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As one of America's closest allies, Israel has remained heavily dependent on the US —politically, economically, and militarily—since its creation in 1948.US arms supplies, mostly provided gratis, are channeled via US Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA).According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the US has provided more foreign assistance to Israel since World War II than to any other country.The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) documented that the United States supplied 79 percent of all weapons transferred to Israel from 2018-2022.No one else was even close – the next closest suppliers were Germany with 20 percent and Italy with just 0.2 percent.A Fact Sheet released October 2023, by the US State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, provides a detailed official breakdown on the unrestrained American security assistance to Israel.Steadfast support for Israel's security has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy for every U.S. Administration since the presidency of Harry S. Truman.Since Israel's founding in 1948, the State Department said, the United States has provided Israel with over $130 billion in bilateral assistance focused on addressing new and complex security threats, bridging Israel's capability gaps through security assistance and cooperation, increasing interoperability through joint exercises, and helping Israel maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME).This assistance, says the State Department, has helped transform the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into "one of the world's most capable, effective militaries and turned the Israeli military industry and technology sector into one of the largest exporters of military capabilities worldwide."In the current war, Israel's overwhelming fire power has resulted in the killings of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the destruction of entire cities—mostly with US supplied weapons.Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, a Visiting Professor of the Practice in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, told IPS the October 7 Hamas attacks were horrendous acts and should be condemned as such."Even so, the Israeli responses to those attacks have been indiscriminate – intentionally so," she said.Two days after the Hamas attacks, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant declared that Israel would carry out a "complete siege" of Gaza, including blocking the supply of water, food, and fuel, while also stopping the supply of electricity. And Israeli forces have done so, she pointed out."The US government bears a special responsibility for the continuing Israeli attacks. It has supplied Israel with massive quantities of military aid and weaponry, and Israel has ignored US restrictions on the use of those weapons".This supply of weapons and ammunition allows the Israeli military to continue its indiscriminate attacks in Gaza," said Dr Goldring, who also represents the Acronym Institute at the United Nations, on conventional weapons and arms trade issues."A key first step in reducing the human cost of this war is for the US government to call for an immediate ceasefire. The US government should also halt supplies of weapons and ammunition to Israel, whether from the US itself or from prepositioned stocks elsewhere."Since 1983, the United States and Israel have met regularly via the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to promote shared policies, address common threats and concerns, and identify new areas for security cooperation.According to the State Department, Israel is the leading global recipient of Title 22 U.S. security assistance under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. This has been formalized by a 10-year (2019-2028) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).Consistent with the MOU, the United States annually provides $3.3 billion in FMF and $500 million for cooperative programs for missile defense. Since FY 2009, the United States has provided Israel with $3.4 billion in funding for missile defense, including $1.3 billion for Iron Dome support starting in FY 2011.Through FMF, the United States provides Israel with access to some of the most advanced military equipment in the world, including the F-35 Stealth fighter aircraft.Israel is eligible for Cash Flow Financing and is authorized to use its annual FMF allocation to procure defense articles, services, and training through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, Direct Commercial Contract agreements – which are FMF-funded Direct Commercial Sales procurements – and through Off Shore Procurement (OSP).Via OSP the current MOU allows Israel to spend a portion of its FMF on Israeli-origin rather than U.S.-origin defense articles. This was 25 percent in FY 2019 but is set to phase-out and decrease to zero in FY 2028.Elaborating further Dr Goldring said: "Unfortunately, the situation in Gaza bears similarities to the documented uses of US weapons by the Saudi-led coalition in attacks on civilians in Yemen"She said: "Our response should be the same in both cases. These countries have failed to honor the conditions of US weapons transfers, and should be ineligible for further transfers until they are in compliance.""US arms transfer decision-making gives too much weight to the judgment of government officials and politicians who frequently fail to consider the full human costs of these transfers," she argued."Earlier this year, the Biden Administration released a new Conventional Arms Transfer policy. They claimed that arms transfers would not be approved when their analysis concluded that "it is more likely than not" that the arms transferred would be used to commit or facilitate the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law."The actions of the Israeli and Saudi militaries are examples of ways in which this standard is not being met, declared Dr Goldring.As of October 2023, the United States has 599 active Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, valued at $23.8 billion, with Israel. FMS cases notified to Congress are listed here; priority initiatives include: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft; CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters; KC-46A Aerial Refueling Tankers; and precision-guided munitions.From FY 2018 through FY 2022, the U.S. has also authorized the permanent export of over $5.7billion in defense articles to Israel via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process.The top categories of DCS to Israel were XIX-Toxicological Agents, including Chemical Agents, Biological Agents, and Associated Equipment (this includes detection equipment ((f)), vaccines ((g)-(h)) and modeling software ((i)); IV- Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and Mines; and VII- Aircraft.Since 1992, the United States has provided Israel with $6.6 billion worth of equipment under the Excess Defense Articles program, including weapons, spare parts, weapons, and simulators.U.S. European Command also maintains in Israel the U.S. War Reserve Stockpile, which can be used to boost Israeli defenses in the case of a significant military emergency.In addition to security assistance and arms sales, the United States participates in a variety of exchanges with Israel, including military exercises like Juniper Oak and Juniper Falcon, as well as joint research, and weapons development.The United States and Israel have signed multiple bilateral defense cooperation agreements, to include: a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1952); a General Security of Information Agreement (1982); a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (1991); and a Status of Forces Agreement (1994), according to the State Department.Since 2011, the United States has also invested more than $8 million in Conventional Weapons Destruction programs in the West Bank to improve regional and human security through the survey and clearance of undisputed minefields.Following years of negotiations with the Palestinians and Israelis, humanitarian mine action activities began in April 2014 – this represents the first humanitarian clearance of landmine contamination in nearly five decades.Israel has also been designated as a U.S. Major Non-NATO Ally under U.S. law. This status provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation and is a powerful symbol of their close relationship with the United States.This piece has been republished with permission from Inter Press Service.

