Suchergebnisse

At head of title: Committee print. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Includes index ; William H. Jenner, chairman of subcommittee ; Mode of access: Internet.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; At head of title: Committee print. ; CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 73 H482-2 ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Cover title. ; Includes bibliographical footnotes. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Hearings held June 3 1969. ; pt. 1-A-B. Georgetown University. 2 v. -- pt. 2. Kent State University -- pt. 3-A-B. George Washington University. 2 v. -- pt. 4. The American University -- pt. 5. University of Chicago; Communist Party efforts with regard to SDS -- pt. 6-A. Columbus, Ohio, high schools -- pt. 6-B. Akron, Ohio; Detroit, Mich.; and Pittsburgh, Pa. -- pt. 7-A. Return of prisoners of war, and data concerning Camera News, inc., "Newsreel" -- pt. 7-B. SDS activities at Fort Dix, N.J.; Washington, D.C.; and Chicago, Ill. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The main objective of the paper is to present the issues of the protection of internal security and constitutional order in view of the tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency in Poland. The author of the text seeks answers to the following questions. (1) To what extent does the lack of clear-cut frames for the ISA's activity influence the instrumental use of this agency? (2) Do over-generalised legal regulations on the ISA's activities lead to poorer efficiency of this agency's operations? (3) Does faulty regulation related to the ISA's range of activities result from inadequacies in Polish legislation, or maybe from the intention to endow the special services with greater freedom of action?In reference to the above questions, the author puts forward the following theses: (1) the selected and analysed legal instruments exert an infinitesimal influence on the scope of the application of "special measures", such as the operational control or access to telecommunications data. Art. 3 of the Bill of 2014 contains too many vague terms or expressions whose legal definitions are missing from Polish legislation; (2) it seems reasonable that the range of the ISA's activities has been restricted, e.g. as regards drug-related crime. However, other areas of the ISA's interest have witnessed few changes, and its impromptu involvement with specific threats and offences is left to the 'political decision' of the Head of the ISA and the Minister of the Interior; (3) the impractical solutions are partly a result of an inadequate 'legislative culture', in this case, at the level of the Ministry of the Interior. This shortcoming might be the result of excessive haste during work on the Bill; nevertheless, such works always carry a political load, which means that the interests of the services themselves, as well as of the state, played an enormous role in this project. ; Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie problematyki ochrony bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i porządku konstytucyjnego przez pryzmat zadań i działań Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w Polsce. W tekście przedstawiono kilka pytań: (1)W jakim stopniu brak szczegółowego określenia zakresu działalności ABW wpływa na instrumentalne wykorzystanie tej służby specjalnej? (2) Czy dość ogólne regulacje prawne, w zakresie zadań ABW, wpływają na niższą efektywność działania tej służby specjalnej? (3) Czy niewłaściwy sposób regulacji kwestii związanych z zadaniami ABW wynika z niskiego poziomu legislacji polskiego legislatora, czy może z chęci pozostawienia służbom specjalnym dość dużej swobody działania?W związku z pytaniami przedstawiono następujące stwierdzenia: (1) wybrane i analizowane rozwiązania prawne nie zmieniają zbytnio, zakresu stosowania "specjalnych środków", takich jak kontrola operacyjna czy dostęp do danych telekomunikacyjnych. W art. 3 Projektu z 2014 r. znajduje się zbyt wiele zwrotów niedookreślonych oraz zwrotów, których definicji legalnych trudno szukać w polskim ustawodawstwie; (2) słusznie ograniczono zadania ABW w zakresie chociażby przestępczości narkotykowej, jednakowoż w innych wypadkach w zakresie działań ABW w zasadzie niewiele się zmienia, a nakierowanie na określony rodzaj zagrożeń i przestępstw będzie "decyzją polityczną" Szefa ABW, jak i Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych; (3) część chybionych rozwiązań jest wynikiem niskiej "kultury legislacyjnej", w tym wypadku na poziomie Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych. Możliwe, że uchybienia są wynikiem pospiesznych prac nad projektami, jednakowoż prace te mają zawsze "wymiar polityczny". W tworzeniu rozwiązań na pewno dużą rolę odegrały interesy samych służb i interes państwa.

Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie problematyki ochrony bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i porządku konstytucyjnego przez pryzmat zadań i działań Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w Polsce. W tekście przedstawiono kilka pytań: (1) W jakim stopniu brak szczegółowego określenia zakresu działalności ABW wpływa na instrumentalne wykorzystanie tej służby specjalnej, (2) Czy dość ogólne regulacje prawne, w zakresie zadań ABW, wpływają na niższą efektywność działania tej służby specjalnej? (3) Czy niewłaściwy sposób regulacji kwestii związanych z zadaniami ABW wynika z niskiego poziomu legislacji polskiego legislatora, czy może z chęci pozostawienia służbom specjalnym dość dużej swobody działania? W związku z pytaniami przedstawiono następujące stwierdzenia: (1) Wybrane i analizowane rozwiązania prawne nie zmieniają zbytnio, zakresu stosowania "specjalnych środków", takich jak kontrola operacyjna czy dostęp do danych telekomunikacyjnych. W art. 3 Projektu z 2014r. znajduje się zbyt wiele zwrotów niedookreślonych oraz zwrotów, których definicji legalnych trudno szukać w polskim ustawodawstwie; (2) słusznie ograniczono zadania ABW w zakresie chociażby przestępczości narkotykowej, jednakowoż w innych wypadkach w zakresie działań ABW w zasadzie niewiele się zmienia, a nakierowanie na określony rodzaj zagrożeń i przestępstw będzie "decyzją polityczną" Szefa ABW jak i Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych; (3) Część chybionych rozwiązań jest wynikiem niskiej "kultury legislacyjnej", w tym wypadku na poziomie Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych. Możliwe, że uchybienia są wynikiem pospiesznych prac nad projektami, jednakowoż prace te mają zawsze "wymiar polityczny". W tworzeniu rozwiązań na pewno dużą rolę odegrały interesy samych służb i interes państwa. ; The main objective of the paper is to present the issues of the protection of internal security and constitutional order in view of the tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency in Poland. The author of the text seeks answers to the following questions. (1) To what extent does the lack of clear-cut frames for the ISA's activity influence the instrumental use of this agency? (2) Do over-generalised legal regulations on the ISA's activities lead to poorer efficiency of this agency's operations? (3) Does faulty regulation related to the ISA's range of activities result from inadequacies in Polish legislation, or maybe from the intention to endow the special services with greater freedom of action? In reference to the above questions, the author puts forward the following theses: (1) the selected and analysed legal instruments exert an infinitesimal influence on the scope of the application of "special measures", such as the operational control or access to telecommunications data. Art. 3 of the Bill of 2014 contains too many vague terms or expressions whose legal definitions are missing from Polish legislation; (2) it seems reasonable that the range of the ISA's activities has been restricted, e.g. as regards drug-related crime. However, other areas of the ISA's interest have witnessed few changes, and its impromptu involvement with specific threats and offences is left to the 'political decision' of the Head of the ISA and the Minister of the Interior; (3) the impractical solutions are partly a result of an inadequate 'legislative culture', in this case, at the level of the Ministry of the Interior. This shortcoming might be the result of excessive haste during work on the Bill; nevertheless, such works always carry a political load, which means that the interests of the services themselves, as well as of the state, played an enormous role in this project.

The internet stays a high potential infrastructure of open interaction, hence, governmental desires in monitoring the internet are growing. A demonstrative example might be the attempts to make any technology based communication 'traceable' with the help of a European scheme of data retention (EU direction 2006/24/EC) and its national ratifications. Regarding this, two theses come up: First, governments try to achieve their logic of 'real life' internal security also within the internet regime. Second, the internet changed the society in so far as it opened space for new relevant communities and actors – lobbying more and more on institutionalised paths. This will be shown by analysing the processes in the UK and Germany. A focus will lie on each national implementation of the EU's data retention directive. Societal and especially political differences will find some notion as well, as they build the framework of any political decision making process.

