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Award date: 1990 ; Supervisor: A. Cassese ; First made available online 3 September 2015

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.

Defence date: 22 October 1993 ; Supervisor: Antonio Cassese ; The final publication is available on http://link.springer.com

Every page on the Web represents an international publication. A client machine in Germany can easily access a server in Michigan, but the copyright laws in the USA differ in a number of significant ways. This column looks at two specific examples, one where there is a difference in the length of protection, and another where German moral rights legislation gives privileges not found in the US law. Although the examples are German and American, similar differences exist between other legal systems. ; Peer Reviewed

"April 1989." ; Shipping list no.: 89-268-P. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

There is no international bankruptcy law, but only the national bankruptcy laws of various states. The failure of a multinational firm therefore raises difficult questions of conflict and cooperation among national bankruptcy regimes. Theorists have proposed various reforms to the uncoordinated territorial approach that most states pursue when a multinational firm suffers financial distress. Among these reform proposals, universalism has long been the dominant idea. Under universalism, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor firm's home country would govern, and that regime would have extraterritorial reach to treat all of the debtor's assets and claimants worldwide. Despite its conceptual dominance, universalism has yet to find vindication in any concrete policy enactments. No universalist arrangements exist. While recent challenges to universalism have emerged, the current lively debate over universalism and rival proposals focuses almost exclusively on their comparative efficiencies. This article provides an entirely new perspective. Applying insights from elementary game theory and international relations theory, I show that universalism is politically implausible. Even for states interested in establishing universalist arrangements, they will be unable to do so. They will find themselves caught in a prisoners' dilemma with no ready solution. I conclude therefore that universalism holds only dubious promise as a prescription for international bankruptcy cooperation.

Changes in the role of collective action at the international level, in the international economic environment, and, most importantly, our better understanding of economics in general require that we rethink the role of international financial institutions (IFIs). For multilateral development banks like the World Bank, their central mission, the promotion of growth and the reduction of poverty, is clear. The steps toward fulfilling this mission in a changing world are also relatively clear, and many of these institutions have already begun processes of renewal. But all of the IFIs have, in one way or another, also been involved in crisis management, especially in recent years. Here, future roles are less clear because they depend on the redefinition of the international financial architecture - a redefinition that has been hotly debated, but has not yet crystallised into a shared vision. The theoretical underpinnings - as well as the practical implementation - of alternative visions will require far more development before clarity on a future role will be attained. In this essay, I will address these questions from the perspective of the theory of international public goods, which is a powerful way to organise our thinking both on why we have IFIs in the first place, and the role that they should play in a changing world.

Written by foreign military officers attending the National Defense University at the invitation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Internationale Politieke Economie (IPE) is een nieuw vakgebied dat een zekere integratie voorstaat van Internationale Betrekkingen, Internationale Economische Betrekkingen, Politicologie en Bestuurskunde. Het is een terrein dat zich goed leent om de wisselwerking van verschijnselen op subnationaal, nationaal en internationaal niveau te analyseren. Dit artikel geeft een oeverzicht van de recente ontwikkelingen op dit vakgebied en signaleert de mogelijkheden en beperkingen van IPE.

Locating Africa on the global stage, this book examines and compares external involvement in the continent, exploring the foreign policies of major states and international organizations towards Africa. The contributors work within a political economy framework in order to study how these powers have attempted to stimulate democracy, peace and prosperity in the context of neo-liberal hegemony and ask whom these attempts have benefited and failed.

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This report has been superseded by GAO-06-394SP, GAO's International Protocols January 2006. This document contains the protocols governing the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work that has international components or implications. These protocols are intended to provide clearly defined and transparent policies and practices on how GAO will interact with U.S. federal departments and agencies, other national governments and international organizations in its international work. They identify what international organizations and supreme audit institutions (SAIs) can expect from GAO. These protocols are intended to cover most situations that arise during the course of GAO's work and are consistent, to the extent applicable, with the protocols that govern GAO's work for the Congress and with U.S. federal agencies. These protocols--which are grounded in applicable professional standards and GAO's core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability--will enable us to conduct international work more consistently, effectively, and efficiently; achieve GAO's strategic goals; support improved government performance and accountability worldwide; and better serve the Congress and the American people."

This volume provides an introduction to the basic theory behind international trade policy. The author analyses current policy issues within a theoretical framework. The book adopts a thematic approach, with each chapter examining a different issue - each of which is of central importance to contemporary trade policy. The book will be essential for all those who want to understand what governments do, in terms of trade policy and how they do it.

Our friend and colleague Rüdiger Dornbusch passed away before he was able tocomplete his book based on the Munich Lectures in Economics that he gave inNovember 17, 1998, at the Center for Economic Studies of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität.The lectures contain a fascinating overview of the mechanics andhistory of international financial crises showing the breadth and ingenuity of thiseminent scholar. The lectures were lively and provocative, full of importantinsights and observations. Interestingly enough, Dornbusch expressed asubstantial mistrust in the actions of political decision makers, supervisoryagencies and central banks in the game that leads to the crisis and even collapse offinancial systems, and he advocated supranational supervisory actions as aremedy. CES has decided to prepare a transcript of the lectures, which are also available inthe Internet as full length-videos. I am grateful to Paul Kremmel for hisassistance.

In general, attitudes towards nations have a fair amount of reciprocity: nations either like each other are relatively indifferent to each other or dislike each other Sometimes, however international attitudes are asymmetrical. In this study, we use social identity theory in order to explain asymmetrical attitudes. Parting from social identity theory, asymmetrical attitudes can be predicted to occur most likely between countries that are linguistically either similar or closely related, but differ in size. Europe, more than any other continent, offers a rich variety of nations which represent natural conditions for our study, such as size and degree of linguistic similarity. In order to test hypotheses derived from social identity theory, we asked respondents (N = 405) from (Dutch- and French-speaking) Belgium, France, Germany, and The Netherlands to fill out a questionnaire on three large nations (Germany, Great Britain, France) and three smaller ones (The Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark). Results strongly supported hypotheses and confirm that a social identity approach may help to better understand international attitudes. ; Peer reviewed