Avrupa Birliği (AB) 2004 yılından bu yana Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin büyük çoğunluğunu resmi olarak birliğe kabul etti ve Batı Balkanlarda geriye kalan üye olmayan ülkeler AB'nin yeni hedefi haline geldi. Ancak, Birlik AB politik üyelik koşulları yoluyla kurallarını Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerine kıyasla Batı Balkanlardaki diğer üye olmayan ülkelere aktarırken birtakım zorluklarla karşılaşmıştır. Burada akla iki soru gelmektedir: Birinci soru, "Hangi şartlar altında bu koşullar etkili olabilir?" iken; ikinci soru, "AB üyelik koşulları neden Batı Balkanlarda bulunan ülkelerin iç politikasında kısmen sınırlı bir rol oynar?" şeklindedir. Bu meseleyi açığa kavuşturmak için Schimmelfennig ve Sedelmeier (2004) tarafından "dış teşvik modeli" benimsenmiştir. Bu çalışma "dış teşvik modelinin" bu soruları tam anlamıyla cevaplandıramadığını ve ulusal kimliğin Batı Balkan devletleri olan Hırvatistan ve Sırbistan'da AB üyelik koşullarının etkililiğini belirleme noktasında önemli bir role sahip olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Çalışmanın Hırvatistan ve Sırbistan'ı durum çalışmaları olarak ele almasının sebepleri; bu iki ülkenin eski Yugoslav Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti olmaları ve 1990'lı yıllarda ortak bir savaş tarihi paylaşmalarıdır. Belirtilen bu ortak özelliklere rağmen bu iki ülkenin Birliğe olan üyelik sürecine ilişkin tutumlarının birbirinden farklılık arz ettiği dikkat çekmiştir (Massari, 2010). Hırvatistan AB üyeliğini hâlihazırda 2013 yılında elde etmiş olmasına rağmen, Sırbistan'ın bu üyeliği gerçekleştirme noktasında kat etmesi gereken daha çok yol vardır ; The European Union (EU) has formally initiated the vast majority of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECS) into the Union and Western Balkans' remaining non-EU countries have became the new target of EU enlargement since 2004. The Union, however, has faced some difficulties in transferring its rules to non-member countries in Western Balkans by means of the EU political accession conditionality in comparison to Central and Eastern European Countries. Here are two questions to mind: 'Under what circumstances could the conditionality be effective?' and 'why does the EU conditionality play relatively limited role in the domestic politics of the Western Balkan states?' An "external incentive model" is adopted by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) to articulate the issue. This study addresses this contestation, arguing that the "external incentive model" is incapable of fully answering these questions and that national identity has a huge impact on the determination of the effectiveness of EU accession conditionality by focusing on the problems limiting this effectiveness in two Balkan states, namely Croatia and Serbia. The reasons why the paper has chosen Croatia and Serbia as case studies are that they are republics of former Yugoslavia and that they have shared war history in the 1990s, however act differently on the way to the European Union (Massari, 2010). Although Croatia has become a member of the Union, Serbia still has got a long way to go The European Union has utilised political conditionality as one of the most significant strategies to export its governance and to encourage non-member countries to obey the rules of the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Political conditions, which are necessitated by the Union from the very beginning, can be described as a competitive party system, and free and fair elections. As for the essential political conditions of EU accession that the EU confirmed in 1993, which are also defined as the Copenhagen Criteria, they are the stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, liberal market economy, human rights and lastly the protection of minority rights (Bieber, 2013:2). The required political conditions are flexible. By which it means that some specific requirements could be added to the conditions. For instance, the UE required cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the context of Western Balkans (Frerburh and Richter, 2010:269-71). Predominant studies select "external incentive model" to articulate the logic of EU conditionality and political conditions. This model is based on a rationalist cost-benefit calculation that assumes that states are regarded as rational actors, seeking to boost their interests (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). The tool of conditionality is perhaps the most significant instrument that the EU external governance applies to force would-be member states to obey the rules of the EU. That is, the Union decides its instructions as conditions and would-be member states are expected or required to accept these conditions to receive rewards. Consequently, the target government would face three various pressures namely from the Union, domestic and international politics in return for EU external