, the socio–political situation in the USSR and in the Soviet Union.

The purpose of the research is to find out the organizational and functional features of the intelligence structures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists foreign centers (1945 – 1950-ies), according to their tasks in the context of the interbloc and socio-political confrontation in the post–war World (during the Cold War). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism and Ukrainocentrism, certain general scientific (analysis, synthesis, systematization) and special-historical (historical-comparative, historical-genetic) methods have been used, which made it possible to investigate the creation and activities of intelligence units of foreign centers of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization in connection with the historical events and processes that took place from the mid–1940-ies to the end of the 1950-ies. The scientific novelty consists in the fact of the very research on the creation of special intelligence units within the structure of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists during the post–war period, their cooperation with Western special services, and the peculiarities of its personnel with the experience of secret anti–Soviet activities in the USSR. The Conclusions. The intelligence activity of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists was one of the least explored aspects of the nationalist movement and the history of national intelligence services. Intelligence training was carried out at the NATO's Special Intelligence Centers. The main way to conduct reconnaissance was to send specially trained teams of emissaries and couriers across the border. According to the strategy of preparation for a possible global conflict with the USSR and the Communist bloc, the intelligence officers were tasked with gathering information about the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the USSR, the secret anti-communist armed activities, the socio–political situation in the USSR and in the Soviet Union.

The purpose of the research is to find out the organizational and functional features of the intelligence structures of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists foreign centers (1945 – 1950-ies), according to their tasks in the context of the interbloc and socio-political confrontation in the post–war World (during the Cold War). The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism and Ukrainocentrism, certain general scientific (analysis, synthesis, systematization) and special-historical (historical-comparative, historical-genetic) methods have been used, which made it possible to investigate the creation and activities of intelligence units of foreign centers of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization in connection with the historical events and processes that took place from the mid–1940-ies to the end of the 1950-ies. The scientific novelty consists in the fact of the very research on the creation of special intelligence units within the structure of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists during the post–war period, their cooperation with Western special services, and the peculiarities of its personnel with the experience of secret anti–Soviet activities in the USSR. The Conclusions. The intelligence activity of foreign centers of the Ukrainian nationalists was one of the least explored aspects of the nationalist movement and the history of national intelligence services. Intelligence training was carried out at the NATO's Special Intelligence Centers. The main way to conduct reconnaissance was to send specially trained teams of emissaries and couriers across the border. According to the strategy of preparation for a possible global conflict with the USSR and the Communist bloc, the intelligence officers were tasked with gathering information about the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the USSR, the secret anti-communist armed activities, the socio–political situation in the USSR and in the Soviet Union.