Suchergebnisse

Som svar på Karsten Friis' kritik af Fokkusspalten, "Når krig blir hverdag", formulerer denne replik en kort begrebslig, empirisk og normativ afklaring af spaltens anvendelse af begrebet militæraktivisme. Begrebsligt påpeger replikken, at militæraktivisme allerede er hyppigt anvendt i litteraturen om skandinaviske landes øgede engagement i internationale militære operationer efter Den Kolde Krig. Empirisk set, er det korrekt, at udviklingen ikke har været lineær, og man kan argumentere for, at Danmark og Norges militæraktivisme var (endnu) større, da Afghanistankrigen var på sit højeste. Dog er begge lande fortsat engageret særligt i NATO-regi, og det er væsentligt at bemærke, at de direkte kampe på landjorden i internationale militære operationer i stigende grad udliciteres til mindre privilegerede lokale og internationale kombattanter. Replikken påpeger, at Friis' påstand om, at militæraktivisme som begreb udgør en slet skjult kritik af Danmark og Norges militære engagement, beror på en misforståelse. Tværtimod stammer aktivisme fra den danske udenrigspolitiske debat, hvor begrebet anvendes politisk med en række positive konnotationer forbundet med at være aktiv (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017). I lyset af afpolitiseringen af Danmarks og Norges krigsdeltagelse velkommer vi fremadrettet yderligere forskningsmæssig og politisk diskussion af militæraktivismen.
Abstract in EnglishReply: Military Activism RevisitedIn response to Karsten Friis' critique of the special issue When War Becomes Daily Life, this reply outlines a brief conceptual, empirical and normative clarification of the special issue's use of the concept, military activism. Conceptually, the reply points out that military activism is already a frequently used concept in the academic literature on Scandinavian countries increased engagement in international military operations after the Cold War. Empirically, it is correct that this development has not been linear, and arguably, Denmark and Norway's military activism was (even more) pronounced, when the war in Afghanistan was at its zenith. However, both countries continue to be engaged particularly in NATO, and significantly, direct battles on the ground are increasingly outsourced to local actors to less privileged local and international combatants. The reply points out, that Friis's claim that military activism is a concealed critique of Denmark and Norway's military engagement, is based on a misunderstanding. On the contrary, activism as a concept derives from the Danish foreign policy debate, where the term is used to connote a series of positive attributes associated with being active (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017). Considering the depoliticisation of Denmark and Norway's military activism we welcome further academic and policy discussions about this important issue.

Danmark har i årene siden den kolde krigs afslutning udviklet sig til at være en permanent krigsførende nation. Den militære aktivisme er karakteriseret ved meget forskellige typer af engagementer, både hvad angår antallet af udsendte og deres mandat, indlejring i forskellige internationale organisationer og koalitioner, og udsendelser til forskellige dele af verden. Den danske vilje til aktivt at fastholde en status som bidragende og konstruktiv allieret gennem deltagelse i internationale operationer er drevet af en opfattelse af USA som afgørende for Danmarks nationale sikkerhed og understøttet af en aktivistisk og pragmatisk strategisk kultur. Den militære aktivisme er på den baggrund robust. Samtidig er der tegn på forandring i finansiering, geografisk fokus og valg af samarbejdspartnere.
Abstract in EnglishConstant Activism in a War with No End: Security, Status and Strategic Culture in Danish Foreign PolicyDanish foreign policy is militarily activist. Danish military activism is characterized by very different types of engagements and deployments regarding the number of troops and their legal mandate, political aims, institutional frameworks and geographical focus. The continuing Danish will to actively maintain its status as a contributing and constructive ally through participation in international military operations is driven by a perception of the United States as crucial to Denmark's national security and supported by an activist and pragmatic strategic culture. For these reasons, Danish military activism is robust, despite indications of change in financing, geographical focus and choice of partners.

Globale helsespørsmål har mange berøringspunkter med internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, men har blitt viet relativt lite oppmerksomhet i diskusjoner i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Denne artikkelen gir en oversikt over kunnskapsgrunnlaget for sammenhengen mellom helse og internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, og belyser fire hovedgrupper av årsakssammenhenger. For det første kan uhelse føre til væpnet konflikt. For det andre kan helsekriser bidra til å svekke beredskapen mot konflikt. For det tredje kan helseintervensjoner bidra til å stabilisere sårbare samfunn i kjølvannet av konflikt. For det fjerde gjør konflikt det vanskelig å løse helsekriser. Alle disse berører også direkte eller indirekte Norges fire hovedprioriteter som valgt medlem i FNs sikkerhetsråd for perioden 2021–2022. Gjennomgangen av disse fire årsakssammenhengene demonstrerer at globale helsespørsmål på flere områder er klart relevante for global sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Global Health and Security – an Overview of Academic KnowledgeGlobal health issues are relevant to international peace and security in numerous ways but have so far received little attention in the United Nations Security Council. This article provides an overview of the status of academic knowledge about the ways that global health and international peace and security are connected, and it highlights four main causal relationships. First, societies with poor overall health conditions or with great health inequalities between different groups, are more prone to armed conflict. Second, health crises can weaken societies' resilience and capacity to deal with conflict. Third, health interventions may contribute to stabilize vulnerable post-conflict societies in the wake of conflict. And fourth, armed conflict makes it more difficult to solve health crises. All four aspects of the health and security nexus directly or indirectly touch on Norway's four main priorities as an elected member of the UN Security Council in 2021–2022. The presentation of the various causal relations demonstrates that global health issues are clearly relevant for global security.