incentives (Trauner, 2011:8). It is therefore the credibility of the EU conditionality plays a key role in evaluating the pros and cons of EU rewards as opposed to domestic compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004:663-7). This model is, however, unsuccessful in fully articulating why the EU political conditionality could perform better in states like Croatia than in states like Serbia in the context of Western Balkan despite the fact that the Union has provided these countries with rewards. At this point, national identity, as a constructivist variable, has a huge impact on the determination of the effectiveness of EU accession conditionality by focusing on the problems limiting this effectiveness in two Balkan states, namely Croatia and Serbia. National identity is the main theme that determines whether conditionality can be effective or not. Constructivists argue that wouldbe member states would acknowledge the influence of the Union by means of socialisation and persuasion processes. It is these processes internalizing identities with the help of domestic actors (Trauner, 2011). Considering the rules of the EU appropriate and compatible with political conditionality helps domestic actors to stick to given EU rules (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006:27-52). In this sense, national identity, as a filter actor, influences EU conditionality. It is, therefore, crucial to note that states, as social actors, often shape and reshape national identity when they face or interact with different social structures. The EU political conditionality has raised doubts about its effectiveness in the countries in question. This is because they had ethnic conflicts in 1990s that shaped their national identities. It is this historic background affecting the effectiveness of EU political conditionality in Croatia and Serbia in different lights. As a result, the European Union (EU) has formally initiated the vast majority of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECS) into the Union and Western Balkans' remaining non-EU countries have become the new target of EU enlargement since 2004. The Union, however, has faced some difficulties in transferring its rules to nonmember countries in Western Balkans by means of the EU political accession conditionality in comparison to Central and Eastern European Countries. In this paper, it is argued that the "external incentive model" is incapable of fully explaining the issue in question and that national identity has a huge impact on the determination of the effectiveness of EU accession conditionality by focusing on the problems limiting this effectiveness in two Balkan states, namely Croatia and Serbia. The reasons why the paper has chosen Croatia and Serbia as case studies are that they are republics of former Yugoslavia and that they have shared war history in the 1990s, however act differently on the way to the European Union (Massari, 2010). Although Croatia has become a member of the Union, Serbia still has got a long way to go.Cooperation with the ICTY has been very sensitive issue in both Croatia and Serbia where these countries had to comply with it as a result of being tied to EU accession. The way in which the transformation of the EU rules, however, quite varied from one another. Croatian elites saw the cooperation with ICTY as indispensable part of EU accession and in line with Croatian respect of European organizations. Croatia met EU requirements. This is simply because the country was one of the European countries in which the rule of law is respected and obeyed. As far as Serbia is concerned, the cooperation with the ICTY was ensured by Serbian elites who felt forced and oppressed to do so. But they rejected the Hague tribunal. Even though they rejected it, a sense of obligation arising from the fear of being punished by the international community through the cancellation or postpone of EU talks took place regarding detaining suspects. This problematic issue resulted in different images of the EU in the eyes of these two countries. Serbia regards the European Union as a punisher and a superior force that inclined to in Serbia. This could be one of the reasons why there is distance between Belgrade and Brussels. As for Croatia, the image of Europe in the eyes of Croatian people is related to high democratic standards, liberty and civilization (Subotic, 2011:326-7). This could be one of the reasons why there is close cooperation between Croatia and the European Union. The rational incentive model is important for explaining the choice of would-be member states. It is crucial to clarify that this model is valid once the rules of the European Union are compatible with national identity of the would-be member states. Once the national identity of the target state is incompatible with the rules of the EU, it is fair to say that any material condition does not serve a very useful purpose. Therefore, national identity matters

