Suchergebnisse

The relative decline in party membership in West-European countries over the last three decades is an accepted fact in the comparative literature on party organization. However, the bare facts do not explain the reasons for such decline and may leave the feeling that the process is irreversible. A number of scholars relate party membership decline to the introduction of public finance of political parties. They suggest that public financing laws and related arrangements have a negative effect on efforts to mobilize party membership, leading to a decline in political participation. In this article, drawing mainly in the Israeli experience, I argue that public funding does not necessarily lead to membership decline, but that changes in the internal competition rules for electing party candidates to national or local posts may affect party membership more than any other variable. Thus, the decline in membership that has been considered to be irreversible, is in fact highly reversible. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

AbstractThe relative decline in party membership in West‐European countries over the last three decades is an accepted fact in the comparative literature on party organization. However, the bare facts do not explain the reasons for such decline and may leave the feeling that the process is irreversible. A number of scholars relate party membership decline to the introduction of public finance of political parties. They suggest that public financing laws and related arrangements have a negative effect on efforts to mobilize party membership, leading to a decline in political participation. In this article, drawing mainly on the Israeli experience, I argue that public funding does not necessarily lead to membership decline, but that changes in the internal competition rules for electing party candidates to national or local posts may affect party membership more than any other variable. Thus, the decline in membership that has been considered to be irreversible, is in fact highly reversible.

In this article, we analyse the media coverage of party disputes during the first 16 Israeli election campaigns, i.e. in the period 1949 to 2003. Based on a content analysis of newspaper coverage of the two main parties (Labor and Likud) and a qualitative discourse analysis, we maintain that the media coverage of party disputes has undergone major change. From 1949 to 1959 the vast majority of reported disputes reflected external, inter-party debates. From 1961 the level of external debates decreased, while the level of internal, intra-party debates sharply increased. These findings reflect a significant change in the role of `the party' as a category in the Israeli media's political discourse. The party ceased to be a unitary actor in the political arena and became an arena for political disputes. The dynamic change in party coverage has gone through three main phases: an ideological and collective phase of an external-partisan era during the first decade; an interim phase led by a combination of disputes by persons and factions affiliated with former parties; and, finally, the phase of personal polemics. The dynamic is closely related to historical changes in the Israeli party system and in the political communication climate.

In this article, I analyze the importance of party ideologies for foreign policy priorities as revealed in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In doing so, I contribute to an increasing number of studies on the relevance of the partisan theory of public policy for foreign policy making. On the theoretical side, I expect liberal governments to direct more diplomatic efforts towards global development cooperation, that is, the fight against poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and discrimination. By comparison, I argue that the foreign policy of conservative governments emphasizes immediate conflicts and threats to national sovereignty. On the empirical side, I present the statistical analysis of all plenary speeches held by the representatives of 38 stable democracies before the UNGA between 1993 and 2016. My empirical analysis reveals that liberal, internationalist governments are significantly more engaged in UNGA debates on global development cooperation, whereas conservative governments allocate more speaking time to debates on the international law and institutions, including issues of national sovereignty. These results are confirmed when zooming in to UN General Debates. Importantly, I find that all of these effects are conditional on governing parties commanding substantive majorities in their national parliament.

We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.

PurposeThis research attempts to explain the decentralization of investment decision. To do so, it highlights the role of the internal capital market in the allocation of decision rights and control as a factor explaining the effectiveness of investment management. The authors aim to apply the theory of the organizational architecture to the investment decision to understand its complexity and its efficiency.Design/methodology/approachAn empirical test was realized on a sample of 63 Tunisian firms using the methods of canonical correlation and cross tabulations.FindingsEven if organizational complexity has a linear and negative impact (opposite sign to what is expected) on the investment decision decentralization, which creates value, it appears that there is a positive association with the uncertainty of the environment, and a negative one with the scarcity and sharing of financial resources between units on the internal capital market.Originality/valueThe authors show that the role played by the internal capital market in the value creating requires the setting of a centralized organizational structure.

"Wir analysieren die Auswirkungen von Investitionsentscheidungen und internen
Organisationsstrukturen auf die Effizienz und Stabilität von horizontalen
Firmenzusammenschlüssen. In unserer Untersuchung sind Synergien endogen
und es können interne Konflikte in dem fusionierten Unternehmen auftreten. Es
zeigt sich, dass 'stabile' Fusionen häufig nicht zu mehr Effizienz, sondern sogar
zu Effizienzverlusten führen können. Da solche Firmenzusammenschlüsse zu
einer geringeren Wohlfahrt führen, sollte der Regulierer nicht ungeprüft
annehmen, dass potentielle Wohlfahrtsgewinne auch immer tatsächlich erreicht
werden. Außerdem bietet das Papier eine mögliche Erklärung für das Scheitern
von Fusionen." (Autorenreferat)