Suchergebnisse

Mesteparten av norske havområder ligger nord for polarsirkelen og er åsted for noen av verdens rikeste fiskerier. De største fiskebestandene er delt med andre land, og internasjonalt samarbeid om ressursforvaltningen er derfor en viktig dimensjon ved nordområdepolitikken. Slikt samarbeid er basert på globale normer om hvordan levende marine ressurser skal forvaltes og deles og foregår på en rekke arenaer både bilateralt og regionalt. Samtidig er det også utfordringer knyttet til blant annet fordeling av ressurser i Norskehavet og klimaendringer som medfører at fiskebestandenes utbredelse er omskiftelig. Et føre-var tiltak i forhold til det siste er etableringen av en avtale om å forhindre uregulert fiske i Polhavet.
Abstract in English:Oceans, Fish and Resource Management in the Northern AreasMost of Norway's oceans are situated to the north of the Arctic Circle and some of the world's richest fishing grounds are there. The largest fish stocks are shared with other countries, and international cooperation on the management of the resources is therefore an important aspect of Norway's northern policy. Such cooperation is based on the international norms for how living marine resources are to be managed and shared, and it takes place in a number of bilateral and regional fora. There are challenges related to the allocation of pelagic resources in the Norwegian Sea and climate change driving change in the geographical distribution of fish stocks in the ocean. A recent precautionary measure in relation to climate change and its effects on marine ecosystems is the establishment of an international agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in international waters in the central Arctic Ocean.

Global helse har stått sentralt i norsk utenriks-, utviklings- og helsepolitikk i en årrekke. Norge er anerkjent som en synlig aktør på global helse gjennom vesentlige finansielle bidrag, men også som en aktør som har bidratt til etablering av nye institusjoner og mekanismer som vaksinealliansen Gavi, Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) og Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Norge spiller også en aktiv rolle i det internasjonale helsepolitiske samarbeidet, og er en aktiv deltaker i Verdens helseorganisasjon (WHO). Norge er – og har vært – gjenkjennelig på global helse over lang tid, og i alle internasjonale fora. Vi mener det er viktig å bidra til – og sikre – at konsekvensene av pandemier og globale helseutfordringer på internasjonal fred og sikkerhet også hører hjemme på dagsordenen til FNs sikkerhetsråd.
Abstract in English:Pandemic Response and Global Health in Norwegian Foreign Policy – and in the UN Security CouncilGlobal health has been a priority for Norway and for Norwegian foreign, development and health policies for the past decades. Norway is recognized as an active and consistent partner in global health questions, both through substantial financial contributions and as an advocate for establishing new institutions and mechanisms such as Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance), the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Norway is also playing a leading role in the international cooperation in global health issues and in promoting a coordinated and effective humanitarian response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Norway actively participates and firmly supports the leading role played by the World Health Organization (WHO) in this regard. Norway will continue to be a consistent and recognizable partner in global health issues in all international fora. We firmly believe that it is important to contribute to – and secure – that the implications of pandemics and global health crises can be seen as threats to international peace and security and thus belong on the agenda of the UN Security Council.

