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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Nature of the Problem -- Defining Terrorism -- Sources of Contemporary Terrorism -- The Role of Ideology -- The Psychology of Terrorism -- The Power of the Group -- The Effects of Terrorism -- 3. Possibilities for International Cooperation -- The Current Status of Cooperation -- Changing Soviet Attitudes -- 4. Conditions for Future Cooperation -- Rule-making -- Rewards for Cooperation -- Penalties for Noncooperation -- Distinguishing Cooperation from Defection -- 5. Nuclear Terrorism: A Case Study -- 6. Conclusions -- Appendix -- 1. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979) -- 2. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1979) -- 3. Excerpts, Summit Conference Statements (1978-1981, 1984, 1986, 1987) -- 4. Excerpt, Vienna Follow-up Concluding Document (1986) -- 5. Recommendations of Private U.S.-Soviet Meetings on Preventing Terrorism (1989) -- About the Author.

Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation—problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains. By contrast, I argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role. Almost regardless of the issue area, states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement. Furthermore, the bargaining and enforcement problems interact. Using a game model, I show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced, the "shadow of the future" cuts two ways. A high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier, but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. Empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories.

Probleme, die in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit bisweilen entstehen, verfügen über eine gemeinsame strategische Struktur. Bevor Staaten ein Abkommen international durchsetzen wollen, muß in Verhandlungen zunächst darüber entschieden werden, welches Abhkommen zur Anwendung kommen soll. Bisherige Theorien gingen davon aus, daß einige Probleme in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit durch mangelnde Koordination entstehen oder als Folge von Zwangsmaßnahmen. Der vorliegende Artikel beschreibt das Problem als "Erst verhandeln, dann zwingen" und stellt fest, daß diese beiden Strategien miteinander interagieren (SWP-Drh)

Many problems in international relations arise from a combination of the free-rider problem, Mancur Olson's collective action problem (The Logic of Collective Action, second edition, Harvard U Press, 1971), & the prisoners' dilemma. The solution of these problems of interdependence depends on the provision of public goods, eg, global peace, a working monetary order, & liberal trade. It is suggested that the undersupply of public goods has resulted from the decline of a dominant world power, the proliferation of sovereign states, rapid change that prevents the growth of trust, & the absence of a world government. Three systems of international relations are distinguished & illustrated: the exchange system, the threat system, & the integrative or love system. The market failures discussed under the prisoners' & contributors' dilemma are attributed to a lag of institutions behind technology. Six examples of institutional innovations are provided to show how global benefits can be achieved & global harm avoided. Modified AA