I en fersk Fokus-spalte i Internasjonal Politikk diskuteres begrepet «militæraktivisme» i en skandinavisk kontekst. Dessverre lider flere av bidragene av en uklar og dels politisert bruk av begrepet. Militæraktivisme sidestilles i det store med internasjonale operasjoner, og bringer dermed ingen nye analytiske bidrag. Spalten viser at begrepet kan ha noe for seg i det danske tilfellet, men klarer ikke å påvise at militæraktivisme er noe skandinavisk fenomen.
Abstract in EnglishMilitary Activism: Vague Definitions and Political LopsidednessA recent issue of Internasjonal Politikk had a Focus section dedicated to "military activism" in the Scandinavian context. Unfortunately, several of the contributions suffer from vague and partly politicized use of the term. Military activism appears to be applied analogous to international operations, thus failing to contribute with any new analytical insights. The section shows that military activism may be a fruitful term in the Danish context, but fails to demonstrate that this is a Scandinavian phenomenon.

Siden Gulfkrigen i 1991 har skandinaviske land deltatt i nesten 30 år med sammenhengende krig, på blant annet Balkan, i Afghanistan, i Irak, Libya, Mali og Syria. Hvordan kan vi forstå denne formen for militæraktivisme? Tradisjonelle teorier fra realismen, institusjonalismen og konstruktivismen gir ingen gode svar. Innenfor organisasjonsteorien derimot, finnes det forklaringer knyttet til begrepet «strategisk kultur». Ved å utforske den strategiske kulturen i USAs militære styrker under krigene i Afghanistan, Irak og Libya trer det frem et tydelig mønster: det bombes for mye på militær side, og det snakkes for lite på diplomatisk side. I USAs doktriner levnes det lite til overs for dialog, forhandling og kompromiss. Dermed blir den strategiske kulturen innad i de militære styrkene et outrert uttrykk for en krigføringsform der operasjonene ses på som et null-sum spill. Resultatet blir oftest systemkollaps i statene som angripes. Denne kulturen har store konsekvenser for små skandinaviske allianseavhengige land: knappe forsvarsressurser trekkes inn i hengemyrerer det er vanskelig å komme ut av, ikke minst fordi koalisjonslederen selv, USA, forårsaker dem.
Abstract in English:How Should Scandinavian Military Activism Be Understand?Since the 1991 Gulf War, Scandinavian states have continuously been engaged in various international operations, i.e. on the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria. How can we comprehend this peculiar form of Scandinavian military activism? Traditional theories derived from realism, institutionalism and constructivism provides few convincing explanations. Within organisational theory however, plausible explanations may be found though the concept of 'strategic culture'. By exploring the military culture prevailing inside US forces operating in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, a consistent pattern arises: too much bombing from the military side, coupled with insufficient diplomatic talks. Little effort is paid to dialogue, negotiations and compromises. US warfighting thereby becomes a one-dimensional expression of a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all. The result is a collapse inside the states that are attacked. This culture has grave consequences for small Scandinavian allies: scarce military resources are trapped into a quagmire made by the coalition leader itself, the United States.

On April 25, 2013, UN's Security Council established a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force for Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) is to take over and continue the security and stabilization task that the French-led military operation in cooperation with UN's African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, initiated in January 2013. The aim of this report is to present a number of long- and short-term perspectives for the recently initiated peace- and state-building process in Mali by focusing on the historical, structural and political causes of the crisis in Mali. Understanding these causes and handling their derived conflict potentials provide a minimum of prerequisites for establishing long-term peace. The report is structured according to four intertwined conflict potentials: Mali's fragile state, the status and background of the Tuareg rebellion, the organized crime and the regional cooperation. .