I denne artikkelen deler Bjørn Tore Godal sine erfaringer fra da han, som handelsminister, undertegnet EØS-avtalen i Porto i Portugal den 2. mai 1992 på Norges vegne. Han viser hvordan EØS avtalen kan forstås som en forlengelse av en norsk utenrikspolitisk tradisjon der forholdet til Europa alltid har vært komplisert og sammensatt. Mens internasjonalt samarbeid har hatt stor støtte, har det også vært en dyp skepsis mot unioner og stormakter. Som AUF-leder tidlig på 1970-tallet kjempet han også mot norsk medlemskap i EF. Som handelsminister mente han lenger enn en del andre politiske aktører at EØS kunne være et varig alternativ til EU-medlemskap. I dette bidraget viser Godal hvordan EØS-avtalen har fungert, og særlig hvordan han har erfart avtalen i sine ulike roller.
Abstract in English:EEA – in RetrospectIn this article, Bjørn Tore Godal shares his experiences from when he, as Minister of Commerce, signed the EEA Agreement in Oporto, Portugal on May 2, 1992, on behalf of Norway. He shows how the EEA Agreement can be understood as a natural prolongation of Norwegian foreign policy tradition where relations with Europe always have been complex and complicated. While international cooperation has been highly supported, there has also been a deep skepticism of unions and great powers. As a leader of AUF (the social-democratic youth league) in the early 1970s, he also fought against Norwegian membership in the EC. As a Minister of Commerce, he believed that the EEA could be a lasting alternative to EU membership. In this contribution, Godal shows how the EEA Agreement has worked and how he has experienced the functioning of this agreement in his various roles.

Siden 2003 har regeringerne i Norge, Danmark, Sverige, Finland og Island arbejdet med at udvikle og implementere nationale strategier for cyber- og informationssikkerhed. Strategierne omfatter mange forskellige områder; f.eks. institutionel kapacitetsopbygning, uddannelses- og forsvarspolitik, internationalt samarbejde etc. Denne artikel skitserer landenes forskellige strategier per august 20181 for statens rolle i samfundets cyberresiliens, dvs. de kritiske samfundsfunktioners evne til at modstå og overkomme negative effekter af hændelser med udspring i cyberdomænet. Endvidere skitserer artiklen de udfordringer, som regeringerne har konstateret, at opgavefordeling og ansvarsplacering har givet, samt hvordan implementeringerne af strategierne reflekterer disse erkendelser. Her har den finske regering vist sig mest konsekvent ved at placere ansvaret for implementeringen af cyberresiliens centralt i en magtfuld organisation og udstyre den med konkrete styringsredskaber og en stor, velintegreret kontaktflade til den private del af Finlands kritiske infrastruktur.
Abstract in English
Since 2003, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have developed and implemented national strategies for cyber and information security. The strategies include several topics such as organisational and human resource capacity building, defence policy, international cooperation, etc. This article gives a thumbnail sketch of the countries' strategies for the state's role in societal cyber resiliens (the ability to resist and overcome negative effects of events emanating from the cyber domain). It then shortly describes the experienced challenges with distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and how the implementation of the strategies reflect attempts to overcome them. It concludes that the Finnish government has gone furthest by placing responsibility for implementation centrally in an influential organisation and giving it a centrally developed common matrix for assessing progress and a well-established formal network within the private segment of Finland's critical infrastructure.

Bærekraftsmålene har blåst nytt liv i debatten om hvorvidt globale fellesgoder kan og bør finansieres med bistand. I denne replikken til Nikolai Hegertuns essay En stille revolusjon av utviklingspolitikken, argumenterer jeg for at det er liten grunn til å være strengt normativ i dette spørsmålet, blant annet fordi den statistiske definisjonen av bistand ikke utelukker dette; det er presedens for en viss bruk av bistand for slike formål; bistandsvolum uansett ikke er et fullstendig mål på givernes innsats og sier lite om kvaliteten på den; og fordi en rekke nasjonale og regionale fellesgoder – som uten tvil kan finansieres med bistand – er nødvendige for at globale fellesgoder skal kunne produseres eller konsumeres av innbyggere i fattige land. Vi vet heller ikke med sikkerhet at tradisjonell bistand gir større velferdsøkninger i fattige land enn finansiering av globale fellesgoder. Det er mulig å se for seg både at de globale utfordringene sluker bistanden og at de gir støtet til internasjonalt samarbeid i et omfang vi ikke har sett før. Gitt de underliggende drivkreftene – en kombinasjon av altruisme og egeninteresser – er det mer sannsynlig med gradvise endringer i utviklingspolitikken enn en revolusjon.
Abstract in English:Development Policy: Revolution is an Illusion?The Sustainable Development Goals have reinvigorated the debate on whether aid can and should be used to finance global collective goods. In this comment on Nikolai Hegertun's essay Aid's Silent Revolution? (En stille revolusjon av utviklingspolitikken), I argue that the statistical definition of aid does not categorically rule out such financing, for which there are precedents; that aid volumes in any case do not tell the full story about the extent and quality of donor efforts; and that many national and regional collective goods – which certainly can be financed by aid – are necessary for the production and enjoyment of global collective goods by individuals living in developing countries. Moreover, we do not know with certainty that traditional aid produces greater welfare improvements in such countries than global collective goods do. It is possible to envisage both that current global challenges will swamp aid and that they will induce international cooperation on an unprecedented scale. However, given the underlying forces of altruism and national self-interest, a gradual change in development policy is more likely than a revolution.