Human freedom and prosperity have varied enormously among and within countries and regions and have changed drastically over short periods. Social sciences research has begun to illuminate how norms and cultures, as well as legal, political, economic, and social institutions, affect freedom and prosperity, but our understanding of how and why these institutions change remains meager. The researchers who gathered at the National Academy of Sciences in 2010 for a Sackler Symposium sought to give a kick-start to the study of institutional dynamics.

The papers presented vary both in their research methods and in the questions they address. The methods range from theory to econometric studies to detailed cases studies, each seeking to highlight some aspect of how institutions change and what accounts for the differences in institutions that emerge in different settings.

Two of the papers in this volume are analyses of stochastic dynamic systems. One captures a process of contagion by which the new norms governing bilateral exchange may invade a population and become widespread. The other studies the evolution of authority in a society with far-sighted decision makers, who sometimes rationally allow erosion in their long-term control to promote sufficiently better short-term outcomes.

The first of these is Peyton Young's “The Dynamics of Social Innovation” (1), which studies the evolution of norms to be used in bilateral interactions. Agents in Young's network model correspond to nodes that interact with their immediate neighbors and earn payoffs in each interaction that depend on how each party behaves. The agents experiment and learn, so behavior in the system can evolve. The paper discusses how the topology of the network, characteristics of individual learning processes, and the size of the potential improvement affects whether norms are adopted, and how quickly. It turns out that a critical property that superior norms (ones that leads to higher payoffs for all) must have for “fast” adoption is that it must be possible for all members of some local clusters of nodes to profit by adopting the norm, even when the other agents in the network do not adopt. This determinant in turn depends on the size of the gains to adopting the norm, as well as on the nature of the network. The nature of the learning process matters, too. For example, too much experimentation can cause a local group to unlearn their superior norm before it has a chance to spread into the rest of the network.

