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Compassion in International Relations: The Case Study of Armenian Genocide Recognition Not all decisions in international politics can be explained by power and interest, as realists would suggest. Constructivists claim identity plays an important role for interaction of countries and nations. Some nations decide to choose the most painful part of their history and are building their special identity – victim identity. In first part of this paper the concept of identity, especially victim identity, is analyzed. Then two competing identities are analyzed – Armenian victim identity and Turkish "denial identity". Reasons for selection of these particular identities, ways of promotion and making it priority of foreign policy agenda are discussed in second and third parts of this paper. Special identity can generate soft power in international politics only in case if it is recognized by other countries. Therefore, Armenia listed recognition of the Armenian Genocide in top priorities list of Foreign Policy. Although right after becoming the independent country, first Armenian President was trying to be "rational" and was refusing claims of recognition by Turkey in order to assure good relationship, victimhood was deep in identity of Armenian society and diaspora, therefore, such foreign policy was not widely accepted. So later Armenian policy makers were making sure not to repeat this mistake and were giving to recignition of genocide a very special place in Armenian Foreign Policy. State coordinated campaigns and civic initiatives have increased public awareness about the issue, and so far, 28 countries recognized Armenian genocide. By recognizing Armenian identity, they denied competing Turkish identity (claiming not being responsible for Armenian genocide), which is being promoted with the same amount of efforts. This paper tries to find an answer: what kind of power leads the decision of other countries choosing to support small, not strategically important country and take risk to anger much powerful actor of international affairs? In case of Germany, it had even more to lose: good bilateral relationship with Turkey and, even more important, strategically important alley in high peak of refugee crisis in Europe. But regardless that, German Bundestag nearly unanimously voted for recognition of Armenian genocide in June 2016. In most cases it is difficult to evaluate direct effect of soft power and prove its effect to implementation of foreign policy goals, therefore it is the most criticised aspect of soft power theory. In this case we can see how the decision by Armenia to choose victim identity and constantly promote it is being converted into soft power and push into political agenda of other country activities that are important and useful for Armenian Foreign Policy goals. Analysis of rhetoric of dedicated political activist Erika Steinbach, strategical documents and arguments of Bundestag members before final vote that led to recognition of Armenian genocide reveals that one of the leading arguments for decision was compassion. Members of Bundestag stressed the importance of recognition as a way to express their compassion to grievance of Armenian people, to share responsibility for mediation of bilateral relationship, and to share the burden of guilt – for not preventing Armenian genocide as former ally of Ottoman Empire. Armenian themselves and many human right advocates all around the world stress the importance of recognition of genocide in order to prevent it in the future. They say would be needed to disclose all the cruelty of humanity in the past in order to ensure any early warning sign would be met with highest concern and world society wouldn't observing just observing. And, finally, would fulfil the promise humanity gave after the Holocaust, most recognized genocide off all times, –– newer again.

