Suchergebnisse

Actors ranging from activists & scholars to policy-makers & politicians claim that many international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), suffer from a democratic deficit, lack of accountability, & illegitimacy. This article argues that these contestations have increased because of rising interdependence & the constrained structure of international governance. High interdependence generates policy spillover effects, but international organizations -- arranged in discrete policy domains -- lack the ability to make tradeoffs necessary to contain the spillovers. Popular mobilization against these organizations results when actors adversely affected by the spillovers are left out of the policymaking process. Based on this explanation of the phenomena, the article generates several policy options that the United States can pursue to restore stability & effectiveness to the international governance system. Adapted from the source document.

This article addresses the lack of international enforcement mechanisms which the author argues pose the most significant challenge to the development of international organizations & the body of international public law they represent. The author illustrates international organizations inability to hold states & other international actor accountable by citing examples from the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Tribunal, & the United Nations. Finally, the article discusses the United States decision, & the subsequent consequences, to preemptively attack Iraq despite the fact that international public opinion did not support such aggression. C. Goger

In global environmental governance, numerous new international organizations have emerged from dozens of multilateral treaties signed over the last 30 years. This paper focuses on intergovernmental organizations in an organizational theory perspective with a particular focus on organizational learning processes. It explores where and when international organizations exhibit organizational learning with significant effects on the organizations' internal structure and behavior. Key hypotheses from principal-agent theory and organizational learning theory are tested in eight case studies of international organizations involved in global environmental governance. The analysis shows that organizations engage in three forms of learning: reflexive learning, adaptive learning, and no learning. Explanations of the observed variation depend on specific learning mechanisms, change agents in leadership functions and external triggers such as pressures from governments or nongovernmental actors. Adapted from the source document.