Covid-19-pandemien har tydeliggjort hvordan grensekryssende helse-trusler har samfunnsmessige konsekvenser. Epidemier ute av kontroll og andre ikke-kontrollerte grensekryssende helsetrusler kan sees som trusler mot fred og sikkerhet. Slike helsekriser kan ha store negative konsekvenser på helse, sosiale forhold og økonomisk utvikling, og har derfor potensiale for å bli både lokale, regionale og globale sikkerhetskriser. Stor ulikhet i tilgang til virkemidler for å kunne håndtere en helsekrise – eksempelvis medisinske mottiltak som vaksiner, legemidler og diagnostikk – kan skape eller forverre ustabilitet og være en sikkerhetsutfordring i seg selv. Med fokus på erfaringer fra covid-19-pandemien vektlegger vi i denne artikkelen global helsesikkerhet som et globalt fellesgode. En økende interesse for grensekryssende helsetrusler i FNs sikkerhetsråd gir muligheter og handlingsrom, men utfordrer også hvordan helsetrusler tolkes og tilnærminger til den internasjonale responsen.
Abstract in English:Outbreaks with Cross-border Potential and the UN Security CouncilThe Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted how outbreaks with cross-border potential have broader macroeconomic consequences. Uncontrolled epidemics and other uncontrolled outbreaks with cross-border potential can be seen as threats to peace and security. Such health crises can have severe consequences for health, social conditions and economic development, and have the potential to impact local, regional and global security. Inequality in access to medical countermeasures, such as vaccines, medicines and diagnostics, can impact or exacerbate instability and be a security threat in itself. Using lessons learned from the covid-19 pandemic, this article emphasizes global health security as a global public good. Increasing interest in outbreaks with cross-border potential in the UN Security Council might open windows of opportunity, but also challenges how global health threats are understood and the international responses to such outbreaks.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Global helse har stått sentralt i norsk utenriks-, utviklings- og helsepolitikk i en årrekke. Norge er anerkjent som en synlig aktør på global helse gjennom vesentlige finansielle bidrag, men også som en aktør som har bidratt til etablering av nye institusjoner og mekanismer som vaksinealliansen Gavi, Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) og Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Norge spiller også en aktiv rolle i det internasjonale helsepolitiske samarbeidet, og er en aktiv deltaker i Verdens helseorganisasjon (WHO). Norge er – og har vært – gjenkjennelig på global helse over lang tid, og i alle internasjonale fora. Vi mener det er viktig å bidra til – og sikre – at konsekvensene av pandemier og globale helseutfordringer på internasjonal fred og sikkerhet også hører hjemme på dagsordenen til FNs sikkerhetsråd.
Abstract in English:Pandemic Response and Global Health in Norwegian Foreign Policy – and in the UN Security CouncilGlobal health has been a priority for Norway and for Norwegian foreign, development and health policies for the past decades. Norway is recognized as an active and consistent partner in global health questions, both through substantial financial contributions and as an advocate for establishing new institutions and mechanisms such as Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance), the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Norway is also playing a leading role in the international cooperation in global health issues and in promoting a coordinated and effective humanitarian response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Norway actively participates and firmly supports the leading role played by the World Health Organization (WHO) in this regard. Norway will continue to be a consistent and recognizable partner in global health issues in all international fora. We firmly believe that it is important to contribute to – and secure – that the implications of pandemics and global health crises can be seen as threats to international peace and security and thus belong on the agenda of the UN Security Council.

Stadig mer av utviklingsdiskusjonen dreier seg om grenseoverskridende problemstillinger og globale fellesgoder som klima, hav, natur og pandemiberedskap. Essayet presenterer tall som viser at Norge er det OECD-landet som vier mest av sin utviklingsbistand til globale fellesgoder. Selv om det er sterke synergier mellom bistand og globale fellesgoder har de grunnleggende sett ulike formål og målgrupper. Det er likevel grunn til å tro at tendensen med å bruke utviklingsmidler på globale fellesgoder vil styrke seg i årene som kommer – gitt de utfordringer verden møter i form av klimaendringer og smittsomme sykdommer. Essayet drøfter således hvordan bistandsfeltet er i ferd med å gjennomgå en gradvis, men fundamental endring – en «stille revolusjon». Dette kan skje ettersom bistanden er et politikkfelt som kjennetegnes av liten offentlig interesse og debatt. Det er imidlertid presserende drøfte implikasjonene av de globale fellesgodenes utvidelse og komplementering av bistanden. Ett forslag kan være å tydeligere rydde i utviklingssamarbeidets ulike engasjement, der bistand til fattigdomsreduksjon (uten hensyn til globale problemstillinger), og investeringer i globale fellesgoder (uten særlig hensyn til fattigdomsreduksjon) danner ytterpunktene. Dette kan hjelpe på dagens situasjon der bistanden presses tematisk og geografisk, og på den annen side arbeidet med de globale fellesgodene vris dit behovene er størst, ikke nødvendigvis dit produksjonen av dem skjer mest effektivt.
Abstract in EnglishAid's Silent Revolution?After decades of progress on a number of development parameters such as poverty reduction, hunger, and child and maternal health, we now see an emerging pessimism related to the international society's ability to solve global challenges. Indeed, the world seems increasingly embroiled by crises of a global nature, whether it's the ongoing economic and health crisis caused by Covid-19 or the weather extremes caused by climate change. Although not explicitly recognized, these developments are fundamentally changing international development cooperation. Foreign aid is increasingly directed towards global public goods such as climate, pandemics, the oceans and biodiversity. Norway is leading the pack with more than 20 percent of its earmarked aid addressing global public goods. Resources for poverty alleviation among the world's poorest nations has come under increasing pressure from these global public goods and confronts us with fundamental questions about what foreign aid has become, and what it should be.