The second is “A Political Model of Social Evolution” by Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin (2), which studies how undemocratic and authoritarian regimes may become progressively more democratic. In their model, choices are made by a changing set of individual decision makers, who rule according to a voting system. Sometimes expanding participation can lead to greater short-run payoffs at the expense of less control in the longer term, and authoritarian regimes may sometimes accept immediate gains even at the risk of reduced control over the longer run. The model provides a framework for studying how the initial state of the system, the payoffs to different actions, and the nature of voting systems affect long-run outcomes of the system. In particular, outcomes can be history-dependent, and change emerges as the combined result of random events and actual choices by the ruling class.

Four of the papers provide general schemata for thinking about a set of issues, from regional and national political leadership and how it affects the evolution of democracy, to the role of international institutions, to the role of norms in promoting economic development both overall and at different stages in development.

Roger Myerson's “Toward a Theory of Leadership and State-Building” (3) surveys his analyses of the problem of nation building, which has both ancient and modern application. The fundamental issues in Myerson's perspective revolve around problems of leadership. On one hand, to gain followers, new leaders must successfully distribute patronage, particularly in times when and places where following the new leader is dangerous. However, the system also needs to provide discipline for the leader, so that promises are kept once the leader gains power. Additionally, for democracy to thrive, it needs to encourage the development of leaders who can establish the credentials and following needed to challenge the existing authority. The paper develops a wide perspective on the groundwork that needs to be laid for nation building, that is, for promoting the development of systems that can evolve into functioning democracies.

Stephen Krasner's “Changing State Structures: Outside In” (4) considers different situations in which, and channels through which, some states deploy purposive strategies to exercise power over other states. His classification covers (i) contracting with basically voluntary agreement of the state that is subject to the influence, (ii) coercion that forces a weaker state to take a particular action or substantially limits its choice set, (iii) institutional power, whereby the stronger state sets the rules of the game of decision-making in the weaker state, (iv) constitutive power, whereby the stronger state establishes the international system within which the weaker state must operate, and (v) productive power, which alters the identities and capabilities of actors in the weaker state. These provide a useful taxonomy and examples for thinking about the interaction between different countries’ institutions and international institutions and organizations.

“Development, Social Norms, and Assignment to Task” by Marcel Fafchamps (5) traces some broad trends in the dynamics of social norms that are required to support different stages in the process of economic development. Developing economies move to greater specialization of labor, requiring more complex interactions to determine efficient allocation of labor to tasks. In the least-developed economies, production occurs in almost self-contained households where workers must be jacks-of-all-trades. As economies develop, families become the basis for small firms that use and eventually employ labor with specialized skills and come to be supervised by the owner or entrepreneur. Finally, as the volume of market transactions grows, large firms arise, with a managerial hierarchy with delegated authority to supervise workers with longer-term employment contracts. Fafchamps examines how the governance of the transactions with workers needs to differ in the different stages, whether the norms and practices appropriate for different stages can coexist or will clash during the dynamics of development, and what this implies for the prospects of successful and speedy development.

In “Individualism, Innovation, and Long-Run Growth,” Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Gerard Roland (6) provide direct and indirect empirical tests supporting the hypothesis that cultures attaching greater social status to innovators experience higher rates of innovation and economic growth. The direct tests use certain cultural scores as independent variables and growth rates as dependent variables. The indirect tests use genetic distance as an instrument for culture, with closer genetic proximity to the US population implying greater cultural similarity.

The last two papers study the roles of two particular but important institutions of development: law (in opposition to custom) and brokerage (facilitating exchange across boundaries).

“Legal Reform in the Presence of a Living Custom: An Economic Approach,” by Gani Aldashev, Jean-Philippe Platteau, and Sake Wham (7) addresses the ability of statutes that empower traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as women, to promote development-enhancing change, even when the statutes conflict with entrenched social norms. Although full enforcement of such laws is rare, by creating an implicit threat to the traditional authorities—loss of face when their decisions are overruled by higher authorities and reduction in the size of the population over which they rule as the disadvantaged populations find better outside options—formal law can shift the bargaining power of parties and lead to changes in outcomes. The paper constructs a theoretical model and offers examples in support.