Compassion in International Relations: The Case Study of Armenian Genocide Recognition Not all decisions in international politics can be explained by power and interest, as realists would suggest. Constructivists claim identity plays an important role for interaction of countries and nations. Some nations decide to choose the most painful part of their history and are building their special identity – victim identity. In first part of this paper the concept of identity, especially victim identity, is analyzed. Then two competing identities are analyzed – Armenian victim identity and Turkish "denial identity". Reasons for selection of these particular identities, ways of promotion and making it priority of foreign policy agenda are discussed in second and third parts of this paper. Special identity can generate soft power in international politics only in case if it is recognized by other countries. Therefore, Armenia listed recognition of the Armenian Genocide in top priorities list of Foreign Policy. Although right after becoming the independent country, first Armenian President was trying to be "rational" and was refusing claims of recognition by Turkey in order to assure good relationship, victimhood was deep in identity of Armenian society and diaspora, therefore, such foreign policy was not widely accepted. So later Armenian policy makers were making sure not to repeat this mistake and were giving to recignition of genocide a very special place in Armenian Foreign Policy. State coordinated campaigns and civic initiatives have increased public awareness about the issue, and so far, 28 countries recognized Armenian genocide. By recognizing Armenian identity, they denied competing Turkish identity (claiming not being responsible for Armenian genocide), which is being promoted with the same amount of efforts. This paper tries to find an answer: what kind of power leads the decision of other countries choosing to support small, not strategically important country and take risk to anger much powerful actor of international affairs? In case of Germany, it had even more to lose: good bilateral relationship with Turkey and, even more important, strategically important alley in high peak of refugee crisis in Europe. But regardless that, German Bundestag nearly unanimously voted for recognition of Armenian genocide in June 2016. In most cases it is difficult to evaluate direct effect of soft power and prove its effect to implementation of foreign policy goals, therefore it is the most criticised aspect of soft power theory. In this case we can see how the decision by Armenia to choose victim identity and constantly promote it is being converted into soft power and push into political agenda of other country activities that are important and useful for Armenian Foreign Policy goals. Analysis of rhetoric of dedicated political activist Erika Steinbach, strategical documents and arguments of Bundestag members before final vote that led to recognition of Armenian genocide reveals that one of the leading arguments for decision was compassion. Members of Bundestag stressed the importance of recognition as a way to express their compassion to grievance of Armenian people, to share responsibility for mediation of bilateral relationship, and to share the burden of guilt – for not preventing Armenian genocide as former ally of Ottoman Empire. Armenian themselves and many human right advocates all around the world stress the importance of recognition of genocide in order to prevent it in the future. They say would be needed to disclose all the cruelty of humanity in the past in order to ensure any early warning sign would be met with highest concern and world society wouldn't observing just observing. And, finally, would fulfil the promise humanity gave after the Holocaust, most recognized genocide off all times, –– newer again.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

The paper explores the epistemic fruitfulness of the contemporary theories of modern relations for historical research about the relations between premodern polities. The application of the neorealist theory in such research is blocked by its assumption that its subject is international system, consisting of sovereign national states. However, there were no such states (and nations) in medieval Europe and most other places in premodern times. The concept of international society of H. Bull is not applicable to premodern polities because of its assumption that Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 was the date of birth of the international law and international society as historical reality. A. Wendt's thesis that in the premodern times international politics was dominated by the Hobbesian culture of anarchy disregards historical evidence about the "Lockean" realities of the dynastic politics in the medieval Europe and other places. In the first part of the article, the corrections to remove these modernist and europocentric deformations are suggested. They include the replacement of the concepts of "international system" and "international society" by the broader notions of "interpolity system" and that of "interpolity society", and the distinction between "sovereign politikes system/society" and "suzerain (imperial) polity system/society", borrowed (with modifications) from M. Wight. Second part and third parts together constitute a case study about the changing roles and challenges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the subject of interpolity relations in XIII–XV centuries. The second part is about the rise of GDL from the polity playing the role of the barrier (but not that of buffer) polity, separating Central European and Eastern European interpolity systems and belonging to both of them, to the regional empire and suzerain polity of the Eastern European interpolity system by the early XVth century. However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only very few years. After 1430, the Eastern European interpolity system was about to transform itself from the suzerain polity system into a multipolar sovereign interpolity system of the type that consolidated in the Central and Western Europe after 1648 and survived for 300 years. However, the political leadership of GDL failed to meet the challenge to maintain an emerging multipolar balance of power in this system. According to the unconventional account of the so-called "feudal war" (1431–1453) in the Great Duchy of Moscow by Alexander Zimin, there was real possibility to establish at least two Russian states in the lands ruled by the Muscovite princes. Great Novgorod was viable polity too, bearing promise of the protobourgeois and protodemocratic Russia. Another viable polity was created in Kazan by Tatars who have changed to sedentary life of agriculturalists, and were about to become the power, filling out the geopolitical space that in older times was held by Volga Bulgaria. However, mainly due to the pursuit by Jagiellonian rulers of GDL and Poland of the dynastic politics in the Central Europe, at least three windows of opportunity to preserve this interpolity system from its annihilation by rising Moscow empire were not used. Last of them was the opportunity to re-establish the independence of Great Novgorod in 1480. These failures of the Lithuanian statesmanship sealed the fate of the Eastern European interpolity system: its disappearance in the Moscow empire. So the history of Eastern European interpolity politics in the XIII–XVIII centuries is another case proving the finding of the recent research by Stuart J. Kaufman, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, David Kangi, Charles Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, Williams Brenner that a long-lasting balance of power in a interpolity system is rather an exception than rule, the rule being the displacement of the multipolar or bipolar balance of power interpolity systems by empires.

