Suchergebnisse

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

A systematic solution to this issue would allow both the Ministry of the Interior and subordinate institutions, including the Police department, to apply the uniform EU's financial support distribution mechanism, based on rationality, transparency and objectivity principles, systematic and measured behavior. It is also suggested when evaluating the EU and other funding sources to create a financial source correlation system: to create the map of funded areas, which would allow to see whether there is a duplication of the same areas financed by different sources. In order to achieve more effective systemic distribution of EU's financial support mechanism, the EU financial support distribution model should be introduced in accordance with a number of components: - to make the legal regulation of EU's financial support distribution more exact in the level of Ministry of Interior (to specify the provisions according to: responsible subjects, the EU's support distribution criteria, EU's support distribution procedures and importance of priorities by distributing the support; support distribution mechanism). - to define the criteria of EU's financial support distribution, according to which the EU's financial support is distributed. Criteria (leverages) would allow a more rational and objective distribution of EU's financial support. - to determine (specify) the EU's financial support distribution procedures and importance of priorities when distributing the support logically ranking the priorities according to their importance and providing a very clear position as to why a particular priority has specific need for funds. - to specify the EU's financial support distribution mechanism while providing in advance the target expenditure need inside the area, and only then generalizing a need for specific area.

A systematic solution to this issue would allow both the Ministry of the Interior and subordinate institutions, including the Police department, to apply the uniform EU's financial support distribution mechanism, based on rationality, transparency and objectivity principles, systematic and measured behavior. It is also suggested when evaluating the EU and other funding sources to create a financial source correlation system: to create the map of funded areas, which would allow to see whether there is a duplication of the same areas financed by different sources. In order to achieve more effective systemic distribution of EU's financial support mechanism, the EU financial support distribution model should be introduced in accordance with a number of components: - to make the legal regulation of EU's financial support distribution more exact in the level of Ministry of Interior (to specify the provisions according to: responsible subjects, the EU's support distribution criteria, EU's support distribution procedures and importance of priorities by distributing the support; support distribution mechanism). - to define the criteria of EU's financial support distribution, according to which the EU's financial support is distributed. Criteria (leverages) would allow a more rational and objective distribution of EU's financial support. - to determine (specify) the EU's financial support distribution procedures and importance of priorities when distributing the support logically ranking the priorities according to their importance and providing a very clear position as to why a particular priority has specific need for funds. - to specify the EU's financial support distribution mechanism while providing in advance the target expenditure need inside the area, and only then generalizing a need for specific area.

Seeking to ensure full national security it is not enough just to guarantee alone State's national security – and security should be guaranteed for whole society's layers and their welfare. In order to guarantee full national security, should be ensured gender equality in the first instance, in all areas: social, military, economic and political. The ideology of feminism precisely declares the ideas of human rights, gender equality and gives more universal conception of security. It is not ensure just State's national security, but it implements economic State's growth, progress, implements the image of welfare State and develops the ideas of democratic culture and tolerance. It is important to guarantee external State's security, but also it is worth to regard to ensuring of State's internal security. Internal security – satisfaction the needs and welfare of sections of society determines existing of the united, stable society, which, if it necessary, might withstand, be resistant against the treats for national security. The master's thesis consists of an introduction, three teaching sections, conclusions and a list of references. The aim of the research – Articulation and conceptualization of the links and influences of national security with gender – feminist theory and highlighting, concretization and implementation of the positive and functional purpose of gender equality positive values in Lithuanian public security policy. The methodology of the research. In the first chapter is analyzing dispersion of feminism ideas and their problems, based on analytical, descriptive, historical and systemic methods. In the second chapter is highlighted interactions of national security and feminism, based on structural, functional, hermeneutic security as one of the goals of gender equality and interpretive, critical, and design methods. The third chapter concretizes gender equality issues in the context of Lithuania's national security, based on comparative, modeling and political forecasting methods. Conclusion. Full national security is not possible if is not ensured gender equality. Ensuring gender equality enables society's harmony, its stability, security, development of democratic culture, social modernization also existence of welfare State and its economic progress.

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'