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Intro -- INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING: NEEDS, GOALS AND RISKS -- INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING: NEEDS, GOALS AND RISKS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: NEED-TO-KNOW VS. NEED-TO-SHARE -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- CHANGES UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO 9/11 -- The Information Sharing Environment -- LIMITATIONS AND RISKS OF INFORMATION SHARING -- Detroit Bomb Attempt -- Fort Hood Shooting -- WikiLeaks -- CONCLUSION -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 TERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING AND THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- WHY INFORMATION SHARING? -- Information-Sharing Systems -- SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING -- NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING INITIATIVE (NSI) -- PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS -- ISE SAR Functional Standard -- NSI PILOT PROJECT -- ISE Shared Spaces Architecture -- Training -- ISE-SAR EE Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead -- CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- Too Many "Dots " -- Training -- Data Privacy and Access -- Information Technology (IT) Infrastructure -- Metrics -- APPENDIX A. SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION-SHARING SYSTEMS -- Law Enforcement Online (LEO) -- Regional Information Sharing Systems Program (RISS) -- Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) -- Law Enforcement Information Sharing Program (LEISP) -- OneDOJ System -- Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) -- FBI Terrorist Tracking Systems -- Guardian -- eGuardian -- APPENDIX B. ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: BETTER ROAD MAP NEEDED TO GUIDE IMPLEMENTATION AND INVESTMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- BACKGROUND -- History of the Information Sharing Environment -- Our Previous Reports on ISE Efforts

Production-Sharing Agreements (PSAs) are among the most common types of contractual arrangements for petroleum exploration and development. Under a PSA the state as the owner of mineral resources engages a foreign oil company (FOC) as a contractor to provide technical and financial services for exploration and development operations. The state is traditionally represented by the government or one of its agencies such as the national oil company (NOC). The FOC acquires an entitlement to a stipulated share of the oil produced as a reward for the risk taken and services rendered. The state, however, remains the owner of the petroleum produced subject only to the contractor's entitlement to its share of production. The government or its NOC usually has the option to participate in different aspects of the exploration and development process. In addition, PSAs frequently provide for the establishment of a joint committee where both parties are represented and which monitors the operations.

This paper examines whether risk sharing exists in mortgage loan agreements. Specifically, we analyze the effect of the number of co-borrowers on foreclosure risk, using data from Singapore. Through the estimation of probit model, the results consistently show that co-borrowers significantly reduce the foreclosure risk, suggesting the existence of risk sharing among the co-borrowers. In addition, foreclosure risk is reduced proportionately with the number of co-borrowers. Further analysis shows that low-rise properties required a larger number of co-borrowers than high-rise properties in order to share risk effectively. Interestingly, low-rise properties experience a greater decline in the foreclosure likelihood than high-rise properties for every increase in the number of co-borrowers.

United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. In many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of U.S. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. One factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. Understanding both the subtleties of an area's social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in long-term success. Using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies.