The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.
International Economics; Germany - De serie 'Voorstudies en achtergronden' omvat werkstukken die in het kader van de werkzaamheden van de WRR tot stand zijn gekomen en naar zijn oordeel van zodanige kwaliteit en betekenis zijn, dat publicatie gewenst is. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud en de ingenomen standpunten berust bij de auteurs.
Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2)When the Home Front meets Foreign Parts. The Aftermath of Commissions of Inquiry into derailed Peace MissionsPeace Missions take place in difficult and volatile circumstances. It is therefore hardly surprising that some peace missions become 'derailed'. Christ Klep zooms in on three 'derailed' missions in his book and focuses on the value of Commissions of Inquiry which are subsequently set up as a result of public and political pressure. Do they succeed in revealing the 'how' and the 'why' of such derailments and – above all – identifying those who are responsible? Based on a broad spectrum of questions and extensive source materials, Klep concludes that 'the number of escape routes from the labyrinth of responsibility is practically infinite'; a clear message for all those taking part in international and domestic politics. It is here that the author skillfully and expertly succeeds: exposing the complex entanglement of domestic and foreign policy, even concerning events that sometimes happen away from the capital city.
Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2).ResponseThe validity of my comparative approach (Somalia-Rwanda-Srebrenica) still stands, in my opinion. At the level of political responsibility and the process of coming to terms with events, the similarities are stronger than the differences. My estimation that the Inquiry reports were 'hijacked' by almost all of the stakeholders involved (especially the Canadian, Belgian and Dutch governments) is more of a matter of fact and a political reality than a reproach that ought to have legal implications. Finally, the question of how far the three governments that were involved learned lessons from the three affairs is difficult to answer. Was it not also the wider developments (for example, the switch from the 'blue' missions to the more robust 'green' missions) that compelled the lessons to be drawn out?
International Economics; Germany; Economy; Public Administration - Nederland is zeer gevoelig voor ontwikkelingen in de Bondsrepubliek en voor het aldaar gevoerde beleid op het terrein van economie, veiligheid, ecologie en ruimtelijke ordening. De beleidsruimte van de Nederlandse regering op die terreinen is betrekkelijk gering.
Voor de zittende Sudanese president Al-Bashir geldt een internationaal arrestatiebevel. België en Senegal bakkeleien in Den Haag over de berechting van de voormalig Tsjaadse dictator Habré. In haar oratie stelt Barbara Oomen dat het de wereldgemeenschap steeds meer menens is met de mensenrechten. Paradoxaal genoeg vraagt dit proces van universalisering van de mensenrechten lokale verankering. De nadruk op 'traditionele' rechtspleging na ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen vormt hiervan een voorbeeld. Oomen stelt dat zowel de wereldgemeenschap in wording als lokale gemeenschappen het monopolie op
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De bestrijding van overlast en criminaliteit is uitgegroeid tot het werkveld van allerlei organisaties. Hierdoor zijn netwerken ontstaan die niet altijd even overzichtelijk zijn. Scherp geformuleerd kan de lokale veiligheidszorg enigszins als een chaos worden bestempeld. Daarom staan autoriteiten voor een grote uitdaging: hoe kunnen gemeenten en politiekorpsen richting geven aan veiligheidsnetwerken? In Strategieën van lokale veiligheid: een achtergrondstudie en drie reflecties wordt geprobeerd antwoorden te formuleren op de geconstateerde complexiteit. Een aantal deskundige auteurs (Ronald va
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The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.
'Will the Netherlands be defended?' The debate about NATO's main lines of defence at the beginning of the 1950sAt the beginning of the 1950s, the Netherlands would not have been able to defend itself in the event of a Soviet attack. Despite the fact that NATO, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, and later General Ridgway, was in the process of rapidly building up its defences, it was still incapable of conducting a forward defence. The pivotal political and military issue in the short term centred on one question: Which areas in Western Europe could and should be kept and which not? Answers to this question exposed conflicting national interests and points of view, particularly those of the Dutch and the French. As it was taking a considerably long time to build up the Netherlands' defences, the Dutch government had very few trump cards to add weight to its demands. Indeed, in the summer of 1952, when Parliament asked to be given a precise account of how the Dutch defences were progressing, the government was practically boxed into a corner.
In een wereld vol met grote uitdagingen als gevolg van klimaatverandering, economische ongelijkheid en migratie, biedt het boek Bankieren voor een betere wereld van Nanno Kleiterp en Marijn Wiersma een diep inzicht in de verbindende rol die ontwikkelingsbanken kunnen spelen bij duurzame ontwikkeling, welzijn en welvaart in de wereld. De publieke verontwaardiging over de financiële wereld behoort nog niet tot het verleden. Maar wat gebeurt er als banken investeren in duurzame en sociale ontwikkeling? Op een actuele en inspirerende wijze putten Kleiterp en Wiersma uit meer dan 45 jaar ervaring in ontwikkelingsbankieren en laten hun licht schijnen op de relevantie van ontwikkelingsbanken. Ze laten zien hoe ontwikkelingsbanken door een brug te slaan tussen overheid, bedrijfsleven en maatschappelijk middenveld de weg effenen voor noodzakelijke investeringen voor een betere toekomst. Lezers van het boek worden meegenomen in de ontwikkeling van FMO, de successen en de vele dilemma's. Soms vanuit een mondiaal perspectief, soms vanuit persoonlijke ervaring. Kleiterp en Wiersma verbinden op een openhartige wijze anekdotes over ontwikkeling, het bankwezen, ervaring met klanten en duurzaamheid tot een businessmodel dat winst door impact en impact door winst mogelijk maakt. Bankieren voor een betere wereld is een belangrijk en toegankelijk boek over duurzame, sociale ontwikkeling en verplichte literatuur voor bankiers, bedrijven, beleidsmakers en het maatschappelijk middenveld. Bankieren voor een betere wereld laat zien hoe ontwikkelingsbanken, de transitie naar een betere wereld versnellen.
The central question of this dissertation is what role national identity has played in the interdepartmental policy field of international cultural policy (ICP) in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2012. In four chapters I analyse the history of ICP and the related political debate, using a theoretical framework consisting of the main concepts of a Discourse Historic Analysis (critique, ideology, and power), and tensions within the discourses on ICP and national identity. The role of national identity in the first period (1970-1986) is characterized as 'cultural nationalism'. Culture plays an important role in distinguishing the nation state from the rest of the world, and due to the decreasing autonomy in the field of economics and politics culture is considered (by some) to be the last bearer of the national identity. The debates focus on the question whether or not the government has a role in (actively) protecting that identity. The publication of the report "Culture without borders" by the Scientific Council for Government Policy marks the beginning of the second period (1987-1996). Gradually the primacy of the policy shifts from foreign to cultural policy, and attempts are made to combine within ICP the growing cultural diversity of the Dutch society with the uniting role of a national identity. Therefore the role of national identity is characterized as 'multiculturalism'. Extra funding for international cultural activities in 1997 marks the beginning of the third period (1997-2006), in which the role of national identity is characterized as 'cultural relativism'. The relationship between culture and the nation becomes more loose, and cultural activities abroad no longer seem to represent the nation's identity. This approach in ICP contrasts strongly with the growing discontent and heated public and political debate on national identity. Characteristic for the fourth period (2007-2012) is the return to the primacy of foreign policy and the focus on diplomatic and economic goals. Culture is treated as a ...
Public administration; Political science - Democratie door interventie gaat over één van de meest actuele en controversiële aspecten van de hedendaagse internationale politiek: bemoeienis met de binnenlandse aangelegenheden van staten om democratische ontwikkeling in gang te zetten, te versterken of te verdedigen. Internationale democratiebevordering is omstreden. Hebben wij het recht en de mogelijkheid om ons in naam van ons idee van democratie te bemoeien met de politieke aangelegenheden van andere staten? De voortdurende problemen in landen als Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan en Irak geven aan dat internationaal ingrijpen, zelfs internationale militaire aanwezigheid, geen enkele garantie biedt op stabiliteit, laat staan op democratische ontwikkeling. In Democratie door interventie komen de argumenten voor en tegen internationale democratiebevordering (met of zonder inzet van militairen) aan de orde.
Het Arabisch-Israëlische conflict is ontstaan als onbedoeld gevolg van Brits koloniaal beleid. Externe partijen van uiteenlopende pluimage hebben zich ingespannen in dit conflict te bemiddelen, dikwijls echter met vrede als nevendoel, niet als hoofddoel. Zo stond voor Amerikanen en Britten in de jaren vijftig containment van de Sovjet-Unie centraal. Het Arabisch-Israëlische conflict stond daarbij in de weg en moest daarom opgelost worden. Zo wilde Europa tussen 1970 en 1980 vooral een onderhandelingsrol om te oefenen in gemeenschappelijk buitenlands beleid en zette het zich af tegen Amerikaans
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