The paper explores the epistemic fruitfulness of the contemporary theories of modern relations for historical research about the relations between premodern polities. The application of the neorealist theory in such research is blocked by its assumption that its subject is international system, consisting of sovereign national states. However, there were no such states (and nations) in medieval Europe and most other places in premodern times. The concept of international society of H. Bull is not applicable to premodern polities because of its assumption that Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 was the date of birth of the international law and international society as historical reality. A. Wendt's thesis that in the premodern times international politics was dominated by the Hobbesian culture of anarchy disregards historical evidence about the "Lockean" realities of the dynastic politics in the medieval Europe and other places. In the first part of the article, the corrections to remove these modernist and europocentric deformations are suggested. They include the replacement of the concepts of "international system" and "international society" by the broader notions of "interpolity system" and that of "interpolity society", and the distinction between "sovereign politikes system/society" and "suzerain (imperial) polity system/society", borrowed (with modifications) from M. Wight. Second part and third parts together constitute a case study about the changing roles and challenges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the subject of interpolity relations in XIII–XV centuries. The second part is about the rise of GDL from the polity playing the role of the barrier (but not that of buffer) polity, separating Central European and Eastern European interpolity systems and belonging to both of them, to the regional empire and suzerain polity of the Eastern European interpolity system by the early XVth century. However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only very few years. After 1430, the Eastern European interpolity system was about to transform itself from the suzerain polity system into a multipolar sovereign interpolity system of the type that consolidated in the Central and Western Europe after 1648 and survived for 300 years. However, the political leadership of GDL failed to meet the challenge to maintain an emerging multipolar balance of power in this system. According to the unconventional account of the so-called "feudal war" (1431–1453) in the Great Duchy of Moscow by Alexander Zimin, there was real possibility to establish at least two Russian states in the lands ruled by the Muscovite princes. Great Novgorod was viable polity too, bearing promise of the protobourgeois and protodemocratic Russia. Another viable polity was created in Kazan by Tatars who have changed to sedentary life of agriculturalists, and were about to become the power, filling out the geopolitical space that in older times was held by Volga Bulgaria. However, mainly due to the pursuit by Jagiellonian rulers of GDL and Poland of the dynastic politics in the Central Europe, at least three windows of opportunity to preserve this interpolity system from its annihilation by rising Moscow empire were not used. Last of them was the opportunity to re-establish the independence of Great Novgorod in 1480. These failures of the Lithuanian statesmanship sealed the fate of the Eastern European interpolity system: its disappearance in the Moscow empire. So the history of Eastern European interpolity politics in the XIII–XVIII centuries is another case proving the finding of the recent research by Stuart J. Kaufman, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, David Kangi, Charles Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, Williams Brenner that a long-lasting balance of power in a interpolity system is rather an exception than rule, the rule being the displacement of the multipolar or bipolar balance of power interpolity systems by empires.