Finally, “Stabilizing Brokerage” by Katherine Stovel, Benjamin Golub, and Eva Meyersson Milgrom (8) examines one of the most important and puzzling institutions that promotes change through the exchange of goods, services, information, and practices across an otherwise disconnected social network, from one isolated group to another. Agents who do this are called brokers, and their role is problematic. Each side in the transaction may suspect the broker's integrity or impartiality; therefore, brokerage can be fragile. The paper examines and compares three mechanisms that can counter this problem: (i) isolation of brokers into a distinct social group, separated from the transactors, (ii) complete capture of brokers by one side of the transaction, and (iii) grafting of brokerage functions on to other organizations that have separate motives to develop and sustain a reputation for trustworthiness. The authors analyze theoretical considerations and discuss examples of all three, but the inherent fragility of brokerage creates a natural dynamic in which relatively frequent failures are followed by change.

The variety of approaches, in terms of both questions and methods, highlights the richness of this area of research and indeed made for lively discussion at the conference. We hope this collection of papers will serve to broker ideas across disciplines and eventually to deepen social scientists’ understanding of the process of institutional change.

On 8 October 1970 in Luxembourg, Pierre Werner officially presented the plan by stages for an economic and monetary union (EMU) in the European Community. This document was the result of seven months of discussions by a group of experts from the six Member States, chaired by the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Finance Minister. The Werner Report set out the broad lines, principles and stages of an EMU based on the principle of irreversibility and an approach rooted in perfect symmetry between the economic and monetary aspects, with political union as the ultimate objective. It provided for the creation of a "centre of decision for economic policy" that would be "politically responsible to a European Parliament" elected by universal suffrage, and a "Community system for the central banks". It introduced the notion of strong macroeconomic governance, requiring the coordination of budgetary and monetary policies, and full financial integration. It also envisaged the involvement of the "social partners" (employers and unions) in defining economic and monetary policy, since the social dimension was seen as an intrinsic part of EMU. Although it was ultimately not implemented, the Werner Report led to the creation of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) in 1973 in Luxembourg – the embryo of the future European Central Bank. This institutional architecture was inspired by the reflections on a European reserve fund initiated in 1948 by Robert Triffin and subsequently developed through his discussions with Jean Monnet and Pierre Werner. The three were committed to the European cause and shared the same vision of EMU, rooted in "perfect parallelism", democratic strength and a social dimension. Robert Triffin and Jean Monnet, together with other members of Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe, intended to work on the strategy devised by Pierre Werner to build a political consensus around the report.

Why, in some cases, did old elites promote democratization without the partisan capacity to embrace mass politics and without guarantees about their future participation in the new regime? This article investigates the case of the Liberals in Belgium who were eager, in the years between 1893–1921, to launch democratization while founding their actions and choices on a selfless approach to politics. In seeking to identify the source of this democratic preference, one factor, largely ignored in the studies on the first wave of democratization, emerges: the diffusion of democratic ideas and practices from France. Constructing and analyzing two original data sets including, respectively, the personal characteristics of Belgian Liberal MPs who were active during the democratic transition period and the speeches of those who addressed topics related to France, this article shows that the democratic ideas as well as the choices expressed by Liberal MPs in the parliament are significantly related to their prior socialization into French democratic norms. This result has broad implications for understanding ideational transfer and diffusion in the first wave of European democratization, opening new avenues for future research.

In the second half of 2015, Luxembourg will hold the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the 12th time. This country, which lies between France and Germany, has taken on the role of mediator between larger powers and has simultaneously succeeded in defending its vital interests. After the Second World War, its politicians made European integration a key plank of their policy. Since the time of Joseph Bech, from Pierre Werner and Gaston Thorn to Jacques Santer and Jean-Claude Juncker more recently, Luxembourg has proved itself to be a master in the art of political consensus and a rich source of 'men of providence' who have been able to find a way out of Europe's successive impasses.