On April 25, 2013, UN's Security Council established a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force for Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) is to take over and continue the security and stabilization task that the French-led military operation in cooperation with UN's African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, initiated in January 2013. The aim of this report is to present a number of long- and short-term perspectives for the recently initiated peace- and state-building process in Mali by focusing on the historical, structural and political causes of the crisis in Mali. Understanding these causes and handling their derived conflict potentials provide a minimum of prerequisites for establishing long-term peace. The report is structured according to four intertwined conflict potentials: Mali's fragile state, the status and background of the Tuareg rebellion, the organized crime and the regional cooperation. .

Tre tiår etter det ble etablert, står Barentssamarbeidet overfor en politisk kontekst preget av økende spenning og et Russland i krig. Ved starten i 1993 signaliserte det en ny politisk linje i Arktis, Nordområdene og norsk Russland-politikk. I et område som utgjorde Vestens nordligste grense mot Sovjetunionen under den kalde krigen og der militariseringen var sterk, skisserte Norge sammen med Finland, Sverige og Russland et felles utenrikspolitisk engasjement der fred og stabilitet stod øverst på agendaen. Utviklingen bidro til nye internasjonale roller og aktiviteter for regionale og lokale aktører. I denne artikkelen har vi deres erfaringer i fokus når vi undersøker legitimeringspraksiser. Vi spør: Hvordan har legitimeringen av Barentssamarbeidet blitt påvirket av endringer i det sikkerhetspolitiske klimaet? Ved å fremheve lokale aktører i Barentssamarbeidet tar vi et steg inn i et utenrikspolitisk felt preget av politiske spenninger, ulike argumenter og et mangfold av meninger. Vi har en diskursanalytisk og praksisorientert tilnærming når vi identifiserer tre legitimeringsdiskurser: en geopolitisk oppdatert legitimering, en motvekt til dominerende representasjon av Russland, og en representasjon av aktøregenskapene til Barentssamarbeidet i lys av framtidig norsk-russiske relasjoner.
Abstract in EnglishThe Barents Cooperation Amid Geopolitical Tensions: A Discourse Analysis of Norwegian ExperiencesBack in 1993 the formalization of the Barents-cooperation signaled a new political approach in the Arctic region, High North, and Norwegian Russia-policy. In the area where militarization was strong and which formed the Wests northernmost border with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Norway, together with Finland, Sweden and Russia, outlined a joint foreign policy engagement where peace and stability were at the top of the agenda. Today, almost 30 years later, the Barents-cooperation is surrounded by growing geopolitical tension – especially highlighted in the period after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this article we try to answer the question: What is the Barents-cooperation in the context of today's international political situation? By emphasizing the voices of the actors in the cooperation, as this article does, we take a step into a field characterized by political tensions, by arguments, and a diversity of opinions within the Norwegian foreign policy field. Based on interviews with actors from the Barents-cooperation, the article presents three different discourses: a geopolitically updated legitimization; a counterweight to the dominant representation of Russia; and a representation of the agency of the Barents-cooperation in light of future Norwegian-Russian relations.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.