The paper explores the epistemic fruitfulness of the contemporary theories of modern relations for historical research about the relations between premodern polities. The application of the neorealist theory in such research is blocked by its assumption that its subject is international system, consisting of sovereign national states. However, there were no such states (and nations) in medieval Europe and most other places in premodern times. The concept of international society of H. Bull is not applicable to premodern polities because of its assumption that Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 was the date of birth of the international law and international society as historical reality. A. Wendt's thesis that in the premodern times international politics was dominated by the Hobbesian culture of anarchy disregards historical evidence about the "Lockean" realities of the dynastic politics in the medieval Europe and other places. In the first part of the article, the corrections to remove these modernist and europocentric deformations are suggested. They include the replacement of the concepts of "international system" and "international society" by the broader notions of "interpolity system" and that of "interpolity society", and the distinction between "sovereign politikes system/society" and "suzerain (imperial) polity system/society", borrowed (with modifications) from M. Wight. Second part and third parts together constitute a case study about the changing roles and challenges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the subject of interpolity relations in XIII–XV centuries. The second part is about the rise of GDL from the polity playing the role of the barrier (but not that of buffer) polity, separating Central European and Eastern European interpolity systems and belonging to both of them, to the regional empire and suzerain polity of the Eastern European interpolity system by the early XVth century. However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only very few years. After 1430, the Eastern European interpolity system was about to transform itself from the suzerain polity system into a multipolar sovereign interpolity system of the type that consolidated in the Central and Western Europe after 1648 and survived for 300 years. However, the political leadership of GDL failed to meet the challenge to maintain an emerging multipolar balance of power in this system. According to the unconventional account of the so-called "feudal war" (1431–1453) in the Great Duchy of Moscow by Alexander Zimin, there was real possibility to establish at least two Russian states in the lands ruled by the Muscovite princes. Great Novgorod was viable polity too, bearing promise of the protobourgeois and protodemocratic Russia. Another viable polity was created in Kazan by Tatars who have changed to sedentary life of agriculturalists, and were about to become the power, filling out the geopolitical space that in older times was held by Volga Bulgaria. However, mainly due to the pursuit by Jagiellonian rulers of GDL and Poland of the dynastic politics in the Central Europe, at least three windows of opportunity to preserve this interpolity system from its annihilation by rising Moscow empire were not used. Last of them was the opportunity to re-establish the independence of Great Novgorod in 1480. These failures of the Lithuanian statesmanship sealed the fate of the Eastern European interpolity system: its disappearance in the Moscow empire. So the history of Eastern European interpolity politics in the XIII–XVIII centuries is another case proving the finding of the recent research by Stuart J. Kaufman, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, David Kangi, Charles Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, Williams Brenner that a long-lasting balance of power in a interpolity system is rather an exception than rule, the rule being the displacement of the multipolar or bipolar balance of power interpolity systems by empires.

The paper explores the epistemic fruitfulness of the contemporary theories of modern relations for historical research about the relations between premodern polities. The application of the neorealist theory in such research is blocked by its assumption that its subject is international system, consisting of sovereign national states. However, there were no such states (and nations) in medieval Europe and most other places in premodern times. The concept of international society of H. Bull is not applicable to premodern polities because of its assumption that Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 was the date of birth of the international law and international society as historical reality. A. Wendt's thesis that in the premodern times international politics was dominated by the Hobbesian culture of anarchy disregards historical evidence about the "Lockean" realities of the dynastic politics in the medieval Europe and other places. In the first part of the article, the corrections to remove these modernist and europocentric deformations are suggested. They include the replacement of the concepts of "international system" and "international society" by the broader notions of "interpolity system" and that of "interpolity society", and the distinction between "sovereign politikes system/society" and "suzerain (imperial) polity system/society", borrowed (with modifications) from M. Wight. Second part and third parts together constitute a case study about the changing roles and challenges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the subject of interpolity relations in XIII–XV centuries. The second part is about the rise of GDL from the polity playing the role of the barrier (but not that of buffer) polity, separating Central European and Eastern European interpolity systems and belonging to both of them, to the regional empire and suzerain polity of the Eastern European interpolity system by the early XVth century. However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only very few years. After 1430, the Eastern European interpolity system was about to transform itself from the suzerain polity system into a multipolar sovereign interpolity system of the type that consolidated in the Central and Western Europe after 1648 and survived for 300 years. However, the political leadership of GDL failed to meet the challenge to maintain an emerging multipolar balance of power in this system. According to the unconventional account of the so-called "feudal war" (1431–1453) in the Great Duchy of Moscow by Alexander Zimin, there was real possibility to establish at least two Russian states in the lands ruled by the Muscovite princes. Great Novgorod was viable polity too, bearing promise of the protobourgeois and protodemocratic Russia. Another viable polity was created in Kazan by Tatars who have changed to sedentary life of agriculturalists, and were about to become the power, filling out the geopolitical space that in older times was held by Volga Bulgaria. However, mainly due to the pursuit by Jagiellonian rulers of GDL and Poland of the dynastic politics in the Central Europe, at least three windows of opportunity to preserve this interpolity system from its annihilation by rising Moscow empire were not used. Last of them was the opportunity to re-establish the independence of Great Novgorod in 1480. These failures of the Lithuanian statesmanship sealed the fate of the Eastern European interpolity system: its disappearance in the Moscow empire. So the history of Eastern European interpolity politics in the XIII–XVIII centuries is another case proving the finding of the recent research by Stuart J. Kaufman, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, David Kangi, Charles Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, Williams Brenner that a long-lasting balance of power in a interpolity system is rather an exception than rule, the rule being the displacement of the multipolar or bipolar balance of power interpolity systems by empires.

