The primary aim of this article is to analyze how the interpretation of "universal" geopolitical ideas, especially those related to images of US power, depend on national, publishing & rhetorical interests. By comparing various predominant intellectual stances, one can see that even after the end of the Cold War its' rhetorical tropes still propel further disputes. As a result, national interests & ambitions of some politicians merge & the lines between political realism & ideologies become blurred. For example, phrases such as "the new world order," but even more often, "the new world disorder" are used indiscriminately in hundreds of titles promising accounts of the international system & its events. Thus instead of seeing rhetoric & reality as mutually exclusive opposites (which happens whenever the rhetoric is relegated to the field of myths & lies), new studies of the Cold War now generally recognize the rhetorical component of reality. This article uses Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "cultural fields" & his theoretical focus on the international circulation of ideas to discuss the rhetoric of "soft power.". Adapted from the source document.
The article analyses the aesthetic dimension of Chinese propaganda in Russia. The analysis seeks to identify the aesthetic component of Chinese propaganda in Russia as the fundamental, synthesising catalyst of Russian Sinophilia which unites several factors. The aesthetic aspect of Chinese propaganda in Russia is revealed through an analysis of official PRC websites in Russian, which clarifies a close connection between form and content in propaganda. The form quite often acquires a function which not only imparts the content, but also corrects it and uses it to manipulate and dominate. The analysis names as Russia's Achilles' heel its unbridled and unshakeable belief in its unique and inevitable Messianic mission in World History. This is its weak spot exploited by Chinese propaganda. The Russian reaction to Chinese propaganda is analysed, invoking the categories of both Sinophilia and Sinophobia. It is asserted that Chinese propaganda in Russia relies on the principles of involvement and participation, which are based on cultural exoticism and Confucian philosophy. To sum up, Chinese propaganda in Russia is identified as part of a plan/strategy for the establishment and maintenance of a grand, universal, practical, cosmopolitan Chinese philosophy or world order at the level of a global international system and world politics. Adapted from the source document.
Security studies have survived a lot of transformations. Like any other social theory, security studies have gone through a number of consecutive development stages: the dominance of traditional theories (realism/neorealism), the rise of critical & discourse approaches as well as the attempts to modify the traditional theories & methodological frameworks & to search for the synthetic or universal theoretic models. Author reviews how the security studies developed in the last few decades. Further attention is devoted to the attempts of Barry Buzan to provide for a compromised frameworks for security analysis in his works People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1991), & Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). The first work was an attempt to sum up the most valuable inputs for a widening security agenda; it includes the new aspects of security (economic, political, social & ecological), acknowledging that a state can be one of the many other subjects in the security studies. The greatest value of this work is a model of sectorization of security studies -- analytical proposition to classify threats by sectors. The second framework for analysis seeks to preserve the use of the security sectors' concept. However B. Buzan, 0. Waever & J. de Wilde propose to include a discursive theory of securitization into the framework. Authors suggest that security is not an objective condition -- it is about presenting issues as existential threats that require emergency measures. Some critiques (eg. J. Eriksson) argue, theories of securitization & sectonzation are incompatible in methodological meaning. The author of this article gives some suggestions that a model of sectorization of security studies should be supplemented by a new sector -- the communication sector. This expansion of the model could help fill some gaps left in the B. Buzan model -- i.e. the way threats emerge, the reason why one threat is considered differently from the other one as well as why they enjoy a specific influence on the other security sectors. 3 Schemas. Adapted from the source document.
In this article I analyzed one of the goals of the 2004-2006 EU Cohesion policy reform -- to adjust the Cohesion policy to the new reality: increased development disparities inside the Union after Enlargement. I argue that despite big changes caused by Enlargement the Commission with its reform proposal of 2004 in principle did not try to reform anything, while decision on Cohesion policy reform taken by the European Council in the end of 2005, which finalized two years of Member States discussions, just slightly improved the situation. Cohesion policy reform of 2004-2006 actually did not reform this policy, because increased development disparities in the EU were overshadowed by indirect factor of Enlargement -- its costs to the EU-15. Adapted from the source document.
Galios savoka yra viena is pagrindiniu, taciau taip pat ir viena is labiausiai gincijamu savoku politikos moksle bei gimininguose socialiniuose moksluose. Straipsnyje apzvelgiami teoriniai debatai del galios savokos reiksmes tarp sociologu ir politologu, prasideje XX amziaus septintajame desimtmetyje - vadinamieji 'galios veidu debatai' - bei galios santykis su giminingomis autoriteto (teisetos valdzios) ir prievartos savokomis. Straipsnio tikslas yra sudaryti 'tarpparadigmine' savokos taksonomija ir isskirti konceptualias 'galios' ribas. 'Galios' savokos ribozenkliais pasirenkamos butent 'autoriteto' ir 'prievartos' savokos, pirmaja is ju tapatinant su galios maksimumu, o antraja - su visisku galios eliminavimu, kai ja pakeicia fizine kontrole. Tai nera vienintele politologiniame diskurse aptinkama galios samprata, nes kai kurie politikos mokslu atstovai, ypac tarptautiniu santykiu tyrinetojai, galia tapatina butent su fizine jega. Vis delto dauguma sociologu ir politikos teoretiku palaiko pozicija (jai atstovaujama ir straipsnyje), jog galia baigiasi ten, kur prasideda prievarta Power is one of the basic, but at the same time one of the most disputed concepts in political science, as well as other social sciences contiguous to it. The article starts by reviewing an ongoing debate between political scientists and sociologists which started around 1960s - the so-called 'faces of power debate' - and moves on to evaluate the conceptual relation between power, on the one hand, and authority and coercion on the other. The somewhat modest goal of this endeavour is to design a taxonomy of, as well as to mark the limits of the concept in question. 'Authority' and 'coercion' (meaning 'physical force') are thus chosen as conceptual markers, the former corresponding to the maximum power with minimum opposition and the latter denoting the complete loss of power in exchange for sheer physical control over outcomes. This is not the only perception of power typical to the political science discourse; some political scientists, namely scholars of international relations, identify the exercise of power precisely with physical coercion by which certain object of value is secured. However, most of the more sophisticated accounts of power in social and political theory favour the conceptual limits proposed in this article. Adapted from the source document.
This article analyses main public management doctrines (traditional administration, NPM and post-NPM), assesses the doctrinal basis of public management reforms in the 2004-2010 period, provides suggestions concerning principles, directions and process of future public management reforms in Lithuania. Despite different political views and terms of various Governments, important decisions of public management reforms were based on the party logic, whose purpose is to strengthen political authority of the government in office. The implementation of the 'bureaucratic' public administration strategy, whose content was informed by the ideas of post-NPM, was initially unsuccessful because of limited political ownership and the legalistic approach. The XV Lithuanian Government undertook wide public management reforms based on the managerial doctrine with prevailing NPM characteristics. A mix of the party logic and the NPM doctrine could be contradictory and risky in Central and Eastern European countries. Also, the NPM has not yielded good results in continental Europe, its solutions do not match Lithuania's problems and there is no solid empirical evidence about its effectiveness in Lithuania. Therefore, its application should be limited and selective during Lithuania's public management reforms. Post-NPM is the best doctrine for future public management reforms, whose implementation in Lithuania should be supported by broader political consensus, better inter-institutional cooperation and a more managerial implementation approach. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article is to review & evaluate the condition & the development perspectives of the relations between the EU & its Eastern neighbors. The problem is analyzed in the context of the recent discussion on the "Broader Europe" concept. The current dominant model of the relations between the EU & Eastern Europe countries is described in the article using the "circular discourse" & "circular interaction" terms. This article is aimed to reveal the initial theoretical & geo/political preconditions that helped this model to become the dominant theoretical & practical approach in the field of EU -- East Europe relations, to uncover the logics of its functioning & the implications of its realization to Lithuania & the other new EU member states. Adapted from the source document.
This paper suggests that "scenario building" offers methodology for understanding the forces which are crucial for ESDP development. Author analyzes such driving forces of ESDP as EU integration tendencies, threats & demands on crises management operations, defense potency & NATO transformation success, as well as the US attitude towards ESDP. After the driving forces are examined, four scenarios are constructed: creation of European security & defense union, integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation, ESDP as a project of "core" states, & ESDP as capabilities & operations of "coalition of willing." All this is done in order to find a scenario, which is most suitable for the small states of the EU. Almost all of them are participating in the activities of ESDP, however, their interests & arguments are different. At last three groups of small EU states may be recognized regarding the European security & role in international sphere. Their preferences mostly depend on the leaders in each scenario: pro-European eurocontinentalists support France & Germany & euroatlantists support those scenarios, where UK is leading. Traditionally "neutral" countries seek the realization of scenarios, which would enhance their structural power inside the EU. So, none of the approached scenarios is supported by the majority of the small EU states. For Lithuania most appropriate, of course, is the one, which withholds the US in Europe. No doubt, this is scenario of integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation. Adapted from the source document.
The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.
In the article, while analyzing Lithuanian foreign policy, specific attention is paid to the link between the national identity & foreign policy. This link could be the key in analyzing the question, if in truth Lithuanian foreign policy has reached a particular point, which could be named as international isolation or at least a tendency towards it, & if yes, -- then why The article proposes the following answers to these questions -- to abandon the complex of bandwagoning & to acquire more self-reliance as democratic national state. Corrections of domestic politics & democratic legalization of political trends in Lithuania is necessary. Herewith, it is noticed that it would be a big mistake to go to the extremes, eventually even trying to reconsider the feasibility of EU & NATO membership. Euro-Atlantic institutions remain the major guarantee of stability in Europe, including Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the KOnigsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle." This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would strongly criticize the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibility is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first & foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant -- the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law & the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural & political life within the unifying Europe. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.