This Index of Personnalities with their short biographie is an output of the major research project dedicated to the European vocation and achievements of Pierre Werner, a former Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, unanimously recognised as one of the architects of Economic and Monetary Union. The first stage of the research was particularly focused on the plan for the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union (more widely known as the Werner Report or the Werner Plan), drawn up by a group of experts chaired by Pierre Werner and officially presented on 8 October 1970 in Luxembourg.

La thèse réunit cinq travaux portant sur le rôle joué par la fiction dans notre expérience et notre appréhension du monde. La fiction peut-elle véhiculer des contenus de savoir ou constituer en elle-même une source de connaissance ? Cette interrogation est déclinée à travers une série d'études portant sur la sociologie implicite de l'écrivain américain William S. Burroughs ; les musiques industrielles comme dispositifs critiques ; le pouvoir configurateur de 1984 dans la dénonciation des nouvelles technologies de surveillance et de contrôle social ; l'homologie profonde entre pouvoir et narrativité ; ou encore les contre-fictions dans les "sociétés de contrôle". L'introduction générale qui précède ces travaux s'attache à construire deux exemples de "formes fictionnelles d'intelligibilité" conçues comme ressources cognitives et pragmatiques utilisées par les personnes : le "simulacre", qui consiste en la critique originale d'une cible, sur un mode systématiquement ironique, de manière à retourner contre elle son langage et son mode de fonctionnement ; le "futur antérieur", qui propose l'anticipation d'une menace décrite comme déjà advenue, de manière à montrer l'urgence d'une action à entreprendre pour la conjurer. La thèse défend une conception minimaliste et holiste de la connaissance fictionnelle : c'est en tant que moyen au service de la modélisation mimétique de processus politiques et sociaux que la fiction, en activant notre sens du possible, exerce une fonction cognitive. Ces travaux dégagent ainsi les premiers éléments d'un programme de recherche en sciences politiques et sociales autour du pouvoir du et comme récit. Le récit apparaît non seulement comme un objet, mais surtout comme un "analyseur" du politique. ; The thesis assembles five publications dealing with the role played by fiction in our experience and apprehension of the world. Can fiction convey contents of knowledge or even constitute a source of knowledge in itself? This question is broken down into a series of studies about the implicit sociology of American writer William S. Burroughs; industrial music as a critical device; the configuration power of Nineteen Eighty-Four in the denunciation of new technologies of surveillance and social control; the deep homology between power and narrativity; as well as counter-fiction within "societies of control". The general introduction preceding these publications aims at building two examples of "fictional forms of intelligibility" conceived as cognitive and pragmatic resources used by members of society: "simulacrum", which consists in criticising a target, in a systematically ironical mode, so as to turn its language and mode of functioning against it; "future perfect", which proposes the anticipation of a threat described as having already occurred, in order to demonstrate the urgency in taking action to thwart it. The thesis defends a minimalist and holist conception of fictional knowledge: it is as a means at the service of the mimetic modelling of social and political processes that fiction activates a sense of possibilities and exerts a cognitive function. In this way, these collected works intend to give the first elements of a research programme in social and political sciences around power of and as a narrative. Narrative appears not only as an object, but especially as a tool for analyzing politics.

"Rentensysteme und Rentenreformen in der EU bewegen sich im Spannungs-verhältnis von Solidarität und Eigenverantwortung. Diese beiden Prinzipien werden länder- und zeitabhängig definiert. Dennoch lassen sich gemeinsame Entwicklungstendenzen erkennen. Wir analysieren vier Entwicklungstendenzen bezogen auf Reformcharakteristika: institutionelle Verschiebungen, institutio-nelle Erneuerungen und Veränderungen in der Interessenvertretung, von denen wir eine allgemeine Entwicklung ableiten. Die Analyse dieser Länderüber-greifenden Tendenzen zeigt, dass Eigenverantwortung und Solidarität in Rentensystemen redefiniert und neu verlinkt werden, sodass sie einander letzt-lich bedingen." [Textauszug]