[Contents note continued] --[v.15:2] Part 19. November 27, 1968. 1969. pp. 1305-1422. Part 20. October 16, 1969. 1970. pp. 1423-1457. Part 20. Errata. October 16, 1969. [1] p. Part 21. June 30, 1970. pp. 1459-1522. Part 22. Testimony of Francisco Antonio Tiera Alfonso. February 24, 1971. pp. 1523-1603. Part 23. Testimony of Francisco Antonio Tiera Alfonso. February 25, 1971. pp. 1605-1667.--[v. 15:3] Part 24. Testimony of Roman Gonzalez-Pardo. September 27, 1971. pp. 1669-1686. Part 25. Testimony of Zulema Bregado Guitierrez, Jose Diaz Hernandez, and Juan Diaz Lopez. October 15, 1971. pp. 1687-1723. ; [v.5] Part 1 Testimony of Maj. Pedro L. Diaz Lanz. July 14, 1959. 32 p. Part 2. Testimony of Joseph Zack Kornfeder, supplemented by a staff study of communist anti-American riots. August 13, 1959. pp. 33-140. Part 3. Testimony of Gen. C.P. Cabell, deputy director, Central Intelligence Agency. November 5, 1959. pp. 141-179. Part 4. December 7, 1959. pp. 181-242. Part 5. Testimony of Edward J. Whitehouse. May 26, 1960. pp. 307-323, iii. Part 7. May 2-4, 6, 1960. pp. 325-441, viii. Part 8. January 22, 23, 1960. pp. 443-52, v. Part 8A. May 9, 1960. pp. 523-661, ii. Part 9. August 27, 30, 1960. pp. 663-710, iv. Part 10. Testimony of William D. Pawley. September 2, 8, 1960. pp. 711-769. Part 11. June 5, 1961. pp. 771-792, iv. Part 12. Testimony of Robert C. Hill. June 12, 1961. pp. 793-830. Part 13. March 29, April 26, June 1, July 27, 1961. 1962. pp. 831-906, index.--[v.15:1] Part 14. July 24, 1959, March 31, 1965. pp. 907-978. Part 15. Appendix to part 15. Political prisoners and their relatives in Cuba. Report of the Inter-American Comission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States. 1956. pp. 979-1046. Part 15. September 13, 15, 1966. pp. 1047-1088. Part 16. March 7, 1967. pp. 1089-1167. Part 17. March 7, 8, 1967. pp. 1169-1220. Part 18. June 28, 1967. pp. 1221-1303. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper discusses the current tendency in the EU to promote a criminal justice model focusing on prevention. In doing so, I examine the EU's internal security agenda with regard to criminal law and assess the extent to which this strategy fits the picture of an European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice placing equal value on freedom, security and justice. I also consider the external dimension to the EU's security program by examining the extent to which the EU benefits from the dual layer of security action provided for in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty of the European Union, or whether such double action creates unnecessary complexity. I contrast the current aspirations for more security and prevention in EU criminal law with the Commission's recent communication on the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law. This communication stresses the importance of ensuring coherence in EU criminal law, while also respecting national diversity and serving the citizens. In addition, I discuss the extent to which the EU's promotion of preventive criminal justice risks turning the EU into a disintegrator instead of an agent of European values (depending on what these values are intended to mean in practice).

"Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary, 1952." ; At head of title: Committee print, 82d Congress 2d session ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper presents a theory of foreign military basing as a function of the degree of internal threat facing a host nation. The theory is based on rational choice logic where politicians balance economic and security benefits against sovereignty and legitimacy costs. When internal threat is low a host nation's political actors value legitimacy and sovereignty and hence reduce base access. When internal threat is high economic and security benefits trump legitimacy and sovereignty costs, hence increasing base access. The theory is assessed through process-tracing the historical events around U.S military basing in the Philippines. When internal threat was low from coups and revolutionary movements the Philippine government reduced U.S. basing access, but when a threat from these movements was high they either maintained or increased access. This study suggests more carefully considering the role of internal threats when assessing the dynamics of foreign basing.

It is a striking feature of current international interventions that state institutions, even if their monopoly over the means of violence has disappeared, if indeed it ever existed, receive by far the most attention - and money. Peacebuilding and state-building continue to be considered two sides of the same coin. This report analyses how Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and broader justice sector reform has been integral to the process of the country's state-building process since before conflict officially came to an end in January 2002. The report begins with a summary of the political and security context in which SLP reforms began and an overview of key aspects of the SSR process in Sierra Leone. It then analyses the reform effort specifically, under four broad headings. First, it provides an account of the institutional and political framework within which reforms took place. Second, it reviews a number of technical and operational initiatives undertaken to move reform forward. Third, it reviews institutional reforms to support rebuilding of the SLP. Finally, it addresses broader justice reform efforts that began with initiation of the Justice Sector Development Programme ( JSDP) in 2005 and designed to be continued in the Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme (IASJP), scheduled to begin in 2010.

Since the 1990s the EU has increasingly succeeded in developing a role in the internal security domain. However, this is constrained by the limitations imposed by the Member states in this regard. The provision of internal security is a core function of the state; hence, this domain remains a difficult one for EU policy-making. Since the 1990s the EU has increasingly succeeded in developing its role, having now a formal mandate and a record of progress in four main fields: information sharing, convergence of national internal security systems, facilitation of cross-border cooperation and common international action. Yet the Union's role is constrained by the limitations the Member States have imposed on its action possibilities, a prevailing cooperative rather than integrative rationale and serious implementation deficits. The Treaty of Lisbon offers some additional potential for developing the EU's role, but also protects the Member States' national competences in the field, so that much will depend on the actual content of the new 2010-14 Stockholm Programme for the Area of freedom, security and justice.

The analysis of threats to Poland's internal security during the first year of the fight against the COVID-19 virus pandemic was the aim of the article. The study was based on the theoretical assumptions of this phenomenon and the most important determinants in the area of the political system, social peace and public order, which led to the disruption of the existing social order. The research was based on the descriptive concept and qualitative data analysis, with the interpretation of information contained primarily in the literature on the subject, normative acts, recent scientific studies, as well as media reports. The study ended with a positive verification of the following hypotheses: 1) Actions taken by the government during the fight against the COVID-19 virus pandemic posed threats to Poland's internal security and 2) During the first year of the fight against the pandemic, events occurred that disrupted internal security in the systemic area, social peace and public order.