Suchergebnisse

"Vor dem Hintergrund der kooperationstheoretischen fundierten Diskussion um internationale Regime entwickelt der Artikel ein Konzept von 'Regieren' im internationalen System. Innerhalb bestimmter Grenzen vermögen Normen das Verhalten rationaler Nutzenmaximierer zu beeinflussen und können deshalb für die gezielte Verhaltensbeeinflussung zur Realisierung bestehender Kooperationsmöglichkeiten eingesetzt werden. Sie stellen aber erst dann geeignete Lenkungsinstrumente dar, wenn sie unabhängig von dem zu beeinflussenden Verhalten gebildet werden können. Dazu bedarf eine an Kooperation interessierte Gruppe von Akteuren der kollektiven Entscheidungsfähigkeit. Die Interaktion muß auf eine neue Ebene verlagert werden, auf der kommuniziert und nicht gehandelt wird. Die Bildung gemeinsamer normativer Erwartungen im Rahmen von Verhandlungen, einer besonders geeigneten Form der Kommunikation, wird damit zum Kern des Regierens." (Autorenreferat)

In this paper I am going to argue a familiar but still controversial thesis about the relation between international ethics and international law, which I would sum up in the following list of propositions:First, international law is a source as well as an object of ethical judgements. The idea of legality or the rule of law is an ethical one, and international law has ethical significance because it gives institutional expression to the rule of law in international relations.Secondly, international law—or, more precisely, the idea of the rule of law in international relations—reflects a rule-oriented rather than outcome-oriented ethic of international affairs. By insisting on the priority of rules over outcomes, this ethic rejects consequentialism in all its forms.

"Eine Ausdehnung des Selbstverteidigungsrechts auf 'vorbeugende Verteidigung' ist unnötig. Das bestehende Völkerrecht bietet einen hinreichenden Rahmen, um dem internationalen Terrorismus zu begegnen. Unilaterale Antworten sind kontraproduktiv, denn sie spielen dem terroristischen Angriff auf die internationale Ordnung in die Hände." (Autorenreferat)

Much of the contemporary literature on the utility of international sanctions approaches the apparent riddle of why sanctions are embraced so eagerly when they are supposedly such an "ineffective" tool of statecraft by focusing on the instrumental and rational purposes of sanctions. As a result, one purpose that does not always lend itself to a rational means-end calculus—the purpose of punishment—tends to be overlooked or, more commonly, dismissed outright. This article explores punishment as both a useful and an effective purpose of international sanctions. It argues not only that sanctions should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft but also that they are a form of "international punishment" for wrongdoing, despite the difficulties of applying the term "punishment" in the context of international relations. The article then examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used, suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions. The argument is then applied to the case of U.S. sanctions imposed after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan to demonstrate the different purposes of punishment at work in this case. The article concludes that just as we cannot understand punishment as a purposive human activity solely by reference to a rational model of a means to a clearly delineated end, so too we cannot entirely understand sanctions as a form of international punishment by an attachment to a rational model of policy behavior. However, some forms of punishment are exceedingly effective, and this may explain why sanctions continue to be a popular instrument of statecraft.