In the case of Lithuania, its national identity reflects traumatizing historical experiences and the values that were infused by the Soviet Union, as well as the values that were reinforced by fighting for independence. Not only national identity shapes Lithuania as a unique member of the European Union, but it also directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Despite the fact that Lithuania with its post-Soviet identity might still appear to be not a complete and modern member of the European Union compared to other, more economically and politically developed European Union members, Lithuania, because of the specific factors shaping its identity, became a member that is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union, as well as one characterized by a strong protection of its national identity and empathy for the countries that have had similar historical experiences. As the transition is still ongoing: younger generations with modern values in Lithuania gradually change the older, more restrained generations infused with harsh memories of the Soviet Union, therefore, Lithuania will gradually become a fully integrated member of the European Union as it makes progresses in the democratisation process it started after independence in 1990.

In the case of Lithuania, its national identity reflects traumatizing historical experiences and the values that were infused by the Soviet Union, as well as the values that were reinforced by fighting for independence. Not only national identity shapes Lithuania as a unique member of the European Union, but it also directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Despite the fact that Lithuania with its post-Soviet identity might still appear to be not a complete and modern member of the European Union compared to other, more economically and politically developed European Union members, Lithuania, because of the specific factors shaping its identity, became a member that is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union, as well as one characterized by a strong protection of its national identity and empathy for the countries that have had similar historical experiences. As the transition is still ongoing: younger generations with modern values in Lithuania gradually change the older, more restrained generations infused with harsh memories of the Soviet Union, therefore, Lithuania will gradually become a fully integrated member of the European Union as it makes progresses in the democratisation process it started after independence in 1990.

In the case of Lithuania, its national identity reflects traumatizing historical experiences and the values that were infused by the Soviet Union, as well as the values that were reinforced by fighting for independence. Not only national identity shapes Lithuania as a unique member of the European Union, but it also directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Despite the fact that Lithuania with its post-Soviet identity might still appear to be not a complete and modern member of the European Union compared to other, more economically and politically developed European Union members, Lithuania, because of the specific factors shaping its identity, became a member that is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union, as well as one characterized by a strong protection of its national identity and empathy for the countries that have had similar historical experiences. As the transition is still ongoing: younger generations with modern values in Lithuania gradually change the older, more restrained generations infused with harsh memories of the Soviet Union, therefore, Lithuania will gradually become a fully integrated member of the European Union as it makes progresses in the democratisation process it started after independence in 1990.

In the case of Lithuania, its national identity reflects traumatizing historical experiences and the values that were infused by the Soviet Union, as well as the values that were reinforced by fighting for independence. Not only national identity shapes Lithuania as a unique member of the European Union, but it also directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Despite the fact that Lithuania with its post-Soviet identity might still appear to be not a complete and modern member of the European Union compared to other, more economically and politically developed European Union members, Lithuania, because of the specific factors shaping its identity, became a member that is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union, as well as one characterized by a strong protection of its national identity and empathy for the countries that have had similar historical experiences. As the transition is still ongoing: younger generations with modern values in Lithuania gradually change the older, more restrained generations infused with harsh memories of the Soviet Union, therefore, Lithuania will gradually become a fully integrated member of the European Union as it makes progresses in the democratisation process it started after independence in 1990.